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The 1880’s witnessed the birth of a new Spanish colonial model 
which the government tried to apply to their remaining colonies. If we 
could summarize in a single word the last years of Spanish rule in the 
Philippines, this would be “reformism.” Conventional accounts, however, 
insist on characterizing this period as a form of “medievalism.” 
The reformist convulsion was reflected in a frantic publication of 
books and newspapers in the late-nineteenth century. The Philippines was 
one of the central preoccupations of these writings, which reflected the 
different political trends in Spain. 
These books were read and acquired by Americans when they 
decided to occupy the archipelago. They needed to know everything about 
its new possession in order to govern it. After these books were read, most 
of them were systematically suppressed in American historiography. This 
was part of the colonial administration’s strategy in its construction of a 
Philippine history to suit its goals. 
The American construction of Philippine history systematically 
denied the reformism and modernity of the late Spanish regime, instead 
shaping the notion of a Dark Age of Spanish rule, described as 
anachronistic, despotic, tyrannical, medieval and halting. The notion of a 
Dark Age perfectly suited the American occupiers since self-government 
could then be denied to the Filipinos who had just emerged from Spanish 
domination. 
The American construction of Philippine history started in 1898 with 
the conquest of the Philippines and continued until independence in 1946. 
 ix 
Its impressive lineage of contributing scholars included important figures 
such as Dean C. Worcester, Jacob Schurman, William H. Taft, James A. 
LeRoy, Edward Ayer, James A. Robertson, David P. Barrows, William C. 
Forbes, Francis B. Harrison, Leonard Wood, and Joseph Ralston Hayden. 
Although these figures played different roles as officials, scholars, 
journalists, and private collectors, all of them held the clear and firm 
conviction that the Filipinos were unfit for self-government. 
To support this argument, these writers developed a stereotyped 
image of Spanish rule. They de-contextualized Spanish terms that, during 
the nineteenth century, were imbued with positive meanings, and 
transformed them into something negative They invented purported evils 
such as caciquism, suppressed documents and books, censored part of the 
press and prohibited associations. Finally, they gave a unique shape to the 
Philippines, encapsulating it within Latin America instead of Southeast 
Asia.  
The early twentieth century produced a colonial discourse in which 
all the pieces seemed to fit together perfectly. The above authors have left 
us an important legacy—their books. By reading these carefully, one can 
begin to appreciate the magnitude of the colonial enterprise. These books 
were part of a sophisticated strategy to woo an apathetic American public 
that was not interested at all in the Philippines. They ultimately succeeded 
in making Americans embrace the ideas of empire, and above all 
convinced them of the necessity to conquer, occupy, and hold on to the 
archipelago. 
 x 
What was originally a production of texts to justify the U.S. conquest 
has become a still-potent discourse in the academe. This thesis not only 
probes into the construction of colonial discourse, but also furnishes an 
alternative by introducing suppressed works, questioning officially-






       Introduction 
 
           In September 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the 
United States had decided to undertake a crusade against international 
terrorism.  This war was to be called the “Global War on Terror” and was 
to be waged with legitimate and legal arms—that is, by spreading the 
sacred principles of American democracy.  Bush launched his war of 
choice in Iraq, in 2003. The American-led invasion of Iraq was called 
“Operation Iraqi Freedom,” a label that signaled the benevolent purposes 
of the United States. 
           The United States had decided once more to become the saviors of 
the oppressed.  The occupation of Iraq was ostensibly to liberate the Iraqi 
people from a tyrannical and decrepit dictator, Saddam Hussein. This 
new crusade against the evils of despotism is rarely called the “Iraq 
War.” Instead we hear terms such as “insurgents” and “insurgency,” 
referring to the Iraqis. The United States has had a tough time 
implementing true democracy in Iraq. It claims it cannot escape the 
responsibilities of government, however, and so they must remain in 
Iraq. If they withdrew prematurely the government of Iraq would lapse 
into a “bloodbath” or civil war. 
           Many people might think that these contemporary events are new 
and terrorism has become the evil in the twenty first century, just as 
“communism” was one of the curses of the second half of the previous 
century. These arguments prevalent in the present American policy are 
part of an old discourse which started as early as 1898, when the US 
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decided to embark upon its imperialist adventure following a specific 
pattern: 
In the realm of ideas and ideals, American policy is guided by 
three conceptions. One is the warm, generous, humanitarian 
impulse to help other people solve their problems. A second is the 
principle of self-determination applied at the international level, 
which asserts the right of every society to establish its own goals 
and objectives, and to realize them internally through the means it 
decides are appropriate… The third idea is one which insists that 
other people cannot really solve their problems and improve their 
lives unless they go about it in the same way as the United States.1 
 
           In 1896, the Filipinos rose against the Spaniards after demanding 
more reforms. In 1897, Spaniards and Filipinos signed the treaty of Biac-
na-bató. It seems that in the fall of 1897, Theodore Roosevelt and 
William McKinley embraced the idea of taking and retaining the 
Philippines.2 Obviously, the Americans disguised their real intentions, 
and instead they presented themselves to some Filipinos insurgents as 
fired with a humanitarian “impulse” to help the Filipinos to expel the 
Spaniards in order to gain their independence. Thus the Spanish-
American war was represented by the Americans as a crusade to liberate 
the Filipinos from Spanish tyranny.     
           Once the Americans liberated the Filipinos from the Spanish 
medieval yoke, they found themselves with international obligations to 
carry out in the Philippines. The natives were deemed incompetent for 
self-government. An 1899 Commission concluded that “the machinery of 
Filipino government served only for plundering the people… crime of all 
                                                 
1 Appleman Williams, W. The Tragedy of American diplomacy. New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 1959, p. 13.  
2 Appleman Williams, W. The Tragedy of American diplomacy, p. 43. 
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sorts was rampant.”3 The Filipinos, said the report, were not a nation, but 
a variegated assemblage of different tribes and people, and their loyalty 
was still of the tribal type. The Americans, thus, realized that the power 
of self-government could not be assumed without a considerable prior 
training and experience under the guidance and tutelage of an 
enlightened and liberal sovereign power.  
          That liberal and sovereign power would be the United States, 
which imposed the government they considered convenient for 
themselves as well as the Filipinos. Jacob Schurman constructed or gave 
shape to a discourse that emphasized the “black legend” of the Filipino 
Republic and outlined the “dark age” of the Spanish regime. Schurman, 
to justify the American occupation and to demonstrate the incapacity of 
the Filipinos for governing themselves, “examined a great number of 
witnesses” and “studied carefully Spanish governmental institutions.” 
The witnesses were deliberately co-opted and Schurman concluded that 
most of the Filipinos did not want independence. The witnesses who 
were favorable to the American occupation happened to be the educated 
class; the other witnesses were the most ignorant. These two extreme 
poles became the vox populi of the Philippines. 
           Careful examination made the Schurman Commission conclude: 
“Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the Commission 
believes that the Government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into 
anarchy.”4 The Americans, thus, could not escape the responsibilities of 
government which their sovereignty entailed. From 1900 onwards, their 
                                                 
3 Report of the US. Philippine Commission to the President. Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1900, Vol. I, p.177. 
4 Report of U.S. Philippine Commission, p. 183.  
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altruistic ends became a tautology. They started to construct, at the 
opening of the twentieth century, a perfect structure where all the pieces 
fitted perfectly. The U.S. colonial administration sought to involve 
academics, publishers, universities, collectors, and private enterprises 
that faithfully served American interests in the Philippines. The books 
produced during this period became an effective propaganda tool with 
which to practically indoctrinate their readers about the necessity to 
occupy and hold the Philippines, and above all to silence antagonistic, 
anti-imperialist voices. This policy was a success. Many books produced 
and promoted during the early colonial period continue to be cited today, 
which books that were neglected or suppressed during this same period 
continue to be omitted from bibliographies today. Universities were the 
institutions that spread the ideas contained in these colonial books, 
serving to indoctrinate future scholars. Newspapers became another 
powerful medium in the service of the state to promote certain kinds of 
knowledge while silencing dissident voices.  
          This thesis treats the above topics taking as its axis the 1899 
Schurman Commission, since Schurman lays the foundations of the 
notion of a “dark age” of Spanish rule, the “black legend” of the Filipino 
republic, and the construction of American discourse of Philippine 
history. What Schurman concluded in his commission’s report was 
further developed by the new commission led by Taft in 1900. The 
difference between the Schurman and Taft Commissions was that the 
latter was vested with the absolute power to reestablish civil order in the 
Islands. The whole machinery of government rested in the hands of the 
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Commission. In fact, the Taft Commission had a sort of “esprit de corps, 
everything was passed unanimously.”5 Bellairs (pseudonym of Charles 
Ballentine) and Henry Parker Willis claimed that the all-embracing 
power and the unanimity of the commission built up an arbitrary and 
despotic government in the Islands, which was disguised as 
“benevolence.” However, Taft and his supporters rejected criticism by 
repeatedly making references to “the good we are doing,”6 and “the good 
we are doing” was the motto which triumphed in the United States since 
Taft relied on James Alfred LeRoy to spread this idea.  
          James A. LeRoy is the other axis of this thesis since what the 
Schurman Commission inaugurated in 1900 was built upon by him. 
LeRoy probably was the most important player in Philippine politics and 
history from 1902 to 1909. He gave shape to the Spanish “dark age” by 
displaying a vast knowledge of Spanish history and sources. His books, 
Philippine Life in Town and Country and, above all, The Americans in 
the Philippines, immediately became references for scholars. LeRoy was 
the main architect of something called “caciquism,” a term I will discuss 
extensively in later chapters. LeRoy constructed the discourse of 
caciquism as a cancer destroying the sacred principles of the democracy, 
a system inherited from the medieval Spanish system with which the 
Americans could not fight. Finally, LeRoy was the director of the 
                                                 
5 Bellairs, Edgar G. As it is in the Philippines. New York: Lewis, Scribner & Co., 1902. Bellairs was 
the first one to state that Taft Commission had an omnipotent and arbitrary power. His book was 
silenced and at present a few scholars have used it. Parker Willis, Henry. Our Philippine Problem. A 
study of American colonial policy. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Parker Willis stated the same 
as Bellairs two years later. See for instance, p. 20. 
6 Parker Willis, H. Our Philippine Problem, p. 41. 
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multivolume collection of documents, The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, 
by James Robertson and Emma Blair. 
          Schurman and LeRoy presented to American public opinion a 
distorted history of the Spanish regime. They concluded that the Spanish 
system was anachronistic, faltering, tyrannical, decrepit, despotic and 
above all “medieval.” Both of them based their conclusions on a study of 
Spanish administration. LeRoy furnished in The Americans in the 
Philippines and The Philippines 1860-1898. Some comments and 
bibliographical notes, an important Spanish historiography on the 
Philippines by suppressed those parts which questioned the “negative” 
portrayal of Spanish rule and instead presented it as progressive, dynamic 
and modern. Schurman and LeRoy were building up the dichotomies 
“bad Spanish” versus “good Americans,” medieval Spanish regime 
versus liberal and progressive American administration, and so forth. In 
sum, they shaped what would become the stereotypical images of 
Spanish administration in the Philippines. 
          After LeRoy presented to the academe and to the American public 
his knowledge of Spanish bibliography and history, scholars have not 
used his work again although in 2005 they are furnishing us with the 
same stereotypic images, such as the following: 
Whether liberal or conservative, pro-church or antichurch, pro- or 
anti- monarchy, Spain became a “backwater,” incapable of 
sustaining any policy that could win consensus, while its economy 
fell further behind the flourishing industrial centers of Europe.7 
 
                                                 
7 Owen, Norman G. The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia. A New History. Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 2005, p. 151. 
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The crucial word in this categorical statement is “backwater” since this 
term implies the same ideas LeRoy fostered in his books “Spain was only 
a democracy in form” and “despite the liberal and progressive people in 
Spain, the reforms were a dead letter.” Norman Owen, in 2005, 
perpetuates a discourse that started as early as 1905—that is, a hundred 
years ago. However, Owen’s statement is based, not on Spanish 
bibliography, but on the books that came out during the period of 
American colonial rule. 
          This thesis aims to provide an alternative to the traditional picture 
above. I provide a more useful framework for understanding the Spanish 
colonial system in the Philippines from 1868 to 1898. The Spanish regime 
was a modern system able to modify the old structures. If we could 
summarize those last thirty years of Spanish rule in the Philippines in a 
single word, it would be “reformism”—certainly not “medievalism” as the 
conventional accounts would put it. Spain decided to implement a policy 
of reforms in order to restructure the whole system. This reformist 
convulsion of the last thirty years of the Spanish colonial system was 
reflected on a frantic publication of books and newspapers. More than two 
thousand books came out having as a main concern the Philippine Islands, 
and more than a hundred newspapers were published in the Philippines.  
          The Philippines—the Pearl of the Pacific for Spain—became the 
protagonist in the books and papers which mirrored the different political 
trends predominant in Spain. These books were read by Americans 
scholars and officials such as Dean C. Worcester, whose collection in the 
University of Michigan is a faithful reflection of his knowledge of Spanish 
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history; James A. LeRoy who provided information of Spanish books and 
newspapers; William H. Taft and Edward Gaylord Bourne who left a 
legacy of Spanish books at Yale University; and, finally, Schurman who 
brought 19th century Spanish books to Cornell University. All of them 
needed to know everything about the archipelago. The books were 
acquired by them when the Americans decided to conquer and occupy the 
archipelago. Afterwards, however, these books were systematically 
neglected by American historiography and have since lain idle in libraries. 
          The first and second chapters of this thesis show how the Americans 
in 1898 started to build up the Spanish black legend by co-opting Spanish 
terms as caudillo, dictador and aniquilar, giving them “negative” 
connotations. Their standard uses and meanings in the Spanish nineteenth 
century have become charged with a negative portrayal of Filipinos 
imputing them with despotic behavior and justifying de facto the 
American occupation of the archipelago. The second chapter pays 
attention to the Schurman Commission and the outlining of a Spanish 
“dark age.” Schurman based his conclusions about Spanish administration 
in the Philippines on the Maura law, which gave the natives the power 
over the municipalities. Schurman relied on official Spanish documents 
translated in English. However, he was to deny the Spanish reforms by 
concluding that “it failed to accomplish even the primary ends of good 
government.”8 
          The argument outlined by Schurman was further developed by 
LeRoy. The main body of this thesis is devoted to LeRoy since he made 
                                                 
8 Report of the US. Philippine Commission to the President, 1900, Vol. I, part IV, p. 81 
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the most important statement that helps us to understand how the 
Americans justified until 1946, first, the occupation; secondly, 
colonization, and, finally, their administration. LeRoy told James A. 
Robertson, in 1904, that the reform programs of liberal and revolutionary 
government in Spain had to be relegated to a secondary place. It was a 
paradigmatic statement since as we have seen in 2005 the reform 
programs are still relegated to a “backwater” or simply ignored.  
          LeRoy followed ad literam this pronouncement. The Americans in 
the Philippines and The Philippines 1860-1898: some comments and 
bibliographical notes invite the readers and scholars to use the Schurman 
report to know about the last years of Spanish administration. He warned 
that “the reader is, however, in danger of being misled if he does not 
understand the organization, showing the governmental scheme as 
modified by recent laws, some of them which had not at all, or had but 
lately, taken effect.”9 
          With this sentence, LeRoy clarified the possible ambiguities of the 
Schurman report and he categorically stated that the Maura reform 
remained a “promise.” Americans scholars from then onwards have 
conceived in this way the Spanish reforms as a “promise” or a “dead 
letter.” No one has used the huge bibliography which is pointed out in this 
thesis about Maura law.  
          The third chapter introduces LeRoy as Taft’s brain. In fact, LeRoy 
elaborated a political strategy which was followed until the Americans 
managed to “Americanize” the archipelago. He attracted some distinguish 
                                                 
9 LeRoy, James A.  The Americans in the Philippines. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1914, p. 42.  
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Filipinos by introducing himself as sympathetic to the Filipino cause. As a 
matter of fact, LeRoy’s correspondence provides us with a better 
understanding of how American policy was engendered in the Philippines. 
This correspondence contradicts stereotypes such as “collaborationism” 
and caciquism. Instead it casts light on the birth of the system of patronage 
introduced by the Americans in 1902 and how Taft and LeRoy created an 
evil called “caciquism” to negate more self-government for the natives. 
Curiously there was not caciquism in the central government. Caciquism, 
as it is explained in the seven chapter, was endemic in some provinces and 
in all the municipalities ruled by Filipinos. 
          The fourth chapter analyzes the significance of LeRoy’s The 
Americans in the Philippines, specially the chapter devoted to the Spanish 
regime. LeRoy wrote this chapter with knowledge drawn from first-hand 
acquaintance with the leaders of the Filipinos; he studied Spanish colonial 
history and he furnished an important bibliography based on personal and 
official records. These factors brought a semblance of rigor to this book. 
No other writer on the Philippines had exhibited such wide acquaintance 
with Spanish and English sources of information. As a matter of fact, 
LeRoy covered all the important literature of the Philippines, casting him 
as the leading American authority on Philippine affairs. The Americans in 
the Philippines is the most valuable source in order to understand the 
notion of “Spanish medievalism,” a word which LeRoy uses frequently in 
his narrative. His chapter on Spanish colonial regime is partial and 
distorted since he suppressed important Spanish sources, which questioned 
de facto his arguments. 
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          The chapters fifth and sixth furnish an alternative to LeRoy’s 
argument about a Spanish “dark age” by introducing part of the 
bibliography he suppressed. Moreover, this chapter introduces Wenceslao 
Retana, who could be considered as the Spanish alter ego of LeRoy. 
Retana became the most cited Filipinologist by Spanish, American and 
Filipino historians. He was a valuable reference for the Americans, as 
historian and bibliographer. He was very prolific, writing many books and 
collaborating in several newspapers and he was director of the most 
important journal published at the turn of the nineteenth century, La 
Política de España en Filipinas. His books are a faithful reflection of the 
Spanish colonial dynamism. 
          Retana’s La Política de España en Filipinas shows us that reforms 
were implemented in the Philippines. However, LeRoy succeeded in 
damning Retana since the latter questioned the American construction of 
Philippine history. Most of Retana’s works have thus been suppressed by 
scholars. Instead, Retana is well-known especially for three works: 
Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, Aparato Bibliográfico and Vida y Escritos 
del Dr. José Rizal. Besides, he was famous for new editions, with 
unpublished writings, of Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, Estadismo de las 
Islas Filipinas o mis viajes por este país and Historia de Mindanao y Joló. 
These works are scholarly but they do not question the American 
discourse, and thus are well-known today. But the reformism advocated by 
Retana has fallen into oblivion together with his more controversial works. 
          The seventh chapter is the catalyst of this thesis since the topic 
inaugurated by LeRoy in 1905 with the publication of Our Spanish 
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inheritance in the Philippines has shown a vigorous continuity in the 
American academe. The “dark age” of Spanish rule pictured in The 
Americans in the Philippines was to be complemented with the image of a 
deep-rooted feudal institution called “caciquism.” LeRoy defined this 
system as a syncretic form of past traditions that had persisted during the 
Spanish regime and that was challenging and distorting the modernity of 
American institutions. LeRoy essentialized the evils of Spanish 
centralization with its dramatic effects in local politics. Caciquism 
surfaces as an institution that paralyzes the process of native government 
in the Philippines. LeRoy gave to a complex system, non-existent in the 
Philippines until the arrival of the Americans, a surrealist meaning. 
          Caciquism is a Spanish word that emerged for first time in 1884. It 
was a strictly Spanish phenomenon inextricably interconnected with an 
incipient democracy. The Spaniards never used the term cacique in the 
Philippines and let alone did they implant the system.  LeRoy co-opted a 
term in vogue at the turn of the nineteenth century and extrapolated it to 
the archipelago to infer that the Americans inherited this system. From 
1905 to 1946, caciquism will become the curse and the burden of the 
Americans appearing with certain intensity in specific moments of the 
American colonial administration. 
          The phenomenon such as LeRoy inaugurated it in 1905 and as it has 
developed during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, lends 
uniqueness to the archipelago through establishing analogies with Latin 
American phenomena such as caciquism or ladronism. LeRoy succeeded 
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in investing a necessary and positive phenomenon, which in Spain had 
brought national stability, with an entirely negative meaning. 
          The eighth chapter pays special attention to the publication of Blair 
and Robertson’s multivolume The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, the 
massive collection of Spanish documents translated into English. The 
Philippine Islands was edited by Emma H. Blair and James A. 
Robertson—two enigmatic persons who have never been properly studied. 
This enterprise was privately set up through the Arthur H. Clark Company 
of Cleveland, a new company set up to publish Spanish documents. The 
Company gave rigor to this work by selecting the most prestigious 
historian in 1902, Edward Gaylord Bourne, to conduct the work. Bourne 
was an Americanist and this fact gave a specific shape to this work by 
making the Philippines an appendage of Latin America.  
          What was initially a purely private enterprise became part of the 
American administration starting in 1904 when LeRoy intervened by 
selecting the contents of volumes 6 to 52. In fact, volume 52 was created 
entirely by LeRoy. The Philippines Islands hence became part of the 
colonial machinery built up by the American administration, a 
propagandistic work with a specific purpose: “Whoever views the 
Philippine question as one of great importance in our [American] national 
life cannot but regard this work as most necessary and valuable.”10  
          LeRoy criticized this work in The American Historical Review by 
considering it of “small value.” However, once LeRoy became part and 
                                                 
10 James A. LeRoy to Emma H. Blair letter, Durango, Mexico. November 1903. Personal Letter of 
LeRoy James Alfred, 1875-1909. Box 1, Folder 1 October 1903 to the end of 1904. Ann Arbor: 
Bentley Library. University of Michigan. 
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parcel of the multivolume work it was acclaimed in academic circles.11 
More than a hundred later, Blair & Robertson continues to be a creed for 
Americans and Filipinos. It is hard to question a work, which on the 
surface evidences nothing surreptitious. But, as I will demonstrate later, 
the publication of this massive collection of primary sources had an 
agenda of ad hoc [mis]translation, [mis]interpretation and de-
contextualization of the documents in order to impute backwardness upon 
the Spanish regime and necessity upon the American project to educate 
the natives. 
          The last chapter shows that the triumph of the Democrats did not at 
all hamper the development of American colonial discourse. On the 
contrary, 1914 proved to be a significant year for twisting the possible 
process of independence for the archipelago. Dean C. Worcester took over 
the legacy left by LeRoy, who died in 1909. Apparently, as history tells 
us, Worcester was forced to resign his charge in the Philippines because of 
his crusade against slavery and peonage. He spread the idea that slavery 
was still prevalent in the Philippines. To enforce his argument, he related 
slavery and peonage to caciquismo. The emergence of this topic has its 
raison d’être: Worcester was appealing for the continuing of  U.S. rule in 
the archipelago. Otherwise, he said, anarchy would rule in the Philippines. 
Obviously, he provoked the anger of the Filipinos, and this is the reason, 
we are told, that Worcester had to resign. But we should note that he 
resigned in order to return to the U.S. for a specific purpose: to write The 
                                                 
11 The Philippine International Jury of Awards and the Philippine Islands University Exposition at Saint 
Louis in 1904 conferred the God Medal Award upon the publishers. Robert A. Clark and Patrick J. 
Brunet. The Arthur H. Clark Company. An American Century 1902-2002. Washington: The Arthur H. 
Clark Company, 2002, p. 82. 
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Philippines Past and Present and to give lectures in different universities 
and clubs. His book, his articles in newspapers and his speeches would 
serve to convince the audience to hold the Philippines, and to 
counterattack and silence a dissident voice, James H. Blount, who 
published The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912. 
Worcester, in the first edition of The Philippines Past and Present, 
discredits the arguments of Blount who had fiercely criticized the 
American occupation. Blount asserted that Filipinos, upon the arrival of 
the Americans, were fit for self-government. Worcester and the U.S. 
administration were denying this fact. Most important, what Blount 
termed the Filipino-American “war,” Worcester termed the “insurgency,” 
stating categorically: “I use the word “Insurgents” as a proper noun, to 
designate the Filipinos who took up arms against the United States.”12 
          The ambiguous terminology used from 1905 by Barrows in A 
History of the Philippines, who used “war” and then a few pages later the 
term “insurgency,” was clarified in 1914. The process of forgetting had 
started. Worcester triumphed over Blount. The edition of 1930, edited by 
Ralston Hayden, omitted any reference to Worcester’s criticism against 
Blount’s The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912. Hayden, 
using Worcester’s arguments was suppressing some books and above all 
omitting the term “war.” 
          There is an unknown aspect of Worcester: he was the architect of 
the Wood-Forbes report. If the Schurman Commission was the progenitor 
of the discourse, Wood’s report became the maturity of the American 
                                                 
12 Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1914, 
Vol. 1, p. 16. Ralston Hayden did not change this definition in the edition of 1930. 
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discourse. The report was categorical in pointing out the evils of the 
archipelago but above all the report signaled the continuity of Taft’s 
policy. To the question of independence, Wood would respond 
categorically, “never.”13 The “benevolent assimilation” policy 
implemented by Taft had been undermined by the incapacity of the 
Filipinos to govern themselves, asserted Wood. The archipelago was 
practically in a state of anarchy governed by a “cacique” oligarchy.  This 
idea will be spread through a whole slew of books, such as Katherine 
Mayo’s The Isles of Fear, a book that indicts caciquismo as the evil of the 
Philippines and demonstrates that this system was inherent in the Filipino 
ethos. Mayo established a cacique hierarchy. Wood tried to eradicate this 
tyranny. These books served as an excuse to spread the idea in the United 
States of holding the Philippines, thus reversing the process of ultimate 
independence. Clearly, the end of these books was propagandistic.  
          Seemingly, imperialist ideas had won. The American construction 
of Philippine history had become completely shaped. The last 
contribution to the discourse, before independence, was apparently 
Ralston Hayden, who wrote the ultimate justification of the American 
experiment in the Philippines: “we tried but we could not.” Hayden 
would impose a model of colonial studies or imperialism at the 
University of Michigan. He indoctrinated many students on how to 
conceive of Philippine history and policy. Hayden’s work simply 
perpetuated the discourse.  
                                                 
13 See Bell Price Edward. ‘Future of the Philippines. Interviews with Manuel Quezon, President of the 
Philippine Senate; Sergio Osmeña, Senator and ex-Speaker of the Philippine Lower House, and Maj. 
Gen. Leonard Wood, Governor General of the Philippines.’ The Chicago Daily News, 1925. Although 
this interview was published in The Chicago Daily News, the first time I came across it was among 
Ralston Hayden papers.  
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          The American experiment was built upon broken promises, 
transgressions of the law, censorship, delusions, rumors, etc. The 
Americans tried to implement their democracy, but instead they created a 
dysfunctional system, by observing that the Filipinos were more capable 
than them to govern themselves. They fostered the centralization of the 
system, conferred power to the oligarchies and created a serious social 
imbalance. They succeeded in having Americans and Filipinos alike 
accept the discourse in which a war of resistance against the United 
States became an insurrection. Their propaganda succeeding in 
suppressing important Filipino works. Last but not least, they convinced 
the Filipinos that there was something evil inherent in themselves: 
caciquism. 
          We can establish analogies with the first part of this introduction 
since the Americans have created an Iraqi government in the same way 
they had created the “old cacique aristocracy” in the Philippines. The 
U.S. has underestimated the size of insurgency in Iraq as they did in the 
Philippines at the opening of the twentieth century. Last but not least, it 
is said that the Bush administration is manipulating the media. But did 
not Taft manipulate it in 1900 when he claimed peace when there was no 
peace? In sum, the U.S, continues to liberate “others” from tyranny by 
transplanting the sacred principles of its democracy to mask the violence 






CHAPTER I: GENESIS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTRUCTION 
OF PHILIPPINE HISTORY 
 
The general character and situation of a people 
must determine what sort of government is fitted 
for them. That nothing else can or ought to 
determine. 
 
       Edmund Burke 
  
Not by our seeking, not by any greed of territory, 
but by circumstances over which we could 
exercise no control, we were forced into a 
relation with the Filipino people which imposed 
obligations on us we could not escape. 
 





In 1898, Wenceslao Retana stated in La Política de España en 
Filipinas: 
The Philippines should not have parties: conservatives, sagastinos 
(supporters of Sagasta), carlistas or republicans are not natural, the 
Spaniards are the only ones who should be admitted… The policy 
of party formation splits and separates people, fosters “caciquism” 
which gives shape to compadrazgos, gives rise to individualisms 
and personal factions, …and produces dissensions and incalculable 
evils in the “patria.”1 
 
          Retana was presenting a metaphor of what had happened in Spain 
since the advent of democracy by inferring that the creation of parties 
had fostered political ideas in Filipino minds and these people lacked 
enough intelligence to understand the political and administrative ideals 
of Western civilization. In fact, Retana was displaying the stereotypical 
imperialist discourse of the turn of the nineteenth century and the 
                                                 
1Retana, W. E.  ‘La Prensa Filipinas.’ La Política de España en Filipinas Segunda Época. Año VIII, 
Núm. 180, 28 Febrero, 1898. 
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twentieth century. Moreover, Retana was claiming that caciquism—
endemic to Spanish democracy—had played an important role in 
fostering the government of conservatives or liberals with the support of 
carlistas and republicans. This support is called by Retana compadrazgo, 
which connotes a clientelist system in which the cacique becomes the 
political intermediary. Finally, Retana was warning that the 
implementation of the reforms in the Philippines or the political 
participation of the Filipinos would generate the same kind of patronage 
system. By voicing the sentence solo caben españoles (Spaniards are the 
only one who should be admitted), Retana was denouncing the power 
acquired by natives thanks to the reforms—such as the new ranks of 
capitanes, tenientes or jueces de paz which would become the embryo of 
separatism. In addition, Retana was praying for the return of the 
conservatives and the friars, the true catalysts of Spanish-ness. 
          Retana was echoing Spanish-ness and the “evils of the patria.” This 
was a metaphysical feeling. Retana is not alluding with the use of this 
terminology to “caciquism” or “compadrazgos” as phenomena developed 
in the Philippines, since in the islands there were yet no political parties 
but only sympathizers of some Spanish ideas. Retana was not aware of 
how the use of his specific terminology was to be deliberately misused 
and misread by the Americans in order to justify and above all to 
legitimate their conquest in the Philippines.  Retana and other 
“Filipinologist” used Spanish terminology in ways that were specific to, 
and typical of, the nineteenth century. Some of the terms used during the 
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last years of the Spanish regime were pejorative per se but they did not 
connote the derogatory meaning that the Americans later gave them.   
          It is not rare to find in the literature on the Philippines words such 
as “dictador” (dictator); “aniquilar or aniquilación” (annihilate as a 
synonymous of “to destroy” or “to humiliate); “latrofaccioso” 
(bandolero--bandit); “clase directora” (director class or ruling class); 
“filibustero,” “laborante (conspirator);” “caudillo” or “pronunciamiento.” 
The use of terms such as cacique and caciquism is, however, different 
since Filipinos identified Spain as the site of the emergence of caciquism 
and they never used caciquism to refer to something emergent or 
endemic in their country. The former terms had a standardized use and a 
specific meaning in 1899, while cacique and caciquism were not at all 
employed in Filipino literature.  
          As early as 1898, when the Spaniards lost the Philippines and the 
United States decided to occupy the archipelago, Retana and other 
conservative authors were co-opted by the Americans and these words 
started to be standardized in American books with a meaning completely 
disparaging. As a matter of fact, these words became part and parcel of 
the American construction of Philippine history –a construction which 
began to be engendered as early as 1899 and culminated in 1914: the year 
many books appeared that displayed a distinct view of history. It is 
important to point out, in contrast to the indiscriminate use of these 
words, that the American administration decided to suppress words like 
“colony” or “possession,” “war” and “independence.” The Americans 
neglected these terms in order to display their magnanimity to the 
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oppressed. Instead, they emphasized the negativity of terms as caudillo, 
dictatorship, Generalissimo,2 annihilation and caciquism to illustrate the 
evils of the “others”3 when they were faced with problems as a result of 
their own incapacity to impose their dictum. 
          This chapter deals with the U.S. conquest of the Philippines in two 
distinct sections. The first embraces the embryonic construction of the 
discourse, which started in 1898 by promising the Filipinos their 
independence. To deny this promise, the Americans needed to de-
contextualize the abovementioned terminology, commonly use in 
Spanish, to demonstrate the unfitness of the Filipinos for self-government 
and to justify their occupation. The second section explores the 
Schurman Commission--the catalyst of Taft Commission and above all 
the cornerstone of the creation of stereotypical images of Spanish rule in 
the Philippines. The report of the Schurman Commission must be viewed 
as the textual construction of a totally despotic and medieval Spanish 
system that “failed to accomplish even the primary ends of good 
government…”4 
          Schurman points out several defects, which were the catalyst for 
the emergence of the Spanish “dark age.” What Schurman sketched in 
the conclusion of the first report would be developed and elucidated upon 
by LeRoy in The Americans in the Philippines, which would become 
perceived as the only valuable and objective source through which one 
                                                 
2 LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1914. LeRoy uses this term Generalissimo by referring Aguinaldo. See vol. 1, p. 125.  
3 “Other” in this context means Filipinos and Spaniards, since as will be explained in this chapter the 
Americans, in order to justify their incapacity to subjugate the archipelago, would systematically blame 
Filipinos and Spaniards. 
4 Report of the U.S. Filipino Commission (1900), Vol. 1, part I, p. 81. 
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could “know” the Spanish administration in the archipelago. Therefore, 
this report would be cited as a reference in all the American books from 
1903 to the present.  
          This perfect genealogy had important makers such as Dean C. 
Worcester, William H. Taft, James A. LeRoy, Edward Ayer, James A. 
Robertson, David P. Barrows, Francis B. Burton, Leonard Wood, Joseph 
Ralston Hayden, Cameron Forbes, Charles Elliott, Daniel Williams, and 
many others. Although these architects played different roles since some 
of them were officials in the Philippines, some were scholars and some 
private collectors, all them held the clear and firm conviction that 
Filipinos were unfit for self-government needing the benevolent 
assimilation offered by the United States. It was the latter that possessed 
the sense of justice and of humor and possibly even something more.5 To 
support this argument until the end, they needed to invent some evils, to 
omit documents and books, to censor part of the press, to prohibit 
associations and to build up an argument by which Spanish system was 
obsolete until the end. This legend, transformed into a perceived reality, 
gave shape to other myths, leading to the encapsulation of the Philippines 
in the context of Latin America instead of Southeast Asia. The 
Philippines becomes a mere appendage of Mexico.   
          No one can doubt that the Americans built up a perfect machinery 
where all the pieces seemingly fitted perfectly. All these authorities have 
left us an important legacy—their works. By reading carefully their 
books one can discern the magnitude of the American enterprise in the 
                                                 
5 Elliott, Charles B.  The Philippines to the end of the Military Regime. America Overseas. 
Indianapolis: The Bobbs Merrill Company Publishers, 1916, p. 60. 
 23 
Philippines. These books were part of a sophisticated strategy to mobilize 
an apathetic American public that was not interested at all in the 
Philippines. However, all these in the end made most Americans embrace 
the imperialist ideal and above all convinced them of the necessity to 
conquer, occupy, and then hold on to the archipelago. 
 
After the War  with Spain: the US “Acquisition” of the Philippines 
          In 1898 Spain lost her last remaining colonies: Cuba, Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines. That empire where the sun never set had become a 
third-class empire. However, a young country was emerging as a new 
power in the world: the United States. 1898 was the starting point in their 
race to power. The U.S. decided to conquer and occupy the Philippines. 
Was this occupation legitimate?  
          This question is not rhetorical whatsoever. I think this question 
explains part of the American discourse of “benevolent assimilation.” 
Most of the books published from the beginning until 1946 justify de 
facto and de iure a licit, legal and even necessary occupation. This 
discourse was spread to other countries, and the British—despite some 
criticism of the American colonial system—accepted tacitly that the 
Philippine conquest was licit and legal.6 It was not difficult to convince 
other countries since the United States announced to the world and to the 
natives that the country would be managed solely in the interest of the 
natives with the deliberate purpose of preparing them for the 
                                                 
6 See, for instance Alleyne Ireland. The Far Eastern Tropics. Studies in the Administration of Tropical 
Dependencies Hong Kong, British North Borneo, Sarawak, Burma, the Federated Malay States, the 
Straits Settlements, French Indo-China, Java, the Philippine Islands. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and 
company, 1905. 
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management of their own affairs.7 Under this premise, the United States 
were disguising a true colonization of the Philippines and a policy of 
subordination of the natives. 
It is said that the modernity of the nineteenth century won over the 
medievalism of the fifteenth century. In this way were the Spanish 
government and its ill-fated fleet conceived. There is a deep-rooted story 
of the easy defeat of the Spanish in Manila bay. Curiously, neutral 
observers in the Philippines contemplated with skepticism the American 
prospects. For example, the German navy informed the Kaiser William II 
that a Spanish victory seemed probable.8 The story is more complex than 
the Americans have explained it from the beginning; other factors played 
an important role in the defeat of the Spaniards. Without going into 
detail, I would like to point out that the Spanish made many mistakes, 
indeed, but American victory could never have been achieved without the 
Filipinos’ support.  
          The American fleet was not as powerful as the textbooks and the 
witnesses have claimed, and Spanish warships were not made of wood. 
In fact, Worcester in a letter dated March 1899 said “we saw three of the 
Spanish war-ships which have been raised, floated to Hong Kong, and 
are now being repaired. None of them are badly injured [emphasis added] 
and all will probably be ready for service in five or six months.”9 
          Moreover, the Americans were ignorant about practically 
everything concerning the Philippines. They could not even map the 
                                                 
7 Elliott, Charles B. The Philippines. To the End of Military Regime…., p. 54. 
8 Rodríguez González, Agustín. ‘El Combate de Cavite.’In Manuel Leguineche. Yo te Diré. La 
Verdadera Historia de los Últimos de Filipinas. Madrid: El País-Aguilar, 1998, p. 374.  
9 Worcester Dean C. Papers. Personal Correspondence. Manila, March 6, 1899. Vol. 16, Folder 16.3. 
Ann Arbor: Harlan Hatcher Library, University of Michigan. 
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archipelago. They needed to use the Filipinos for the success of their 
strategy. This part, obviously, is neglected in the textbooks since the 
potential eyewitness testimonies-–Filipinos memoirs—fell into discredit 
thanks to a fruitful American campaign against them.10 Some of them 
simply fell into oblivion.      
          Emilio Aguinaldo, Galicano Apacible, Felipe Calderon,11 and 
some newspapers tell us that the Americans Consul Pratt, Consul 
Wildman, General Anderson, and Admiral Dewey promised Aguinaldo  
independence: “The United States, at least, would recognize “the 
Independence of the Philippines” under a naval protectorate.”12 
Aguinaldo asked for a written agreement but Consul Pratt stated 
categorically it was not necessary to sign any agreement since “the 
American Government was very honest.” 
          Not only did Consul Pratt promise independence, but Admiral 
Dewey asserted also that “The United States have come to the 
Philippines to protect the natives and liberate them from Spanish yoke. 
America is rich in lands and money and does not need colonies.”13 
                                                 
10 Up to a certain extend this campaign of discrediting has had certain continuity in American 
scholarship. Glenn May in 1997 wrote Inventing a hero. The posthumous re-creation of Andres 
Bonifacio. Quezon City: New Day Publishers. May dismisses Filipino sources of Bonifacio by 
considering most of them forgeries. There is some misleading data in this book. May, for instance, 
ignores the fact that Retana was a close friend of de los Santos. Retana and de los Santos shared 
documents and books. With the intention of discrediting de los Santos, May makes a mistake when he 
explains that de los Santos got information from an interview with Clemente J. Zulueta. Then May 
states that  “Zulueta,  so far as the documents indicate was not close to Bonifacio,” p. 32. Zulueta  had  
in fact been an active part of the revolution. From 1895 he had worked for the Katipunan. He also 
shared his notes and writings with de los Santos. See Clemente J. Zulueta to James A. LeRoy, Manila 
20 September 1902. Robertson James Alexander: Annapolis Md. Manuscripts. Box 2 Letters, 1902-
1906. North Carolina: Duke University. 
11 Aguinaldo, Emilio. Reseña Verídica de la Revolución Filipina. Tarlak: P.I. Imprenta Nacional,1899, 
pp.8-15; Calderon, Felipe G.  Mis Memorias sobre la Revolución Filipina. Segunda etapa (1898 a 
1901). Manila: El Renacimiento 1907. G. Apacible. ‘To the American People.’ An Appeal, 1899?  
12Aguinaldo, Emilio. Reseña Verídica de la Revolución Filipina, p. 10. 
13 Aguinaldo Emilio. Reseña Verídica…, p. 13 
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          Finally, Aguinaldo concluded his meeting with Admiral Dewey by 
stating that this ensured the recognition of Philippine independence. To 
get this independence Aguinaldo had to attract the masses to revolt 
against the Spaniards.  It is said that Admiral Dewey and Generals Merrit 
and Anderson treated the Filipinos as friends and allies, saying 
“sincerely” that the Filipinos were fit for independence. [emphasis 
added]. The Filipinos believed in those words and they helped the 
Americans to expel the Spanish oppressors and they hailed the stars and 
stripes as an emblem of freedom, as the token of liberty for the living.14 
          Independence was not the only promise made by the Americans. 
They promised, as well, freedom of press. This freedom was a fact for a 
few months and in this conjuncture the paper La Independencia emerged. 
It became the first separatist newspaper and was subsidized by the 
revolutionaries. The second separatist newspaper was called La 
Republica Filipina15 directed by Paterno.  As La Independencia stated in 
1898: 
We will defend Filipino independence because it is the ambition of 
a country which has come on age, and when a people rise as one 
man to protest against a policy of oppression and injustice, they 
demonstrate enough vitality to live in freedom. The institutions of 
Administration and Justice were implemented in the brief period of 
three months…16 
 
          La Independencia heralded the United States as “that great and 
strong country with which we are bonded by a sincere friendship.” These 
words imply that the Americans made promises to the Filipinos, and that 
                                                 
14 Galicano Apacible. ‘To the American People,’ p. 4. 
15 La República Filipina came out on September 15th 1898.  
16 ‘Nuestro Programa.’ La Independencia. Malabón, 1898. In Retana, Wenceslao E. Aparato 
Bibliográfico de la Historia General de Filipinas. Madrid: Imprenta de la Sucesora de M. Minuesa de 
los Ríos. Vol. 3, entry 4575, p. 1761.  
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they presented themselves as the saviors, the champions of the freedom 
of the oppressed countries. But later the promise was denied and the 
newspapers were suppressed and destroyed.17 In fact, this first number of 
La Independencia fell into oblivion in American writings. Charles Elliot 
typically mentions that “the Insurgent newspaper, La Independencia” for 
November 22, 1899 acknowledges that “America has aided us indirectly 
by the blockade of Manila” but does not claim that the Filipinos had in 
any way assisted the United States.18 La Independencia had emerged 
with American consent, under their regime of a free press. However, the 
above excerpt subsumes the paper into the category “insurgent.” The 
sentence America has aided indirectly is, in fact, quite ambiguous and 
does not affirm or deny the assistance of the United States. 
          Fired by the verbal promise of independence, Aguinaldo arrived in 
Manila. According to him, Consul Wildman charged him to “as soon as 
he arrived in the Philippines, establish a Filipino government on a 
dictatorial basis.”19  It is hard to guess if Aguinaldo was charged to 
establish a dictatorship or he decided on it himself. Be that as it may, if 
Consul Wildman ordered Aguinaldo to implement a dictatorship that 
means that from the beginning the Americans had the clear aim of 
keeping the Philippines. By establishing a dictatorship Americans would 
have the perfect excuse to discredit Aguinaldo’s government. It is, 
therefore, not strange to discover William Howard Taft asserting some 
                                                 
17 La Independencia was dismantled by the Americans after February 4th 1899. Zulueta owned the most 
complete collection of this newspaper. When he died this collection became part of the Philippine 
Library which was destroyed during the Second World War. 
18 Elliott, Charles B. The Philippines. To the End of Military Regime…, p. 382. 
19 Aguinaldo, Emilio. Reseña Verídica…, p. 12 
 28 
years later that they could not abandon the islands to Filipino control 
because Aguinaldo’s government was “that of the military dictator.”20 
          Taft had valid arguments to dismiss an Aguinaldo dictatorship. 
Aguinaldo had sent a document to Admiral Dewey laying out the 
foundations and basis of a dictatorship.21 This document would serve as 
perfect testimony to the alleged spread of tyranny and arbitrariness under 
Filipino rule. Moreover Admiral Dewey sent this document to foreigners 
who lived in Manila. This facilitated the international discrediting of 
Aguinaldo’s government. Americans could appeal to the world on behalf 
of their legitimate right to conquer the Philippines in order to save it from 
dictatorial rule. 
          The final outcome of Aguinaldo’s government would be swiftly 
represented by the Americans as oppressive, arbitrary and a disturbance 
greater than ever occurred in the time of Spain. 22 This categorical 
judgment, which would be reiterated throughout the American term in 
the Philippines, demonstrated de facto Filipinos’ incapacity for 
independence, since for more than three hundred years Filipinos had been 
governed arbitrarily, and during the short term of the Filipino Republic 
Aguinaldo’s government was more tyrannical than at any time of Spanish 
rule or misrule such as the Americans started to define it.  
          There is the possibility, as well, that Consul Wildman never 
charged Aguinaldo to establish a dictatorship. Manuel Sastrón in 
Insurrección en Filipinas devotes a section to this topic and he infers that 
Aguinaldo proclaimed himself “dictator” advised by his assessor, the 
                                                 
20 Storey, Moorfield. ‘Taft’s Philippine Argument.’ [Sl., sn.],1904?, p. 22 
21 Aguinaldo, Emilio. Reseña Verídica…, p. 17. 
22 Storey Moorfield. ‘Taft’s Philippine Argument,’  p. 22 
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lawyer A. Rianzares Bautista. The first decree proclaimed by Aguinaldo 
about his régimen dictatorial makes clear what was the meaning of this 
“dictatorship”: 
Vuelvo a asumir el mando de todas las huestes para el logro de 
nuestras levantadas aspiraciones estableciendo un régimen 
dictatorial que se traducirá en decretos bajo mi sola 
responsabilidad, y mediante consejo de personas ilustradas, hasta 
que dominadas completamente estas islas puedan formar una 
Asamblea constituyente republicana y nombrar un presidente con 
su gabinete en cuyas manos resignará el mando de las mismas. 
 
(I assume again the command of all huestes [army] in order to 
achieve our raised aspirations establishing a dictatorial regime 
which will be translated in decrees under my sole responsibility, 
and through the advice of ilustrada (erudite) people until, once 
these Islands are reorganized completely, a Republican Constituent 
Assembly could be formed and a president with his cabinet could 
be appointed into whose hands the leadership will be transferred.)23 
 
          This decree, enacted in Cavite on 24 May 1898, was published as 
well by Felipe Calderon in his “Época de la Revolución (primera serie).” 
Calderon uses some other terms which will be misused and de-
contextualized by the Americans:  
De Nuevo me he esforzado en “acaudillar”las fuerzas que van a 
luchar para que consigamos nuestro glorioso deseo: por ésto se 
establece un Régimen dictatorial para ordenar las disposiciones, de 
acuerdo con el parecer de personas competentes si bien bajo mi 
única responsabilidad, hasta que pacificado todo este territorio, 
pueda establecerse una Asamblea que nombre un Presidente y 
Consejeros, a cuyas manos entregaré el gobierno del 
Archipiélago.24 
 
(I have toiled again in leading the forces which will fight in order 
to achieve our glorious wish: this is the reason a dictatorial regime 
is established, to carry out programs upon the advice of competent 
persons although under my sole responsibility, until the whole 
territory is pacified, whereupon an Assembly might be established, 
                                                 
23 Sastrón, Manuel. Insurrección en Filipinas .Madrid:  [s.n.], 1901, p. 421.  
24 Calderon, Felipe.‘Documentos para la Historia de Filipinas. Época de la Revolución (primera serie).’ 
In Retana, Wenceslao E., Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino. Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de M. Minuesa 
de los Ríos, 1905. Vol.5, p. 8. Felipe Calderon says that Aguinaldo, advised by Mabini, suppressed the 
dictatorship in June and declared the “Revolutionary Government.” 
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which appoints a President and Councilors, to whom I shall 
transfer the government of the Archipelago.) 
 
          The content of both paragraphs is practically the same changing 
only the form which gives more emphasis to some expressions. I think 
that the original document is that published by Calderon in Archivo del 
Bibliófilo Filipino, judging from the use of some words such as 
“acaudillar,” expressions of hope such as “nuestro glorioso deseo” 
instead of “levantadas aspiraciones,” and the omission of Republic 
Constituent Assembly in the second document. That published by 
Sastrón was, according to Aguinaldo, provided by Pedro Paterno.25 
Sastrón was emphasizing some terms or expressions in order to transmit 
the sense that the Filipinos had the ultimate “objective” of independence, 
endemic since the 1890’s. This nuance can be observed in the expression 
“nuestras levantadas aspiraciones” (our raised aspirations). The term 
“levantadas” used in this context connotes an impulse to something 
completely abstract while “aspiraciones” is synonymous with 
“pretensiones” in Spanish connoting purpose or objective instead of hope 
or wish. Sastrón, therefore, was paving the way for the construction of 
historical linearity prevailing in Spanish history and, above all, was 
subscribing to the idea that the Filipinos were unfit for the independence. 
This can be perceived in his use of the word “levantadas,” meaning 
something indeterminate, in contrast to a concrete or precise goal. 
                                                 
25 Paterno, Pedro A. El Problema Político de Filipinas. Solución dada por Pedro A. Paterno. Manila, 
Manifiesto. Manila [J. Alemany Gunao], 1900. 
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Probably this is the reason Sastrón26 became an authority for Spanish and 
Americans, who co-opted some of his arguments.  
          However, it is more common to find Filipino writtten expressions 
such as “nuestro glorioso deseo” (our glorious wish), since this 
expression connotes not just “wish” but also “hope.” Moreover, this 
sentence had a more widespread understanding than that used by Sastrón. 
In sum, these paragraphs, despite their differing nuances, indicate that 
Aguinaldo appointed himself as “dictator.” If he did this by motu propio 
no doubt he was using part of his Spanish knowledge and indoctrination 
in Roman history and laws and by being advised by Rianzares who 
demonstrated his knowledge in politics. The Régimen dictatorial and 
dictador in this context had a specific meaning. Aguinaldo was 
establishing a government under exceptional conditions.  As for the term 
“dictador,” this was introduced in the dictionary of the Real Academia 
Española  in 1732 with the meaning “Supreme magistrate among the old 
Romans who was appointed by the Consuls during dangerous times of 
the Republic in order to rule as Sovereign. By its institution, which only 
had to last six months, the law was observed with few alterations.”27 
 
           When Aguinaldo used the term dictador in 1898 the RAE 
definition had changed a bit since 1732: “Supreme magistrate among the 
old Romans, who the consuls appointed after the Senate agreement 
                                                 
26 Sastrón’s book is cited as practically the only source in LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the 
Philippines. 
27 Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana, en que se explica el verdadero sentido de las voces, su 
naturaleza y calidad, con las phrases y modos de hablar, los proverbios o refranes, y otras cosas 
convenientes al uso de la lengua. Dedicado al Rey Nuestro Señor Don Phelipe V (Que Dios Guarde) a 
cuyas reales expensas se hace esta obra. Compuesto por la Real Academia Española. Tomo Tercero. 
Que contiene las letras D.E.F. con privilegio. En Madrid: En la Imprenta de la Real Academia 
Española: por la Viuda de Francisco del Hierro. Año 1732, p. 268. 
 32 
during dangerous times in the Republic in order to order as Sovereign.”|| 
“In some modern republics, supreme magistrate with extraordinary 
faculties as that of Roman dictator.”28 
  
          It is significant to note that the Spanish usage–which Aguinaldo 
and Rianzares had learned, emphasizes the exceptionality of the control 
of the dictator. Aguinaldo pointed out this fact when establishing a 
dictatorial regime until the country became pacified. Thus, this statement 
makes clear the temporariness of this regime. As for “dangerous times,” 
the Filipinos were fighting against the Spaniards.  
          Sastrón, apart from modifying the original document a little bit, did 
not make any comment—positive or negative—regarding the regime or 
the term dictator since he knew the Spanish definition. However, 
Americans, establishing an isomorphism, gave this “dictatorship” a 
modern meaning: “Government which in a country imposes its authority 
violating the old laws in force.” Dictator was interpreted as a “person 
who abuses his authority or treats arbitrarily the others.”29 “Dictador” and 
“acaudillar” or by derivation “caudillo” were acquiring a specific shape 
in relation to the future discourse: abuse and corruption of Filipino 
leaders as inherent in Filipino ethos.30  Therefore, if ordered by Consul 
Wildman or established by Aguinaldo, the conquest was being delimited 
                                                 
28 Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana por la Real Academia Española. Decimotercia edición. Madrid: 
Imprenta de los Sres. Hernando y Compañía. Año de 1899, p. 354. 
29 The literature from 1900 onwards emphasizes this idea. See for instance, Report of the US. 
Philippine Commission to the President, 1900; Census of the Philippine Islands taken under the 
direction of the Philippine Commission in  the year 1903; Storey Moorfield. ‘Taft’s Philippine 
Argument;’ Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present, etc.  
30 Acaudillar means to lead an army. This is what Aguinaldo did during the revolution. As for its 
derivation, Caudillo in 1899 had two different meanings: “head and superior who leads and orders the 
people of war.”|| “head or director from some guild, community or body.” Aguinaldo was both. See 
Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana por la Real Academia Española. Decimotercia edición, p. 211. 
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from the very beginning. Step by step, Americans were establishing their 
legitimacy for keeping the archipelago.    
          The Filipino government proclaimed independence on 12 June 
1898.  At that time a Congress was constituted in order to write 
regulations. The foundations of the regulations were those from the 
Spanish Congress. This congress appointed a committee to write the 
Constitution.31 Therefore, the Filipino Republic and independence were 
“legal” and “legitimate.”  
          This legality and legitimacy would soon be violated by Spain and 
the United States. The Americans started to reveal their real intentions by 
sending a big contingent of soldiers, and above all by keeping 
Aguinaldo’s forces out of Manila. The Americans once more had 
designed everything. They argued for a humanitarian reason –to prevent 
the Spaniards to be massacred by the Filipinos. 
The sufficient justification for the restraint put upon the insurgents 
is the fact that had they been admitted to the city before the 
American authority was complete and arrangements for the 
protection of life and property perfected, they would beyond a 
shadow of a doubt, have sacked and looted the town.32 
 
          According to American accounts, the Spaniards wanted all sorts of 
things to come under U.S. protection: “This city, its inhabitants, its 
churches and religious worship, its educational establishments and its 
                                                 
31 Most of American scholars assume that the Filipino Constitution emerged from the French revolution 
and/or Latin American Constitutions. According to Felipe Calderon, Mabini wanted to take as model 
the Spanish Republican Constitution, but he adapted it after the Constitution of Costa Rica. The 
Filipino Constitution was a re-adaptation of the Spanish Constitution of 1869 via the Costa Rican 
Constitution.  
32 Chamberlin, Fred C. The Blow from Behind or Some Features of the Anti-Imperialist Movement 
Attending the War with Spain…Boston: Lee and Shephard, 1903, p. 32. According to Chamberlin this 
story was told by Dewey, Merritt  and Green. 
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private property of all descriptions are placed under the special 
safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army.”33 
          August 13th the capitulation of Manila was signed. Americans had 
decided to conquer Manila. Aguinaldo was not part of this negotiation. 
The Filipinos were not part of the victor, in fact, they became the victims 
since Americans were appealing “we were bound to take all steps in (our) 
power to re-establish and insure so far as possible, public order and 
safety.”34 
          All these arguments –the sacred duties of America—had its raison 
d’être. They were claiming for international recognition to make their 
occupation legal, but in order to support these arguments—that is, to 
protect Spaniards and foreigners from the natives—Americans spread the 
story that Aguinaldo and his forces wanted to “annihilate” at that 
moment, Spaniards, and later on all “Whites.” LeRoy emphasized this 
point in several letters,  above all in two he sent to El Renacimiento (one 
in 1904 and the other in 1907). Bourns, in confidence, told LeRoy that 
Antonio Luna had ordered the extermination of the Whites in 1899, but 
LeRoy –a master in research recalled Filipino testimonies that Bonifacio 
had preached a war of races and the assassination of Whites.35 LeRoy 
was really selective in his use of Spanish documents—specifically 
Retana and Sastrón—to justify the legitimacy of American occupation.  
                                                 
33 Chamberlin, Fred C. The Blow from Behind…, p. 34. 
34 Chamberlin, Fred C. The Blow from Behind…, p.39. 
35 Personal Letters of LeRoy, James Alfred, 1875-1899, Box 1 and Box 2. Ann Arbor: Bentley Library, 
University of Michigan.  
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          It is remarkable that Aguinaldo would have decreed “to annihilate 
the forces of Spanish Government.”36 Aguinaldo used quite often the 
term “aniquilar” or “aniquilación” (annihilate or annihilation). Aniquilar 
(annihilate) is etymologically and literally “to reduce to nothing.” 
Aniquilar means to destroy, to ruin, to wreck, to humiliate, to confuse, to 
discourage. “Aniquilar” is not synonymous with “exterminate”--to kill en 
masse. Americans, by translating ad literam this term [mis]interpreted 
what Aguinaldo implied, giving powerful reasons to fight against the 
Filipinos. Aguinaldo, when ordering his men to “annihilate Spanish 
forces,” was asking for combating and annihilating the Spanish forces 
while giving prisoners of war humanitarian treatment. In Spanish, for 
instance, the enemy is annihilated (destroyed) in combat. As a matter of 
fact, there is not a good translation of this term in English. No doubt, it 
was a good argument to legitimize the conquest. The same argument will 
be used later to justify the Filipino-American war, the further occupation 
of the archipelago and the “annihilation” or extermination of many 
Filipinos.37  
          The last stage in giving full shape to the legitimacy of the conquest 
and occupation is the war –or I should say the “insurrection” since 
Americans considered this “uprising” as a mere “Tagalog insurrection.” 
By localizing the insurrection in Tagalog provinces, Americans were 
inferring that Aguinaldo did not have influence in other provinces. 
Therefore, independence would have meant anarchy since other 
                                                 
36 Calderon, Felipe. ‘Al Pueblo Filipino.’ Documentos para la Historia de Filipinas. Época de la 
Revolución (primera serie).  Documento Núm. 6. Art. 1, p. 19.  
37 I give the terms “annihilation” and “extermination” their original meaning in English –“kill en 
masse,” since the Americans, in order to put down the Filipino forces, massacred some villages. 
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provinces would have never accepted Tagalog preeminence. This so-
called insurrection was provoked by the Americans themselves. On 4 
February 1899 American forces suddenly attacked all Filipino lines 
which were abandoned because it was Saturday and most of the Generals 
had gone to spend the week-end with their families.38 A letter from 
Worcester said that 1,900 insurgents had been killed.39General Otis sent a 
cablegram to Washington explaining that the Filipinos sparked the 
hostilities. What General Otis said in that cablegram has become the 
dictum of the truth, since Americans immediately reacted by ratifying by 
a narrow margin the annexation of the Philippines. As for international 
opinion, it was believed as well that Aguinaldo’s forces attacked 
American soldiers or provoked American soldiers to attack the Filipinos. 
This provocation would justify the insurrection of the Filipinos: “The 
most ingenious devices were resorted to by the Filipinos to throw the 
responsibility of the first act of hostility on the shoulders of the 
Americans. As a matter of fact the war was commenced by the 
Filipinos…”40 
          I have pointed out all these stages since they conform to the real 
intentions of the Americans: imperialism, conquest, occupation, and 
colonialism. It is quite clear that in the interval which elapsed between 
the battle of Manila Bay on 1 May 1898, and the signing of the Peace 
Protocol on 12 August, U.S. actions in the Philippines had assumed 
definite shape. The war would become a fait accompli by giving 
                                                 
38 Aguinaldo, Emilio. Reseña Verídica…, p. 36.  
39 Worcester, Dean C. Papers. Personal Correspondence. Ann Arbor: Harlan Hatcher Library, 
University of Michigan   
40 Ireland, Alleyne.  The Far Eastern Tropics…,p. 194 
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legitimacy to the occupation. If some Americans, some of them 
Republicans and Democrats41 embraced some doubts as to whether the 
U.S. had to occupy the archipelago, the commencement of hostilities 
made them ratify the annexation. In short, the Americans conquered an 
independent country; they infringed the law by occupying a legitimate 
nation.42      
          Soon the first dissident voices started to be heard: the occupation 
and conquest, they said, were contrary to the principles of the Monroe 
Doctrine and the Constitution of the United States did not provide a 
government for the colonies. The American administration reacted by 
counterattacking these voices. They started up their well-oiled 
propaganda machine by writing inflammatory articles discrediting 
Aguinaldo and the natives, arguing that “the retention of the Islands was 
completely necessary since if Americans withdrew anarchy would 
ensue.” These they published in newspapers and books.  
          The U.S. administration started to deny any promise of 
independence to Aguinaldo,43 and if Consul General Pratt or Admiral 
Dewey made one, such promise was deemed to be beyond the authority 
                                                 
41 Some Democrats such as Colonel Bryan had been a critic of subjugating the Philippines. However he 
came out in favor of supporting the treaty, advising the Democratic senators to vote for ratification. 
This decision, obviously, makes clear that Democrats and Republicans only differed on the form, not 
on the content. Leech, Margaret. In the days of MacKinley. New York:  Harper & Brothers, 1959, p. 
350. She illustrates the volubility of Colonel Bryan.  
42 Agoncillo, Felipe. ‘Are the Filipinos Civilized?’ Leslie’s Monthly. 48:75. May, 1899. In Teich, 
Emma L. Selected Articles on Independence for the Philippines. Minneapolis: The H. W. Wilson 
Company, 1913.  
43 Lamentably Aguinaldo altered his first arguments that the Americans had promised independence 
sixties years later. See Aguinaldo, Emilio. A Second Look at America. New York: Robert Speller and 
Sons, Publishers, 1957. In A Second Look at America, Aguinaldo states that “he [Consul Pratt] replied 
readily, ‘will give you much greater liberty and much more material benefits than the Spanish ever 
promised you,’ p. 33. 
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of these officers.44General Dewey and Consul General Pratt 
systematically denied broaching any alliances. In fact, Admiral Dewey 
always grew indignant when the subject arose of any promise relative to 
the independence of the Philippines. He was quite categorical in stating: 
I never directly or indirectly, promised the Filipinos independence. 
I never received Aguinaldo with military honors or recognized or 
saluted the so-called Filipino flag. I never considered him as an 
ally although I did make use of him and the natives to assist me in 
my operations against the Spaniards. 45 
 
          These words are quite eloquent and the indignation of Admiral 
Dewey infers that there was an agreement since at the same time, Dewey 
was admitting that without Filipino assistance they could not have 
defeated the Spaniards. Lamentably there is no testimony, since 
apparently the alliance was verbal –although John Foreman in 1899 
mentioned a draft. Be that as it may, it is Aguinaldo’s word against the 
American officials’ word. However, it is surprising how Americans 
emphasized and systematically justified this fact in textbooks, speeches 
and newspapers. This reiteration implies there was a firm promise.  
          As early as 1899 Dean C. Worcester was invited to deliver a 
speech at the Hamilton Club of Chicago.46 This speech had a double 
purpose. On the one hand, Worcester needed to counterattack anti-
imperialist accusations about “American crime in the Philippines.” On 
the other hand, he had to deny the promise of independence. Worcester 
could not categorically negate the fact of a promise, but he was very 
                                                 
44 Williams, D.R. The United States and The Philippines. New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 
1924, p. 78.  
45 Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present. New York: the McMillan Company, 1914,  p. 
110. 
46 Worcester, Dean C. Some Aspects of the Philippine Question. 1899. Worcester papers. Vol. 10-16. 
Ann Arbor: Harlan Hatcher Library, University of Michigan. 
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skilled in de-contextualizing and discrediting Aguinaldo by stating that 
instead of independence, Consul Pratt had promised “protection.” 
Inviting suspicion is Worcester’s insistence on any direct or indirect 
promise of independence. His insistence, justification and de-
contextualization of some texts makes us suspect quite strongly that a 
tacit agreement existed. Worcester fifteen years later continued to deny 
any promise of independence.47 By this time his justification has become 
a bit more sophisticated, doctrinaire and categorical than in 1899 by 
treating any hint of a promise as myth or fiction. He appeals to a lack of 
understanding because Aguinaldo could not speak English and Consul-
General Pratt, Spanish. The conversation was translated by Bray 
[…] Whatever was said during this conversation it is within the 
limits of the possibility that Pratt may have been made to say by 
his interpreter more than he intended and that his statements of 
what would probably be granted by the United States Government 
and his expression of good wishes for the cause of Filipino 
independence may have been translated as assurances and as 
promises…48 
 
          It seems that Worcester bases this argument on Taylor’s Philippine 
Insurgent Records. However the idea of a possible misunderstanding 
between Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo was mooted by Manuel Sastrón in 
Insurrección en Filipinas in 1901. No doubt, Worcester appropriated this 
information for his book since he was fluent in Spanish and in fact he 
acquired this book and even translated chapters one and three into 
English in 1902. American scholars were very selective when they 
needed to use Spanish books. Sastrón stated, 
                                                 
47 See for instance Charles B. Elliott, who in 1916 affirmed the same arguments as Worcester. Elliott, 
Charles B. The Philippines to the end of Military Regime…, p. 380. 
48 Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present, p. 96.   
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Neither did American Consul speak Spanish, nor Aguinaldo 
English: the conference was made through an interpreter…without 
stating categorically that in such meeting there were from both 
parts statements which suffered a big alteration in meaning.49 
 
There is one other important fact until now ignored by all historians 
which invites more suspicion about the absence of a promise. John 
Foreman –a Britisher who lived in the Philippines—wrote The Philippine 
Islands in 1892. This book became a reference for the Americans when 
they needed to know everything of the archipelago. But this fact is 
secondary now. John Foreman re-wrote his book, including new 
chapters, in 1899. He devoted a chapter to the Filipino insurrection 
against Spain. He explains in great detail the arrival of Aguinaldo to 
Singapore and his meeting with Consul-General Pratt: 
The result of this Singapore meeting was that a draft Agreement 
(emphasis added) between Consul-General Pratt and Emilio 
Aguinaldo was drawn up, subject to the approval of Commodore 
Dewey and subsequent confirmation from Washington. The 
essence of this provisional understanding was as follow, viz.: -- 
(1) Philippine Independence to be proclaimed…50 
 
          This information is significant in asserting categorically that there 
was an agreement—one that, according to Foreman, not only was verbal 
but also written. Foreman was promptly denounced by Pratt for 
publishing this and other allegations in his book. Pratt was successful in 
pressuring Foreman to remove the “offending page and insert an 
apology.”51 
                                                 
49 Sastrón, Manuel.  Insurrección en Filipinas.p 417. 
50 Foreman, John . The Philippine Islands. A Political, Geographical, Ethnographical, Social and 
Commercial History of the Archipelago. Embracing the whole period of Spanish Rule. Shanghai: Kelly 
and Walsh, LTD, 1899, p. 567. 
51 Worcester Dean C. “Some Aspects of the Philippine Question,” p.5.  
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          Finally, I have found one more testimony that asserts categorically 
in 1924 and again in 1928 that the Americans and Aguinaldo made an 
agreement in Singapore and they promised “nationality” and 
“independence.” The Americans could not silence the voice of 
Franciscan priest Villajos since he wrote his manuscript in Spanish and 
this manuscript has never been published. Villajos states that 
The country, specifically the Tagalog region, responded to the call 
to arms by Aguinaldo, who confided to them the promise of 
independence offered by the Americans …The Yanquis have not 
fulfilled to them what they promised in Singapore: “to concede the 
yearned independence.”52 
 
          Americans had won another battle. Foreman, in the third edition 
published in 1906, removed or suppressed the parts about the meeting 
and the agreement between Aguinaldo and Consul-General Pratt. 
However, he insisted on Aguinaldo’s claim of “Philippine independence 
to be proclaimed.” Foreman stated in this edition that the claim of 
independence and other goals were revolutionary aspirations. What had 
been a draft Agreement between Aguinaldo and Pratt in Foreman’s 1899 
edition, now was a text published by the Spanish newspaper, El 
Liberal.53 Foreman and the second edition of his book would be 
systematically discredited by James LeRoy. 
          Worcester was successful in his discourses and he opened the 
Pandora’s box for other “imperialists” to justify the war and further 
actions taken in the Philippines. A powerful propaganda campaign would 
                                                 
52 Villajos, Juan de Dios. Apuntes del P. Juan de Dios Villajos ex-ministro provincial de la de San 
Gregorio. Manuscript. Archivo San Gregorio, 1924 p. 219. The friar Juan de Dios Villajos insisted on 
this promise in 1928, pp. 3-4. This manuscript belongs to Reynaldo Ileto who has shared it with me.  
53 Foreman, John. The Philippine Islands…Singapore: Kelly and Walsh, LTD. Third Edition, 1906, p. 
420. 
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emerge to gain the sympathy of American public opinion and to counter 
the anti-imperialist arguments. 
          The anti-imperialist movement considered the occupation of the 
Philippines to have violated the sacred principles of the American 
Constitution, and above all questioned American values. Imperialists 
argued the necessity of occupying the territory since this had become 
hostile. But imperialists were confronted with the problem that the 
Federal government lacked the power to acquire territory to be held and 
governed permanently as colonies.54 Then Americans had no other 
choice but to resort to European laws: 
The whole subject (of military authority over hostile territory) has 
been regulated by Section III of The Hague Second Convention, 
On Military Authority over Hostile Territory. 
 
XX Art. XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually 
placed under the authority of the hostile army.55 
 
          We can find another justification for this occupation in the 
argument that the Filipino Republic was to all intents a Tagalog 
oligarchy, engineered and dominated by a few persons: “The Philippine 
people, as such, had no representation, nor did the vast bulk of them have 
any knowledge of what was transpiring.”56 More will be said about this 
in later chapters. 
          Last but not least, all this illegitimacy, illegality and trail of broken 
promises led the American administration into some contradictions in the 
proclamation of the peace treaty on 21 December 1898. In this 
proclamation, the Secretary of War stated that Admiral Dewey effected 
                                                 
54 Leech Margaret. In the days of McKinley…, p. 353.  
55 Chamberlin Fred C.  The Blow from Behind…, p. 8. 
56 Williams, D. R. The United States and the Philippines, p. 94. 
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the “conquest” of the Philippines and the suspension of Spanish 
sovereignty therein. He used the term “conquest” but later on, when he 
explained the main duties of the Americans, he claimed 
It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to 
announce and proclaim in the most public manner, that we come 
not as invaders or “conquerors” but as friends to protect the 
natives…The mission of the United States is one of benevolent 
assimilation…57 
           
The term “benevolent assimilation” will appear again in this thesis. 
It was a surreptitious message to demonstrate to other colonial masters 
the magnanimity of American colonial policy: “The Government which 
they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction, or for the 
expression of our theoretical views but for the happiness, peace and 
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands.”58 
           Almost every act of the U.S. in the Philippines was characterized 
by what may be called, from one standpoint, a certain peculiarity and 
originality, or, from another point of view, a blindness to local 
conditions. There was not any “benevolent assimilation” whatsoever, but 
this is the story which has prevailed, taking into consideration Americo 
Castro’s comment, “not everything that happens in the past of a country 
deserves to be remembered.” The Americans decided to furnish this face 
of Clio—their altruistic face—to other colonial powers and above all to 
the Filipinos while in the United States the newspapers fostered the 
cruelest face of colonial and imperialistic ideas, stating typically that 
“The Islands and their people belong to us because we have bought it and 
                                                 
57 Williams D.R. The United States and The Philippines. p. 95. 
58 Elliott, Charles: The Philippines To the End of the Military Regime…, p. 57.  
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we intend to possess it while any portion of our people wish it. This is 
our policy stripped of all pretension and hypocrisy.”59 
          It is important to point out that these articles did not reach the 
archipelago. Therefore the Filipinos could ignore this imperialistic 
propaganda. Actually, this formed part of America’s “altruistic” aims—
the denial to Filipinos of access to the American press. The policy of 
Benevolent Assimilation was further belied by the suppression and 
discrediting of most articles written by Filipinos or by the Anti-
imperialist League. Therefore, another sacred principle—freedom of the 
press—was violated in the name of Benevolent Assimilation. 
          The first journals, La Independencia and La Republica Filipina, 
which had greeted the Americans as their saviors, were censored in 1899. 
Both of them disappeared not only as an effect of censorship, but also 
because the Americans succeeded in suppressing them from the 
collective imaginary.  In 1899 Filipinas ante Europa appeared, published 
in Madrid. This newspaper became an organ for the defense of the 
Filipino people. The Americans persecuted this journal more than the 
Spaniards had persecuted the Propagandist organ, La Solidaridad, in 
Manila. 
          Isabelo de los Reyes and Dominador Gomez contributed articles to 
Filipinas ante Europa. 60 They displayed a nationalist-revolutionary 
outlook. The first number devotes an article to Mr. McKinley. This 
article is a fierce criticism of what they considered “imposition by brute 
                                                 
59 I found this citation in the Villajos Manuscript. According to Father Villajos this statement was 
published in the Evening World. P. 5. 
60 Isabelo de los Reyes, who was a laborante for the Spaniards, was now called “irreconciliable” 
(intransigent). Dominador Gomez contributed to this newspaper but he became more prominent in 
1905 by collaborating in “Copy of the Memorial asking for the Independence of the Philippines.”  
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force” carried out by  the Americans following the precepts of McKinley. 
Moreover they criticized the rationale of “benevolent assimilation”: “You 
also assert that without your protectorate, we would fell into fratricide 
anarchy, which is untrue…”61 
          But even more eloquent and important was Galicano Apacible who 
wrote “To the American People.” By reading this essay we can infer that 
the promise of independence was real. Apacible put forward an 
extraordinary argument: 
What reward did we get? Did the expected freedom come to us? No! 
As a requittal for our sacrifices and as a reward for our loyalty, 
subjugation is offered to us instead of freedom [emphasis added]. 
We may have a colonial government of the United States, 
administered in a foreign language, instead of the colonial 
government of Spain, which at least, was administered in a language 
already known to us and which we have made ours. We are to have 
a colonial government which will deny us the citizenship of its 
nation. In spite of their imperialistic tendencies, the Spanish 
government never went so far as to deny such citizenship! [emphasis 
added].62 
 
          Such was the “benevolent assimilation” implemented by the 
United States. Galicano Apacible clamored for “independence or death.” 
But the voices of these Filipinos were being silenced by the so-called 
“Americanistas,” prominent Filipinos who had decided to cooperate with 
the Americans after having surrendering to them. These voices would be 
what the Americans would foster, while Apacible, Aguinaldo, 
Dominador Gomez, Isabelo de los Reyes and other “recalcitrants” would 
be gradually neglected, discredited and silenced until they fell into 
oblivion. 
                                                 
61 ‘To McKinley’ Filipinas ante Europa. Defender of the People, Tomo 1 Madrid 25 October 1899, 
p.2. 
62 Apacible, Galicano. ‘Please read and circulate. To the American People. An appeal,’ p. 5 
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          One of the last claims of Los Filipinos was published in Manila, in 
November 1899: “La Política Actual de Filipinas.” This short account of 
political affairs in 1899 is an indictment against American policy in the 
Philippines as one geared to implementing the policy of an oppressor. 
Once more, this account states the promise of independence and how the 
Filipinos believed in the Americans by considering them sincere and the 
redeemers of the oppressed.63  
          The examples cited above provide an alternative to the prevalent 
discourse of the academe—Spanish, American or Filipino. These works 
have been neglected systematically, some of them because they were 
written in Spanish, while others were deliberately omitted since they 
represented the other face of American benevolence: cruelty, oppression, 
tyranny. All these Filipino examples emphasize an important point: the 
failed task of the Schurman Commission. They are critics of the 
Commission since the latter co-opted some Filipinos—the so-called 
Americanistas—as the vox populi or representation of Filipino 
aspirations. As Reynaldo Ileto states, the Commission interviewed 
“dozens of Philippine-born witnesses of the ‘respectable and influential’” 
class and concluded that “the masses of the Filipino people, including 
practically all who are educated or who possess property, have no desire 
for an independent and sovereign Philippine state.”64 The Schurman 
Commission arrived in the Philippines with specific orders and this it 
                                                 
63 La Política Actual en las Filipinas. Present Policy in the Philippines. A Short account of the 
Philippines Affairs and views thereof. Manila: Noviembre, 1899. 
64 Ileto, Reynaldo C. ‘Knowledge and Pacification. The Philippine-American War.’In Knowing 
America’s Colony. A Hundred Years from the Philippine War. Philippine Studies, Occasional Papers 
Series No. 13. University of Hawai’i at Manoa, 1999, p. 23. 
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carried out faithfully—which was to represent the Filipinos as unfit for 
self-government. 
Not only did Filipinos but also the anti-imperialists criticized 
American “benevolence” in the Philippines. If Worcester was invited by 
the imperialist and expansionists to deliver speeches, to the anti-
imperialists George S. Boutwell was the other side of the coin. Boutwell 
presented an excellent address in September 1899 entitled “The War of 
Despotism in the Philippines Islands.” Boutwell complained of the 
suppression of opinions in the U.S. of those who differed with the 
imperialist project. The government, he said, was co-opting the press and 
other organs in order to pressure the people into silence—leading to the 
tacit acceptance of imperialism in America.65 
          One must recognize that the U.S. government’s mission of 
inculcating blind acceptance was a huge success. Despite Boutwell’s 
claims of the Filipino capacity for self-government, imperialist discourse 
succeeded in imposing its criteria. It succeeded in mounting a campaign 
of discrediting the anti-imperialists as anti-Americans and collaborators 
of the insurgents. The imperialists were little by little silencing these 
voices and imposing their dictum. While the critical works I mentioned 
earlier started to be suppressed, others were being fostered. An example, 
which would serve as a template for presenting the “true” Filipino 
aspirations is Isabelo Artacho’s “Declaración, Carta y Proclama.” 
Artacho, through personal questions addressed to Aguinaldo, mounted a 
                                                 
65 Boutwell, George S. The War of Despotism in the Philippine Islands. Liberty is Liberty as God is 
God. Published by the Anti-Imperialist League, 1899.  
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fierce criticism of the revolution, one which would be co-opted by the 
Americans as a dogma of faith. Artacho declared that the insurrection 
only serves to satisfy political-personal ambitions, despicable and 
bastard passions, to execute with impunity in the dark of a political 
regime established with the name of Republic, eminently barbaric, 
treacherous and despotic acts and crimes ignored in the penal 
codes of the world…66 
 
          Needless to say, this statement was adopted ad literam by the 
Americans and it became the perfect excuse and pretext to keep the 
archipelago. It is important to note that Artacho, a Filipino previously 
involved in the revolution, now started to use the term “insurrection” 
instead of revolutionary war. The propaganda machinery of the U.S. can 
also be seen here working with effectiveness to transform “war” to 
“insurrection,” although at the beginning this machinery fell into 
contradiction and was mired in ambiguity. 
          The year 1905 saw the wide dissemination of what was originally 
asserted in the reports of the above Commissions. Fred Atkinson, the first 
general superintendent of education, was the first American author to 
tackle the Filipino insurrection of 1898 through his book, The Philippine 
Islands. The term “war” appears timidly, to be overlapped by the term 
“insurrection.” LeRoy managed to disparage Atkinson’s book, which 
thus never saw wide acceptance. David P. Barrows, building on 
Atkinson, was much more influential. He reissued his History of the 
Philippines in 1907, 1914, 1925 and 1926.67 
                                                 
66 Artacho Isabelo. Declaración, Carta y Proclama, Hong Kong: 1899, p. 2. I have used Spanish 
version. I have a free translation in English which emphasizes deliberately some excerpts.  
67 Barrows, David P. A History of the Philippines. Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: World Book 
Company. 
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          The abovementioned works form only a small part of a wider 
discourse whose embryo was formed in 1899 and which became 
completely shaped in 1914. Artacho argues in this 1899 account that the 
insurrection was despotic and cruel and that Aguinaldo’s government 
was plagued with anarchy and familism. All these arguments would be 
used by the Americans to construct a distorted Philippine history ratified 
up to a certain extent by the Filipino Americanistas. Artacho praised the 
great nation of America as protector and liberator, motivated by the 
honest and generous purpose of “liberating the Filipinos from the new 
slavery”68 It was better, he argued, to live under American tutelage rather 
than a Filipino government since Filipinos were not yet educated in 
politics. 
          Artacho’s manifesto contributed greatly to beginnings of American 
colonial discourse. As the years went by the discourse became more 
sophisticated and histrionic, but it also became a tautology. Americans 
broke their promises, violated international laws, conquered and 
subsequently occupied an independent country by starting a war. They 
censored newspapers and showed themselves cruel, irreverent and 
intransigent.  America’s war was a war of despotism, such as Boutwell 
claimed. Some voices were silenced and suppressed forever, some were 
censored, other voices sang praises of the Americans—such as Artacho’s 
who would become a spokesman of the “honest intentions” of America. 
Artacho and other Americanistas would become the collaborators par 
excellence. 
                                                 
68 Artacho Isabelo. Declaración, Carta y Proclama. p. 27.  
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          I am more concerned here with articulating the voice of the losers 
–those who were clamoring for independence and would continue to do 
so during the decades of American rule. Filipinos were stigmatized with 
the epithet of “ignorant,” but they were not blind. They would not have 
collaborated with the Americans to expel the Spaniards unless they had 
received some promises. Despite the massive attempt by the Americans 
to deny or negate any sort of agreement between their representatives, 
Consul-General Pratt and Admiral Dewey, and General Aguinaldo, 
Foreman has fortunately left us with a document that tends to vindicate 
the claims of the revolutionaries: the draft Agreement between Consul 
Pratt and General Aguinaldo. 
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CHAPTER II: GENEALOGY OF THE DISCOURSE—THE                 
SCHURMAN COMMISSION 
We have freed the Filipinos from the abuses 
 of Spanish rule. We cannot have them to drift 
 alone on a dark aimless sea. We must save 
                  these less fortunate people from barbarism. 
                  This missionary Council does not support a 
                  grab for empire, but we support a paternal 
                  arrangement of our government toward the 
                  Philippines. 
       Josiah Strong      
                      
Background of the Commission 
          The starting point of the genealogy of American imperial discourse 
can be located in 1898 when the United States decided to protect or to 
become the guardians of the Filipinos. The U.S. administration involved 
itself in justifying such protection and guardianship through harnessing 
private enterprises, private collectors, newspapers and above all the 
academe. The universities would become the ideal forum to indoctrinate 
future students about the American project. The indoctrination acquired a 
specific character in which imperialist discourse prevailed. This 
discourse is characterized by the discrediting of Spanish rule. 
          Jacob Schurman, the president of Cornell University, had studied 
Spanish administration and decided univocally that the Spanish system 
was amorphous. Although important royal decrees were translated into 
English as early as 1899—for instance the Maura law—Schurman 
decided to suppress part of the archive and instead based his report on 
generalizations. He summarized more than three hundred years of 
Spanish rule in the Philippines as follows: “The Philippines was a colony 
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which remained a province of the Spanish missionary orders…”1 Thus he 
inaugurated the representation of Spanish rule as a “dark age” 
characterized by “three centuries of rule by medieval Spanish 
ecclesiastics.” 
          The Schurman Commission also initiated the suppression of terms 
such as “colony,” “war,” “independence” and “possession,” which 
henceforth became taboo. The U.S. administration would henceforth be 
able to disguise its imperialist policy through a discourse of 
Americanization of a backward country and the implementation of the 
sacred principles of democracy. The most important task, no doubt, was 
to fulfill the promise of a future self-government: “…when education 
shall have become general, then, in the language of a leading Filipino, his 
people will become more American than the Americans themselves.”2 
          The Schurman Commission played the main role in the embryonic 
construction of a new history to underpin the U.S. acquisition of the 
Philippines. It laid the foundation for the Taft Commission to transform 
this into colonial policy. Some previously unknown people would gain 
unprecedented prominence as a result of their participation in this 
process. Dean C. Worcester, thanks to the publication of his book, The 
Philippines and their People, in 1898 became an immediate referent and 
an authority on the archipelago. 3 This fact made him a valuable member 
                                                 
1 Golay Frank Hindman. Face of Empire. United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946. Quezon City: 
Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1997, p. 59. Golay follows literally the conclusions of the 
Schurman Commission.  
2 Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission to the President., Vol. 1, p. 184. I think that, up to a certain 
extent,  the Americans achieved their aim. 
3 Dean C. Worcester played an important role during the Schurman and Taft Commission but I think 
that his most important task took place from 1914, with the publication of his book The Philippines: 
Past and Present, to 1924. He was to influence several generations. Therefore, his important task will 
be treated in another chapter. 
 53 
of the Schurman Commission. Worcester would involve his alma mater, 
the University of Michigan, in the making of imperial policy.  
          More important, because of his anonymity, is Edward Ayer, a 
private collector who became de facto involved in the imperial project 
and  took an active part in constructing the perfect colonial machine for 
producing knowledge.  
          Before analyzing the Schurman Commission as the catalyst of 
some stereotypical arguments in Philippine history, it is important to see 
how the U.S. administration got to involve private individuals such as 
Edward Ayer. Ayer played an important role since his task as Maecenas 
of the Philippines and his library as a tribal showcase generated three 
important topics:  the encapsulation of the Philippines within the Latin 
American context, the suppression of books, and the Filipinos’ unfitness 
for self-government.   
          As soon as Edward Ayer knew that the Americans had decided to 
keep the Philippines he decided to buy all the books about Philippine 
history. He narrates his story as follows: 
At the end of May, 1898, I happened to be in Venice, when the 
news came of the battle of Manila. At once  I wrote to the principal 
book sellers of both Europe and America to send me a list of 
everything they had relating to the Philippine Islands, both 
manuscripts and printed, to my Chicago address, where I expected 
to be in about thirty days. Arriving there, I found a mass of 
material, catalogues, lists and letters from dealers all over the 
world, and in a few weeks the great Philippine Islands collection, 
now a part of the Edward E. Ayer Collection was well started. I did 
not need to await the treaty of peace to realize that for many years 
to come these islands would be under the care of the US [emphasis 
added] and that all this material about their native races would 
come well within the scope of my collection.4 
                                                 
4 Ayer Edwards papers. MSS. ‘Why I love Presscott’s Conquest of Mexico. Box 4, Folder 60. Chicago: 
Newberry Library. Edward Ayer explained this story in 1926. 
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          Ayer’s paradigmatic statements throw light on the future pattern of 
colonial politics, education and scholarship. Ayer was right when he 
stated that he kept in touch with booksellers all over the world to acquire 
books.5 Americans were eager to know the history of a country they had 
acquired that was completely unknown for them. This eagerness for 
knowledge made Mr. Ayer, some publishers and above all the U.S. 
administration buy and collect documents regardless of the content or 
quality of the textbooks or manuscripts.   
          Ayer’s sentence, “I did not need to await the treaty of peace to 
realize that for many years to come these Islands would be under the care 
of the United States,” is important for several reasons. We can recognize 
the subtlety since there is not a single allusion to the term “colony” or 
“possession.” The Islands are merely “under the care of the United 
States.” Ayer was following the precepts of his government to identify 
the Americans as “protectors.”6 Moreover this statement is an 
interpolation where the past is origin of the present. Edward Ayer penned 
this story in 1926. At that moment, the American government was 
launching again, under Gen. Leonard Wood’s governorship, a campaign 
of propaganda to justify the U.S. refusal to grant the Filipinos 
independence nearly thirty years after the original “promise” in 1898. 
          It is important to follow Ayer’s career as the maecenas of 
Philippine history since his career reveals how he was implicated in the 
                                                 
5 Edward Ayer kept in touch with the most and prestigious Filipinists from Spain –Wenceslao Retana, 
Pedro Vindel, Pablo Pastells and José Sánchez y Garrigós –librarian from the collection of La 
Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas. 
6 This precept from the days of McKinley was to consider the Philippines as a dependency belonging to 
the United States. There is an ad hoc omission of the term “colony.” 
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U.S. administration. Ayer bought many books, mostly dealing with the 
sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. He went to Spain and acquired there 
an important collection, although some of the books he bought are 
completely useless—rubbish, even. Americans were in hurry to know 
everything about the Philippines. Spanish booksellers took advantage of 
such American eagerness by emphasizing the possession of “rare books.” 
As Retana explained in 1904—when he was working for Pedro Vindel—
to José Sánchez, librarian from La Compañía General de Tabacos de 
Filipinas, Ayer had been in Madrid visiting the collection of Pedro 
Vindel. He describes Ayer as follows: 
He came with the aspiration to buy old books. “I have a lot of 
money.” Vindel sold him algo de deshecho impreso y manuscrito 
(rubbish - printed and manuscript)…  
 
Americans are madly acquiring three kinds of works: history, 
language and customs. They neglect legislation and newspapers…7 
[emphasis added] 
 
          The last sentence is significant since the neglect of these 
documents was part of the campaign of suppression and discrediting 
aimed at Spaniards and the Spanish system. Ayer was interested in 
acquisitions from the first period of Spanish rule in the Philippines and 
above all from the accounts of the friars.8 This is the reason he said to 
Vindel that he wanted rare and old books. It was part of the machinery 
being constructed in order to illustrate the medievalism and the 
evangelization work at the heart of the Spanish system. Ayer bought 
books from the nineteenth century but only a few embrace the period 
                                                 
7 Wenceslao Retana played an important role in this business. La Compañía General de Tabacos de 
Filipinas Papers. Barcelona: Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya. Fons n. 138, Codi 030205 
8 For instance, Edward Ayer bought to Pablo Pastells manuscripts from Spain in the United States and 
the Philippines, 170 volumes. He paid $10,000. 
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from 1868 to 1898, and these are imbued with a conservative trend. On 
the other hand, books related to legislation were acquired by officials 
such as Taft and Worcester. They made good use of them, implementing 
in the Philippines Spanish laws–this is the main reason these books had 
to be relegated to a secondary place. Ayer’s collection, then, was a 
pretext to foster, on the one hand, the notion that Spain was a despotic, 
tyrannical, anachronistic and medieval colonial master; and on the other 
hand, the state of backwardness of the Filipinos, who were pictured as an 
amalgam of tribes living in anarchy. 
          The second collaboration of Ayer with the construction of 
American discourse is connected with the first. With the purchase of 
these books—specifically from the sixteenth century—he was 
encapsulating the Philippines in the Latin American context. In fact, his 
main aim was to select documents of the acquisition of New Mexico and 
all parts of the United States which were once under the dominion of 
Spain. For this purpose, he contracted some students from the University 
of California who later became prestigious specialists on Latin American, 
such as Charles E. Chapman, Charles W. Hackett, William Lytle Schurz,9 
and Charles H. Cunningham,10 who all contributed to the definition and 
contextualization of Philippine history within Latin America. All of them 
were in Seville collecting and transcribing documents from the Archivo 
                                                 
9 William Lytle Schurz wrote in 1930 The Manila Galleon. Lytle Schurz emphasizes the argument that 
the Philippines, during the Spanish rule, was a mere appendage of New Spain. This book became a 
reference for historians and at present continues to maintain its influence.  
10 Charles H. Cunningham wrote in 1919 The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies. As Illustrated by the 
Audiencia of Manila. Cunningham’s book was a reference and continues to be so at present because of 
the uniqueness of the topic. The book is biased and wrong, but no-one has questioned him. Charles H. 
Cunningham, influenced by James A. Robertson, one of the editors of The Philippine Islands 1493-
1898, is a clear example of suppression in history with a specific effect, which is to show that the 
Spanish system was medieval.  
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General de Indias and later on, from 1928 onwards, they collaborated in 
the Hispanic American Historical Review with James A. Robertson, one 
of the editors of the multivolume compendium, The Philippine Islands, 
1493-1898.  
          Finally, in 1904 Ayer visited the Philippines Islands, where he met 
Worcester,11 who at that time was the Secretary of Interior for the 
Islands. Worcester showed him a collection of about 8,000 photographs 
taken all over the archipelago. Ayer ordered copies of all these 
photographs and classified them by linguistic group. The photographs 
and the further classification became part of the Ayer collection in 
Chicago. The exhibition and the classification of these photographs had a 
specific objective: to demonstrate the incapacity of the Filipinos for self-
government. One of the main points in the reports of the Schurman 
Commission and the Taft Commission was “racial and linguistic 
diversities disqualify them to undertake the task of governing the 
archipelago…”12 Ayer was providing a showcase for a big audience. The 
exhibition of these photographs demonstrated histrionically a barbaric 
civilization. This was part of American propaganda to spread the idea of 
Filipinos’ unfitness for self-government, and to justify the maintenance 
of the Philippines in American hands.  
          Ayer’s main contribution to American administration took place in 
1921 during the preparation of the Special Wood-Forbes Mission to the 
Philippine Islands. His involvement in this special mission is an enigma 
                                                 
11 After this visit Ayer and Worcester continued to maintain a frantic correspondence. Worcester started 
to send him the official publications and recommend him some books which were included in his 
Philippine Collection. 
12 The Schurman commission made special emphasis in that point and the volume 45 of Senate 
Documents is devoted entirely to illustrate the tribal diversity in the archipelago.  
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since he was quite careful in suppressing his personal correspondence. 
However, we know he made some suggestions to Leonard Wood since at 
Newberry Library we can find Wood’s letters. 13 Besides his suggestions, 
Ayer presented as well some problems which Forbes and Wood were to 
confront: “P.S. The problems which you present are indeed difficult ones, 
and yet they are those which we must confront. Our Mission here is to 
make a thorough investigation on conditions and report to the President, 
so that he may have something definite on which to act.”14 
          One can speculate what the “problems” were—that the Filipinos 
were vigorously claiming for an immediate independence as promised in 
1914.  In fact, as I shall explain in a later chapter, the Forbes-Wood 
mission had a specific task: to reverse the process of Filipinization and to 
argue and demonstrate that the Filipinos were still unfit for 
independence. These letters, thus, are a convincing demonstration of how 
the American administration was able to co-opt, in its laudable aims, 
different kinds of people—far removed from official positions but 
located in strategic institutions able to foster among scholars the 




                                                 
13 Personal letter. Manila, P.I. May forth nineteenth twenty-one. 
 Dear Mr. Ayer: 
 Thank you for your good letter. 
 I shall be delighted to receive the suggestions which you speak of. Please write as frankly as 
you think…Ayer, Edward Papers. ‘Special Mission to the Philippine Islands.’ Box 2. Chicago: 
Newberry Library. 
14 Ayer, Edward Papers. ‘Special Mission to the Philippine Islands.’ Malacañang Palace, Manila, May 
10, 1921. Box 2. Chicago: Newberry Library. 
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The Schurman Commission as Catalyst of the Taft Commission 
          The Schurman Commission is important for several reasons, 
probably the most important being that through it the United States and 
President McKinley made clear the policy to hold the Philippines. The 
Schurman Commission was in fact the catalyst of the Second Philippine 
Commission led by William H. Taft, as well as future commissions. 
However, the Schurman Commission has received less importance, being 
completely eclipsed by the Taft Commission. The reasons for this are 
rooted in three main factors. First of all, Schurman and his 
commissioners were not able to subordinate the Filipinos and to put and 
end to the war. Secondly, the Schurman Commission was characterized 
by the polarizations and disagreements among its members. And, finally, 
the exegetes of Schurman explain that as early as 1902, he stated openly 
that “the islands should be granted their independence as soon as 
possible.”15 
          It is important to pay some attention to this Commission and its 
most important motto, “to retain the Philippines,” since in order to back 
up McKinley’s and the Republicans’ decision to keep the Philippines, the 
Commission constructed certain images of the Filipinos and their former 
colonial master, Spain, and put forward certain arguments that have 
prevailed, with some ramifications, up to the present.  As a matter of fact, 
the Schurman Commission established a pattern that would be followed 
by the subsequent commissions. This was the practice of meeting only 
                                                 
15 Hendrickson Kenneth, E. J.R. ‘Reluctant expansionist –Jacob Gould Schurman and the Philippine 
Question.’ In Pacific Historical Review. Berkeley: University of California Press, Vol. XXXVI, 1967, 
p. 419. 
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two classes of people. One was the very limited but thoroughly pro-
American type of natives who, more or less, could be the beneficiary of 
American patronage; the co-optation of these ilustrados would pave the 
way for an evolutionary argument, of “collaborationism” as synonymous 
to “caciquism,” and “compadrazgo.”16  The other class was carefully 
“culled” from the most ignorant and impoverished natives. American 
Commissions considered from the beginning that the Filipinos could not 
obtain independence since this class did not wish it, nor even a 
protectorate. Besides, this poor and ignorant “rabble” would impose a 
military oligarchy which would reign with terror. Therefore these two 
classes became the vox populi of the Filipinos.  
          There is a second important issue brought up by the Schurman 
Commission which has provided another stereotypical image. Schurman, 
who had studied Spanish institutions, stated categorically that the 
Philippines had been ruled for three hundred years by medieval 
ecclesiastics. Schurman suppressed for this purpose important 
documents. His summary of Spanish rule would be used by future 
scholars as the dictum of the truth, giving form to a notion of the Spanish 
“dark age.” Subsequent commissions would put forward a similar history 
of Spanish colonial government.  
          Last but not the least, Schurman and his commissioners were 
tasked with sorting out any doubts regarding the promises made to 
Aguinaldo about independence under an American protectorate. The 
                                                 
16 Peter Stanley and David Steinberg extrapolate the birth of clientelism back to the Spanish period, but 
they emphasize that the Schurman Commission gave shape to the future patron-client relationships. 
Stanley, Peter. A Nation in the Making. The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1974, pp. 56-57; Steinberg, David J. The Philippines. A Singular and a 
Plural Place. Oxford: Westview,  Third Edition, 1994,  pp. 63-66 
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Commission explained in detail, although ambiguously, why the 
Philippines could not attain the category of protectorate. Schurman 
suppressed two important terms in order to demonstrate the magnanimity 
of American intentions regarding the Philippines: “colony” and 
“possession.”  
          When McKinley decided to retain the Philippines he needed to 
legitimate the American occupation by developing adequate means of 
administration besides easing the tension in relations with the Filipinos. 
For this purpose, McKinley named to the Commission Schurman 
(president of Cornell University), George Dewey, Charles Denby, Dean 
C. Worcester—considered by Fred Chamberlin as the encyclopedia of 
the committee—and Major General Otis. The Commissioners were 
representative of the two main American factions: Republicans and 
Democrats. This fact is significant in order to understand how, in a 
situation where public opinion was divided between retention of the 
Islands and anti-imperialism, “patriotic” American values were brought 
to the fore.  
          It is said that Schurman was an enemy of expansionism and that 
his attitude did not change when he was appointed President of the 
Commission. However according to his account of the interview with 
McKinley, 
He reminded the president that he was an avowed opponent of 
annexation; however, McKinley countered by saying that he too 
opposed taking the Philippines but saw no way out, since he 
believed that to cast the islands adrift would cause “severe 
international complications and perhaps involve the United States 
in a world war.”17 
                                                 
17 ‘President Schurman on the Philippine Situation.’ Outlook, (Nov. 4, 1899), p. 534. 
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          It seems, judging by this paragraph, that Schurman decided to 
accept the expansionist policy out of patriotic duty. McKinley and 
Schurman were transgressing, by using patriotic ends, the legitimate 
aspirations of the Filipinos for independence and were showing to the 
world the benevolent ends of the United States: 
We were to aid in “the most humane, pacific and effective 
extension of authority throughout these islands, and to secure, with 
the least possible delay, the benefits of a wise and generous 
protection of life and property to the inhabitants.”18 
 
          This paragraph demonstrates us that the Americans presented 
themselves as liberators rather than conquerors. Not only did the 
Americans have to deal with the Filipinos but also the possibility of other 
Europeans powers intervening in favor of the Filipinos or the Spaniards. 
This is the reason McKinley was appealing to American patriotic values. 
The Americans twisted the argument around claiming that “an 
independent Philippine Republic would have been engulfed in the 
irresistible tides of rival imperialism…”19  
          The Commission soon announced the benevolent purposes of the 
United States, which was anxious to establish in the Philippines an 
enlightened system of government under which the Filipino people might 
enjoy the largest measure of home rule and the amplest liberty. The 
Commission offered the Filipinos a government consisting of “a 
Governor-General appointed by the President; a cabinet appointed by the 
Governor-general and a general advisory council elected by the people.” 
The Commission also promised Filipinos the largest measure of local 
                                                 
18 Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present,  p. 253. 
19 Williams, Daniel R. The United States and The Philippines, p. 106. 
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self-government consistent with peace and good order.20 This 
announcement—a faithful reflection of the claims made by the Filipino 
reformists to Spain and, in fact, the reforms implemented by Moret in 
1898—would attract the educated and propertied men who had separated 
from Aguinaldo and his Republic and joined their interests to those of the 
United States.  
This will be the genesis for the future history of the collaborators.21 
Avoiding the clichés or stigmas characteristic of the Philippine history 
devised by the Americans, we should understand that the so-called 
collaborators were an American creation in order to legitimize and 
establish a governmental system in the Philippines, rejecting the use of 
terms such as “colony” or “possession.” As Ileto explains, “The 
Americans found that, with a few exceptions, the Philippines had no 
sultans as in British colonies, no ‘hereditary chieftains or rulers,’ no 
‘established sovereign to whom the people owed and recognized 
allegiance.’”22 
          In fact, the Americans were faced with a typical colonial 
government implanted by the Spaniards in a transitional phase that was 
moving towards the British model. Those collaborators, as the 
                                                 
20 Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission to the President, 1900-1901, 1:9. 
21 Guerrero, Milagros. ‘The Provincial and Municipal Elites of Luzon during the Revolution, 1898-
1902.’ In Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus (ed.),  Philippine Social History. Global Trade and 
Local Transformations. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1981. Guerrero argues that there was 
not a disruption between the reforms implemented by the Spaniards in 1893 and the revolutionary 
government. Aguinaldo co-opted the propertied and ilustrado men in order to rule at the provincial and 
municipal level and he used the system established by the Spaniards. Guerrero assumes that those 
“caciques” who emerged during Spanish rule continued to have preponderance during the Filipino 
Republic and that later they collaborated with the Americans. Therefore, she is establishing an 
evolutionary emplotment related to two different approaches. On the one hand, the Marxist idea of 
class; and on the other, the American construction of “caciquism.” She misses an important issue in 
that the “ilustrados” were necessary as political intermediaries in an incipient government. In fact, they 
were the only ones with the needed political experience.  
22 Ileto, Reynaldo. ‘Knowledge and Pacification. The Philippine-American War,’ p. 21. 
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evolutionary history explains, are the same ones who collaborated with 
Spain. Not in vain were the Spaniards establishing a native autonomous 
government or self-government, but they had no time to develop this 
model.23 
          Therefore, the Commission needed to define, or to ascribe a  
category to, this new dependency, following upon its knowledge of the 
old government of the “ilustrados” and the “irreconciliables.” The United 
States was caught between Scylla and Charybdis since the “ilustrados” 
misunderstood, according to the commissioners (specifically, Worcester) 
the term “protectorate.” Thus, they had to explain why they could not 
implant a protectorate. Besides, they needed to reject categorically the 
term “colony,” which, on the one hand, meant continuity of the 
“tyrannical” government of the Spaniards; and on the other, reflected the 
Filipino insurgents’ violent opposition to any colonial form of 
government. The Commission was forced to suppress this term to attract 
the Filipinos.  
          The Filipinos were not mistaken, as the Americans claimed, in 
thinking that the United States promised independence under an 
American protectorate. Aguinaldo wrote in Reseña Verídica that, “at 
least, the United States would recognize Philippine independence under a 
naval protectorate and there was no necessity to document this fact.”24 
                                                 
23Robles, Eliodoro. The Philippines in the 19th century. Quezon City: Malaya, books INC, 1969. Robles 
stated in 1969 that “Spain was not entirely averse to granting more powers to municipal and provincial 
governments at the proper time, as evinced by reforms in the last decades of the century when local 
capacity to rule began to emerge. Unfortunately, time ran out on her.” In spite of the bibliographical 
limitations because of American bibliographical suppression, this book is the best history of the 
nineteenth century. Robles recognized the reformist policy of the Spaniards. Lamentably he denies the  
Maura law by using LeRoy’s The Americans in the Philippines, and the Schurman report.  
24 Aguinaldo Emilio.  Reseña Verídica…, p. 10. 
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Apparently, the idea of a protectorate was part of the promise made by 
Consul-General Pratt in Singapore. Moreover, as I stated previously, the 
1899 edition of Foreman’s book supported this view. It states that “an 
American protectorate would be recognized on the same terms as those 
fixed for Cuba.”25 There is still another testimony by James Creelman in 
a letter of 20 November 1899: “General Aguinaldo has officially stated to 
the American representative his will and wish to accept a Protectorate 
from the United States.”26  
          Worcester and Schurman denied any promise of the establishment 
of a protectorate. In negotiations Worcester established with some 
Filipinos,27the latter illustrated clearly what they understood by 
“protectorate,” displaying a great knowledge in international laws.28 
Schurman also rejected the promise, alleging “misunderstandings.” 
According to Schurman, the Filipinos misinterpreted American 
purposes.29 Finally, both had to make clear the real intentions of the 
United States vis à vis the Philippines—to establish de facto and de iure a 
colony. 
                                                 
25 Foreman, John. The Philippine Islands. 1899, p. 567.  
26 Paterno, Pedro. ‘El Gobierno del Pueblo Filipino. Por el mismo Pueblo bajo la suprema dirección de 
los Estados Unidos.’ In El Problema Político de Filipinas, solución dada por Pedro A. Paterno, p. 11. 
27 I have Worcester’s interview with Galicano Apacible. Worcester stated that “he was, like all his 
countrymen, perfectly childish.” According to Worcester, Apacible said that “the function of a 
protector was to protect.” Worcester was simplifying and discrediting the knowledge of Apacible. 
Worcester Dean C. Papers, 1899. Personal Correspondence. Ann Arbor: Harlan Hatcher Library, 
University of Michigan. 
28 Paterno, Pedro. El Problema Político de Filipinas, solución dada por Pedro A. Paterno. Paterno 
makes an excellent definition of Protectorate by which the Philippines would have sovereignty under 
American rule. He makes clear any possible misunderstanding by quoting international laws: “When a 
State, Le Moine says, is under the protection of another State, expressly reserving, in all cases the right 
to self- govern and to enact the laws that a country considers more convenient, it does not disappear as 
member of the society of nations…,” pp. 8-9.  
29 Schurman, Jacob G. Philippine Affairs. A Retrospect and Outlook. New York: Charles Scribeners 
Sons, 1902. p. 8. 
 66 
          It is hard to guess through the report of the Philippine Commission 
what the American purposes alluded to by Schurman were. Volume I of 
this report devotes fourteen pages (97-111) to explaining the plan of the 
government for the Philippines. These pages are full of ambiguity and 
confusion and disguise the real intentions of the Americans to colonize 
the archipelago. Predictably, the report starts by denying any Filipino 
aspiration toward a “protectorate.”30 The explanation is confused and, 
above all, contradictory. I wish to highlight two important reasons why 
the Americans could not consider the Philippines as a protectorate. First, 
the United States considered the Philippines as its new dependency. This 
is an important term—“dependency”—since it is part of the new 
American terminology and a priori conceals their real purposes. The 
second reason can be gleaned from the Commission’s comparison of 
British protectorates with the establishment of a possible protectorate in 
the Philippines. It concludes: 
The United States possesses sovereignty over the Philippine 
Islands, and nowhere in the archipelago (excepting Mindanao, 
Palawan, and the Sulu group) are there sultans or chieftains. At the 
time of Spanish conquest the great majority of the natives were 
governed by chieftains or datus. But the Spanish system of 
government was uncongenial to the system of native rulership and 
by degrees the native potentates disappeared…31 
 
This paragraph is really very ambiguous since the commission was 
reversing the first promises made to the Filipinos, or more specifically, to  
Aguinaldo. As has been mentioned there was not, in the Philippines, an 
established sovereignty. In fact, when the Americans decided to hold the 
archipelago the government was in a phase of transformation in which 
                                                 
30 ‘The Philippines under an American protectorate.’ In Report of the US. Philippine Commission to the 
President.  Vol. I, p. 99-103.  
31 Report of the US. Philippine Commission…, p. 100. 
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the principalía began to self-govern their “municipios” (municipalities). 
The second phase of this project was to concede provincial self-
government by extending the vote. The Spaniards did not have time, but 
Americans found an incipient political autonomy, which they needed to 
deny at this moment, but later the power of the principalía would be 
highlighted in order to demonstrate that caciquism was a structure of 
government implanted by the Spaniards and headed by the principalía 
who controlled the masses.32 
          The last sentence from the above excerpt disguises something 
deeper: the idea that the Spanish disrupted the native system in the 
Philippines as they had done before in Latin America. This is part of the 
black legend.33 The Spaniards did not destabilize the native system. On 
the contrary, for more than twenty years both systems coexisted with 
each other and when this changed, the principalía always had limited 
powers. In short, the United States was searching for some excuses to 
break the promise to Aguinaldo and to legitimate their conquest. But the 
Americans did not find a tabula rasa; on the contrary, they came across a 
political faction headed by “ilustrados and wealthy”—the so-called 
“autonomists” such as Pedro Paterno, Pardo de Tavera and Felipe 
Buencamino, among the others; and a leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, who was 
able to mobilize the masses in order to attain the independence of the 
                                                 
32 LeRoy, James A.  The Philippine Life in town and country.  New York and London: G.P. Putnam’s 
sons, 1905, p. 178. 
33 The Black Legend started in England and France. This anti-Hispanism became an integral part of 
English thought. The writers highlighted examples of Spanish vileness and treachery and in Europe and 
the United States the idea spread widely that Spain was the cradle of ignorance and fanaticism, unable 
to compete with modern nations. The church was the main cause of the Spanish cultural “degradation.” 
It seems that this discourse is quite similar to that spread by the United States in the Philippines. 
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Philippines and to implement a Republic with the establishment of 
institutions that worked quite well.      
          The Commission put more emphasis on the negation of the 
Philippines as a probable colony. The Filipinos had revolted against the 
Spaniards in order to become a province, such as Cuba and Puerto Rico, 
instead of a colony. The Spanish government made clear in the articles of 
the constitution that the Philippines was a colony in the most modern 
sense—a territory ruled by a foreign country. But the Philippines was a 
colony from the sixteenth century as a territory out of the nation 
conquered and ordinarily ruled by “leyes especiales” (special laws.) The 
United States, therefore, had to nuance, in order to attract the Filipinos, a 
specific terminology. The term “colony” was completely suppressed: 
The commission desires, on behalf of all the Filipinos, to protest 
against the suggestion of calling the archipelago colony…for in the 
experience of the Filipinos a “colony” is a dependent political 
community which the sovereign power exploits, oppresses and 
misgoverns. 34 
 
          The last sentence is a clear allusion to Spanish rule as oppressor, 
and it is a contradictio in terminis. The Americans by protesting against 
calling the archipelago “colony” were informing the Filipinos of their 
benevolent purposes. Therefore, they were to change the term colony to 
dependency –a more subtle word, which connoted subordination, 
subjection, subjugation or submissiveness. Dependency and colony are 
complementary terms and so the report states in the last sentence that “a 
colony is a dependent political community.” Obviously, the American 
necessity of suppressing any negative-ness to their “benevolent 
                                                 
34 Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission… p. 106. 
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assimilation” made them fall into contradictions. They had already 
forgotten that they had stated categorically that the Philippines was a 
“dependency” of the United States.  Filipinos would understand the 
American objectives as a new colonization since they were to implement 
the principle of Crown Colony Government by appointing officials 
instead of electing them. A priori, the report rejected the principle of 
Crown Colony since the American ends were to concede self-government 
to the Filipinos when these were prepared and this principle denies this 
right. The United States changed the form but not the content.  
          In sum, the Americans decided that the Philippines was not to be a 
colony or a protectorate but a territorial government – an ambiguous 
term that conceals the real purposes of the United States, which was the 
permanent annexation of the Philippines as with the case of Hawaii or 
Alaska. The Americans did not entertain the idea that independence 
would ultimately be granted and this point became one of the main 
principles of American discourse: “It is impossible, even approximately, 
to fix a time for the withdrawal of American sovereignty over the 
archipelago…”35 As I shall explain later in this thesis, this principle 
would become a dogma of faith.   
          The Schurman Commission, as has been mentioned, established 
the parameters for future commissions by keeping in touch with the pro-
Americans, on the one hand, and on the other, the most ignorant and poor  
people specifically chosen in order to demonstrate that the Philippines 
was not prepared for self-government. This is the context in which we 
                                                 
35 Report of the US. Philippine Commission…, p. 103. 
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need to view the diplomatic negotiations of the Schurman Commission 
with representatives of Aguinaldo’s government. The Commissions 
attitude was framed by a budding construction of a “black legend” of the 
Filipino republic. Worcester defines the Filipino Republic as “a veritable 
reign of terror.” In fact he explained that 
These leaders [of the Republic] never established a government 
which adequately protected life and property, or gave to their 
people peace, happiness or justice, but on the contrary inaugurated 
a veritable reign of terror under which murder became a 
government institution.36 
 
          The Schurman Commission thus exaggerated the facts to justify 
one of the conclusions of the report: unfitness for self-government. The 
report could thus only but conclude that “The United States cannot 
withdraw…we are there and duty binds us to remain. The Filipinos are 
wholly unprepared for independence…there being no Philippine nation, 
but only a collection of different people.”37  
          This categorical statement of the Commission was to be supported 
by two main arguments. First was that the masses of the Filipinos did not 
really wish independence or even a protectorate.38 The second argument 
was to stigmatize the Filipino Republic and its leaders since the Republic 
was to be subsumed in the “dark ages” of Philippine history. Therefore 
this republic was to be as tyrannical and despotic as its predecessor, 
Mother Spain:  “‘Philippine republic’ is the ideal of the Tagalog 
                                                 
36 Worcester Dean C. The Philippine Past and Present. New York: The McMillan Company, 1914 and 
1930, p. 15. Modern historiography, for instance Peter Stanley, prefers to consult Filipino sources such 
as  Felipe Calderon’s Memorias. Calderon defined the republic as a “military oligarchy.” See Stanley, 
Peter. A Nation in the making, p. 53. Stanley is being very subtle in selecting Calderon’s Memorias 
since he infers that American officials such as Worcester and Taft were right when they described 
Aguinaldo’s government as a military oligarchy.  
37 ‘The Government of the Philippine Islands.’ In Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission …, 1900-
1901. 1:4 
38 See, Ileto, Reynaldo C. ‘Knowledge and Pacification. The Philippine-American War.’ p. 23. 
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insurgent leaders to whom the formation of that organization, at least on 
paper, offered a welcome means of escape from the despotic associations 
of the previous dictatorship, which, in fact, continued unchanged.39 
          Therefore the report and Worcester harped on the dictatorship and 
the republic being a “government of terror.” As a matter of fact, 
Worcester in a letter written on 26 May 1899 defined one of the leaders 
of the Republic, General Antonio Luna, as a military dictator.40 
Schurman, in the meantime, set the precedents for the future 
commissions: 
Military power released from civil authority always lapses into a 
selfish and remorseless tyranny. And nowhere is this law more 
tragically illustrated than in the Philippines. Such an unholy 
carnival of militarism, despotism, brigandage, cruelty and 
wholesome intimidation of peaceful and unoffending inhabitants as 
the disorganized insurgent bands have since enacted in different 
parts of the Philippine Islands is without parallel in occidental 
history…41 
 
          This conclusion lays the foundation for the further development of 
the discourses of “caciquism,” and “caudillism,” besides supporting the 
idea of a perennial chaos, anarchy and incipient oligarchism in the 
islands. 
                                                 
39 Report of the US. Philippine Commission…, p. 102. Benedict Anderson states that the Filipino 
Republic was fragile “with more than a few similarities to Bolivar’s abortive Gran Colombia…” “Had 
it not been for William McKinley, one might almost say, the Philippines in the early twentieth century 
could have fractured into three weak, caudillo-ridden states with the internal politics of the nineteenth 
century Venezuela or Ecuador.” Anderson, Benedict, ‘Cacique Democracy in the Philippines’ or 
‘Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams,’ in Spectre of Comparisons. Nationalism, 
Southeast Asia and the World. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1998, p. 200. 
Anderson’s statement has been followed up by other scholars,  such as for instance Paul Hutchcroft in 
Booty Capitalism. The politics of banking in the Philippines, who cites literally this excerpt in order to 
ponder the fact that Filipino Republic exhibited a pattern of “caudillismo.” (p. 25) We can see that 
there is continuity in the discourse from 1900. The Filipino Republic was an autocratic oligarchy. 
There is still a justification of American tutelage in the Philippines.  
40 Worcester Papers. Personal Correspondence. Ann Arbor: Harlan Hatcher Library. The University of 
Michigan.  
41 Schurman, Jacob G. Philippines Affairs. A Retrospective an Outlook,  p. 13. 
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          The Commission continued to argue why the Filipinos could not 
become independent at that moment, and again there was an insistence in 
the arbitrariness of the natives and if they were left alone, a patronage 
system would emerge in which would prevail despotism, misgovernment 
and corruption, since they had inherited these customs from the 
Spaniards.42 As I shall demonstrate in a later chapter, despite American 
tutelage the “patronage” or “cacique” system would be constantly 
referred to in the literature about the Philippines. We need to understand 
that was regularly deployed as the main argument when rejecting any 
idea of independence during certain phases of American colonial rule.     
          Another argument of the Schurman commission—inextricably 
related to the former—was that the diversity of tribes and language did 
not allow a pacific co-existence. This fact made at that moment an 
independent sovereignty Philippine state neither possible nor desirable.43 
In sum, when the first Philippine Commission finished its short trip 
to a few provinces, drawing on its interviews with a select elite and its 
biased knowledge of Spanish history and institutions, it concluded 
categorically that the Filipinos were unfit for self-government. The 
arguments were apparently, and on paper, multiple but the report of the 
Commission is in fact unilinear and repetitious in its argumentation. 
                                                 
42 This argument can be frequently found in American literature. Modern scholars have established a 
linkage between deep-rooted Filipino traditions and the development of systems of patronage which 
establish a dysfunctional democracy. Reynaldo Ileto develops this topic in ‘Orientalism and the Study 
of Philippine Politics’ in Knowing America’s Colony. A Hundred Years from the Philippine War. 
43 The First Philippine Commission insisted on this point, probably at the request of Worcester. They 
considered it as one of the main obstacles for Philippine independence and they settled this matter in 
one volume devoted entirely to the different tribes. Volume III of the report is dedicated to this topic 
Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission to the President. ‘Senate Documents’. 56th Congress 1st 
Session, Vol. 45 1899-1900.   
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Obviously, the commissioners thought that the rebellion was not a 
national movement. It was only a “Tagalog insurrection” and  
In general, such machinery of “government” as existed served only 
for plundering the people under the pretext of levying “war 
contributions” while many of the insurgent officials were rapidly 
accumulating wealth. The administration of justice was paralyzed 
and crime of all sorts was rampant…never in the worst days of 
Spanish misrule had the people been so overtaxed. In many 
provinces there was absolute anarchy and from all sides came 
petitions for protection and help.44 [italics mine] 
 
          This above excerpt deserves comment since it is the catalyst for the 
construction of a new Philippine history. This paragraph provides 
stereotyped images of Spanish colonial rule and the Filipino republic by 
suppressing Filipino and Spanish documents and newspapers such as La 
Independencia. Filipino institutions established by Aguinaldo worked 
quite well since they did not differ too much from those implemented by 
the Spaniards. Therefore there was not a radical disruption during the 
brief interregnum of the Republic. Felipe Calderon explains in his 
“Memorias” that the Congress inaugurated during the Republic accepted 
small changes to the Spanish regulations.45Moreover, the project of the 
Constitution redacted by Mabini follows the articles of the Spanish 
republican constitution. 
          Paterno proposed a constitutional project following the Spanish 
Constitution of 1869. However, the father of the Constitution, Calderon, 
states that he took as model the Constitutions of Latin American 
republics, specifically that enacted by Costa Rica. In any case, the 
constitution finally implanted in the Philippines followed the model 1869 
                                                 
44 Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission… Volume I., p. 177. 
45 Calderon Felipe G.  Mis Memorias sobre la Revolución Filipina. Segunda Etapa (1898 a 1901). 
Manila: El Renacimiento, 1907, p. 235.  
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Spain, although most scholars follow Calderon’s argument. Some 
intentionally do so in order to support the idea the Republic could 
become a dictatorship as its “American forebears”46 or to deny that the 
Spanish Constitution of 1869 was the most modern of Europe. 
          The revolutionary government of Aguinaldo followed, as well, the 
Spanish reforms implementing a modern structure and function of  
provincial and municipal government from 1893. In other words, the 
Maura law was implemented by the Republic despite the systematic 
denial of the fact by American scholars from the Schurman Commission 
until the present. Aguinaldo, thus, was limiting the vote to a minority, as 
the Spaniards did before, from the propertied and educated class. This 
fact, however, should not be relevant per se since Aguinaldo was 
establishing a governmental structure familiar to his fellow Filipinos. 
          A problem arises when the Republican government’s policies are 
de-contextualized by scholars intent upon constructing an evolutionary 
emplotment and categorizing the government, therefore, as conservative 
when it should really be defined as the opposite—liberal. To state 
categorically that the conservative government ruled by Filipino 
oligarchies “perpetuated cacique society and government47 simply echoes 
the Schurman Commission, which for imperial purposes demonized the 
Filipino Republic, portraying it as more obscure than the Spanish “dark 
ages” since by perpetuating this oligarchy the Americans could not 
implant the sacred principles of democracy.  
                                                 
46 Anderson, Benedict. ‘Cacique Democracy in the Philippines,’ p. 200. 
47 Guerrero, Milagros. ‘The Provincial and Municipal Elites of Luzon during the Revolution, 1898-
1902.’ p. 167. 
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          Apart from the establishment of these institutions, the Aguinaldo 
government founded a budding university and a great library with books 
confiscated from the Spanish religious. This data has been ignored by 
historiography because of the tendency to use a specific or official 
bibliography and omit important testimonies. Moreover, the brief 
interregnum of this “despotic” Republic—according to the Americans, of 
course—produced a series of stamps with a sun and a triangle.48 Such 
“despotism” is the histrionic portrayal of the Filipino Republic, part of 
the black legend, which unfortunately has maintained its efficacy up to 
today. The accumulation of wealth supposedly engendered the spread of 
oligarchism and the corruption of the Filipinos, a cancer which the 
Americans portrayed themselves as confronting and trying to eradicate, 
but could not. 
 
Revisiting the “Dark Age” of the Spanish Regime 
 
          It is important to note that the use by the Schurman Commission of 
the terms “Spanish misrule” to define the old regime became the genesis 
of the construction of the “dark age” of the Spanish system. In fact, the 
Schurman report observed of the general government of the Islands at the 
end of the Spanish regime that 
It failed to accomplish even the primary ends of good 
government—the preservation of peace and order, and even the 
administration of justice; nor can there be any doubt that it proved 
an engine of oppression and exploitation of the Filipinos… 
                                                 
48 Villajos, Juan de Dios. Apuntes del P. Juan de Dios Villajos ex ministro Provincial de la de San 
Gregorio, p. 205. Villajos was a friar who lived in the Philippines during the revolt. He wrote his 
memoirs--unpublished-- in 1924.  
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The most prominent defects of the government were: (1) The 
boundless and autocratic powers of the governor-general; (2) the 
“centralization” of all governmental functions in Manila; (3) the 
absence of representative institutions in which the Filipinos might 
make their needs and desires known; (4) a pernicious system of 
taxation; (5) a plethora of officials who lived on the contrary and 
by their very number obstructed, like a circumlocution office, the 
public business they professed to transact; (6) division of minor 
responsibilities though the establishment of rival boards and 
offices; (7) the costliness of the system and the corruption it bred; 
(8) confusion between the functions of the state and the functions 
of the church and of the religious orders.49  
  
          These conclusions regarding the Spanish regime were discrediting 
and tendentious, by displaying a decrepit, tyrannical and faltering 
Spanish rule. Schurman argued, then, that the unfitness of the Filipinos 
for self-government is because Spain “failed to accomplish even the 
primary ends of good government.” He showed how the Filipinos had 
lived for more than three hundred years under a state of anarchy and 
chaos. The isomorphism raised by Schurman created a mythogenesis 
which has survived up to the present. 
          It is important to analyze the defects as noted by the Schurman 
Commission since some of them are based on the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries instead of the end of the nineteenth. This 
assumption can be observed in the statement about “the boundless and 
autocratic powers of the governor-general.” This defect, as pointed out 
by the commissioners, gave the governor-general supreme authority over 
the islands. This idea is immanent in the term “autocratic power.” 
                                                 
49 Report of the US. Philippine Commission…, Vol. 1, 1900, p.81. These conclusions about the old 
regime will be reproduced by Gaylord Bourne. ‘Historical Introduction.’ In Blair and Robertson  (ed.), 
The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 vol. I; David P. Barrows. History of the Philippines; Charles H. 
Cunningham. The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies as illustrated by the Audiencia of Manila; James 
A. LeRoy. The Americans in the Philippines or Joseph Ralston Hayden. Philippines A Study in 
National development. In fact, these conclusions have become the stereotyped images of the Spanish 
regime.  
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However, the commissioners fell into a contradiction since this 
supposedly absolute power of the governor-general, linked to the Royal 
instructions to the governors during the early years of the conquest, 
clashes with the argument about the “confusion between the functions of 
the state and the functions of the church and the religious orders.” The 
word “confusion” infers that the function of the state was not as powerful 
as it seemed. On the contrary, Schurman seemed to be arguing that 
absolute power was really in the hands of the religious orders:  “It will be 
noticed that there is scarcely any branch of the municipal government in 
which the reverend parochial priest does not play an important part.” 50 
          The report of the Commission in fact gives the friars an omnipotent 
power. However, as I have stated repeatedly, there are many ambiguities 
in the report. Schurman and his commissioners recognized tacitly that the 
Maura law was implanted in the archipelago. They knew that the power 
of the friars had been limited to inspections and giving advice. But the 
commissioners needed to dismiss this reality, offering instead the 
observation that “in practice [the priest] is said to make himself a power 
in the ‘pueblo’ by simply using these attributes effectively.”51 
          Although the commissioners were conducting an inspection of the 
archipelago, they could not directly observe and verify the power of the 
friars and so they made reference to what they heard from their 
informants, e.g., “It is said that…” In sum, to illustrate the dichotomy 
between religious power and secular power, the commissioners were 
mobilizing an image anchored in the sixteenth century.   
                                                 
50 Report of the US. Philippine Commission…, Vol. I, part IV, p. 57. 
51 Report of the US. Philippine Commission…, p. 57. 
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          One can perceive that the defects pointed out by the report were 
written at the request of Worcester who had published, in 1898, The 
Philippines and their people. Worcester based his arguments regarding 
the Spanish regime on the first edition of John Foreman’s The Philippine 
Islands. Foreman experienced in situ important reforms in the Philippines 
and so he could state in his Preface that “within the last twenty years the 
colony [the Philippines] has made great strides on the path of social and 
material progress; its political  and commercial development is rapidly 
increasing…[emphasis added]52 
          Worcester neglected this paragraph, emphasizing instead 
Foreman’s explanation of the first Spanish centuries. Foreman was 
echoing the vertiginous changes the Philippines was undergoing in the 
late nineteenth century. As a matter of fact, the decade of the eighties and 
the nineties of the nineteenth century saw the restructuring of Spanish 
colonial objectives in the Philippines, opening up two reformist avenues: 
the first was fiscal, the second and most important was institutional 
reform—i.e., judicial and municipal. This reform thus denies the claim of 
“the boundless and autocratic powers of the governor-general.” The 
“mission-military” paternalism pointed out by Schurman had already 
given way in the late nineteenth century to the authoritarianism of a 
modern colonialism based on the idea that the native races had to be 
raised to the category of subjects, economically useful and grateful 
receptors of modern colonial engineering. 
                                                 
52 Foreman, John . The Philippine Islands. A Historical, Geographical, Social and Commercial sketch 
from the Archipelago and its political dependences. London: Sampson Low Marston & Company, 
1892. Preface to the first edition. 
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          Under Spain’s reformist thrust, liberal governments would 
reorganize the whole administration. One of the first measures would be 
to strip the friars of their preeminence in the archipelago. The second and 
most important would be a readjustment of the institutions of the islands 
under the new concept of Spanish imperialism. This new concept 
anticipated giving minor positions to the natives in order to create a 
strong native bureaucracy similar to the British.     
          It was precisely the new colonial vision of the Spaniards that was 
reflected on the Philippines Exposition of Madrid in 1887. This 
exhibition showcased a tribal amalgam needing Spanish domination. The 
semi-savage native showed in the Exhibition had to be the receptors of 
the new Spanish colonial engineering. Victor Balaguer, Minister for the 
Colonies during the first liberal government, was the promoter of the 
Exhibition and the new colonialism. Although Balaguer furnished the 
new parameters of the colonial policy conceiving of the archipelago as an 
exploitative entrepôt, he defended as well the principle of gradual native 
assimilation. This idea was materialized with the publication of the Penal 
Code according to which the jueces de paz—justices of the peace—
would be natives. 
          The new system of administration of justice was enacted in the 
Philippines, despite the defects noted by the Commission regarding the 
administration of justice. In fact, the Commission studied the Spanish 
administration and used official Spanish documents to elaborate on part 
IV of the report entitled, The Government of the Philippine Islands. The 
first chapter is devoted to the Spanish government in the Philippines. 
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Schurman ignored, precisely, the Compilation of the Organic provisions 
of the Administration of Justice in the Spanish Colonial Provinces and 
Appendices relating thereto of 1891, 53 Tratado teórico práctico y 
colección de legislación para los juzgados de paz (Theoretical and 
Practical Treatise and Compilation of Laws for the Tribunals of Peace)  
(1893). This work contains the principles tying together the organization, 
attributions, civil, criminal and administrative procedures and above all 
the general rules for the justices of the peace—the Código Penal de 
Filipinas y Ley provisional para la aplicación de las disposiciones del 
mismo (1887), (Penal Code from the Philippines and Provisional Law to 
the application of its dispositions) and Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil de 
Filipinas (1888), (Civil Trial Law of the Philippines).54  The U.S. 
government used all these works to administer justice in the archipelago. 
However, it emphasized the idea of the “absence” of a true justice 
administration in order to demonstrate the tyranny and oppression 
characteristic of its Spanish predecessor. 
          Victor Balaguer implemented other revolutionary reforms 
dismissed by the Commission.55 These reforms were conceived as the 
product of the progress or exigencies of the nineteenth century. His 
                                                 
53 These documents were translated during the Schurman Commission by the War Department, 1899. 
Washington: Government Printing Office. 
54 José María Pérez Rubio compiled all these books which were published in Spain and the Philippines. 
Pérez Rubio founded in 1882 El Faro Jurídico in which are treated the issues related to laws. In 1889, 
he founded the journal El Consultor de los Jueces de Paz. He wrote all the legislation enacted for the 
archipelago. The books written by Rubio were acquired by Worcester, an active member of the 
Commission. These books can be found at the University of Michigan in the Dean C. Worcester 
Special Collection. 
55 Victor Balaguer was the maker of the Consejo de Ultramar, an institution for the matters of the 
colonies. Moreover he encouraged public works, although the Commission stated categorically that 
“there were no public works.” He fostered agriculture and promoted the creation of a library in the 
Philippines. On August 12, 1887 the Museum-Library of Manila was inaugurated. The director of this 
museum was Pedro Paterno who started to publish in 1895 Boletín de Museo Biblioteca de Filipinas. 
This information is provided by W. E. Retana in Aparato Bibliográfico de la Historia General de 
Filipinas [3 vol.] vol. 3,  entry  4556, p. 1773.  
 81 
Memoria, Islas Filipinas is a faithful reflection of his idea of progress. “It 
is necessary,” he states, “to prepare those islands in order to respond to 
the expectations and promises of the future; it is necessary to foster the 
trade with the metropolis; to ‘hispanize’ the country.”56 There is no doubt 
that the real intentions of Spain were the “re-colonization and 
Hispanization” of the archipelago--aims that were very different from 
what the Schurman Commission stated in its report.  
          Other liberal ministers paid special attention to reorganizing the 
administration of the Islands. Becerra during his term as Minister for the 
Colonies contributed to the development of public education and 
implanted the first reform of local administration on 12 November 1889. 
This was deemed as 
the first step…taken in order that Spanish sons of the Archipelago, 
irrespective of race, because this does not exist in the law, learn 
about working in the councils, about the idea of municipio 
[municipal government] and how this work, preparing themselves 
at the same time for carrying out local matters.57 
 
          This reform motion was concluded by Antonio Maura in 1893, 
thus the term “Maura law.” The Organic Royal Decree of 19 May 1893 
which is published in Gaceta de Manila gives basically the form of the 
new municipal regime of the archipelago: 
In the Philippine Islands, my government [liberal] will restore soon 
the destroyed communal institutions which have there the 
inestimable roots of tradition, restoring the faculties and means in 
order that they may meet by themselves the needs of every town.58 
  
          These two excerpts contradict the defects presented by Schurman, 
i.e., “absence of representative institutions in which the Filipinos might 
                                                 
56 Balaguer, Victor. Islas Filipinas: Memoria. Madrid: Angles Imprenta, 1895. p. 7.  
57 Colección Legislativa, 2 semestre. ‘Exposición de motivos,’ pp. 1335-1351. 
58 Retana, Wenceslao E. Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal. Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano 
Suárez, 1907. p. 305. 
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make their needs and desires known” and “centralization of all 
governmental functions.” Moreover the Maura law was enacted to 
decentralize the political system and foster the tribunales municipales 
(municipal tribunals) by representing the legal association of all the 
inhabitants of a municipality and administrating their own communal 
interests.59   
          The Maura law contained two crucial points. The first one is the 
election of officials which, although this was certainly restrictive, became 
a landmark achievement since the members of the municipal tribunal 
were to be elected by Filipinos instead of the governor. The second point 
is that the friars lost their power, becoming mere observers; “The 
municipal reform reduced the overwhelming influence the friars had had 
in all the matters of the town.”60  
          Schurman knew all these dispositions since the Department of War 
had translated the Maura law into English as Spain, translation of the 
General Instructions for drafting public documents subject to record in 
the Spanish Colonial Provinces of 1899. Morever, the Commission 
possessed as well the Decretos creando y organizando el Cuerpo de 
Administración Civil de Filipinas (Decrees creating and organizing the 
Civil Administration in the Philippines) of 1870. These decrees were 
enacted by Moret. In fact, Schurman based his explication of Spanish 
government in the Philippines on the Maura law. Therefore, the reader 
                                                 
59 The tribunal was to be constituted by five persons: a captain –before gobernadorcillo-- and four 
tenientes. These representative had to be elected by twelve persons belonging to the principalía (the 
most distinguished or noble Filipinos). These terms started to have a significant importance during this 
commission since the members of the principalía were the makers of the patronage system discovered 
by the Commission. 
60 Retana, W. E. Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal, p. 306. 
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can conclude that the Schurman Commission in fact found this 
administrative system operating in the archipelago. Schurman, however, 
needed to deny that the law was in force. To this end, he used the 
categorical statement “absence of representative institutions.” The term 
“absence” was to play an important role in this context, since by using 
this word he could not deny the implantation of Maura law, but he might 
argue by “absence” that the representative institutions were only 
nominal. Thus, the term “absence” would develop into the notion of 
“dead letter.” Schurman would conclude that the Maura law had not 
educated the natives for self-government. 
          As for the de-centralization of the government, first Moret in 1870 
and later Maura in 1893 started to de-centralize the system by giving 
power to the municipal tribunals. Schurman devotes a short paragraph to 
this so-called de-centralization, thus inaugurating an important topic for 
future scholars. He was to entitle this section “evils of Spanish 
centralization in government.” The evils which the Americans inherited 
were the omnipotent power of the cabezas de barangay (village 
headmen) who formed the vital core of the municipal economy. This 
omnipotence, says the Commission, shows the “malignancy of the 
disease by which [municipal government] had been corrupted.”61 The 
Americans could, therefore, be portrayed as confronting a centralized and 
corrupt system, which derived from a cacique-dominated system. In fact, 
                                                 
61 Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission…, vol. I, part IV, p. 61. 
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in due time Cabeza de barangay would be assimilated into Cacique in 
colonial discourse.62  
          In spite of the defects pointed out by the commissioners, the 
Schurman and the Taft Commission did not disturb the previous 
structure. On the contrary, they resumed implementation of the Maura 
law and imposed the same bureaucratic and administrative system 
implanted by Moret. Taft used the same restricted franchise, reopened the 
schools that the Spaniards inaugurated and imposed the same system of 
taxation. However, Schurman and, later, Taft made the American people 
believe that these reforms were part of the process of “benevolent 
assimilation” by which the Filipinos were to achieve substantial self-
government. Naturally, Spanish “misrule” had to be portrayed as 
medieval with a strong domination of the friars to the detriment of 
secular power. This idea fostered the defect pointed out by Schurman: the 
“confusion between the functions of the state and the functions of the 
church.” Flying in the face of facts, Schurman claimed that the Spanish 
administration had centralized structures and that it was a rudimentary 
and authoritarian system with a rudimentary policy of education. 
          In sum, Schurman furnished the genesis of the notion of a Spanish 
“dark age” which supplied “an engine of oppression and exploitation.” 
“The maintenance of law and order at the local level,” he asserted, “was 
the responsibility of the priest who dominated the municipal government 
in his parish and could call upon the provincial detachment of the 
                                                 
62 Owen, Norman. ‘The Principalía in Philippine History: Kabikolan, 1790-1898’; Cullinane, Michael. 
Ilustrado Politics. Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908; McCoy, Alfred (ed.). An 
Anarchy of Families. Owen, McCoy and Cullinane, among the others, establish a parallelism between a 
centralized system and the dysfunctional power of the oligarchy. It seems that the discourse is alive a 
hundred years later. 
 85 
Guardia Civil.63 This statement sums up the notion of three hundred 
years of ecclesiastical medievalism under an autocratic regime, which 
had remained imperturbable from 1565 to 1898. This sentence is thus the 
negation of the reformism of the last thirty years of Spanish rule in the 
Philippines. A specific terminology such as “absence” was to later 
develop into “dead letter,” referring to these reforms. The résumé of the 
whole governmental system of Spain in the Philippine Islands, as 
provided by the report of the 1900 Philippine Commission (volume I, 
part IV) became immediately the most valuable and “rigorous” source for 
future scholars. Although, as the years went by, the Americans knew of 
and acquired Spanish books on the Philippine Islands—books which 
could have put the Schurman report into question—these would be 
suppressed in order to promote the history first narrated by the Schurman 
Commission. 
          The notion of a Spanish “dark age” has enjoyed a certain 
continuity up to the present. For instance most American scholars, 
following upon the Report of the Philippine Commission, continue to 
deny that the Maura law was implemented in the archipelago. For 
instance, Glenn May in his widely cited essay, “Civic Ritual and Political 
Reality,” states that the Maura law was never implanted in the 
Philippines. All the elections, he says, “were conducted according to the 
regulations established by the Municipal Reform Decree of 1847, despite 
                                                 
63 Golay, Frank H. Face of Empire, p. 60. Golay follows ad literam the summary and abstract written 
by Schurman in 1899. Schurman was successful and Golay’s book published in 1997, practically a 
hundred years later, follows the same pattern. 
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the fact that a new municipal law specifying a new electoral procedure 
was passed in 1893.”64  
          May’s statement could be supported in part with the secular 
argument, obedezco pero no cumplo (I obey but I do not enforce). This 
sentence lends some validity to his assumption since although we know a 
new electoral procedure was enacted, it might never have been enforced. 
Unfortunately, May sidesteps the issue empirically by drawing his 
examples from elections held prior to 1893.  
          As for the argument that the Spanish system was faltering, 
anachronistic and paternalistic until the end, we find it regurgitated in 
2005 in the textbook edited by Norman Owen, The Emergence of 
Modern Southeast Asia. A New History. “Whether liberal or 
conservative, pro-church or antichurch, pro- or antimonarchy,” states 
Owen, “Spain became a backwater, incapable of sustaining any policy 
that could win consensus, while its economy fell further behind the 
flourishing industrial centers of Europe.”65  This sentence is nothing short 
of a dogma of faith. The same idea can be expressed in different forms 
but the content has always been the same since the publication of the first 
Report of the Philippine Commission in 1900. Spanish misrule had to 
give way to the magnanimity of the Americans, who were called up to 
confront Spanish tyranny. As the Schurman report concludes: 
If the government is administered in the Philippines in the spirit in 
which it is administered in the United States, the people of that 
archipelago will, as already a few of them foresee, enjoy more 
                                                 
64 May, Glenn A. ‘Civic Ritual and Political Reality: Municipal Elections in the late nineteenth 
century.’ In Ruby R. Paredes (ed.), Philippine Colonial Democracy. Monograph Series Number 32 
New Haven: Yale, 1988, p. 36. 
65 Owen, Norman G. The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia. A New History. Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 2005, p. 151. 
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benefits than they dreamed of when they took up arms against the 
corrupt and oppressive domination of Spain.66 
 
          This statement clarifies all the ambiguities confronted by the 
Americans in deciding to hold on to the archipelago. The corrupt and 
oppressor Spanish system had not prepared the Filipinos for self-
government. The Americans, transplanting their institutions, were to 
educate the poor and ignorant Filipinos. Progress triumphs over 
medievalism. 
          Any reader of the Report would have to conclude that, first of all, 
the Filipinos are unable to undertake the task of governing the 
archipelago at the present time. Diverse arguments are employed to 
support this categorical statement: the multiplicity of tribes, the diversity 
of languages which are mutually unintelligible and reflecting the 
multifarious stages of civilization. In sum the Filipinos are not a nation 
“but a variegated assemblage of different tribes and peoples, and their 
loyalty is still of the tribal type.” The Americans are inheriting from the 
Spaniards a geographically, ethnically, and linguistically fragmented 
colony. 
          Secondly, the reader would conclude that if the United States 
withdraws, the islands would lapse into anarchy and that would mean 
that the Great Powers would step in to protect their citizens and property 
there and would divide the islands among themselves. This argument is 
interwoven with the support that the U.S. receives from the Filipino 
Autonomists, who are identified as the representatives of the whole 
archipelago. Predictably the report states the indispensable need from the 
                                                 
66 Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission… Vol. I, part IV, p. 82. 
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Filipino point of view of maintaining American sovereignty over the 
archipelago, recognized by all intelligent Filipinos and even by those 
insurgents who desire an American protectorate; “They recognize the 
indubitable fact that the Filipinos cannot stand alone.” 
Americans, therefore, cannot escape the responsibilities of 
government: “The commission is strongly persuaded that the 
performance of our national duty will prove the greatest blessing to the 
peoples of the Philippines.” This is the final conclusion of the 
Commission, presented on 2 November 1899. 
          The reaction of the press was mixed, ranging in comments from 
those of the Boston Journal and New York Press which termed the report 
of Schurman as “able” and “statesmanlike,” to those of the Washington 
Post which leveled a bitter attack upon both the report and its author. The 
detractors of the Schurman report would be silenced, however. The 
discourse had begun to take shape. The machinery had been engendered. 
The first Commission led by Schurman, through its contacts in some 
Philippine provinces with witnesses consisting of a few prominent men 
as well the most “ignorant,” wrote the report in order to pave the way for 
the second commission, which would rely on a strong military contingent 
to “conquer the peace.” The first Commission committed a serious 
blunder by assuring the American people that the insurrection was over 
and that the Filipinos generally welcomed U.S. rule. This optimistic 
report mobilized American public opinion to support the occupation. But 
the Commission was unable to silence the strong Filipino feelings for 
independence since, in spite of its conclusion that the insurrection came 
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from only a single Philippine “tribe”—the “Tagalos”—as distinguished 
from “the great mass of the Filipino people,” this insurrection would 
spread like wildfire to other islands.  
          The first Philippine Commission needed to twist the arguments to 
convince and mobilize public opinion of the necessity to keep the 
archipelago. From now on, a vertiginous publication of books with the 
same arguments and stereotyped images of the Filipinos and the 
Spaniards would invade the market. Yale and Michigan would become 
the cradle of democratization and imperialism, respectively collecting 
Spanish books and spreading the American discourse. The idea of saving 
“others” had germinated. 
          Worcester said of the Schurman Commission that “more than 
fourteen years’ experience in governmental work in the Philippines has 
profoundly impressed me with the fundamental soundness of these 
conclusions of the first Philippine Commission. Every statement then 
made still holds true.”67 As I shall show in the chapters to follow, every 
statement made then would hold “true” until independence, and maybe 
every statement has since become the dictum of truth until the present, 
using deceptively new terminologies, theoretical frameworks and 
discourses. 
                                                 








We have difficulty in Cavite with old 
ladrones Montalon and Felizardo, 
the difficulty in Albay, that arose 
really out of the oppression of some 
of the municipal caciques and has 
now developed into pure ladronism 
and a little mixture of religious 
fanaticism and ladronism… 
 




          Jacob Schurman and his commissioners came back to the United 
States with their categorical conclusions: the United States could not 
withdraw from the Philippines since the Filipinos were “wholly” 
unprepared for independence. The great mass of the people were 
ignorant, with a vague idea of what independence meant. And the 
educated class “is clearly desirous of peace here.1 The latter statement 
was one of the misrepresentations of the Schurman Commission, since 
the reports inferred that most of the Filipinos welcomed American rule 
and that the insurrection was over. This optimistic news was beneficial 
for McKinley, who was preparing for his re-election. He could then 
mobilize public opinion around the fact that he [as the representative of 
America] had won the “respect and affection of the inhabitants of the 
Philippines.”2 
                                                 
1 Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission (Schurman), II, 68, 352. 
2 Salamanca, Bonifacio S.  The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 1901-1913. Quezon City: New 
Day Publishers, 1984, p. 23. 
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          The conclusions of the Schurman Commission made McKinley 
undertake the task of establishing civil government in the new 
possession. Towards this end, he appointed a second Philippine 
Commission, designating William Howard Taft as its President. Other 
commissioners were Dean C. Worcester, Luke Wright, Henry Ide and 
Bernard Moses. This new Commission had a specific mission to continue 
and perfect the work of organizing and establishing civil government 
already commenced by the military authorities subject in all respects to 
any laws which Congress may enact.3  
  The new Taft Commission brought with it a long Instruction 
promulgated by McKinley, which among other things stated: 
In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which 
that are authorized to proscribe, the commission should bear in 
mind that government they are establishing is not designed for our 
satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views but for 
the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine 
Islands…At the same time the Commission should bear in mind, 
and the people of the islands should be made plainly to understand, 
that there are certain great principles of government which have 
been made the basis of our governmental system which we deem 
essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual 
freedom…4 
 
          Words such as “happiness,” “peace,” and “prosperity” disguised 
the real purposes of the United States: an indefinite retention of the 
Philippines. “The maintenance of individual freedom” became part of the 
democratic doctrine implanted in the Philippine islands in order to 
demonstrate that the Philippines had not prospered politically, 
                                                 
3 Willis Henry P.  Our Philippine Problem. A Study of American Colonial Party. New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1905, p. 29.  
4 President McKinley’s Instructions to the Philippine Commission, April 7, 1900. This Instruction can 
be found in W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands. Appendices VII, p. 442. 
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economically and socially since the Spaniards did not believe in this 
principle. 
          Taft carried out, in part, McKinley’s instruction. In 1902 the peace 
was signed. Taft won many Filipinos over with his “policy of attraction” 
and his slogan “the Philippines for the Filipinos,” which was understood 
as the Filipinization of the archipelago. From 1902 to 1914 he would 
intervene in the archipelago—as Governor, Secretary of War and 
President of the United States. During these years he tried to 
“Americanize” and “democratize” the islands. 
          “Americanization” and the “democratization” would not be free of 
problems deemed to be inherited from the Spaniards or inherent in the 
Filipinos. Accompanying the positive terms such as happiness, peace, 
prosperity, and individual freedom stressed by Taft and the Republicans, 
we find a new terminology, which the Americans imbued with 
completely negative meanings. Taft and American rule would be faced 
with something that they called “caciquism.” This term started to appear 
in the textbooks in 1904, no doubt when the Americans were already 
familiar with the Spanish bibliography. This is the reason that this term 
cannot be found in the reports of the Commission.  
          Moreover, the Americans would start to misuse typical Spanish 
terms from the nineteenth century such as “clase directora” [ruling class] 
in order to infer “oligarchism and caciquism as a form of government.” 
Oligarchy was in Spain inextricably related to caciquism. However the 
Americans gave a different meaning to oligarchy; it would come to refer 
to a political class. Caciquism was assigned a different meaning as well: 
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landlordism.  From the Spanish term ladrón, the Americans coined a new 
word to refer to the evils they had inherited: “ladronism” [corrupt 
brigandage]. And since they considered that the Filipinos were inherently 
bandits with insurgent trends, they resurrected a rare Spanish term from 
the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries: “latro-faccioso” (bandit).  
This word cannot be found in the RAE. The root “latro” comes from 
“latrocinio” or “latrocinar,” which means the act of theft; and the second 
word, “faccioso,” means “rebel.” Through this noun “latro-faccioso,” a 
species of Filipino “bandit-insurgents” came to be known. 
          Another term adopted from Spanish in order to justify the intensive 
military operations carried out by the Americans to “pacify” the Islands 
during the Taft Commission is “reconcentración.” This term should not 
be confused with “reconcentration camps,” such as the Americans 
inferred. Valeriano Weyler had imposed the “reconcentration policy,” 
which meant a separation of the rebels from civilians by putting the latter 
in safe havens protected by loyal Spanish troops. However the Americans 
decided to co-opt the negative term “concentration camp.” By doing so 
they were inferring that the Spaniards previously used these draconian 
measures. The Spaniards in fact never used such measures in the 
Philippines. Weyler only used it in Cuba. Last but not the least, the 
triumph of the nationalists in the Philippines gave rise to a new Spanish 
term, “peonage” (debt bondage), a system never used by the Spaniards in 
the Philippines  In sum, the Taft era was giving form to the binary 
opposition “bad Spain—good United States.”  
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          This binary opposition, which started to be enunciated by the 
Schurman Commission, became fully established during the term of 
Taft’s Commission. Taft announced the “benevolent purposes” of the 
U.S. in different provinces in order to pacify the archipelago. “The 
Americans,” he declared, “in contrast to the Spaniards, had not come to 
enslave the people, but to promote an honest, liberal government which 
would secure to each Filipino his personal liberty.”5 
          Sentences like the above were commonplace in American 
textbooks that were published from 1903.6 Many hagiographies of the 
Taft era came out from 1903 to 1946, but some books would be 
especially significant since they were published during difficult years for 
the policy of attraction implemented by Taft. 7 In fact, the Taft era has 
not lost its influence in American scholarship, since from the 1970’s to 
the present many scholars have devoted books to this period. These 
books have a specific feature: the theme of the emergence of the Filipino 
collaborators8 who used Taft and his commissioners for their own benefit 
                                                 
5 LeRoy, James A. ‘Travelogue’. 1900-1901. Cited in Gleeck Lewis. Nine Years to make the difference. 
Metro Manila: Loyal Printing, Inc., 1996, p. 15. 
6 See Chamberlin, Fred C. The Blow from Behind or some features of the Anti-Imperialist Movement 
attending the war in Spain. This book is completely propagandistic. In fact it is a hagiography of 
McKinley’s policy and the Schurman and Taft Commissions. 
7 1905 witnessed the publication of David P. Barrows. A History of the Philippines; Fred Atkinson. The 
Philippine Islands; and James A. LeRoy. Philippine Life in Town and Country. 1913-1914 would 
become another landmark for Taft’s hagiographies and the appearance of Dean C. Worcester, The 
Philippines Past and Present; James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines – a posthumous 
work; Daniel R. Williams. The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission; David P. Barrows. A Decade of 
American Government in the Philippines; and Frederik Chamberlin. The Philippine Problem 1896-
1913; Charles B. Elliot, The Philippines to the end of Military Regime and The Philippines to the end of 
the Commission Government. 1925-1930 would see the culmination of the discourse: W. Cameron 
Forbes. The Philippine Islands, in two volumes; David P. Barrows. A History of the Philippines; D. R. 
Williams. The Philippines and the United States; Nicholas Roosevelt. The Philippines. A Treasure and 
a Problem; and Dean C. Worcester. The Philippines Past and Present with an introduction by Joseph 
Raston Hayden, etc. Practically all the authors were American officials involved in Taft Commission. 
8 David J. Steinberg started to treat this topic during the 1970’s at the University of Michigan; and 
Peter Stanley, in A Nation in the Making,  developed the same argument. At present many American 
scholars follow the pattern of Steinberg or Stanley. In fact, Stanley considered that the Taft’s era 
finished in 1914 when he lost the presidential elections. Michael Cullinane in Ilustrado Politics affirms 
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and became de facto and de iure the makers of the dysfunctional 
democracy prevalent in the Philippines. Underpinning this narrative is a 
surreptitious evolutionary emplotment. 
          No doubt, the decade of Taft’s policy is the most decisive for 
understanding the American construction of Philippine history. Above 
all, the year 1905 is significant, for three reasons. First is that by this year 
the Americans had become completely familiar with Spanish 
historiography on the Philippines. This knowledge bore fruit in the 
publication of many books.9  These were mainly textbooks that followed 
a specific pattern: a history of Spanish rule until the Spanish-American 
war in which there is a systemic discrediting of the Spanish regime. Here 
the books would take the cue from the report of the Schurman 
Commission. The implication of this narrative is that the Americans 
found a tabula rasa in the Philippines. Spanish rule had kept the subject 
population in a state of ignorance. Furthermore, all the textbooks 
included an ethnological study of the diverse tribes of the Philippines. 
This would justify the American occupation since the Philippines—an 
amalgam of islands and tribes—was seen to be inhabited by semi-savage 
tribes. 
          A second reason for the importance of 1905 is linked to the first: 
Accompanying the new familiarity with Spanish writings was a tendency 
to suppress certain books which would question the construction of the 
American discourse. Only those Spanish books which helped to foster the 
                                                                                                                                            
that Taft lost influence when the Federalistas or collaborators lost their pre-eminence. Taft lost his 
power for the brief interregnum of the democrats in the Philippines. Leonard Wood and Henry L. 
Stimson in 1928 were to follow the politics inaugurated by Taft. In fact, Henry L. Stimson had been 
Secretary of War in 1911, during Taft’s presidency.  
9 See, the above note. 
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discourse were promoted. This policy of suppression was used as well 
against some American scholars who dissented against Taft’s policy, and 
above all against the Filipino ilustrados. Their voices continue to be 
silenced. 
          The third and most important fact is that in 1905 James A. LeRoy 
emerged as an authoritative voice—arguably, the only voice—of 
Philippine history. He became the expert in the history of Spain and its 
centuries of rule in the Philippines, portraying a distorted image which 
has prevailed up to the present. 
          LeRoy is notable for his grand overviews of the Spanish regime, 
although he himself admitted that “the general conclusions I have stated 
are not always brought out clearly.”10 Nevertheless, these “general 
conclusions” led him to confirm what the Schurman Commission had 
noted in its report. LeRoy gave full form to the notion of the “dark age” 
of Spanish rule—the view that for three hundred years the Spaniards 
ruled the Philippines under a medieval system dominated by the religious 
orders, a medievalism so deeply rooted that any reformism would 
become a dead letter. It is LeRoy’s work that underpins the discourse of 
the “immobilism” of Spanish rule.  
          LeRoy’s intimate knowledge of Spanish historiography on the 
Philippines allowed him to cleverly suppress important works related to 
the last thirty years of Spanish rule and to relegate Spanish reforms to a 
secondary place. In fact, in 1904 he  wrote probably the most direct 
statement on how to marginalize the reformism of late Spanish rule: “Of 
                                                 
10 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, August 24, 1904. James A. Robertson 
Special Correspondence. Box 5. Washington: The Manuscript division, Library of Congress. I ought 
this information to Professor Bernardita Churchill who kindly shared with me. 
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course, the various reform programs of liberal and revolutionary 
governments in Spain must have attention, but these, and the 1872 revolt, 
are really to be relegated to a secondary place…11 
          LeRoy was to follow literally this statement in his book The 
Americans in the Philippines, in which there is a systematical denial of 
Spanish reformism. Instead, LeRoy invites us, for an understanding of 
the Spanish regime, to use the report of the Schurman Commission.  
          In addition, LeRoy, as I will explore in the fourth chapter, 
discredited all those who could question the American construction of 
Philippine history. In this context, we have to include Spanish scholars 
such as Wenceslao Retana; the Britishers John Foreman and Alleyne 
Ireland, and fellow Americans such as Henry Parker Willis (Our Spanish 
Problem), Charles Ballentine (As it is in the Philippines) and James H. 
Blount (Philippine Independence –Why, and Philippine Independence –
When).12    
           There are several other aspects of LeRoy’s career that make him 
indispensable to understanding Philippine history from 1900 to 1909. He 
witnessed the work of the Taft Commission as Worcester’s secretary. He 
wrote a first hand testimony of the congressional trip in 1905. He was the 
personal secretary and, above all, political adviser of Taft.  
          It is not well-known that LeRoy was as well the architect, from 
1904 to 1907, of The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, that massive 
                                                 
11 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, May 18, 1904. James Alexander 
Robertson Special Correspondence. Box 5. Washington: The Manuscript division, Library of Congress.  
12 Parker Willis, Charles Ballentine and James Blount were systematically discredited and suppressed 
of the bibliographies. At present Parker Willis and Blount are known as –Democrats anti-Imperialists 
and their important works have been forgotten by practically all the scholars. The case of Ballentine is 
different he has been completely forgotten.  
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collection of Spanish documents translated into English and edited by 
James A. Robertson and Emma H. Blair. This part of LeRoy’s career will 
be tackled in a later chapter in which the Blair & Robertson collection 
will be analyzed. As we shall see, this influential work gave shape to 
another myth—the encapsulation of the Philippines in a Latin American 
context—with which LeRoy was fully complicit. 
LeRoy was important for his articles in newspapers and journals, 
for his books Philippine Life in town and country and The Americans in 
the Philippines—a posthumous work published in 1914. He left an 
important legacy in Michigan in the form of a travelogue of the Taft 
Commission and his notes of the Congressional trip of 1905. But his 
most important legacy is a file of his correspondence with Filipino 
ilustrados, American officials, James A. Robertson and above all with 
William H. Taft. Through these letters we can challenge the official 
discourse since they cast new light on the activities of the Americans in 
the Philippines during the first decade of their rule. These challenges to 
the official history will be presented in the chapters that follow. 
 
LeRoy: A sketch of a short life 
 
         There are three official biographies of LeRoy. A short 
introduction written by Taft in 1913 is found in the posthumous work of 
LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines. These biographical notes 
introduce the erudite scholar and politician LeRoy.  The second 
biography included in the same work was written by LeRoy’s good 
friend Harry Coleman, editor of the Pontiac (Michigan) Press Gazette. 
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Finally a biography was written by his daughter Elizabeth L. Kallock.13 
The three biographic sketches are completely hagiographic, specially 
those written by Taft and Coleman. The latter pursued a specific 
objective: to mobilize LeRoy’s work in order to reverse the new policy of 
Filipinization ordered by President Wilson and implemented in the 
islands by Governor Francis B. Harrison. Therefore it is not rare to find 
some isomorphism between past and present in Coleman’s biography. 
The interpolation of past as origin of the present was aimed at mobilizing 
American public opinion through the voice of LeRoy, who had become 
known as the authority best able to make judgment on subjects connected 
with the Philippines. Coleman was speaking of the present when he said 
the following of the late LeRoy: 
It was his firm belief that until the great mass of Filipinos have 
been raised to a higher standard of citizens, both from an 
educational standpoint and with a knowledge of stable 
governmental discipline, any efforts toward independence would 
tend to the creation of factional difficulties of a disrupting and 
demoralizing nature. To promise the Islanders any particular time 
when independence would be granted seemed likewise to him 
inadvisable…14 
 
Of course, LeRoy subscribed to this belief. He was a convinced 
imperialist and a Republican conservative able to suppress any work 
which could damn the imperial machinery of the United States. 
                                                 
13 I do not know if this biography was published since I found a draft among James A. LeRoy papers. 
According to this draft, this biography was written in 1979. However, Lewis Gleeck affirms that the 
biographic sketch was written in 1970. Gleeck Lewis. Nine Years to make a difference, p 1,. 
14 Coleman, Harry. ‘James Alfred LeRoy,’ p. xx, 1913. In James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the 
Philippines. A History of the conquest and first years of occupation with an introduction account of the 
Spanish rule. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914. 
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James A. LeRoy15 was born in Pontiac, Michigan, on 9 December 
1875 to a farming family. He graduated in the Classical, Latin and 
Scientific courses of his high school at the age of seventeen and had 
shown considerable athletic and scholastic ability, acquiring University 
attention by winning track events. In the three years during which he 
completed the full four-year course in the Literary College, he 
participated in track and football and won the admiration of President 
Angell and the faculty, as well as his many friends. His sports and other 
student activity articles, written while working in the Michigan Daily as 
Sports Editor and Managing Editor, were bought by the Associated Press, 
which appreciated the point of view of the participant who was also the 
writer. In this Senior Year he was a Director of the Athletic Association, 
to which he had belonged all three years; Captain of the track team, 
Managing Editor of the Daily, Senior Reception Committee, aside from 
being a top-ranking student. He was Ann Arbor correspondent for a 
number of papers throughout his these years, contributing to the 
Michigan Daily, Detroit News, Detroit Free Press, Pontiac Gazette and 
other metropolitan papers.  
          He graduated in 1896 from the University with the degree of 
Bachelor of Arts, his standing throughout his course entitling him to the 
highest honors. After his graduation he became Principal for one year at 
the Pontiac High School. He resigned his position to enter the ranks of 
journalism, being successfully connected with the Detroit Free Press and 
Evening News, and occupying a responsible position as political reporter.   
                                                 
15 To write most of this brief biographic approach I follow Elizabeth L. Kallock’s biography and Harry 
Coleman’s.  Some parts are my own arguments as a result of the reading of LeRoy’s correspondence. 
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He was in New York where he made extensive connection with the best 
publications. Later he became Sunday editor of the Baltimore Herald. It 
was while on this newspaper that he had an assignment in Washington 
which placed him in touch with the members of the Philippine 
Commission only recently chosen by President McKinley. He met in 
Washington his former professor and friend, Dean C. Worcester, who 
invited him to be his secretary and tag along with the Second Philippine 
Commission. He took Philippine history and Spanish classes en route. In 
fact, Worcester said of Le Roy: 
Knowing his excellent university record I selected him 
unhesitatingly from a large number of applicants for this 
position…He has necessarily been entrusted with much 
information of a confidential character, and has always displayed 
the greatest discretion in the uses to which he has put the 
knowledge which he possesses…16 
 
          During his term as secretary of the Philippine Commission LeRoy 
became close to Taft, being his political analyst, his advisor and his 
“brain,” defending him until he died. LeRoy kept in touch with the 
Filipino elite –the members of the recently founded Partido Federal who 
provided him bibliographical information about the Spanish period and 
the Filipino revolution, and never lost touch with them until he died in 
1909. LeRoy’s correspondence with this elite raises some questions as to 
whether the Americans made promise of definite independence to these 
so-called collaborators or Americanistas. What it is perceptible through 
the letters is that Taft and his Commissioners promised the 
“Filipinization” of the archipelago.   
                                                 
16 Department of the Interior, Manila. January 9th 1902.  
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          When LeRoy returned from this trip he had caught tuberculosis. 
The doctors advised him to live in dry climate. He went to Mexico and 
during his stay there he learnt about Spanish politics through Spanish 
magazine. He also began to discredit the emerging anti-Imperialist 
literature. LeRoy looked with grave concern upon any movement which 
had for its end the turning over of the Islands to complete native control. 
He plunged into magazine and newspaper writing, allowing no argument 
in favor of Philippine independence to go unchallenged. Of LeRoy’s 
vigorous journalistic campaign Coleman remarks: 
In none of these was there any attempt at controversy other than 
properly to inform the people of the United States of the duty 
resting upon them, to the end that the Filipinos should not be cast 
adrift while undergoing a sane and unselfish process of 
amelioration.17 
 
          Contrary to Coleman’s hagiographic account, there was an attempt 
at controversy and what LeRoy tried to do was silence dissonant voices. 
Ballentine had questioned the arbitrariness of the Taft Commission in 
1901. Henry Parker Willis and, later, James Blount started a crusade 
against U.S. policy in the Philippines. They were to affirm categorically 
that the Filipinos were prepared for independence. LeRoy, making use of 
his good literary connection with numerous publications, was eager to 
counterattack these arguments. He also wrote papers for prestigious 
journals such as the Political Science Quarterly, the American Historical 
Review, the Independent and the Atlantic Monthly.  
          After his stay in Mexico, LeRoy was appointed Consul at Durango 
in 1904. In 1905, he consolidated himself as an authority by publishing in 
                                                 
17 Coleman, Harry. ‘James Alfred LeRoy’, p. xxi. 
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the Atlantic Monthly the essay, “Our Spanish Inheritance in the 
Philippines.” This piece inaugurated publicly the notion that “caciquism” 
was the “chief obstacle to social and political progress in the 
Philippines.”18 No doubt, LeRoy learnt this term while reading Spanish 
works since he did not use it in his writings for the Taft Commission. 
This paper, I will explore in a separate chapter, had two objectives: The 
first one was to counter British criticism of the American colonial 
enterprise by Alleyne Ireland and others. LeRoy was to answer Ireland 
by arguing that the Americans inherited an evil from Spanish rule called 
“caciquism.”  
          The second and most important purpose was to demonstrate that 
the Filipinos were unfit for self-government and for independence. He 
was surreptitiously reversing Parker Willis’s arguments. Even the title 
Our Spanish Inheritance is the underside of Our Philippine Problem. He 
underpinned his argument about “caciquism” in his book Philippine Life 
in Town and Country. This book became a replica of Taft’s reports but 
disguised under the form of scholarship. Philippine Life in Town and 
Country provided a pattern for future books. It is important to analyze in 
some detail this book. Finally, in 1905 LeRoy would travel to the 
Philippines as personal secretary of Taft in the Congressional tour known 
as the Alice Roosevelt Longsworth trip.   
          LeRoy spent his short life collecting information to write what he 
considered his magnum opus, The Americans in the Philippines. Reading 
his correspondence it seems he finished this book before he died but he 
                                                 
18 LeRoy James A. ‘Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines.’ Atlantic Monthly, 1905, p. 340.  
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had some problems publishing it—above all a fierce controversy on 
political issues with Dean C. Worcester. Worcester in 1906 told LeRoy 
that he could help him in publishing his book but he encouraged him to 
change some ideas which he considered big mistakes. We do not know if 
LeRoy could not publish the book for this reason. He complained to Taft 
that Philippine matters were undermining his health and his finances. 
Perhaps he did not finish it for this reason. The publication in 1914 
invites suspicion since the book counters the new policy of Filipinization 
implanted by Harrison, and some parts seem written by Worcester more 
than by LeRoy. 
          LeRoy passed away in 1909 at the age of 34. Two months before 
his death, General Clarence Edwards asked him to review the two first 
volumes of Taylor’s manuscript, The Philippine Insurrection Against the 
United States: A Compilation of Documents with Notes and 
Introductions. LeRoy, with his usual eloquence and articulation, 
managed to ensure that this manuscript would not be published. This was 
his last advice to Taft, who was about to be appointed president of the 
United States. 
          This has been a quick review of LeRoy’s life. His work and his 
task as scholar and politician are more important since he established 
some stereotypes that have survived to the present, and he managed to 









LeRoy and his Filipino friends: Enter the “collaborators” and 
“caciques” 
          The autonomists,19after a brief involvement with the revolutionary 
government, accepted U.S. sovereignty since the Americans promised 
justice, liberty and self-government. Pardo de Tavera, Luzuriaga and 
Legarda joined the Taft Commission. The Partido Federal was 
organized,  becoming substantially the agent of the government. It is said 
that the members of the Partido Federal shaped Philippine conditions. 
Pardo de Tavera, Arellano, Legarda and others exerted considerable 
influence on American civil and military officials. Last but not least, they 
were among the main protagonists in the restoration of the peace.20 This 
linear emplotment has its raison d’être—to show how the influence of 
this elite on the country and on the American administration led to the 
build-up of a dysfunctional democracy ruled by prominent families who 
had been influential during the Spanish era. The Americans, finding 
themselves incapable of governing the islands, were looking to history in 
order to pin the blame on others.  
                                                 
19 I use this term since the ilustrados who promised alliance to the United States  were close to some 
Spanish Republicans and “Autonomists” such as Emilio Junoy and Pi y Margall. These Spanish 
politicians clamored insistently to concede parliamentary representation to the Filipinos. In 1898, the 
prominent ilustrados expressed their love for Spain “porque queremos que las islas Filipinas sean 
españolas”(because we wish the Philippine Islands to belong to Spain). Spain denied the reforms and 
when they implemented them it was too late.   
20 See, for instance, Cullinane, Michael. Ilustrado Politics…, pp. 57-58. Steinberg, David J. The 
Philippines A singular and a Plural Place. 
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          Pardo de Tavera, Arellano, Legarda, Luzuriaga, Albert, Clemente 
J. Zulueta and others became an indispensable resource, at the beginning 
at least, for the Americans. They knew Spanish, Tagalog, Spanish 
history, Spanish documents, the history of the Philippines and so forth. 
The Americans were to show them how liberal they were by authorizing 
them to create a political party and to implement an “apparent de-
centralized system” in which Filipinos would have important positions in 
the government. Besides, the Americans were to promise independence 
for sure and above all, a time frame for the Filipinization of the 
archipelago, equivalent to total autonomy.   
          The members of the Partido Federal believed in the promises of 
the Americans and decided to accompany the commission on its journey 
through the provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac and Pangasinan. In this 
context Pardo de Tavera, Legarda, Arellano, Albert and Torres met 
LeRoy, who immediately showed his friendliness by telling them about 
his intention to write a history of the Philippines from a Filipino 
standpoint. We note, however, that in his private correspondence LeRoy 
revealed his true attitude toward these ilustrados by calling them 
Latinized, bastard half-Spaniards and, above all, “caciques.”21  
          When LeRoy returned to the United States and above all when he 
was appointed Consul of Durango, he began to send letters to his friends 
as well as those who were not his friends such as, for example, Leon M. 
Guerrero and Isabelo de los Reyes. The excuse was to ask about Spanish 
bibliographical sources to write his book, paying special attention to the 
                                                 
21 The correspondence between James A. Le Roy and W.H. Taft  frequently contains these epithets. See 
Robertson James Alexander. Annapolis Md. Manuscripts. North Carolina: Duke University; Personal 
Letters of LeRoy James Alfred, 1875-1909. Ann Arbor: Bentley Library, University of Michigan.  
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events from 1860 to 1896.22 LeRoy needed to know everything about 
Spanish rule in order to build up his arguments about the immobilism and 
backwardness of America’s colonial predecessor. Moreover, the Spanish 
books would help him to elaborate upon some “evils” that the Americans 
had inherited from the Spaniards. This knowledge had a specific purpose: 
to demonstrate to the anti-Imperialist and Democrats the Filipinos’ 
unfitness for self-government and ultimate independence. LeRoy, then, 
by displaying in his dealings with the ilustrados a liberal acceptance of 
the goal of future independence for the Philippines, was able to know 
about the thoughts and feelings of his Filipino friends concerning 
American policy in the archipelago. This knowledge would then help him 
design an effective policy to would undermine any possible Filipinization 
and continuation of the Spanish imprint. 
As early as 1902, LeRoy communicated with Clemente Zulueta23 
through José Albert. Zulueta became a key person for LeRoy since he 
provided valuable information which LeRoy would use in his paper “The 
Philippines, 1860-1898; Some Comments and Bibliographical Notes”24 
and in his book, The Americans in the Philippines, with some comments 
which Zulueta never affirmed. LeRoy introduced himself to Zulueta as 
follows: “I have committed myself to write a work about the American 
                                                 
22 James A. LeRoy to Florentino Torres, Durango, Mexico, August 28, 1904.  Personal Letters of 
LeRoy, James Alfred, 1875-1909. Box 1. Folder 1 October 1903 to end of 1904. Ann Arbor: Bentley 
Library, University of Michigan. 
23 Clemente J. Zulueta is important for de-constructing the work of Blair and Robertson, The Philippine 
Islands 1493-1898. Zulueta was born in Paco in 1876. He was a distinguished Filipino bibliographer.  
He studied law at the University of Santo Tomás. Although he realized different activities as journalist 
in La Independencia he has become well known as a historian. During Taft’s term as governor of the 
Philippines, Zulueta was named the collecting librarian traveling to Spain. He died in 1904. 
24 This paper was published in  Blair and Robertson (ed.), The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, vol. 52. I 
shall explain in the chapter devoted to Blair and Robertson how LeRoy was to use Zulueta’s knowledge 
of Spanish works such as Montero y Vidal, Sastrón, Memoria del General Blanco, Retana’s works and 
so forth. 
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Occupation in the Philippines (1898-1903) next summer. I shall try to be 
fair with all the parties involved.”25 
          LeRoy’s predisposition to read the works written by Filipinos and, 
above all, his claim that he wished to provide his fellow Americans with 
a true history of the revolution, captivated Zulueta and other ilustrados. 
This led Zulueta to admit to LeRoy that he possessed important 
documents of the revolution: 
I see you have in mind to write a chronicle of the Philippine 
Revolution. I have enough unknown documents about the 
revolution. Some of these documents are so precious that I think 
that one cannot write accurately about the Philippine Revolution 
without previously consulting them.26 
 
          Zulueta had important documents on the Katipunan, the treaty of 
Biac-na-bato, the revolution and the first phase of the newspaper La 
Independencia, to which he had been a contributor. He did not share 
these documents with LeRoy but his whole collection was sold to the 
American government in the Philippines. What Zulueta’s documents 
contained we cannot find out since they fell victim to the American 
suppression of sources. 
          Zulueta provided two important statements to LeRoy, which would 
be suppressed or ignored by him and by future scholars. In 1904 Zulueta 
wrote, “The only works I recommend to you are La Política de España 
                                                 
25 James A. LeRoy to Clemente J. Zulueta, Durango, Mexico October 3, 1903. Personal Letters of 
LeRoy, James Alfred, 1875-1909. Box 1, Folder 1 October 1903 to the end of 1904. Ann Arbor: 
Bentley Library, University of Michigan. 
26 Clemente J. Zulueta to James A. LeRoy, Manila 20 September 1902. Robertson James Alexander. 
Annapolis. Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. North Caroline: Duke University. 
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en Filipinas and Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino. These two works contain 
reports and excerpts of the trials, etc. all rigorously official.”27 
          LeRoy did not make any reference to La Política de España en 
Filipinas despite Zulueta’s advice to him that the last issues of the 
journal were important since they presented the Spanish political debates 
about the archipelago and the new colonial restructuring. In fact, Retana, 
who is the underside of LeRoy, put the blame for the loss of the 
Philippines on those liberals who carried out the colonial transformation. 
LeRoy decided to ignore Zulueta’s recommendation since recognition of 
Spanish reformism would undermine the American construction of 
Spanish-Philippine history as an era of ecclesiastical medievalism until 
the very end. LeRoy instead decontextualized the journal: “When you 
come to read La Política de España en Filipinas  you will find there 
sufficient internal evidence to damn Retana.”28 This journal was not to be 
used by American scholars anymore. 
          As for Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, another of Zulueta’s 
recommendations, LeRoy used the documents it contained relating to the 
Katipunan—that is, Volume 3— in order to infer that this movement was 
an excrescence of the poor and ignorant masses and that Bonifacio 
intended to “aniquilar” (exterminate) all the whites. 
          The other important statement Zulueta made LeRoy was related to 
the “Audiencia of Manila”: “The Audiencia of Manila did not depend on 
Mexico as some scholars believe; since its foundation it was autonomous 
                                                 
27 Clemente J. Zulueta to James A. LeRoy, Madrid 31 Enero 1904. Robertson James Alexander. 
Annapolis. Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. North Caroline: Duke University.  
28 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson. James A. Robertson Special Correspondence, Box 5. 
Washington: The Manuscripts division, Library of Congress. 
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of [Mexico].”29 Zulueta was denying the traditional argument that the 
Philippines was a mere appendage of New Spain. Precisely, the role that 
the Audiencia played in the Philippines made the archipelago de facto 
and de iure independent, with its own legislative corpus. LeRoy ignored 
this statement since it could undermine the emerging argument of the 
encapsulation of the Philippines in Latin America. Instead, LeRoy 
decided to follow Pardo de Tavera’s argument that “The Philippine 
Islands had relations with Spain through the viceroyalty of Mexico and in 
many things the Philippines depended on the viceroy of New Spain, 
being also its Audiencia what decided many lawsuits from the 
Philippines.”30 Pardo de Tavera’s argument suited perfectly the history 
that LeRoy was writing. This is the view which has come to prevail in the 
textbooks.  
          Zulueta died in 1904. He never got to know how LeRoy used his 
bibliographical knowledge. He was only useful to LeRoy in the scholarly 
sense. On the other hand, Pardo de Tavera, Florentino Torres, José Albert 
and others were both scholarly and politically useful.  
          It is important to note that LeRoy only absorbed the political 
perspective of the members of the Partido Federal since those whom he 
considered “irreconciliables” such as Isabelo de los Reyes and 
Dominador Gomez never answered his letters. LeRoy therefore based his 
arguments on the one-dimensional political trend he was familiar with. 
This fact made him distort the events which took place in 1904 and 1905.   
                                                 
29 Clemente J. Zulueta to James A. LeRoy, London, 26 de Abril de 1904. Robertson James Alexander. 
Annapolis. Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1904. North Carolina: Duke University. 
30 Trinidad Pardo de Tavera to James A. LeRoy, Manila, 20 Noviembre, 1902. Robertson James 
Alexander. Annapolis. Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1904. North Carolina: Duke University.  
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In 1903 Taft wrote LeRoy with a great concern: 
We have difficulty in Cavite with those old ladrones Montalan and 
Felizardo, the difficulty in Albay, that arose really out of 
oppression of some of the municipal caciques and has now 
developed into pure ladronism and little mixture of religious 
fanaticism and ladronism in the corner of Nueva Ecija, Tarlac and 
Pampanga…31 
 
          This excerpt is important for several reasons. The first is that, 
while Taft was sending to the United States optimistic messages and 
information, he privately revealed his grave concerns about the situation 
in the Philippines. These worries give us an alternative view to the 
official story about the stability of the civil government established by 
the Taft Commission. 
          The organization of municipal governments was attempted in 1902 
and 1903. Sometimes, however, upon the reports of disorder or 
“ladronism” the Commission would turn over a province to the military. 
In 1903 Taft reported that “it became perfectly evident that many of them 
were not able to maintain decent government.”32 Therefore, the governor 
decided to reduce the number of municipalities. The discontentment of 
some municipalities provoked serious disturbances in some provinces. 
Taft, LeRoy and other officials represented these disturbances as 
“ladronism”—as the work of a small, disorderly element. We can see 
from the words used by Taft that ladronism was more serious than the 
reports show. Besides, the letters written by Pardo de Tavera, Albert, 
Legarda and other “ilustrados” show us a generalized discontentment, 
although related more to their own political survival. 
                                                 
31 William H. Taft to James A. LeRoy, Manila, September 7, 1903. Robertson James Alexander 
Annapolis Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. North Carolina: Duke University.  
32 Parker Willis H. Our Philippine Problem. A Study of American Colonial Policy. New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1905, p. 73. 
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          Taft used terms derived from the Spanish words “ladrón” and 
“cacique.” In fact, this will be the first time that the terms appear, 
although privately. Taft was to define “caciquism” as a kind of bossism 
or a “tendency to exercise arbitrary powers which have not been 
conferred by law.”33 It is obvious that by 1903 the Americans were 
becoming familiar with Spanish historiography on the Philippines, 
although at this time “caciquism” was not yet the main evil confronting 
the implementation of American democracy. As for the term 
“ladronism,” this could be translated as “corrupt brigandage.” As an “-
ism,” however, this term does not exist in Spanish. The Spanish word 
“ladrón” (thief), was turned into an “-ism,” a system. Actually, Filipinos 
themselves did not use the term “ladronism,” preferring instead the 
Spanish term “bandolerismo.” But the Americans decided to co-opt the 
word “ladron” in order to infer that they inherited this problem from 
Spain. The textbooks use synonymously the terms ladrones and 
tulisanes, a Tagalog word used by the Spaniards to refer to bandits. 
          When LeRoy received the abovementioned letter by Taft, he 
immediately communicated with his Filipino friends. In a letter to 
Florentino Torres in October 1903, LeRoy as usual first asked for 
bibliographical information for his book. Immediately afterwards, he said 
he wanted Torres’ opinion about the events that were taking place in the 
Philippines. Torres, subtly, complained about the ambiguities of 
American policy from the beginning. He said that “the Americans had to 
state clearly and put forward a concrete policy of the McKinley 
                                                 
33 Report, 1903, p. 84. Cited in Willis Henry P. Our Philippine Problem, p. 79.  
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government. Their concrete and defined aims had to be expressed 
without doubts or ambiguities, and with absolute clarity and frankness.”34     
 Torres was claiming for more self-government or autonomy and, 
above all, he was urging the American administration to clarify its policy 
for the future. The same claim would be expressed by Jose Albert, but 
Albert was more categorical than Torres. He stated that what was being 
discussed in Manila was a tacit finality of American policy in the 
Philippines. Manila had become a focus of anti-Americanism. Albert 
disagreed with Taft’s belief that a declaration of future independence 
would be disturbing for the Philippines. In fact, Albert was complaining 
about the ambiguity of Taft by voicing the phrase, “Philippines for the 
Filipinos.” “No reason exists to justify the silence of Congress, since this 
silence is translated into the practice that the United States wants to have 
the freedom to make of the Philippines what they wish.”35   
           Albert was being categorical by identifying the turn of American 
policy towards a flagrant colonialism. He considered as offensive the 
argument that a future promise by Congress about independence would 
simply lead to the encouragement of the radicals: 
The “Federales,” who have helped effectively in order for there to 
be peace in the Philippines, constitute the conservative opinion, 
which will always be the necessary counterweight to the radical 
opinion in the free Government of the Philippines.36 
 
          Albert was probably the most radical within the Partido Federal 
and he would leave the party, becoming president in 1908 of the Partido 
                                                 
34 Florentino Torres to James A. LeRoy March 14th 1904. Robertson James Alexander. Annapolis. Md. 
Manuscripts. Box 2. Letters 1902-1906. North Carolina: Duke University.  
35 Jose Albert to James A. LeRoy, May 5, 1904. Robertson James Alexander. Annapolis. Md. 
Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. North Carolina: Duke University 
36 Jose Albert to James A. LeRoy, May 5, 1904.  
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Nacional Progresista by considering that the alternation and plurality of 
the parties would give stability and freedom to a government.  He 
realized that everything in the Philippines was being paralyzed by the 
reduction being made in civil positions and municipalities. The race 
toward self-government had suffered an involution. Albert complained to 
LeRoy that the present administration had paralyzed the participation of 
the Filipinos in government: 
In order to prove you we are now equal or even worse than two 
years ago, I invite you to read the collection of La Democracia and 
you can see the “appointments” that this government makes and 
you will be able to realize that there is a huge difference between 
American and Filipino wages. 
 
…The gradual expansion of the government has remained 
paralyzed and the number of the Filipino judges has decreased. An 
additional proof that the gradual extension of the government is not 
being carried out is the appointment of Provincial Treasurers who 
continue to be Americans, in spite of the reiterated 
embezzlement…37 
 
          Albert provides important information about the real situation in 
the Philippines, and above all he demonstrates that the members of the 
Partido Federal were not as conformist as conventionally pictured in 
American historiography. It is important to illustrate from this excerpt 
three important issues in order to understand the further centralization of 
the administrative system under the U.S. and, above all, the policy of 
patronage (or “caciquism”) that the Americans would start to define and 
normalize. Albert mentions a policy of “appointment.” The government 
would engender the development of a system of patronage. The other two 
issues—prevalence of American officials to the detriment of the 
Filipinos, and the graft and corruption of these American officials—are 
                                                 
37 Jose Albert to James A. LeRoy, May 5, 1904. 
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inextricably interwoven with Taft’s policy of merits and appointments. 
Lamentably, these points have been suppressed or overlooked in the 
historiography, which follows a unilinear approach in which Americans 
are always posited as the ideal types. Thus the emergence of the corrupt 
system has become identified with something inherent in the Filipino 
societal make-up. 
          Albert continues his letter by criticizing the abusive fiscal system 
implemented by the Americans and above all the arbitrariness of the 
methods used by the constabulary. 38  Albert views these two measures as 
having provoked a state of unrest among the Filipinos.  
          Another letter, this time from Pardo de Tavera, provides more or 
less the same perspective, but Tavera adds an important point. The 
Filipinos, he said, were starting to note that the U.S. had decided to 
remain in the archipelago: “. . .the concept of perpetual sovereignty of the 
U.S. in the Philippines is the genesis of the abuses which many 
Americans are making here, abuses which have substantiated an 
increasing hostile feeling…39 
                                                 
38 The Constabulary was the rural police force in the Philippines organized in 1901. The officers of the 
constabulary were selected chiefly from American volunteers and from “honorably discharged 
soldiers” of the United States army. Some few Filipinos “whose loyalty was above suspicion,” were 
appointed to the lower grades. This is the first definition provided by Dean C. Worcester  in The 
Philippines Past and Present, vol. 1, p. 381. However in p. 382 he says “The Philippine Constabulary 
may be defined as a body of armed men with a military organization, recruited from among the people 
of the islands, officered in part by Americans and in part by Filipinos, and employed primarily for 
police duty in connection with the establishment and maintenance of public order.” This second 
definition has an explicit purpose to counterattack The American occupation of the Philippines. 
Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present. New York: The Macmillan and Company. Vol. 
1, pp. 381-382.  
39 Pardo de Tavera to James A. LeRoy, March 10 1905. Robertson, James Alexander. Anápolis. Md. 
Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. North Carolina: Duke University.  
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          LeRoy reacted to the criticism of his friends by reversing the 
argument. He showed sympathy to a definite promise of independence, 
and he even a priori accepted a tacit declaration of independence: 
If I believed that the majority of sensible Filipinos not only favor 
independence as the future destiny of their country (I do not doubt 
this is the case) but also that they think that a declaration or 
promise of future independence, granted now, would save the 
situation instead of making it worse, I assure you that I would not 
hesitate to vote for it if it was possible.40 
           
LeRoy was denying the idea that the United States wished to 
implement a policy of a permanent colonial system. Instead he insisted 
that the U.S. was protecting the Filipinos, doing the “best” for them “to 
hold the archipelago indefinitely.” The neutral words used by LeRoy 
made him seem favorable to the claims of the Filipinos.  The first 
sentence of this excerpt—“the majority of sensible (Sp. sensato)  
Filipinos”—is significant since LeRoy implies that at that time only a 
few Filipinos wanted independence and precisely those who wished it 
were, far from being “sensible,” the “volatile Filipino agitators.” In fact, 
LeRoy was spreading the idea that most of the Filipinos had never had 
the slightest wish for independence and he was laying the groundwork 
for his most persuasive argument that the masses lacked the education to 
know what independence meant. Thus, the poor and ignorant masses 
were simply being led blindly by some leaders.    
            LeRoy continued his argument as to why a definite declaration of 
independence could not be feasible at that moment: 
I cannot believe that a promise made in the present situation would 
not provoke an agitation by those less responsible and serious 
                                                 
40 James A. LeRoy to Benito Legarda, Durango, Mexico, 17 de Agosto, 1904. Personal Letters of 
LeRoy, James Alfred, 1875-1909, Box 1, Folder 1, October 1903 to end of 1904. Ann Arbor: Bentley 
Library, University of Michigan. 
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Filipinos, those less capable to be the guides of a thousand of 
villagers who still live under the “yoke of ignorance.”41 
 
          LeRoy underpinned this argument with two important facts. The 
first one was a despotic portrayal of the government of Malolos. He 
asserted that the Aguinaldo government encouraged the ignorant, 
peaceable, and non-vicious masses to commit the most heinous crimes. 
In the present situation, if the Americans made any promise of 
independence the situation could be repeated. This argument would 
become a tautology during the whole period of American rule in order to 
deny immediate independence to the Philippines.  
          As for education, LeRoy was supporting the cornerstone of 
American policy in the Philippines: the implementation of public 
instruction. LeRoy was approaching the question of education via the 
political development of the people. From now onwards, every problem 
in the control and development of the Islands would find its solution in 
the establishment of a complete system of public instruction.  
          LeRoy was to justify the systematic complaints of the Federales 
about abuses and economic advantages by Americans over Filipinos by 
arguing that the Americans worked more and better than the Filipinos. In 
short his articulate discourse was meant to convince his critical Filipino 
friends. But he was simply defending the policies implemented by 
Governor Taft. 
          Torres, Albert and Tavera offered LeRoy a sectarian perception of 
the real situation and their complaints were more related to their loss of 
preeminence. New political groups related to an incipient Partido 
                                                 
41 James A. LeRoy to Benito Legarda, Durango, Mexico, 17 de Agosto de 1904. 
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Nacionalista and composed of both conservatives and radicals, were 
gaining ground. They were clamoring for national independence as soon 
as they could install a free government constituted by Filipinos.  LeRoy 
was to play a most important role in silencing, in part, this new 
nationalist campaign. In the last five years, LeRoy had done a great deal 
of reading in Philippine history, especially on the political history of the 
last years of Spanish rule. This fact gave him authority to claim to know 
about Filipino politics. His knowledge of Spanish history and its Filipino 
policy would become materialized in his most important work, The 
Americans in the Philippines. This book would shape irreversibly the 
notion of a Spanish “dark age” and create a Filipino and Spanish curse 
called “caciquism.” The significance of both constructions—the “dark 
age” that denies Spanish reformism and the “caciquism” that would be 
harnessed to roll back incipient nationalism—will be explored in separate 
chapters of this thesis. 
 
LeRoy’s last years: A definite policy of historical reconstruction 
          The articles published by LeRoy in various newspapers, the 
publication in 1905 of his Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines and 
Philippine Life in Town and Country, and his knowledge of Spanish and 
Filipino politics, were the main reasons why Taft required LeRoy to 
accompany him as his personal secretary during the Congressional visit 
to the Philippines. LeRoy’s perceptions of conditions in the archipelago 
and his relationship with members of the Partido Federal were to furnish 
the embryo of Taft’s future strategy for governing the Philippines.  
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          LeRoy started to elaborate upon this new strategy in his meetings 
with editors and in speeches he gave that misrepresented and exaggerated 
conditions of the archipelago. He asserted, for example, that 
The masses except in some of the more advanced districts and in 
particular the Tagalog provinces, are negligible and follow their 
leaders—ignorant and mere adventurous leaders that constituted 
the old cacique class, the men of property and education, speaking 
generally.42 
 
          LeRoy was justifying publicly why the United States had to hold 
the archipelago, since the Islands were just a conglomerate of different 
uneducated and wild tribes subordinated to a tyrannical oligarchy. LeRoy 
was explaining to the American public that the Philippines remained 
without a middle class and without gradations between top and bottom in 
the social scale. Therefore, the archipelago lacked the homogeneity 
necessary for political unity. For now, as LeRoy argued, the masses 
needed education in order to create or sustain a free government. The 
heterogeneity of the archipelago, the lack of a free government and the 
domination of caciquism or oligarchic government would become a 
tautology in newspapers, textbooks, journals and speeches. 
          This was the official image that the U.S. administration was to 
promote to the public and in the academe. However, we can glimpse a 
different view in LeRoy’s letters. His visit to the White House and his 
correspondence with Taft show us the underside of the story: how the 
U.S. administration built up a perfect strategy through which they could 
justify holding the Philippines. This strategy circles around the argument 
                                                 
42 I have been unable to guess in which journal appeared this article written by LeRoy Secretary Taft’s 
Party in Manila Problems that demand solutions. I found out it among his papers but the publication 
does not appear in any place, only the date, September 24, 1905. LeRoy James A. Papers 1875-1909. 
Box 2. Ann Arbor: Bentley Library, University of Michigan. 
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favoring or encouraging “bossism.” As a matter of fact, it is argued by 
modern historiography that the so-called Filipino collaborators used the 
Americans for their own benefit. This assumption is behind the moves to 
justify caciquism, bossism or a patronage policy. However, LeRoy’s 
interview with President Roosevelt and his correspondence with Taft 
demonstrate how the Americans used precisely the so-called 
collaborators to install “bossism” as an institution. 
 
LeRoy as Taft’s brain 
 When Taft and LeRoy returned from the Congressional trip to the 
Philippines, Taft urged LeRoy to come to Washington to bring some 
matters related to Filipino politics before the President. Taft thought that 
Roosevelt was to continue the Philippine policy he had implemented in 
1901-1902. However Roosevelt had stated his purpose to transform an 
American government assisted by Filipinos into a Filipino government 
helped by Americans. Taft wanted LeRoy to dissuade Roosevelt from 
pursuing this idea. 
          On 14 October 1905, LeRoy met Roosevelt. He explained to the 
President how in 1901-1902 the members of the upper class were 
recognized by the U.S. in order to arrange the franchise. He stated 
categorically that the Federal Party is the party of caciques, but since 
these men are, in general, the commanders and leaders of their people, 
we must necessarily recognize them, in one way or another, while 
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creating as much as possible the conditions that will lead to social 
improvement and thus the lessening of their power.43 
 
          LeRoy, by using the term “cacique,” was defining the members of 
the Federal party as the old cacique aristocracy. He was imputing 
something negative upon the old members of the party. He considered 
them as unfit for politics, at least for the Philippine politics of the present.  
In fact, he used the term cacique in order to demonstrate to Roosevelt 
that the old members of the Federal party had been educated under the 
Spanish regime. In this definition of cacique we find two very important 
words—“wealthy” and “educated”—that imply de facto the possession of 
Spanish education and methods. This excerpt is also significant for its 
tacit recognition of the implantation by the Taft Commission of a policy 
of patronage or appointment. 
 Roosevelt was not comfortable with the use of the term “cacique” 
and he replied to LeRoy that they had to recognize the constituted leaders 
in the Philippines in the same way they do in the United States. He was 
assuming the use of the policy of making appointments, as in the United 
States. LeRoy realized that Roosevelt avoided the use of the term 
cacique. When LeRoy elaborated upon what he regarded as the most 
suitable policy for the Philippines, he provided an alternative term, 
“bosses”: 
We have to bring together a nucleus of pro-American sentiment, 
and build upon the necessity of our using the “bosses.” At the same 
time I said that I thought it should be the policy of the government 
to cultivate as far as possible the younger element—younger in the 
main—who have been the more radical, who have in the majority 
                                                 
43 Gleeck, Lewis E. Jr. Nine years to make a difference, p. 77. 
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of cases remained more suspicious towards us. . .With proper 
handling and a proper conduct of policy in the Philippines, we 
could attract the better sort of these young radicals, and that this is 
the important thing to be done in the Philippines.44 
 
          This excerpt is relevant for understanding the future policy of the 
Philippines. The first sentence elucidates the implementation of 
“bossism” in the Philippines as a necessary evil to Americanize the 
archipelago. As for the strategy of attracting the younger radicals, this 
policy would start from 1907 onwards. To achieve this end, LeRoy and 
Taft dismembered the old Federal Party, suppressing key figures such as 
Tavera, Legarda and Albert—LeRoy’s Filipino friends. Furthermore, 
LeRoy succeeded in discrediting the members of the conservative 
nationalist party who were considered too “hispanized” such as Del Pan 
and Fernando M. Guerrero; the old radicals such as Lukban, Barretto and 
Dominador Gomez; and republicans such as Paterno and Isabelo de los 
Reyes. 
 LeRoy, always in the shadows, became an essential element for 
Taft’s functioning. In fact he was Taft’s brain. On 22 January 1906, Taft 
sent a confidential letter to LeRoy explaining his concern about Pardo de 
Tavera. He wanted Pardo de Tavera to retire from the government for 
when the popular assembly comes to be elected he could become a 
delegate. He wanted, instead, to promote a Filipino, Araneta, to head of 
one of the large executive departments: “Araneta in many respects is the 
ablest Filipino in the Islands; certainly he is the ablest for our purposes 
                                                 
44 Gleek, Lewis Jr. Nine Years to make a difference, p. 80. 
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because of his knowledge of English and of American law. . .but Tavera 
is loath to give up the office.”45  
          Araneta was chosen to commence the Americanization of the 
archipelago. Tavera was considered too old. But this was simply an 
excuse. Actually, Taft wanted Tavera to retire because the commission 
was to be constituted by four Americans and four Filipinos; Araneta was 
to replace Tavera, not one of the Americans. The Americans were 
avoiding the Filipinization of the administration.46 
          Tavera47 fell into the trap, deciding to retire from the commission 
even though he knew that Taft had deeper reasons to want him out. 
Tavera thought that he was forced to resign for his criticism against 
Governor Wright’s administration. Taft, in fact, considered him 
dangerous, able to mobilize public opinion to achieve his purpose. 
          LeRoy replied to Taft by discrediting Tavera. He distrusted the 
latter as politician and as Filipino, and called him one of “the most 
pronounced caciques.”48 Obviously, Tavera never knew that LeRoy had 
this opinion of him, since he continued to trust LeRoy. In spite of 
LeRoy’s assertion that Tavera was not to be considered as Filipino, 
                                                 
45 William H. Taft to James A. LeRoy, War Department, Washington, January 22, 1906. Confidential. 
Robertson James Alexander. Annapolis. Md. Manuscripts. Box 2,  Letters 1902-1906. North Carolina: 
Duke University. 
46William H. Taft to James A. LeRoy. War Department, Washington, January 22, 1906. 
47 Ruby Paredes has studied this period using Taft’s correspondence. She mentions the political game 
imposed by Taft –a tacit patronage system. However, she believes that the forced resignation of Pardo 
de Tavera was related to his strong criticisms towards Governor General Wright. Tavera thought that 
this was the main reason, but Taft considered him a political danger. Taft did not want to undermine the 
Federal Party. On the contrary, the idea was to attract the Americanized younger elements. Paredes 
Ruby R. ‘The Origins of National Politics: Taft and the Partido Federal.’ In Ruby R. Paredes (ed.), 
Philippine Colonial Democracy. Monograph Series Number 32. New  Haven: Yale/University 
Southeast Asia Studies, 1988. She emphasizes the argument that in a colonial environment the 
patronage system is legitimate and even inherent in the policy of colonialism. Sometimes it seems that 
she establishes a clear dichotomy between good patronage system and bad caciquism by concluding 
that caciquism was endemic to Filipino traditions, customs and kinship.   
48 James A. Leroy to William H. Taft, Durango, Mexico, February 6, 1906. Robertson, James 
Alexander. Annapolis. Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. North Carolina: Duke University.  
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Tavera made complaints about how some American officials had 
committed abuses with total impunity, while Filipinos were severely 
punished. Moreover, Tavera told LeRoy that Filipinos were just as 
prepared as the Americans to administer the various bureaus. These 
reasons, obviously, made the administration uncomfortable with Tavera.   
          LeRoy insisted with Taft on the need to change American political 
strategy by attracting the younger radicals instead of recognizing the “old 
cacique aristocracy”—meaning, the members of the Federal Party: 
It seems to me that the time has now come when we should win 
over the best element among the radicals, the young men who have 
been led by the noose too often by Isabelo de los Reyes and others, 
but who are honest enough and well-intentioned. In order to do 
this, they must be divorced so far as may be, not only from men 
like Don Isabelo and his ilk, but also from some of the older men 
who are never going to like us and our ways, and who are at the 
same time too intellectually egotistical and too grounded in a 
preference for Latin ways and Latin ideas ever to accept, in their 
hearts, our ideas.49 
 
          This statement is essential to understand the further so-called 
“compadre colonialism”50 or policy of adjustment. LeRoy was trying to 
undermine any continuing Spanish imprint in the archipelago. Isabelo de 
los Reyes, since Spanish rule, was trying to attract the popular masses. 
He was one of the irreconciliables as far as the Americans were 
concerned—too educated and too Spanish. He was able to attract those 
called by the Americans ignorant and young radicals. LeRoy was urging 
Taft to accelerate the process of self-government by conceding more 
                                                 
49 James A. LeRoy to William H. Taft, Durango, Mexico, February 6, 1906. 
50 Reynaldo Ileto defines “compadre colonialism” as a symbiotic relationship between the United States 
administration and Filipino nationalist leaders from the wealthy and educated class. Ileto, Reynaldo C. 
Filipinos and Their Revolution. Event, Discourse and Historiography. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila 
Press, p. 271. Ileto gives an accurate definition to what some American scholars in the 70s started to 
call “compadre colonialism” with a pejorative meaning. Norman Owen, David Steinberg, and Michael 
Cullinane among the others, described “compadre colonialism” as a political farce by which  some 
prominent Filipino politicians advocated independence in the Philippines but in the United States, they 
begged Washington not to concede the final independence. This has become the secular argument.  
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power to the Filipinos. This was the only way to attract those Filipinos 
who showed adverse sentiments toward the United States. The extension 
of self-government would convince the most radical of Filipinos of the 
Americans’ good-will. However, LeRoy warned about the need to hold 
back self-government when the Filipinos claimed for more privileges, by 
using arguments such as “caciquism” or “bossism.”    
          It is important to add that LeRoy when referring to Isabelo de los 
Reyes, Guerrero or Del Pan does not use the term cacique. In his 
arguments to Taft, he said that to combat the secret influence of these 
men the Americans had relied on the men of the old cacique class—those 
from the Federal party. It was time, according to LeRoy to get rid of the 
old caciques. However, since the Americans were to follow the policy, 
also endorsed by LeRoy, of making appointments and using patronage, 
the term “cacique” would reappear during periods of crisis, functioning 
as a discursive weapon in order to undermine the process of 
independence. 
          In spite of the statement made by LeRoy about not recognizing the 
so-called caciques, one of his letters to Taft furnishes a flagrant case of 
caciquism promoted by the American government. Juan Cailles, 
provincial governor of Laguna appointed by the Americans, was called 
upon to administer a vote on whether or not Laguna province would 
employ forced labor under the new law of the Commission permitting it. 
Cailles needed to secure the promises of a majority of municipal 
presidents in favor of this project.  According to LeRoy, Dominador 
Gomez mounted agitation against such forced labor by appealing to the 
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proletariat. Cailles’ party accused Gomez of sedition, of inciting the 
masses to independence and revolt. The use of forced labor was voted 
down and Gomez arrested. Cailles telegraphed Manila that he had 
“irrevocably resigned.” 
          Governor Ide did not accept Cailles’ resignation and instead the 
use of forced labor was unilaterally approved. This law was bitterly 
opposed by the Filipino press when it was passed. LeRoy wrote with 
regret: “This is exactly the perpetuation of that caciquism, which we wish 
to have uprooted in Philippine local governments.”51 
          Cailles was a typical case of the policy implemented by Taft in 
1901-1902. It was not a matter of the perpetuation of caciquism since this 
did not exist before the American occupation. What Governor Ide did 
was to perpetuate the patronage policy, or policy of appointment, 
inaugurated by the Taft Commission. LeRoy did not put the blame on the 
Americans for authorizing Cailles to implement this coercive measure. 
On the contrary, LeRoy was to reverse the argument by considering its 
rejection a defect of the Filipinos: “Such things upset a whole year’s of 
preaching and talking about the ‘spirit of American government’ and the 
‘caciquistic’ defects of the Filipinos which render self-government a 
failure among them as yet.”52 
          This statement speaks for itself: self-government, particularly 
when it goes against American wishes, will always be rendered a failure 
because of “Filipino caciquism.” LeRoy reveals other worries in this 
letter which will have relevance for the future. He lamented that El 
                                                 
51 James A. Leroy to William H. Taft, October 28, 1906.Robertson James Alexander. Annapolis. Md. 
Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. North Carolina: Duke University. 
52James A. LeRoy to William H. Taft, October 28, 1906.  
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Renacimiento had become a real political force which showed its hatred 
of everything American or Anglo-Saxon, and expressed itself in a 
rancorous way.  The anti-imperialist Henry Parker Willis was in touch 
with some Filipinos such as Del Pan and Guerrero who criticized Taft of 
deceiving them, leading them to believe that statehood was possible. El 
Renacimiento, Parker Willis, Del Pan and Guerrero, among others, were 
to suffer a powerful campaign of discrediting by LeRoy. 
 
LeRoy and his subtle indictment against El Renacimiento 
           LeRoy prepared a letter for publication in Manila in order to carry 
out his campaign of discrediting the Filipino nationalists. It was an 
attempt to undermine the Spanish imprint by emphasizing the medieval 
character of Spanish rule. LeRoy wrote a counter-argument to Felipe 
Calderon’s Mis Memorias sobre la Revolución Filipina published by El 
Renacimiento in  1907. Calderon had decided to publish this Memorias 
since he felt that Filipino students were forgetting their own history by 
learning a history of the Philippines from the American standpoint. 
LeRoy sought to neutralize Calderon and those who supported his views. 
Furthermore, this letter was part of the rising debate concerning Rizal 
versus Bonifacio as the hero to be remembered. 
          At the end of 1906 LeRoy sent that letter to El Renacimiento. 
According to him its main purpose was to reply to some ironic comments 
against Taft published in that newspaper. It was alleged that Taft showed 
himself in public to be a friend of the Filipinos, while in private he 
considered them “distinctly childish, whimsically, often unreasonably 
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childish, sometimes obstinately childish.”53 LeRoy used his defense of 
Taft as an excuse to attack the enemies of American rule and above all 
the most Latinized segment of the Philippine population. He was to 
emphasize the “dark age” of Spanish misrule: 
Those who supported that the alma Filipina (Filipino soul) is in 
danger in front of the Anglo-Saxon monster, are those who have 
been educated in Latin and Spanish molds, those who prefer Latin 
civilization, Latin literature and Latin customs. For this kind of 
Filipinos, all that involves a change in the traditional Spanish 
education, political organization and administrative procedures, is 
bad for the Philippines.54 
 
          This excerpt is a subtle criticism of very influential Filipinos, those 
who, LeRoy thought, were “never going to like us and our ways.”55 He 
was directing his criticism, first of all, at Leon Maria Guerrero, editor of 
El Renacimiento, whom he considered egotistical and too grounded in a 
preference for Latin ways and Latin ideas. Guerrero had given 
recognition to those whom LeRoy called “demagogues, vicious liars and 
mental weaklings” such as Teodoro Sandiko and Isabelo de los Reyes. 
          More than Guerrero, however, LeRoy was targetting Del Pan, co-
founder with Guerrero of a conservative nationalist party, who had been 
attacking Taft surreptitiously in the press. Del Pan’s family was Spanish, 
which made it all the more obvious that LeRoy was attacking the Spanish 
legacy itself. LeRoy’s second argument to discredit Del Pan and 
Guerrero concerned their clamor for independence. A third argument 
                                                 
53 James A. LeRoy to El Renacimiento. Durango, Mexico, November 1, 1906. Published in 
supplements to El Renacimiento of January 17, 19, 22 and 24, 1907. These aroused comments and 
answers in those and succeeding numbers of the magazine and in other Filipino periodicals. Robertson 
James Alexander. Annapolis. Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, Folder Letters November-December 1906. 
North Carolina: Duke University. 
54 James A. LeRoy to El Renacimiento. p. 3. 
55 See James A. Leroy to William H. Taft February 6, 1906. Robertson James Alexander. Annapolis. 
Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. North Carolina: Duke University.  
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would be built around the fact that Del Pan and Guerrero were in touch 
with some important anti-imperialist such as Parker Willis. Let us 
examine these arguments in detail. 
          LeRoy’s letter was no less than a lesson in history. He always 
appealed to history in order to understand present conditions. However, 
this and other history lessons he gave were always just a means to 
support the idea that all of America’s problems were inherited from the 
old regime or were inherent in the Filipinos. LeRoy accused the Filipino 
newspapers of forgetting or ignoring its more recent history, such as, for 
example, the revolt of 1896. The selection of this revolt to focus on has 
its raison d’être. LeRoy wanted to make clear that this revolt was still 
reformist in character and that the Katipunan was “minor French 
Revolution” on the part of the poor and ignorant masses. 
          The nationalists and their newspapers such as La Independencia 
and El Renacimiento were claiming Bonifacio as the model of patriotism 
during the revolt of 1896. Bonifacio was starting to become an icon of 
“independence.” He and the Katipunan were to become potent signs to 
attract the masses in the future, but at this point in time, when El 
Renacimiento was advocating for Bonifacio as martyr and hero,56 
                                                 
56 Glenn May in 1997 published Inventing a Hero: The Posthumous Re-creation of Andres Bonifacio. 
He questioned the sources about Bonifacio used by some Filipino historians, beginning with Epifanio 
de los Santos and Manuel Artigas. He supports the argument that the writings of Artigas and de los 
Santos honoured the memory of an earlier, anticolonial struggle and transformed the life of the leader 
of that struggle into a classic heroic story “intended to build pride in things Filipino and keep alive the 
notion of an independent Philippines. By attempting to promote nationalist feeling in a colonial 
environment, they directly attacked the traditional order.” This argument is valid when May assumes 
that they tried to attack the traditional colonial order. However he is wrong in asserting that de los 
Santos and Artigas were promoting Bonifacio like a hero. Artigas’s biography is from 1911, that of 
Epifanio de los Santos from 1917. The claim for Bonifacio as hero and martyr came out as early as 
1900 when Taft Commission did foster the worship of Rizal. According to LeRoy the adherents of 
Bonifacio resented this and considered that Bonifacio was being “neglected.” Bonifacio emerged again 
in 1906. LeRoy promoted a campaign for discrediting Bonifacio. His argument appealing to 
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Bonifacio was not part of the discourse of political rallies. In 1907, 
advocating Bonifacio and the Katipunan signified a tacit refusal of 
American institutions being imposed by the administration. The 
nationalist were complaining that the Americans had neglected Bonifacio 
from the beginning. They were right, since in their reports and in their 
official histories, the Americans considered Bonifacio and his adherents 
as the less educated men of the insurrection. LeRoy was to underpin his 
history lecture with the following argument: 
As for the badly-considered exultations of Bonifacio, which are 
heard now from some Filipinos who despised him, I would remind 
them that what he preached was a war of races and the 
assassination (there is no other word for it) of the whites. And 
before claiming his work as glorious and before glorifying the 
revolt of 1896 as a legitimate phase, namely, the evolution to more 
social and political freedom, it must be remembered that no stable 
nation has ever been established upon assassination.57 
 
LeRoy bases his argument of the “war of races” in the documents 
published by Wenceslao Retana and Sastrón. These documents were 
written by friars and the more conservative sector. General Blanco, 
however, did not mention any war of races. LeRoy was furnishing an 
important argument for future scholars: Bonifacio as symbol of violence, 
                                                                                                                                            
Bonifacio’s alleged war of races was quite effective. It seems that Glenn May represents the continuity 
of the American discourse. This is not the place to fully counter May’s argument, but it is important to 
note that May mentions Retana and the publication of the documents of the Katipunan and above all 
the translation into Spanish of Kalayaan. He says that Retana did not allude to Bonifacio as author of 
any of the articles of Kalayaan. Moreover, he compares the translation of Retana and that made later by 
de los Santos. He takes for granted that Retana’s translation is reliable, while that from de los Santos is 
faulty. Retana did not translate Kalayaan; this was translated by Caro Mora, a completely Hispanized 
Filipino. May, basing his arguments on Retana’s Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, accuses de los Santos 
of “forgery” since the latter published documents not included in Retana’s.  We cannot know if it is a 
forgery or not. Retana could not publish all the documents he had in 1897; Retana was a very good 
friend of Epifanio de los Santos. Maybe he gave him the other part of Bonifacio writings. We cannot 
respond fully to these questions here but Bonifacio certainly was not “as invented” as Glenn May 
assumes.   
57 James A. LeRoy to El Renacimiento. p. 15. 
 131 
armed insurrection and anger.58 LeRoy excuses Bonifacio’s behavior by 
saying that this man had been educated in a “medieval atmosphere.” This 
is the picture of the long dark age of Spanish regime. By giving Spanish 
rule a layer of medievalism, LeRoy was subtly insulting Del Pan, 
Guerrero, Sandiko, Gomez and others.  
          LeRoy continued his historical lesson for Filipinos by arguing that 
if Dewey had not helped them get rid of the Spanish yoke the most 
reactionary party of Spain would have denied them any reform: 
If the United States had not interfered in 1898, what would the 
state of the Filipinos be now? The insurgent movement of 1898 
would have continued, but what hopes were there to expel Spain? 
And as a result of the insurgencies the Spanish reactionaries might 
have restricted more the freedom and cut the reforms already 
began under Spain.59 
 
          The good Americans had liberated them from the bad Spanish. The 
Filipinos could not complain. According to LeRoy it was impossible to 
have more freedom than they enjoyed under American regime. There is 
arguably a complete reversal of the historical record in this letter, but 
LeRoy was successful. The signifier of opposition to armed revolution 
became Rizal, who protested against the abuses of the Spanish 
government and oppression by the friars, he refused to join the revolt. 
Rizal had been promoted by the Taft Commission in 1900, now LeRoy 
was promoting him again. He was teaching the Filipinos how to use the 
past.     
                                                 
58 Ileto, Reynaldo C. ‘The “Unfinished Revolution” in Political Discourse.’ In Filipinos and Their 
Revolution. Event, Discourse and Historiography., p. 183. 
59 James A. LeRoy was trying to convince his Filipino friends about this argument. He wrote this letter 
to Jose Albert the same month and year he sent his letter to El Renacimiento. James A. LeRoy to Jose 
Albert, Durango, Mexico, 23 Noviembre, 1906. Robertson, James Alexander. Annapolis. Md. 
Manuscripts. Box 2, Folder Letters November-December 1906. North Carolina: Duke University.  
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          In 1906, Guerrero, Pablo Ocampo and Pedro Paterno founded the 
Liberal Party. LeRoy constructed an interpolation of the past as origin of 
the present, designed to discredit Paterno, by writing a biased history of 
the Biak-na-bato treaty in which he accuses Paterno of making verbal 
promises of reforms assuring that he had the authority of General Primo 
de Rivera to make them. He claimed that there were documents in 
Washington that proved Primo de Rivera’s assertion that when the 
document of the insurgents concerning the reforms was presented to him, 
he [Primo de Rivera] squarely refused the proposals. They were not to 
talk anymore about reforms, but only of money.60 
          LeRoy had selected only a part of the story in order to accuse 
Paterno of keeping the money given by the Spaniards—the same claim 
that Primo de Rivera made in the Senate in order to justify his policy of 
repression. What LeRoy omitted from his account was that Primo de 
Rivera was replaced by Augustin who came to the Philippines with a 
specific mission: to concede the reforms claimed by Aguinaldo. Augustin 
did not shun Paterno or accuse him of being a “traitor.” LeRoy co-opted 
Primo de Rivera’s La Memoria and neglected to tell the underside of that 
history. He only stated what was useful in order to silence the voices of 
those who became uncomfortable for the American regime. LeRoy was 
not giving a lesson in history. He was constructing a new history and 
suppressing the voices of those Filipinos hostile to the Americans, who 
would eventually be forgotten by the younger radicals and the new 
generations of Filipinos.  
                                                 
60 James A. LeRoy to El Renacimiento, p.17. 
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          The next target of LeRoy’s attack was the Malolos government. El 
Renacimiento and the different nationalist parties were claiming that the 
Malolos government had demonstrated its capacity for self-government 
and public order. Then, as now, they were ready for independence. This 
argument had already been put forward by La Independencia in 1898 and 
Felipe Calderon asserted it as well in his Mis Memorias. LeRoy could not 
entirely deny this fact. However, he argued that the insurrection was only 
based in the provinces around Manila and dominated by Tagalogs: 
The relatively good public order of 1898-1899 was not due to the 
government of Malolos, but the result of the Filipino nature, 
generally docile and pacific. This would not have demonstrated the 
capacity of the government of Malolos to rule the destiny of the 
whole archipelago with its several interests and languages.61 
 
          Furthermore, LeRoy pursued the old argument that the Americans 
never promised independence to Aguinaldo during the meeting in 
Singapore. He was more definitive than Worcester and he discredited 
entirely Aguinaldo’s 1899 account in Reseña Verídica: “Dewey and 
Anderson have categorically denied having said to Mr. Aguinaldo the 
things that Reseña Verídica of Mr. Aguinaldo put in their mouths. I 
suppose that he did not write the said document and I prefer to believe so, 
because it contains several categorical lies.62 
          This part of LeRoy’s letter attempted to rebut the arguments of 
Reseña Verídica. He alluded to the misinterpretation of terms by 
Aguinaldo. What Dewey and the consul conceded to him was merely a 
future recognition of independence. LeRoy again was making an 
isomorphism, reading back into the past Taft’s policy of a “future 
                                                 
61 James A. LeRoy to El Renacimiento, p. 18. 
62 James A. LeRoy to El Renacimiento, p. 21. 
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independence.” This future was to remain uncertain, according to LeRoy: 
“I think independence will take attained after ‘generations,’ but it will not 
be soon.”63   
          LeRoy doesn’t say how many generations it will take before 
Filipinos can expect to gain their independence. The term “generations” 
here is completely ambiguous, although the following sentences clarify 
that this will not be soon. LeRoy told Albert he did not know what could 
happen in ten or twenty years, but the Filipinos in 1906 were not in any 
condition to carry on a national life and to maintain a national 
government. LeRoy was not as frank in his piece for El Renacimiento as 
he was in his correspondence, but we can see that Taft and LeRoy 
thought of holding the archipelago forever.  
          LeRoy wrote in El Renacimiento of the Spanish “dark age” in the 
Philippines. This time, instead of inventing history, he criticized and 
discredited some important people. The first one was Wenceslao Retana. 
LeRoy had a special aversion for Retana since the latter represented a 
potential, serious challenge to the arguments he [LeRoy] had constructed 
about the medievalism of Spanish rule until 1898. He accused Retana of 
being anti-Filipino and above all anti-reformist. He said that those who 
tried to keep alive the “latinismo” tradition in the Philippines have 
resurrected Retana in their desire to resist the changes brought about by 
the Americans. 
          LeRoy was correct up to a certain extent. Retana was collaborating 
in the newspaper El Renacimiento and in 1907 published Vida y Escritos 
                                                 
63 James A. LeRoy to Jose Albert, 23 Noviembre, 1906. Robertson James Alexander. Annapolis. Md. 
Manuscripts. Box 2, Folder Letters November-December 1906. North Carolina: Duke University. 
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del Dr. José Rizal, the best biography of Rizal at that time and a vivid 
reflection of Spain in the 1890’s and her policy in the Philippines. This 
book challenged the American construction of Philippine history. 
Therefore, LeRoy needed to damn Retana. 
          Retana was to be only the excuse for attacking two important 
leaders in the Philippines in 1906, for different reasons. The first one was 
Del Pan. LeRoy accused Del Pan of being Spanish or Mexican instead of 
Filipino and to have been an anti-reformist in the Philippines. Del Pan 
had been making innuendos against Taft and the Federal party and 
calling for independence. The second was Dominador Gomez. It seems 
to me that Gomez had a more relevant role than Del Pan since he was one 
of the ciudadanos Filipinos who presented the memorial to Taft asking 
for immediate independence, and denying this thing called Filipino 
“caciquism.” Gomez was a natural born leader and in 1906 was involved 
in organizing labor unions. He campaigned against the use of forced 
labor in Laguna, pitting him against the governor, Juan Cailles. The U.S. 
administration was extremely uncomfortable with him. At precisely this 
moment LeRoy came along to lend his voice against Gomez: 
Mr. Cailles, whom Mr. Gomez attacked as a “bad Filipino,” was in 
the battlefield fighting for the Filipino cause and winning the 
admiration of the American combatants. I am not saying anything 
about the question of forced labor in Laguna; for me it was 
“caciquism” not to allow the voters of Laguna to make their 
decision freely in favor of it, and the ridiculous protest of the 
Provincial Junta and the suggestions from above were certainly 
dictated by some other spirit than Americanism. 64 
 
          LeRoy justified Cailles’ position on the labor issue by recalling 
that he had been an insurgent fighting for the Filipino cause. Dominador 
                                                 
64 James A. LeRoy to El Renacimiento, p. 24. 
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Gomez, on the other hand, had been in Cuba with the Spanish army. 
LeRoy was presenting a contrast between a good Filipino and a bad 
Filipino. Moreover he was representing “caciquism” as a Filipino 
institution diametrically opposite to the American spirit or 
“Americanism.” 
          Finally, LeRoy concluded this long letter by misrepresenting the 
Democratic Party and exalting the Republicans. The main purpose was to 
undermine the campaign of independence for the Philippines presented 
by Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryan. He said that the 
Republicans had always supported the independence of the Philippines at 
“an indefinite future”: “The truth is that the Democratic Party does not 
exist as a great national party and is disorganized and split by 
personalities and diversities of criterion that they could not concede 
immediate independence.”65 LeRoy was discouraging Filipinos from 
thinking of immediate independence by misrepresenting the Democrats. 
Moreover, he distorted American public opinion saying that most 
Americans had accepted the ongoing policy, meaning Taft’s policy: 
At the present moment, to give political independence to the 
islands would result in the immediate loss of civil rights, personal 
liberty and public order, as regards the mass of the Filipinos for the 
majority of the islanders have been given these great privileges by 
us, and only keep them because we vigilantly safeguard and 
guarantee them.66 
 
This was the apparent reason American public opinion supported 
Taft’s policy: that a Filipino government would only result in anarchy. 
American government was giving a chance for more self-government by 
                                                 
65 James A. LeRoy to El Renacimiento, p. 27. 
66 LeRoy mentions Roosevelt speech of 1904. James A. LeRoy to El Renacimiento, p. 28. 
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inaugurating in 1907 the Filipino Assembly. This Assembly would prove 
the empathy of the American government with the Filipinos and would 
become the culmination of the legislative program of Congress for the 
Philippines. 
          LeRoy summed up this long letter by telling the young Filipinos 
that this was the true history from 1897 on: An evolutionary narrative, 
which presented a dichotomy between Spanish-Filipino and American 
regimes and other binary oppositions such as “bad Spaniards” versus 
“good Americans,” and “good Filipinos” versus “bad Filipinos.” Spanish 
misrule was pictured as a long dark age, which certainly did not prepare 
the Filipinos for independence. LeRoy was in fact fostering the “black 
legend” of Spain and trying to undermine any Spanish traces in the 
archipelago. The time had come to win over the best element among the 
radicals, the young men who would foster the American construction of 
Philippine history and Americanize the country.  
          LeRoy’s letter to El Renacimiento provoked a significant reaction 
in the Philippines. For instance, Dominador Gomez was compelled to 
defend his past before a crowd of his old-time constituents. Del Pan did 
not respond to LeRoy directly. Instead he requested a list of such 
questions as might prove of interest to American readers. To the question 
of being “ready” for self-government, Del Pan said: 
To my way of thinking the Filipinos themselves are more capable 
of government and do it better than many nations who today are 
ruling their own destinies, although they may not attain in the 
beginning that degree of perfection which has been reached by 
more advanced nations.67 
                                                 
67 ‘Means Tariff Solution. Candidate Del Pan, discussing reasons for granting Filipinos independence.’ 
La Independencia, 1907. I was unable to get the exact date. LeRoy James A. Papers, 1875-1909. Box 2. 
Miscellaneous. Ann Arbor: Bentley Library, University of Michigan. 
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He and his party therefore asked for independence. Del Pan had 
also to respond to the question of whether he was Spanish or Filipino. 
LeRoy even accused him of being Mexican. Del Pan’s reply was 
categorical: he was Filipino.68  
          LeRoy had proposed to “divorce” the young Filipino nationalists 
from the “old” hispanophiles. His letter, published by El Renacimiento, 
would be the beginning of the divorce, which would materialize in the 
decade of the twenties. 
                                                 
68 Cablenews: ‘Rafael del Pan denies being Mexican.’ June, 1907. LeRoy James A. Papers, 1875-1909. 
Box 2. Miscellaneous. Ann Arbor. Bentley Library, University of Michigan. 
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CHAPTER IV: CONFIGURING THE “DARK AGE” OF SPANISH 
RULE—THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
Of course the various reform 
programs of liberal and 
revolutionary governments in Spain 
must have some attention; but these 
and the 1872 revolt are really to be 
relegated to a secondary role. 
 
        James A. LeRoy 
 
          From 1902 to 1909 LeRoy wrote many articles in different 
newspapers and journals.1 He reviewed books, and he re-wrote David 
Barrows’s textbook, A History of the Philippines. However, he has 
become recognized by his two books: Philippine Life in Town and 
Country and The Americans in the Philippines. LeRoy never talked much 
in his letters about Philippine Life in Town and Country since this book 
came out with a specific purpose: to explain the present problems by 
interpolating the history of the old regime. This book outlines the 
Spanish “dark age” but it is The Americans in the Philippines that shapes 
and substantiates this image by [mis]using the Spanish sources. LeRoy 
had a definite judgment about the Spanish regime in 1904 when he wrote 
                                                 
1 For instance ‘Taft as Administrator. Traits and methods as revealed by his work in the Philippines.’ 
This paper was totally propagandistic in promoting Taft career for the presidency. Also see‘The 
Philippines and the Filipinos’ written in 1906 for the Political Science Quarterly; and ‘The Philippine 
Assembly’ or ‘Philippine Problems after ten year’s experience.’ All these papers emerged with a 
definite purpose depending on the years they appeared. The most important is ‘The Philippines and the 
Filipinos’ since this is an indictment against Parker Willis’s book Our Philippine Problem.  LeRoy is 
more radical here than in Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines in treating the topic of caciquism 
and bossism. This time he uses the term bossism as a corrupt system and fruit of an intellectual 
oligarchism. At the same time, this article was an excuse to foster some readings of the Philippines 
such as David Barrows’s book, A History of the Philippines and Gaylord Bourne ‘Historical 
Introduction’ in Blair and Robertson (ed.),  The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. Vol. I. Instead, LeRoy 
discredited Parker Willis’s book by considering it misleading. 
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this book. However, The Americans in the Philippines was published in 
1914. This is a posthumous work, published by Dean Worcester, whose 
intervention will be detailed in a later chapter.  
          In The Americans in the Philippines LeRoy wrote the chapter 
devoted to the Spanish regime with the knowledge drawn from his first-
hand acquaintance with the leaders of the Filipino cause. Furthermore, he 
had studied Spanish colonial history and he furnished an important 
bibliography based on personal and official records. These factors served 
to confer rigor on this work. No other writer on the Philippines had 
exhibited such wide acquaintance with Spanish and English sources of 
information. In fact the author covers all the important literature on the 
Philippines, introducing himself as the leading American authority on 
Philippine affairs. 
          Bearing all the marks of rigorous scholarship, The Americans in 
the Philippines is thus the most valuable source in order to understand 
the American construction of “Spanish medievalism” by carefully 
examining the sources he used, or ignored. We can see how LeRoy 
provided a partial and distorted history by suppressing important books 
which would question de facto his arguments. This chapter will furnish 
an alternative to LeRoy’s idea of a Spanish “dark age” by introducing 
part of the bibliography he omitted. 
           It is important to examine first LeRoy’s Philippine Life in Town 
and Country since some of the arguments therein will be displayed again 
in The Americans in the Philippines, with bibliographical comments. 
Philippine Life in Town and Country is a propagandistic book that 
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follows a specific pattern: the report of Taft Commission transcribed in a 
scholarly way with a new contribution in the chapter entitled, Caciquism 
and Local Self-Government.2 LeRoy puts emphasis on several topics 
such as backwardness, fanaticism, caciquism and racialism—all of them 
inherited from the medievalism of the Spanish regime. Therefore he was 
de facto laying out the contours of a Spanish “dark age.” Obviously, the 
selection of the topic was meant to demonstrate de facto and de iure the 
Filipinos’ unfitness for self-government, and the necessity of a safeguard 
in the United States.   
The first chapter shows the central argument of the book: 
We do not need to condone the “backward” and “halting” policy 
which at last turned the Filipinos against Spanish rule. We must do 
full justice to her actual achievements, if not as ruler, at any rate as 
teacher and missionary to put the Filipinos of today in their proper 
category. Spain has never yet fully entered into the nineteenth 
century, politically nor intellectually, in the Peninsula itself.3 
 
          LeRoy clearly portrays Spain as an anachronism, a perpetual 
medievalism. This assertion is corroborated by stating Spain that did not 
experience the changes of the nineteenth century. LeRoy promoted the 
idea of medievalism and theocratic rule by selecting terms such as 
“backward” and “halting.” This argument contrasts obviously with the 
liberalism and modernism implemented since the American occupation. 
The dichotomy modern America—backward Spain is quite clear. But the 
terms “backward” and “halting” bring forth a deeper idea: that the 
Filipinos were not educated for independence since they had remained in 
                                                 
2 This chapter is a longer version of ‘Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines.’ The Atlantic Monthly, 
March 1905.  
3 LeRoy, James A. Philippine Life in Town and Country. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1905, p. 7. 
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a state of ignorance. The argument first articulated fully by LeRoy 
became prevalent in the textbooks that followed.  
          The introduction provided the pattern that the book would follow. 
Present-day problems are explained by an interpolation of Spanish rule.  
Now the first problem the Americans had to confront was the 
conglomeration of different uneducated tribes in the islands. This chapter 
by LeRoy addressed the problem by criticizing Retana and Blumentritt as 
ethnologists. Instead, the work being done by the U.S. government’s 
Ethnological Survey, headed by David P. Barrows, was praised. LeRoy 
was recommending to present and future scholars which works had to be 
used in order to write a true history of the Philippines, and which ones to 
reject.   The second issue identified by LeRoy was the dichotomy 
between the Christianized tribes--more or less educated and civilized--
and the savage tribes. This dichotomy did not therefore allow the U.S. to 
concede more self-government to the Filipinos. 
          LeRoy inaugurated a topic which was to be revived in the 1960s4 
and 1970s: the emergence of the Chinese mestizo and Spanish mestizo as 
economical and political forces in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. These mestizos held the greatest authority in Filipino 
communities. They became the leaders and bosses abusing their people. 
LeRoy set a precedent for future scholars to build on. 
          In the chapters that follow of Philippine Life in Town and Country, 
LeRoy paves the way for his most important topic: “caciquism.” In “A 
typical Filipino Community” he furnishes a picture of ruralism endemic 
                                                 
4 The most authoritative work upon this topic is  Wickberg, Edgar. The Chinese in Philippine Life 
1850-1898.  New Haven: Yale Southeast Asian Studies 1, 1965. 
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in the Philippines thanks to the feudalistic Spanish regime, which 
connived with the principales to maintain social customs. This 
characteristic procedure of the Spaniards made the Philippines remain 
without a middle class “and hence without those gradations between top 
and bottom in the social scale which make for homogeneity of social 
sentiment and the corresponding political unity which alone can create or 
sustain a free government…5  
          The Americans tried to foster this middle class at least on paper by 
transplanting their social and political institutions. Only these institutions 
could sustain the full independence that was desired. In fact, however, 
the Americans undermined the incipient “colonial bureaucracy” 
implanted by Spain in 1893 following the British colonial model. And 
ironically, the transplantation of American institutions brought with it a 
system of relations called “bossism.”  
          In sum, Philippine Life in Town and Country is an interpolation of 
the past into the present in which LeRoy develops a dichotomy between 
past theocratic rule and present liberal democratic rule. The new regime 
was to give opportunity and progress for all; the old regime fostered the 
wealthy and educated who became the caciques whom the masses 
followed blindly. Moreover, Spanish connivance with the sustaining of 
native customs nourished the maintenance of a family feudalism, which 
degenerated into the predominance of a few families in the communities. 
Therefore, the Americans had a major duty: to eradicate these feudalistic 
                                                 
5 LeRoy, James A. Philippine Life  in Town and Country, p. 45. 
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trends and to educate the mind of the Filipinos as well as to teach the 
Filipinos something about the dignity of man and the dignity of labor: 
Our work is to plant here the result of American democracy and to 
justify its ideals. We are here to promote a better understanding 
between the races and to bring about a thorough spiritual accord 
between the men of the East and the West, in which our own 
nation shall be the leader.6 
 
          These were the noble intentions of the Americans and so did 
LeRoy present them before American public opinion. His literary 
versatility and articulate prose concealed his conviction that the Filipinos 
were not yet prepared for independence. LeRoy’s ambiguities left a box 
open. The legacy from Spain was too deep-rooted for the Americans to 
grant the Filipinos independence. This would be relegated to the future—
an indefinite future 
 
The Americans in the Philippines: A gift for scholars 
          The Americans in the Philippines: A History of the conquest and 
first years of the American occupation with an introductory account of 
the Spanish rule, has to be LeRoy’s magnum opus since he spent years 
working on this book. He never finished it or if he did it, it was not 
published until 1914 as a posthumous work. In making this book LeRoy 
asked for bibliographical help from his friends such as Zulueta, Pardo de 
Tavera, Florentino Torres, Albert and even enemies such as Isabelo de 
los Reyes: 
I would like to have a list or catalogue of all your works about the 
Philippines. Could I buy a collection of the newspaper Filipinas 
ante Europa?  I want to buy the collections of La Solidaridad and 
La Independencia. I am American, sir (as you can see I am the 
                                                 
6 LeRoy, James A. Philippine Life in Town and Country, p. 232. 
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American consul here), but I do not have prejudices and I want to 
study the Philippine revolution not only from an American 
standpoint but also specially from the Filipino point of view. 7 
 
          This introduction “to write a history of the Philippines from a 
Filipino standpoint” attracted many Filipino intellectuals. He got those 
newspapers since they are cited in this book. However he discredited De 
los Reyes since he was a leader and defender of the perpetuation of Latin 
customs and ideas. In fact, De los Reyes showed himself to be anti-
American. 
          It is difficult to guess if the publication was truly the book that 
LeRoy was working on from 1902, or whether it had suffered some 
censorship and or included some new contributions. We should not forget 
that The Americans in the Philippines was published in 1914 and it is not 
a coincidence that its publication followed after James Blount’s book The 
American occupation in the Philippines 1898-1912—an indictment 
against the implementation of Taft’s policy. We cannot even be sure if 
this was the title actually selected by LeRoy. What he says in his 
correspondence is simply that “…yo mismo, por ejemplo, tengo 
comprometida una obra sobre la Ocupación Americana en Filipinas 
(1898-1903) para el verano que viene (I have promised a work about the 
American Occupation in the Philippines [1898-1903] for next summer).”8  
          According to these words LeRoy had entitled his book much as 
Blount’s and he had to finish it for publication in 1904. When he wrote 
                                                 
7 LeRoy James A. to Isabelo de los Reyes, Durango, Mexico October 13, 1903. Personal Letters of 
LeRoy James A. Box 1, Folder 1, October 1903 to end of 1904. Ann Arbor: Bentley Library, 
University of Michigan. 
8 LeRoy told about his purpose Zulueta in October 1903. James A. LeRoy to Clemente J. Zulueta, 
October 3, 1903. Personal letters of James A. LeRoy. Box 1, Folder 1. October 1903 to the end of 
1904. Ann Arbor: Bentley Library, University of Michigan. 
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Zulueta he said he was to cover the American occupation until 1903 and 
when he explained the contents of his manuscript to Robertson in 1904, 
he said he planned to cover the entire period during which he actively 
served the U.S. government on the ground: 
I shall devote the next chapter to summing up the civil government 
in the islands, giving both an abstract of the framework of 
government as it has been constituted from early 1901 onward and 
a discussion of the actual workings of government, municipal, 
provincial and insular, up to the present time (this covering many 
of the more significant events since 1902).9 
 
          This was his intention. Gleeck says that he had to end his book 
prematurely owing to his failing health.10 LeRoy, as I shall show, was 
working until two months before he died in Fort Bayard. It was not very 
difficult for him to devote a chapter to the American civil government 
until 1904 since he already started to do this in his earlier books, among 
others Our Spanish Inheritance and Philippine Life in Town and Country. 
However, his analysis of the civil government from 1902 to 1905 was 
critical of Governors Wright and Ide and completely antagonistic to that 
of Dean Worcester. Worcester in fact wrote LeRoy a long letter in 1906 
strongly criticizing his arguments.  At the end of this letter, he asked 
LeRoy to send an outline of his book 
So that I might be in a position to talk business to Ayer should he 
show any inclination to look favorably on backing its publication... 
If the general average of your work on your book is up to that 
which you did on the translation of Mabini’s memoirs I would do a 
good bit of hustling to get it published in the proper way because I 
should consider that it would be a contribution of great and 
permanent historic value. But if in covering the period during your 
absence from the Philippines you have fallen into serious errors of 
                                                 
9 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, August 24, 1904. James A. Robertson Special 
correspondence, Box 5. Washington: The Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 
10 Gleeck Lewis, E. Jr. Nine Years to make a difference, p. 89. 
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fact and I were to help get the thing out I should kick myself for all 
time to come.”11 
           
          The first part of this paragraph indicates that Worcester was 
willing to help LeRoy publish his book if he ignored the years he was not 
in the Philippines. LeRoy replied to this letter telling Worcester that he 
read the Filipino press regularly, which gave him a good perspective on 
Philippine events: 
I have done a good deal of reading, moreover, in Philippine history 
these five years past, especially in the political history of the last 
years of Spanish rule, and I am by that means in possession of a 
good deal of information of a general sort, sometimes also very 
particular and personal, which gives me some right to claim to 
know Filipino politics of today in a measure.12 
 
          LeRoy was telling Worcester categorically that he was not about to 
change his mind, something Worcester knew. LeRoy preferred to leave 
his book unpublished rather than be forced to represent anything other 
than his own views. He offered his manuscript, “American occupation,” 
to the Macmillan publishers but they did not approve of a part of it. 
Therefore, it seems that LeRoy practically finished the whole book but 
could not publish it.  
          This story makes me wonder whether The Americans in the 
Philippines, as published in 1914, is only a part of the whole book. 
Probably Worcester selected the chapters which could be used to 
effectively attack Blount and cast doubts on the Filipinization of the 
government. The Americans in the Philippines and The Philippines Past 
and Present, published the same year by Worcester, would together be 
                                                 
11 Dean C. Worcester to James A. LeRoy, February 27, 1906. James A. Robertson papers. Annapolis 
Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, letters 1902-1906. North Carolina: Duke University. 
12James A. LeRoy to Dean C. Worcester, August 3, 1906. James A. Robertson papers. Annapolis Md. 
Manuscripts. Box 2, letters 1902-1906. North Carolina: Duke University. 
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formidable in countering Blount’s arguments. Finally, LeRoy’s book, by 
covering the Spanish centuries backed by a large Spanish historiography 
on the Philippines, and the first years of occupation making extensive use 
of the Filipino press, would make a great contribution to the (re)writing 
of Philippine history. 
          The Americans in the Philippines is divided into two parts.  The 
first chapter is devoted to the Spanish regime and contains a summary of 
“Spanish achievements.” One cannot doubt LeRoy’s imprint in 
presenting the mythogenesis of Spain. “The Spanish regime: a three-
century prelude” relates and interprets the Spanish heritage of the 
country. LeRoy is ambiguous about the word “prelude” since it seems 
there is predestination in the American arrival to occupy the Philippines 
or a condemnation of the Spanish problems they inherited. However, 
some pages later he uses again the term “prelude” and makes clear that 
the Filipino revolts of the nineteenth century were the “prelude of 
Spanish crash.” LeRoy bases his argument on a de-contextualization of 
Feodor Jagor’s Mis Viajes por Filipinas,13 Sinibaldo de Mas’s Informe de 
las Islas Filipinas, and some decrees of the Cortes from 1810, concluding 
with a picture of “the undeveloped state of the Philippine archipelago and 
its inability to sustain this burden.”14 
          LeRoy shows his ability to de-contextualize by bringing in some 
arguments from 1810 to 1898. The Spanish assumption of an 
“undeveloped state” in 1810 is brought forward by LeRoy to 1898, 
                                                 
13 I use the Spanish version, since Jagor’s book was sent by Zulueta to LeRoy in Spanish.  LeRoy 
translated and interpreted the excerpts cited in The Americans in the Philippines.  
14 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, January 27, 1904. James A. Robertson 
Special Correspondence. Box 5. Washington: The Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 
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giving shape to his idea of a “halting” regime or as Schurman pointed 
out, an “absence of institutions.” As we will observe, he did the same 
with the reforms from 1868 to 1898 by harnessing the comments of Jagor 
and Sinibaldo de Mas, who wrote their books before the reform period. 
The use of these sources as a dictum of the truth leads LeRoy to conclude 
that the Spanish “reforms were a dead letter.” The chapter devoted to 
Spanish rule is the confirmation of what Schurman had pointed out in 
volume 1 of his Commission’s report— that Spanish rule was medieval, 
ecclesiastic, and theocratic. Therefore, this leads to the inevitable 
conclusion of a Spanish “dark age.” The difference between this chapter 
and the arguments of Philippine Life in Town and Country is in the use of 
sources. Scholars have ascribed historical value to this chapter since 
LeRoy displays his knowledge of a “tendentious” Spanish 
historiography. But the way he read or interpreted these Spanish books 
would only lead to the suppression and misinterpretation of these 
works.15 
          LeRoy used a number of specific strategic narratives in writing this 
book. His account is diachronic although there are present interpolations 
that hook up to the past. The first chapter devoted to more than three 
years of Spanish regime is based on general conclusions, as the author 
                                                 
15 Leon Wolff in 1961 defines the Spanish regime as follows: “Whatever Spain gave the Philippines in 
the form of decent human relations and more institutions was incidental. Since the system was designed 
to nurture graft and racism, and to save souls for the Catholic Church, no attempt was made to develop 
economic factors or the free play of native culture. Occasional reformers who emanated from Madrid 
were murdered or otherwise rendered impotent. The country was really an enormous mission rather 
than a colony …Spanish law was paternal but autocratic; despite meaningless decrees slavery was 
perpetuated. The people were thrust into a medieval mold, their initiative paralyzed, their education 
throttled.” Wolff, Leon. Little Brown Brother. Singapore:  Oxford University Press, 1991, p.17. Wolff 
bases his history of the Spanish regime on The Americans in the Philippines. LeRoy has triumphed and 
his discourse has been perpetuated in the American academe. 
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himself admits: “I am well aware that the first two portions of my 
introductory chapter are general in their nature and that general 
conclusions I have there stated are not always brought out clearly by the 
anatomy my own text develops.16 
          LeRoy presents a review of general tendencies of the Spanish 
regime supported only by his deliberate co-optation and interpretation of 
the sources.  His chapter is thus full of hiatuses and abrupt transitions 
brought on by his attempt to condense all the events of the three centuries 
of Spanish term. The final result reveals a tendency to make general 
conclusions that are not fully substantiated, such as the notion that the 
reforms in the Philippines were a dead letter because of the omnipotence 
of the friars. This argument has become prevalent in our textbooks.  
LeRoy displays another important and strategic narrative, which is 
used in all his works: 
The various reform programs of liberal and revolutionary 
governments in Spain must have some attention, but these, and the 
“1872 revolt,” are really to be relegated to a secondary place. But 
in the eighties and nineties the propaganda for reforms, conducted 
on the part of the Filipinos, especially in Spain, laid the foundation 
for the later more radical movements in the Islands themselves, 
though it was itself not separatist propaganda. It is more 
worthwhile to trace this propaganda in the writings of Rizal, Lopez 
Jaena, Marcelo del Pilar, Blumentritt and others than to devote 
special attention to the Katipunan.17 
           
          This scheme as elaborated by LeRoy can be found in The 
Americans in the Philippines. The reform programs and the revolt of 
1872 are relegated by him to a secondary place, while he promotes La 
                                                 
16 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, August, 1904. James A. Robertson Special Correspondence. 
Box 5. Washington: The Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.  
 
17 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango Mexico, May 13, 1904. James A. Robertson 
Special Correspondence. Box 5. Washington: The Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 
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Solidaridad, the propagandist organ which featured the collaboration of 
Rizal, Lopez-Jaena, Marcelo del Pilar and Blumentritt. But this 
promotion of La Solidaridad is at the expense of other journals and 
newspapers which came out in the Philippines. LeRoy also deliberately 
neglects the underside of La Solidaridad: La Política de España en 
Filipinas. And last but not least, he does not pay much attention to the 
Katipunan, using only Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino and Sastrón’s 
Insurrección en Filipinas. Both sources have become a reference for 
American scholars. 
          The following excerpt sums up LeRoy’s tendencies to make 
general conclusions displayed at the very beginning of the chapter. It 
displays his main argument about Spanish rule—that it was a long dark 
age in which “ignorance” prevailed: 
The people of the Philippines were on the 1st day of May in 1898, 
the product of mixed Asiatic ancestry, both of blood and of 
environment; of more than three centuries of rule of “medieval 
Spanish ecclesiastics;” of commercial and political contact for that 
length of time with Spaniards of a more progressive type, and for a 
half-century back with the world in general; and of a generation of 
strife and of revolution, on the part of their somewhat 
homogeneous civilized elements, toward a more independent 
existence and a dimly recognized ideal of nationality.18 
 
          This summary of three centuries of Spanish rule tries to clarify the 
problems that the Americans had faced since May 1898. LeRoy 
emphasizes the heterogeneity of the territory and its different races. The 
strongest argument is the medievalism conferred by the Spanish regime. 
However, his narrative construction falls into a contradiction in terms of 
the following assumption: “Spanish of a more progressive type.” What 
                                                 
18 LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1914, p. 24. 
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did LeRoy mean? He knew perfectly about the progressive reforms in the 
archipelago in the last decade of the century such as he mentioned to 
Albert; he knew that the Spaniards had implemented reforms. However 
he would deny them all along in this chapter. Subsequently, he 
emphasized the opening of the Suez Canal, which led to liberal ideas 
coming to the archipelago. “The homogeneous civilized elements” 
learned of these ideas and they proceeded to fight against the tyrannical 
Spanish and friar caciquism. All the arguments laid out by LeRoy in the 
first paragraph of his book—heterogeneity, medievalism and a certain 
homogeneity—led to the conclusion that the United States needed to 
protect the archipelago.   
          LeRoy constructed the whole chapter with these generalizations. 
But if we had to select one portion of his story about the Spanish regime, 
we should have a look at the Spanish conquest. LeRoy assumes that the 
Spaniards consciously destroyed native institutions and customs. “I still 
believe,” he wrote, “that the Spaniards did consciously endeavor to 
destroy native institutions and customs, as they did in Mexico and as they 
did wherever else I have seen their work.”19 This is a sweeping statement 
that encapsulates the Philippines within the whole empire. 
          LeRoy based the above argument on Las Leyes Nuevas from 
1542.20 The conquest of the Philippines had to follow ad literam the 
                                                 
19 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, August, 1904. James A. Robertson Special Correspondence. 
Box 5. Washington: The Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 
20 The orders and decrees enacted for the Philippines were ruled by these New Laws from 1542. In fact, 
these were the first Laws of the Indies. The Leyes Nuevas lost their preeminence referring to conquest 
and pacification when Ordenanzas sobre pacificaciones y poblaciones (Ordinances upon Pacification 
and Population) were enacted in 1573. Curiously these Ordenanzas were not enacted in the Philippines 
until 1599. Blair and Robertson published ad hoc the Memorial of Bishop Salazar in order to infer the 
abuses committed by the Spaniards in the Philippines. Bishop Salazar said that these Ordenanzas were 
not being obeyed, but the Ordenanzas had not been sent to the Philippines. Cano, Glòria. La Formación 
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corollary of these laws. LeRoy was fostering the black legend of Spanish 
rule and inferring that the laws were never enforced in the Philippines. 
Thus he was stressing the famous sentence, obedezco pero no cumplo (I 
obey but I do not enforce). LeRoy did not seem to realize that he was 
contradicting himself since in Philippine Life in Town and Country he 
blamed the Spaniards for conniving with and nourishing native customs. 
In sum, LeRoy provided an image of a corrupt, backward, halting, 
anachronistic, tyrannical Spanish rule in order to undermine all the Latin 
imprints in the archipelago and facilitate Americanization. 
          The Spanish regime until the nineteenth century, or specifically 
until the 1860s, is pictured by LeRoy as the “Golden Age” of Spanish 
ecclesiastical rule, which was never transcended: 
Patriotic, sometimes also intelligent “efforts” were made to avert it 
[the final collapse], and the nineteenth century in particular was in 
Spain a drawn-out wrestling bout between the blind power of the 
“old giant of medievalism” and reaction and the spasmodic and 
nervous exertions of the young man of Spanish liberalism, re-
aroused at intervals to the movement of scientific and political 
progress.21 
 
          I have highlighted the term “effort” since this neutral word is 
central to understanding the further conclusion of LeRoy that the reforms 
or promises made by the Spaniards were only “efforts,” never enforced. 
In addition, he establishes in this paragraph the axis of development from 
medievalism to liberalism, the former being so deep-rooted that 
liberalism failed to surmount it. Finally, for LeRoy the concessions made 
                                                                                                                                            
de una Colonia: Filipinas 1569-1614. Unpublished dissertation. Barcelona: Institut Universitari 
d’Història Jaume Vicens Vives, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2002, pp. 70-71. As for the Ordenanzas, see 
Copia Literal de las Reales Zedulas despachadas desde  el año 1580 en adelante, de D. Antonio de 
Figueroa, Escribano Mayor de la Superior Gobernación y Guerra de estas Yslas Philipinas , año de 
1751. Barcelona: IUHJVV, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. 
21 LeRoy, James A.  The Americans in the Philippines, p. 15. 
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by the Spaniards were only generous and democratic in manner but Spain 
was unable to free herself from the iron hand which “bound her 
stationary to a past in whose glories she came more and more to live.”22 
LeRoy pointed the finger at Spain—the mother country—unable to 
implant modern ideas of government, education, politics, and religious 
tolerance in their full sense. 
          LeRoy recognized that some progress was made from 1863 
onwards but he undermined his own argument by using Sinibaldo de 
Mas, who wrote his Informe in 1843 in order to support his thesis that 
Spain was unable to retain the Philippines. He also used José Montero y 
Vidal’s Historia General de Filipinas. Now Montero y Vidal was rabidly 
pro-friar, conservative and anti-reformist. Naturally this ideological 
orientation of LeRoy’s major source would cast a shadow on his 
treatment of this crucial period. 
          LeRoy devotes attention to a specific section entitled Municipal 
reorganization, which was meant to support Schurman’s argument about 
the “absence of native institutions.” He explains in detail the municipal 
reorganization from 1886 to 1893. He takes his information from the 
Schurman report and in doing so, advises the readers to use it as well. He 
starts with the timid reform implemented by Becerra which was to be a 
step towards giving the natives the right to exercise complete control in 
local affairs. This was, however, “only a decree conferring upon a few of 
                                                 
22 LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines., p. 15. 
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the larger towns the right to organize en ayuntamiento like those of the 
municipalities of Spain…”23  
          Curiously, LeRoy explains in detail the reform implanted by 
Becerra, but he downplays and distorts the Maura law by stating that the 
priest was in the end the one who dictated the selection and election of 
local officials “by virtue of his personal authority, influence, and training, 
and by reason of his multifarious functions, by which he discharges the 
most potent functions in the government of the municipalities.”24 
           LeRoy says of the Maura law that it remained, like too many other 
reforms of Spain, mostly a promise. At this point he tells the readers: 
For a resumé of the whole system of Spain in the Philippine 
Islands, see Report of Philippine Commission, 1900, vol. 1, part 
IV. The reader is, however, in danger of being misled if he does 
not understand that the organization, showing the governmental 
scheme as modified by recent laws, some of which had not at all, 
or had but lately, taken effect.”25 [emphasis added] 
 
          This advice is essential for LeRoy’s summary negation of the 
implantation of the Maura law.26 He informs the reader that the 
organization of the municipal and provincial government, such as was 
explained in the Schurman report, was modified or did not take effect. 
Schurman, as we have seen in the second chapter, based his discussion of 
                                                 
23 LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines, p. 42. 
24 Report of the US. Philippine Commission to the President (1900), Vol. I, Part IV, p. 62. 
25 LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines, p. 44 
26 LeRoy’s warning was categorical for future scholars since there has been a tacit agreement that the 
Maura law never took force in the Philippines. For instance Eliodoro Robles, who has written the best 
history of the nineteenth century in the Philippines, by following the Schurman report and The 
Americans in the Philippines states: “The measure had admirable qualities and was mainly a response 
to the demands of Filipino leaders. Coming, however, in the wake of the Philippine revolution, the law 
was really never carried out.” Robles, Eliodoro. The Philippine in the Nineteenth century, p. 218. 
Robles followed practically literally LeRoy’s argument. However, Robles is probably the only one who 
has admitted that Spain granted power to municipal and provincial governments “at the proper time, as 
evinced by reforms in the last decades of the century when local capacity to rule began to merge.” See, 
p. 295. Robles’s arguments have been silenced by the scholars since he dared to say that the Spaniards 
laid the foundations of the national unity. By 1969, American scholars were starting to bring out the 
evils of Filipino centralization which damaged the implantation of the sacred principles of American 
democracy.  
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the Spanish government on the decree of Maura. This is a tacit 
recognition that the Maura law, as with other decrees from the Spanish 
reform period, was indeed implanted in the Philippines. However, 
Schurman concluded that there were no representative native institutions 
since the Maura law was only nominal. Thus, LeRoy advises the readers 
to consult page 81 of the Schurman report, which demonstrates the 
corruption, autocracy and backwardness of the Spanish regime. What for 
Schurman was an “absence of representative institutions” would be 
rendered by LeRoy as a definite “dead letter” by emphasizing that the 
laws never took effect. 
          To render his conclusion more effective LeRoy recommends that 
for a fuller idea of the old Spanish system of internal administration, the 
reader could consult the appendix to volume XVII of The Philippine 
Islands, 1493-1898 which has translations of sections of Mas’s Informe 
of 1843 and Montero y Vidal’s Historia. But Mas and Montero y Vidal 
never wrote anything about the Maura law since this took effect long 
after their publications. LeRoy seems to have provided a neat picture or 
structure of the Spanish system by suppressing important books. He does 
not mention Wenceslao Retana, who was very prolific during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In fact, Retana had published a 
large bibliography about the Maura law.27 LeRoy, although knew some 
                                                 
27 Retana said in 1907: Probably, Maura does not know all the bibliographical extension of his famous 
decree of 19th May 1893. It was published for first time in La Gaceta de Madrid and it was reproduced 
in La Gaceta de Manila and in all the newspapers published in the archipelago. It was also published 
by La Solidaridad; La Política de España en Filipinas. In addition this decree can be found in Royal 
Decree of 19th May 1893; Tribunales Municipales. Su organización, constitución y atribuciones, that 
is the new municipal regime, D. Miguel de Liñán y Eguizábal. Manila 1893; Reforma Municipal de 
Filipinas by Camilo Millán; El Régimen Municipal en las Islas Filipinas by Pedro Paterno. This book 
is at Yale University and University of Michigan; El Municipio Filipino in El Faro Administrativo 
directed by Manuel Artigas; Diccionario de la Administración de Filipinas by Miguel Rodríguez 
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of the books from Retana’s bibliography, decided to ignore them. He did 
the same with Retana, who was seen as a danger since he could question 
LeRoy’s arguments. As a matter of fact, Retana was the alternative to 
LeRoy. As we shall see, like LeRoy he became an authority on the 
Filipinos—those all-too-Latin Filipinos. This is one of the reasons LeRoy 
wanted to put him down. 
          LeRoy concludes this section with some very important statements. 
First of all he alludes to the censorship of the press during the Spanish 
regime. Secondly, he reiterates the idea that the Spanish were making 
progress although this progress was confronted with strong opposition 
from the religious orders, which tried to perpetuate the status quo. 
Censorship and the patronage of the religious sparked the discontentment 
of the natives who revolted in 1872 and in 1896. LeRoy establishes a 
linear emplotment between both revolts, although he prefers to overlook, 
as he stated to Robertson, the revolt of 1872—such as he defined it, 
anyway. His strategy in  relegating this revolt to a non-event, is related to 
his denial of reformism and the creation of the image of an “amorphous 
Spain.” LeRoy tried to emphasize the idea that Spain was a grotesque 
deformation of European civilization.28 For this purpose he concealed the 
nature of Spanish democracy by considering it “a democracy only in 
manner.” 
                                                                                                                                            
Berriz. Manila 1887-1895. This book is in the Special Collection Worcester at Michigan; Compilación 
legislativa del Gobierno y Administración civil de Ultramar by Manuel Fernández Martín; Diccionario 
Alcubilla. This decree was also commented in other works. LeRoy makes references along his chapter 
Filipinas: Estudio de algunos asuntos de actualidad by Eduardo Navarro, however he does not 
mention there is a chapter in which Navarro complains the enforcement of Maura law. See Wenceslao 
E. Retana. Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal. Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez, 1907, pp. 
305-306. 
28 This sentence was stated by Ramón Valle Inclán. Alvárez Junco, José. ‘History, Politics and Culture, 
1875-1936.’ In.David T. Gies (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Modern Spanish Culture. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 75. 
 158 
 
The underside of this Dark Age: The 1872 prelude 
          The revolt of 1872 has to be contextualized in the Spanish 
construction of the democratic state and the importance the Philippines 
acquired as a colonial entrepôt. LeRoy portrayed the Spanish government 
as obsolete—as he put it, “medieval Spanish ecclesiastic.” However the 
Spanish revolution of 1868 witnessed the birth of a new Spain and a new 
generation—Europe-centered, culturalist, and democratic—that sparked a 
special dynamism in which ideas of freedom and progress were founded. 
For Vicens Vives, this generation carried an important intellectual 
baggage with doctrinal and pragmatic features.29 These features had 
immediate consequences in the colonies and above all in the Philippines, 
which became the “perla del pacífico” (pearl of Pacific). From now on, 
until the collapse of the empire, the archipelago would experience 
dramatic economic, political, juridical, legislative and cultural change in 
its structures. These transcendent reforms brought about the effective re-
colonization of the archipelago in which the clergy would lose its pre-
eminence, being pulled out from all  civil matters. 
          The sudden importance of the archipelago was reflected in the 
books and newspapers of this period. More than two thousand books and 
more than a hundred newspapers and journals30 were published from 
1868 to 1898. These show the constant struggle of two dynamics and 
                                                 
29 Sánchez Mantero, Rafael and Feliciano, Montero. Historia de España. Revolución y Restauración. 
Del Sexenio Revolucionario a la guerra de Cuba, 1868-1898. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2004, vol 13, p. 
11. 
30 The newspapers and journals were published in the Philippines. It is surprising how the papers and 
journals from 1868 to 1898 tackled all sort of topics--political, cultural, law, the economy  and others. I 
have used for this information Retana, Wenceslao E. Aparato Bibliográfico Filipino. The newspapers 
and the journals were part of the collection of La Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas.  
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trends, between those who advocated change and the defenders of a static 
order who demonized such changes. 31 The press would become during 
this period the pulse of society, the catalyst of political debate. In fact, 
from the constitution of the provisional government to the coronation of 
Amadeo de Savoy in 1870, in Madrid alone there were more than three 
hundred newspapers embraced by all political factions. The press was 
completely free of censorship during these years.32 Most of the 
newspapers devoted a special and unusual attention to the Philippines, 
specially to the reformist policy emanating from the Ministry for the 
Colonies (Ministro de Ultramar). Finally, the importance of the 
archipelago can be seen in the changes made to the traditional juridical-
political structures of the colony. 
          LeRoy reduces this story to the important contributions of two 
Ministers for the Colonies mentioned in his book: Manuel Becerra and 
Segismundo Moret.33 Becerra was the loyal defender of the revolutionary 
idea. He suggested the rectification of the political and administrative 
system. Although he resigned in 1870, Moret was to follow the same 
policy. Besides, he had made a study of an ambitious project of 
reformism similar to the French and Dutch models. It called for, firstly, 
the development of interior wealth by connecting the archipelago with 
the metropolis; second, the creation of a special administration, “as 
                                                 
31 There are many examples about how the clergy was forbidden to take part in civil matters. For 
instance, Giraudier, Baltasar. Los Frailes de Filipinas. Breves consideraciones de actualidad escritas 
por un español peninsular, 1888. Giraudier states that the revolution of 1869 paved the way for the 
separation of the clergy from civil matters, p. 16; another example is Navarro, Eduardo. Filipinas: 
estudio de algunos asuntos de actualidad (1897). The works of Retana from the nineteenth century, etc. 
These works are a loyal testimony that the reforms were implemented in the Philippines.  
32 Seoane, M. Cruz. Oratoria y Periodismo en la España del Siglo XIX. Madrid: Fundación Juan March 
Castalia, 1977. p. 381. 
33 Manuel Becerra became again Minister of Ultramar (Colonies) during the Restoration. Segismundo 
Moret was the last Minister for the Colonies and one of the most vilified. 
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intelligent and active as possible…to develop the civilization of that 
territory and to foster Spanish interests”; and thirdly, the reform of the 
economy.34 
          Moret was fully willing to implement this system and sent different 
decrees to the islands.35 More important, it seems to me, were the decrees 
of 16 August and 6 November 1870, which urged the reform of the 
administration and educational system.  Moret ordered the creation of a 
new Body of Civil Administration in the Islands in order to cleanse the 
Administration of a bureaucratic endogamy that was “depraved and 
ignorant.” To implement this reform he encouraged qualified personnel 
to be sent instead.36     
          As for the reform of secondary education, Moret wanted to 
undermine the monopoly of the Church. He established a modern system 
which tried to secularize secondary education and the university. This 
reform provoked the reaction of the Church and finally it was 
suspended.37 
          These reforms were to have a deep impact in the Philippines. The 
news of the triumph of the Revolution in Spain arrived in Manila on 28 
October 1868. The Governor General of the Philippines, José de la 
                                                 
34 Memoria presentada a las Cortes constituyentes por el ministro de Ultramar, don Segismundo Moret 
y Prendergast, November 1 1870, Madrid: Imprenta Nacional, 1870. For instance, an example of this 
reform was implemented in the Philippines is Manuel Artigas who worked for the new administration.  
35 For instance, the decree of July 7 authorized the correspondence via the Suez Canal –Barcelona-
Manila. October 16 total liberalization of the trade; October 23 and 25 creation of a new Tribunal of 
Account and new Courts and the promotion of fiscal, etc. I think that these are enough data to 
demonstrate that the archipelago was not as static as the image presented to us in textbooks. 
36 The access of the Administration would be through a competitive exam for the position. The 
candidate had to study Natural history, History of the Philippines and its legislation, sciences, arts,  
customs of the indigenous villages, Tagalog and its dialects. Celdrán Ruano, Julia. Instituciones 
Hispanofilipinas del Siglo XIX. Madrid: Colección Mapfre, 1994. p. 142. 
37 The cruelest criticism of this reform came from Casimiro Herrera. Frutos que pueden dar las 
reformas en Filipinas.Madrid: Imprenta Universal, 1871. 
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Gandara, reacted by sending a telegram to Madrid, “swearing loyalty and 
unión to the Metropolis.”38 Gandara decided to ignore the news in order 
not to provoke disturbances. But the news could not be hidden for a long 
time. The first reaction in the Philippines was surprise and fright among 
the most conservative and reactionary sectors, and happiness among the 
liberals.  
          It was not necessary to wait too long for the explosion of the first 
reactions. On 1 February 1869 the newspaper La Discusión announced 
that the Ministry for the Colonies had created a Commission of Reforms 
of “administration and government of the Islands.” One of the members 
of this committee was Vicente Barrantes,39 who was designated to 
execute agreements and internal resolutions. 
          The newspaper considered the appointment of this Committee and 
its members as a betrayal since Vicente Barrantes was a hireling of the 
religious orders and a reactionary. The expectations of a group of liberals 
who had lived in the archipelago, and some Filipinos in Spain, were 
frustrated. The most radical sector would systematically criticize this 
Committee.  This criticism is part of the political debate generated during 
that period. Patricio de la Escosura40 and Vicente Barrantes were 
                                                 
38 The news of the revolution arrived in the Philippines via a telegram sent by Spanish ambassador in 
London.  See Sánchez Fuertes, Cayetano. ‘La Prensa Española y Filipinas, 1868-1872.’ In Luis 
Togores (ed.), Extremo Oriente Ibérico. Investigaciones Históricas: Metodología y Estado de la 
Cuestión. Madrid: CSIC, 1988, p. 417.  
39 Vicente Barrantes had been quartermaster general of the Treasury in the Philippines. This data has 
always been relegated to a secondary place since Barrantes has become famous because of his writings. 
He was interested in theater and other entertainments, but his main contribution was the book La 
Instrucción Primaria en Filipinas, published in 1867. Barrantes shows the necessity to implement this 
reform in the archipelago, although he considers essential the role of the religious orders in the islands. 
He was a conservative.  
40 Patricio de la Escosura wrote Memoria sobre Filipinas y Joló redactada en 1863 y 1864 published in 
1882. Francisco de Cañamaque, member of the Parliament, wrote the prologue and was the one who 
urged the publishing of this Memoria. Cañamaque states categorically in the prologue that the 
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appointed members of this Commission because they were officials in 
the Philippines and therefore they knew first hand the dynamics and 
structures of the archipelago. Their conceptualization of the islands was 
wrong and biased since both of them considered the friars as a necessary 
evil but the new Spanish government needed to learn about the situation 
of the Philippines in order to implement the most suitable reforms. 
          LeRoy asserts categorically that the reforms of the administration 
were revoked. He ends his statement at this point. He is right. The 
reforms in 1872 were revoked by Madrid. But LeRoy’s simplistic 
explanation reflects his broader view about the triumph of the friars and 
the perpetuation of the status quo. This is the main reason he fostered 
hiatuses in his narrative. At the same time, though, it seems that LeRoy 
establishes a linearity between the revocation of the reforms and the 
Cavite revolt of 1872. Since he implies that the revolt was provoked by 
the friars and conservatives, he is underpinning to 1872 his idea of the 
perpetuation of conservatism in the archipelago. This is the reason the 
reforms and the 1872 revolt had to be relegated to a secondary place. 
 
The Cavite events: The birth of an evolutionary history  
          The ambiguity provided by LeRoy in tackling this period has 
paved the way for the use of a specific terminology that magnifies the 
Cavite insurrection.41 The ambiguities are based on one source, Montero 
                                                                                                                                            
continuity of the status quo in the islands was dangerous and suicidal. Escosura urged the 
implementation of reforms in the archipelago although in 1863, there was no a clear delimitation for 
the establishment of the suitable reforms.  
41 I prefer to use the term “insurrection”to define the events of Cavite since Spanish accounts written in 
the nineteenth century defined it as “La Insurrección de Cavite.” Retana always defines this event as 
“Los Sucesos de Cavite” (Cavite incidents).  
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y Vidal, who has become the authority par excellence to explain this 
period.42 Montero y Vidal mentioned one Casimiro Herrera, a friar 
defender of the status quo. Apart from Montero y Vidal, Spanish scholars 
also use as a valued source Las Proscripciones de Sila.43 In contrast, the 
Manifiesto al país sobre los sucesos de Cavite, y Memoria sobre la 
Administración y Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas, written by the liberal 
governor Carlos M. de la Torre, has been relegated to a secondary place. 
          LeRoy interpolates several terms to define the Cavite events. 
Sometimes he uses “revolt,” a term which strengthens his argument about 
the “prelude to the crash.” At other times he uses the term “affair,” which 
is a literal translation of the word “asunto.” LeRoy also uses a synonym 
of “asunto”—“caso”—which means notorious affair, scandalous and 
even criminal. 44 Other words in his glossary are “disturbance” and 
“mutiny.” 
          The accounts from the nineteenth century use the term 
“insurrección” (insurrection).45 Or, like Retana, they define this 
movement as “los sucesos de Cavite” (Cavite incidents). No doubt, we 
can see that LeRoy took his terminology from Retana by translating by 
“sucesos” as “affairs.” However in twentieth century historiography—
above all Anglo-American—this insurrection is designated as “the Cavite 
                                                 
42 Montero y Vidal, José. Historia General de Filipinas: desde el Descubrimiento de dichas Islas hasta 
nuestros Días. [3 vols]. Madrid: Imprenta y Fundición de Manuel Tello, 1887, 1894-95. Not only has 
Montero y Vidal become a creed for Spaniards but also for Americans, since Blair & Robertson (ed.) 
The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 –the American creed par excellence- translated some chapters into 
English. 
43 Pedro Gutiérrez de Salazar acerbic enemy of Carlos M. de la Torre wrote in 1870 Las Proscripciones 
de Sila (remedo de) en Filipinas, por el Exmo. Sr. D. Carlos M. de la Torre. This source has been only 
used by Spanish Scholars. Most of them following Montero y Vidal who utilized this source to describe 
the impact of La Gloriosa in the Archipelago.  
44 Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana por La Real Academia Española. Decimatercia Edición. 
Madrid: Imprenta de los Sres. Hernando y Compañía, Año de 1899. 
45 For instance, Montero y Vidal, Casimiro Herrero and Baltasar Giraudier. 
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mutiny.” Mutiny, according to the dictionary of La Real Academia 
Española means “chaotic movement of crowd, by and large against 
constituted authority.” It seems that this event a priori was not chaotic 
and even less against constituted authority—there was still a liberal 
government. Some Spanish scholars, instead, call this event “Asonada de 
Cavite.” There is not a good translation in English of this Spanish term. 
A synonym could be “mutiny.” “Asonada” gives to the event a sense of 
Spanish-ness, since it derives from the Latin asonare, while “motín” 
(mutiny) is a French term. Asonada means a tumultuous and violent 
meeting in order to achieve a political purpose. It does not seem that this 
was the real objective of this uprising. Other Spaniards use the term 
“sublevación” (uprising), “uprising in sedition.”46  
          The use of this specific terminology—mutiny or asonada more 
than  uprising—disguises the real nature of the rebellion. Mutiny, in 
English, has a narrower sense than in Spanish: “open rebellion against 
constituted authority (by seamen or soldiers against their officers.).” The 
purpose of the use of mutiny is related to the “constituted authority,” 
since it was a revolt to undermine Spanish “despotism.” Asonada is a 
more incisive term since the Spaniards categorize this insurrection as 
exclusively political. Therefore, mutiny, as used by LeRoy, and 
“asonada” as used by modern Spanish scholars, have been co-opted to 
construct an evolutionary history. The Cavite “mutiny” has been 
identified as the prelude to the revolts of 1896 and 1898 and as an 
incipient nationalist movement or, more precisely, proto-nationalist. By 
                                                 
46 I have found this terminology in an unpublished manuscript written by a friar called Villajos. By 
defining the facts of Cavite as “sublevación” uprising he is implying it was not as grave as a rebellion. 
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establishing this linear sequence, scholars have constructed the 
stereotyped images of the Spanish system as anachronistic, despotic and 
tyrannical in accordance with the perspective of Anglo-American 
historiography. The insurgents, according to this historiography, revolted 
against the despotism of the government and against the friars. In sum the 
reforms implemented by de la Torre would become a dead letter. The 
Spaniards, instead, prefer the image of an obsolete and paternalistic 
system such as was displayed in the nineteenth century books. It seems 
that the Spaniards, through their arguments, reveal a surreptitious 
justification that “the loss of the Philippines would be imminent.”  
          More interesting, it seems to me, is the definition of the Cavite 
events in the nineteenth century. By using the term “insurrection” the 
conservative reactionaries and the friars—the defenders of maintaining 
the status quo—were inferring the idea of “separatism.” They were 
warning of the danger of implementing liberal reforms in a country 
where the people were childish, illiterate and unfit for assimilating 
dramatic changes. Retana is probably the most extremist by using 
“sucesos” and this is probably the reason LeRoy co-opted the term.  
Retana tried to play with the ambiguity since we do not know if he 
inferred by “sucesos” a criminal act or an event of transcendental 
importance. No doubt, for Retana this event had the two senses. Retana 
in the nineteenth century, defender of the political immobilism of the 
Spanish regime, considered this fact as a criminal act; however, Retana, 
in the twentieth century, observed Cavite as the catalyst of the newly-
introduced liberal ideas, and therefore the cornerstone to the modernity of 
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the archipelago. This term “sucesos” became standardized and the 
Filipinos started to use it in 1898.47   
          In spite of the ambiguity showed by LeRoy and other scholars 
through the use of a vocabulary that implies “prelude or germ of 
separatism,” the Cavite insurrection was not necessarily considered as 
such by others. American scholars have portrayed this insurgency as the 
struggle of the nationalists against an oppressive Spanish system and 
against the omnipotence of the friars, selecting ad hoc for this purpose a 
small portion of the books written in the nineteenth century. LeRoy, who 
knew Spanish bibliography, used in illustrating this event the books of 
Montero y Vidal, Casimiro Herrera, and Francisco Vila.48 All of them 
support the American argument related to the Spanish system since they 
described the deplorable and chaotic state of the archipelago. But, 
probably the most important assertion is their argument concerning the 
“Cavite insurrection,” since this is a claim for the maintenance of the 
status quo and the danger of implementing reforms in a country ruled by 
“indolence.” They considered this insurrection as a separatist 
movement.49  
          Despite LeRoy’s conclusive argument that the Spanish system was 
obsolete, the years from 1868 to 1872 were not a failure, and the reforms 
were not a dead letter. The Spanish colonial system shifted dramatically 
towards an exploitative system. The most important testimonies of the 
                                                 
47 An example is the newspaper La Independencia which came out in 1898. An excellent newspaper, it 
became the first separatist one published in the archipelago. La Independencia, by using this term, was 
implying a criminal act of the friars. 
48 Vila, Francisco. Filipinas. Promotor Fiscal y Juez de Primera Instancia que ha sido de los Distritos 
de Bohol, Bataan, Leyte, Samar y Quiapo en aquel Archipiélago. Madrid: Imp, y Fund. De la Viuda e 
Hijos de J.A. García, 1880.   
49 See, for instance Vila, Francisco. Filipinas, p.15. This article is in the University of Michigan. 
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idea of re-colonization and exploitation are, on one hand, the 1887 
Philippine Exposition in Madrid and, on the other, Retana’s legacy. They 
provide an alternative to the story narrated by LeRoy and the American 
scholars who came after him. The Exposition is absent in The Americans 
in the Philippines. As for, Retana, LeRoy made a sectarian selection of 
his legacy of writings. 
 
The versality of Retana: The reforms not a dead letter 
          Wenceslao Emilio Retana is perhaps, since the nineteenth century, 
the most cited “Filipinologist” by Spanish, American and Filipino 
historians. Retana at the turn of the nineteenth century became the 
catalyst for the American construction of Philippine history beginning 
with its “Spanish dark age.” Retana was well known in the Philippines, in 
the United States after the American take-over, and obviously in Spain. 
He became immediately a reference for the Americans –as historian and 
bibliographer. In fact, he was in touch with prominent Filipinos and 
Americans such as Edward Ayer, James A. Robertson, 50 David 
Barrows,51  Gaylord Bourne52  and the librarian Putnam from the Library 
of Congress. 
                                                 
50 Emma H. Blair and James A. Robertson used some of the documents published in Archivo del 
Bibliófilo Filipino and translated them into English for The Philippines Islands 1493-1898. In fact, they 
took from Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, vol. 3, the following documents: Relación de las cosas de las 
Filipinas, hecha por Fr. Domingo de Salazar. Manuscrito Inédito de 1583, pp. 1-45; Carta de Relación 
de las cosas de la China y de los chinos del Parian de Manila, a 24 de Junio de 1590, pp. 47-80. See 
The Philippine Islands vol. 5 Affairs in the Philippine Islands pp. 210-255; and vol. 7 The Chinese and 
the Parian at Manila. Domingo de Salazar, pp. 212-238. 
51 See the first edition of David P. Barrows. History of the Philippines. When David Barrows wrote this 
book, The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 had not come out. To write part of the Spanish history he used 
some works of Retana. Barrows stated “Of modern historical writings mention must be made of the 
Historia de Filipinas three volumes, 1887, by Montero y Vidal, and the publications of W.E. Retana. 
To the scholarship and enthusiasm of this last author much is owed. His work has been the 
republication of rare and important sources. His edition of Combes…, Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino –
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          As a reference, Retana’s books and articles he published have 
become stereotyped. The stereotypes were furnished by LeRoy, who 
cited and talked about Wenceslao Retana a lot. He had some kind of 
animadversion against Retana since this man represented Spanish-ness, a 
strong Spanish legacy in the Philippines and above all because Retana’s 
work reflected the fact that reforms in the Philippines were 
implemented—something LeRoy wanted to ignore or debunk. 
          LeRoy used some of Retana’s works in The Americans in the 
Philippines, but silenced the most important. In fact, he consulted only 
those which could not question his narrative. He does not make any 
single mention of Retana when he explains the Maura law, even ignoring 
La Política de España en Filipinas, newspaper which published the law 
among others and devoted many pages to Maura’s policy. LeRoy devotes 
a long footnote to Retana stating that he “was an industrious and fairly 
accurate Philippine bibliographer, but as a political writer he was a 
veritable calamity.”53 
          This sentence speaks for itself. LeRoy does not give any credibility 
to Retana and above all to La Política de España en Filipinas which is 
summed up by LeRoy as “the organ of the ancient regime.” This is a 
tendentious definition, related to his narrative strategy of using 
“generalizations,” since La Política represented only the conservative 
                                                                                                                                            
a collection of rare papers on the islands, of different dates; and his edition, the first ever published of 
Zúñiga’s Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas, an incomparable survey of the islands made about 1800…”p. 
20 
52 Edward Gaylord Bourne was an Americanist. The lack of American Filipinologists in 1902 forced 
Arthur Clark to contract Bourne to write a ‘Historical Introduction’ to The Philippine Islands, 1493-
1898. Bourne, in order to write this historical introduction, simply extrapolated Latin American 
institutions to the Philippines, basing his historical approach on Antonio Morga. Sucesos de las Islas 
Filipinas and Retana’s works such as his annotation of Zúñiga and Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino. 
53 LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines, p. 74. 
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faction. But this was part of LeRoy’s campaign to discredit Retana. In 
fact, he started this campaign in 1904 when he accused Retana of being a 
“friar-eulogist” and hence biased.54 
          LeRoy tried to dissuade James Robertson from using the advice of, 
or works from, Retana for his The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. He also 
cautioned him that “La Política de España en Filipinas was the organ 
subsidized for the purpose of combating the campaign of Spaniards and 
Filipinos for a liberal regime in the Philippines. It was widely believed 
that the friars supported it.55 LeRoy said of the pro-friar Retana, I have 
very little respect for his reliability.56 
          LeRoy continued his personal crusade against Retana and in 1905 
he sent off two important letters to discredit him. The first one, sent to 
Robertson, stated: “When you come to read La Política de España en 
Filipinas, you will find there internal evidence sufficient to damn Retana 
completely.”[emphasis added]57 LeRoy was encouraging Robertson to 
read La Política and to neglect and “damn” Retana and his work. He 
achieved his purpose since, as we will see, La Política is not consulted by 
most scholars. Robertson joined the fray. While he was director of the 
Philippine National Library he accused Retana of not contributing 
anything new.58  In a second letter to the director of El Renacimiento, 
Fernando M. Guerrero, LeRoy state: 
                                                 
54 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, January 29, 1904. James A. Robertson 
papers. Box 5, Special Correspondence. Washington: The Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 
55 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, January 29,1904. 
56 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, January 20, 1904. 
57 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Mexico, March 14, 1905. James A. Robertson papers. Box 
5, Special Correspondence. Washington: The Manuscripts Division. Library of Congress. 
58 Robertson James Alexander. Annapolis. Md. Manuscripts. North Carolina: Duke University. (X-F, 
“Articles and notes, n.d.V.). See John Schumacher N. S.J. The Making of a Nation. Essays on 
Nineteenth Century Filipino Nationalism. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1991, p. 150. 
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I cannot understand why you Filipinos again accept Mr. Retana. 
He is no better than a silly mercenary. Having lost by circumstance 
his market in Spain and in the convents of the religious orders who 
supported him, now he seeks to reconcile or reintegrate with the 
Filipinos in order to benefit from them as purchasers of his endless 
and always absurd “notes.” 
(No puedo ver como ustedes, los filipinos toleran al Sr. Retana 
otra vez. Es un mentecato mercenario, ni más ni menos. Habiendo 
perdido por las circunstancias su mercado en España y en los 
conventos de las órdenes religiosas que le soportaban antes, ahora 
trata de rehabilitarse59 con los filipinos para ir aprovechándose de 
ellos como compradores de sus “notas” interminables y siempre 
disparatadas.)60 
 
This strong statement disguises something deeper than LeRoy’s 
discrediting of Retana. It is linked to the American strategy of 
undermining the Spanish imprint in the Philippines. LeRoy was right. 
Retana was collaborating in El Renacimiento and with most of the 
“ilustrado” Filipinos such as Epifanio de los Santos, Felipe Calderon, 
Isabelo de los Reyes, Dominador Gómez and Fernando Ma. Guerrero—
those considered by LeRoy as too Latin and egotistic. Retana and his 
works enjoyed more influence among them than LeRoy and other 
Americans.    
                                                 
59 LeRoy uses the Spanish verb “rehabilitarse,” making a wrong construction. The verb “rehabilitarse” 
does not exist in Spanish. We can only find the verb “rehabilitar” which means to restore something or 
someone to its old state.” There are two possibilities to translate this verb: to reconcile, since it is what 
Retana tried in the twentieth century or to re-integrate himself with the Filipino community.  
60 James A. LeRoy to Fernando Ma. Guerrero, Durango, Mexico, 23 March 1905. Robertson James 




CHAPTER V: LEROY, RETANA, AND THE SPECTRE OF 
SPANISH REFORMISM 
When you come to read La Política de España 
en Filipinas, you will find there sufficient 
internal evidence to damn Retana completely. 
If I knew nothing else about him, that would 
be enough for me, either with regard to him as 
a man or to his position as a “Philippine 
authority.”  
      James A. LeRoy 
 
In order to better understand the magnitude of the task faced by 
James LeRoy in rewriting the Spanish past in his book The Americans in 
the Philippines, we need to probe more deeply into the life and works of 
LeRoy’s Spanish “other”—Wenceslao Emilio Retana. Spanish scholars 
allude to Retana as “historiographer” and “historian” but in fact few 
things are known about Retana’s life. It is not easy to find any reference 
to his biographical details. I have found a personal anecdote narrated by 
Retana himself in La Política de España en Filipinas and a bio-
bibliographical review written by Manuel Artigas y Cuerva,1 although 
John Schumacher mentions two more biographies.2 
          According to Artigas, Retana was a public official appointed by 
royal decree on 4 December 1883, at the age of 21, to occupy a position 
of warehouse guard with the collector of public treasury in Batangas. 
Retana was transferred as official 4 to the Intendencia General de 
Hacienda; six months later becoming official 4 in Administración 
                                                 
1 Artigas y Cuerva Manuel. Quién es Retana. Su antaño y hogaño. Reseña bio-bibliográfica. Manila: 
Imprenta y Litografía de Juan Fajardo, 1911. 
2 Schumacher, John N. S.J. The Making of a Nation. Essays of Nineteenth-Century Filipino 
Nationalism. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1991. John Schumacher mentions a 
book written by Epifanio de los Santos y Cristobal, entitled Wenceslao E. Retana: ensayo crítico 
acerca de este ilustre filipinista and Retana y Gamboa (Wenceslao Emilio) Espasa 50, 1378-79.   
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Central de Impuestos directos where he remained until 1889. In July of 
that year he was promoted as official 3 of Contaduría Central. Artigas 
states that Retana got his position by influence and was a bureaucratic 
parasite.3 This is the only information we have about the official life of 
Retana in the Philippines.  
          As for Retana’s task as journalist and writer, his first work was El 
Indio Batangueño. As journalist he started to write articles in Batangas 
under the pseudonymous of “A. Nater.” He worked in La Oceanía 
Española, a newspaper directed by José Felipe del Pan from whom, 
according to Artigas, Retana learned much “although he did not partake 
of the standards upheld by this gentleman, since Retana was a 
retrograde.”4 Retana worked in other newspapers in the Philippines, such 
as La Opinión, but his outcries against the Spanish reforms and the 
Filipinos themselves provoked the antagonism of the latter. 
          It is said that he returned to Spain because the religious 
communities made him an offer to launch La Política de España en 
Filipinas in January 1891. In fact, we do not know by whom this 
newspaper was subsidized but its content links it to the Unión Católica 
(Catholic Union)5 and the friars. 
          Manuel Artigas does not provide more data. However, Retana 
explained in La Política de España en Filipinas that he had been official 
                                                 
3 Manuel Artigas uses the term señorito who won the place through influence while he (Artigas) had to 
do “oposiciones,” an exam to get the place. Artigas y Cuerva, Manuel. Quien es Retana…, p. 11. 
Artigas’s statement is important since when he mentions he did “oposiciones” this demonstrates that 
the reform of public administration urged by Segismundo Moret was implemented. 
4 Artigas y Cuerva, Manuel. Quien es Retana…, p. 20. 
5 The Unión Católica –political party. One of the most important militants was Menéndez Pidal. Pidal 
defended Catholicism but disguised it under the term “Spain.” From 1881 onwards “patriotism” was 
inextricably interconnected  with the religion and the Ancien Regime. See Alvárez Junco, José. Mater 
Dolorosa. La Idea de España en el siglo XIX. Madrid: Taurus Historia, 2001, p. 447. 
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of the Ministry of “Ultramar” (the Colonies) leading the press during 
Antonio Maura’s term as Minister for the Colonies.6 This fact is essential 
to give credibility to his writings. When Retana published the Maura law 
and his criticisms against the reforms, it was because these had been 
implanted in the archipelago. This editorial is interesting since Retana 
defines himself, in 1896, as “archiconservador” (ultraconservative), a fact 
that provides us  with an insight into the origins of his discourse 
regarding the archipelago and that helps us to understand the hard 
criticisms he made against the liberal governments. Moreover, Retana at 
that moment was a member of the Cortes. This is all the information we 
have about Retana in the nineteenth century. 
          We have not paid attention to the difference between Retana in the 
nineteenth century and Retana in the twentieth century. This is crucial in 
order to counter the stereotyped, one-dimensional image of him provided 
by American scholars. In 1906, Retana stated, “I was never reactionary 
but a hothead Spanish and therefore a detractor of the writings of 
Filipinos. . .who longed for certain reforms and whose rise I thought was 
an indication that the loss of the colony for Spain was approaching.”7  
           Retana was really a reactionary or, as he defined himself, an ultra-
conservative, and this idea can be perceived in his works in which he 
defended the morality and dignity of the friars who could not be removed 
from the islands. He criticized republican ideas and the anticlericalism 
that prevailed in Spain and to some extent in the Philippines. He termed 
                                                 
6 Retana, Wenceslao E.  La Política de España en Filipinas. Quincenario defensor de los intereses 
españoles en las colonias del Extremo Oriente. Segunda Época, Año VI-Num. 141, 15 Julio 1896. 
Madrid, p. 245.  
7 Retana, Wenceslao E. Aparato Bibliográfico. Vol. 3, p. 1630.  
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himself a “hothead Spaniard” (español exaltado) and this was true since 
he highlighted the Spanish-ness and the values of the mother country 
(patria) in his works. But Retana was merely echoing the ideas of the 
Unión Católica which considered the religious orders and Spanish-ness 
to be synonymous and could not forget the services that the religious had 
rendered to the country. “The conquest of the Philippines,” he stated, 
“was more religious and moral than warlike. The conservation of those 
Islands for Spain during three centuries is owed to the moral prestige of 
the friars.”8 
          This statement, which sounds very familiar to us, was put forward 
in order to check the advent of liberal ideas, the reformist spirit, and 
above all to uphold the paternalistic policy led by the religious orders , 
which had in fact come to an end. The religious orders were being 
separated from administrative and political matters, as they had been 
from the sixteenth century onwards, although at an opportune moment 
during the seventeenth century the religious orders attained a great 
influence that prevailed until the first half of the nineteenth century.9 The 
                                                 
8 Retana, Wenceslao E. Los Frailes Filipinos por un español que ha residido en aquel país. Madrid: 
Imprenta de la Viuda de M. Minuesa, 1898, p. 9. I found this book among Folleto de W.E. Retana, 
Frailes y Clérigos in the University of Michigan. However this book has been attributed to Baltasar 
Giraudier who wrote an article with a similar title-- Los frailes de Filipinas. Breves Consideraciones de 
actualidad escritas por un Español Peninsular. Madrid: Imprenta de A. Pérez Dubrull, 1888. Los 
Frailes Filipinos por Un Español que ha residido en aquel país was written by Retana. In fact, this is 
the third edition of Frailes y Clérigos which he decided to keep anonymous. See Aparato 
Bibliográfico, Vol. 3, entry 4013, p. 1403. 
9 Cano, Glòria. La Formación de una Colonia: Filipinas 1569-1614. Universitat Pompeu Fabra. In this 
dissertation, the traditional idea that the Philippines was an evangelical mission is questioned. Philip II 
made us believe that this was the real purpose of Spain, at the beginning since the Philippines was just 
in the demarcation line of Portugal. Philip II kept the archipelago in a state of indefiniteness in order 
not to provoke the ire of Portugal until 1580 when this was annexed to Spain. From then onwards there 
was a clear separation of the powers --friars and governors. The Instruction to Gómez Pérez 
Dasmariñas is a clear example on this matter becoming the real cornerstone of the definiteness of the 
archipelago in which the bishop is advised not to interfere in political matters. During the seventeenth 
century –at that moment we do not know why, how and when—the religious orders attained a great 
influence in the archipelago. This influence would last until the middle of the nineteenth century. 
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new position of the friars in Retana’s time provoked a hard confrontation 
with the indigenous elite, the principalía, who were now carrying out 
many of the traditional tasks of the friars. Retana observed these 
developments, and one can find in his works expressions of concern that 
the friars had become vilified because of the imprudent reforms from 
1870 onwards, that the lack of press censorship10 had allowed the 
importation of antireligious and political ideas. He vented his ire, as well, 
against the policy of attraction of some venal governors and last but not 
the least, the spread of masonry, which had become the locus of antifriar 
and separatist feelings—or filibusterismo.11 
          This term “filibusterismo” at the turn of the nineteenth century 
acquired an unanticipated relevance. In fact, Retana contributed to the 
definition or de-contextualization of the term. To the definition of the 
RAE—party of the filibusteros in overseas (colonies) and parliamentary 
obstructionism—Retana added the meaning “independence and 
separatism,” encapsulating these term specifically in the Philippines.12 In 
fact, in the nineteenth century a filibustero was a pirate in the Antilles 
and a subversive anti-Spanish. Retana introduced a new concept: 
filibustero is one who wants as soon as possible, the emancipation of the 
“Philippine Archipelago.”13 Curiously, this new meaning—now fallen 
into disuse—was taken up by the RAE. The term filibusterismo took its 
definite form in 1891 when Rizal wrote El Filibusterismo and this novel 
                                                 
10 This statement from Retana “lack of press censorship” contradicts the argument displayed by 
LeRoy’s  “censorship of press.” 
11 See, Retana W.E. Los Frailes Filipinos por un español que ha residido en aquel país, 1898, p. 10. 
12 Retana, Wenceslao E. Folletos Filipinos IV. Reformas y Otros Excesos. (Desengaños). Madrid: 
Librería de Fernando Fe, 1890, pp. 44-53. 
13 Retana, W.E. Reformas y Otros Excesos, p. 45. 
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was considered as the embryo of the independence struggle. In sum, 
Retana of the nineteenth century was, as Becerra defined him, a “clerical 
reactionary.”14 
          However, after the loss of the Philippines, Retana changed 
dramatically. He became a champion of the Filipino cause and 
proclaimed himself politically as a socialist. As Zulueta said to LeRoy 
about Retana in 1904, 
Retana is no longer “frailista” (pro-friar).  He justified himself by 
saying that he [Retana] fought in favor of the friars because the 
latter subsidized him by buying his books and subscribing to his 
newspaper. He recognized that such behavior was a big mistake 
and that it damaged his career. Now he is distanced from the friars 
and has become a member of the most radical party of Spain. His 
last novel, “La tristeza errante,” follows a socialist trend. He has 
changed radically and seemingly his regret is sincere.15 
 
          Zulueta was right; Retana had changed and this turn can be 
perceived in the book, Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal. His exultation 
of the friars is transformed into a fierce criticism, even putting upon them 
the blame of the loss of the Philippines. In fact, not only Zulueta echoed 
this transformation in Retana but also Javier Gómez de la Serna, who 
said that  “Retana had an overwhelming prejudice that without the friars 
                                                 
14 Retana, W.E. La Política de España en Filipinas. Coram Populo. Madrid January 20, number 1, 
1891. 
15 Clemente J. Zulueta to James A. LeRoy, London, 26 April 1904. Robertson James A. Annapolis Md. 
Manuscripts Photographs. Box 2, 1902-1906. North Carolina: Duke University. Moreover, LeRoy 
explained this fact to James A. Robertson, reproducing ad literam what Zulueta wrote to him. James A. 
LeRoy to Robertson, May 13, 1904. James A. Robertson Special Correspondence. Box 5. Washington:  
The Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.  LeRoy used Zulueta’s knowledge in The Americans in 
the Philippines but he did not mention Zulueta, p. 74.  See as well the translation of this excerpt written 
originally in Spanish of John Schumacher.The Making of a Nation. Essays of Nineteenth-century 
Filipino Nationalism, pp. 143-144. Schumacher omits some important sentences from Zulueta referring 
to Retana not any more being in favour of the cause of the friars and above all about Retana’s new 
political trend.  
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the power of Spain would be pulled down. When he [Retana] could think 
by himself, he strongly attacked this false premise. . .16 
          Retana continued his political life with minor positions such as 
civil governor of Huelva and Teruel. Later, he became head of the police 
force in Barcelona. He was member of important European cultural 
organizations and the Royal Spanish Academy of History. He worked for 
Pedro Vindel as librarian and bibliographer and in 1905 started to work 
for La Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas. In sum, Wenceslao 
Retana was a very prolific and versatile man.  
          As for Retana’s impact on scholarship, we can say that he has 
become a reference and authority for scholars from the nineteenth 
century to the present. Retana wrote inflammatory articles with a viperish 
language, which did harm to both Filipinos and Spaniards of the liberal 
sort in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, his articles and books have a 
precious, eloquent and convincing rhetoric, which permits us to glimpse 
the irony of the author. Lamentably, the double language he displayed 
has become translated in a unidirectional manner that is made to reflect 
the anachronism of the Spanish system and the power of the friars and 
the theocracy. In fact, only few of Retana’s articles and books have been 
used and these have been [mis]interpreted by scholars. 
          Retana is well-known to Spanish scholars especially for three 
works: Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino,17 Aparato Bibliográfico, and Vida 
                                                 
16Gómez de la Serna, Javier. ‘Prologue.’ In Wenceslao E. Retana,  Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal, p. 
xi. Javier Gómez de la Serna was lawyer and government employee of Ministry for the Colonies. 
17 The fifth volume of Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino has been ignored by historiography. This fifth 
volume differs in form and content from the former fourth. First of all, we know who subsidized this 
volume –Victoriano Suárez; secondly, it came out in the twentieth century, that means after Spain lost 
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y escritos del Dr. José Rizal.18 Besides these works, however, Retana is 
also known for the new editions, with unpublished texts and his 
comments, of Antonio de Morga’s Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas (1909), 
Joaquín Martínez de Zúñiga’s Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas o mis 
viajes por este País (1893), and P. Francisco Combes’ Historia de 
Mindanao y Joló (1897). Spanish historiography has, by and large, 
highlighted these works.19  
          Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, which we might consider a 
predecessor of Blair & Robertson’s The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, 
since it is a compilation of primary sources, permits us to glimpse 
Retana’s approach. The prefaces are as eloquent as the compilation of the 
documents, most of them friar accounts. However, the fifth volume, 
ignored by most Spanish scholars and practically unknown to American 
scholars, is different from the preceding ones, being a political history of 
the archipelago. This last volume was subsidized by the editor, 
Victoriano Suárez. Aparato Bibliográfico is said to be one of the best 
                                                                                                                                            
the Philippines, and last but not the least, this volume shows a different Retana who was willing to 
explain a true Philippine history. 
18 Retana published this book in 1907. While Retana was co-editor with Pablo and José Feced of La 
Política de España en Filipinas and director of the said paper, Rizal suffered a campaign of 
discrediting with racialist comments. After Spain lost the Philippines, Retana started to exult Rizal by 
publishing Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal. On December 30, 1907, Retana gave a conference in 
Barcelona, in the “Centre Nacionalista Republicà” (Nationalist Republican Centre). The conference 
resulted in a small book considered as a small tribute of admiration “al gran martre de la Patria 
Filipina” (the great martyr of the Philippine Patria). This book, entitled Rizal, Notícies Biogràfiques. 
Barcelona, Tipografia l’Avenç, 1910, was written in Catalan. In fact, the members of this centre were 
those who supported the claims of the Filipinos at the turn of the nineteenth century.  
19 I only allude to Spanish scholars since Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, Aparato Bibliográfico and 
Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal and his annotations of Zúñiga, Combes and Morga are practically the 
only references cited by Spanish scholars. I cannot see these works being mentioned often after 
American occupation. A case in point is Glenn May who has used above all the Archivo del Bibliófilo 
Filipino. However, an exception which confirms my argument –these works are the most appreciated—
is John Schumacher who states categorically: “The writings of Retana that seem to be permanent 
contributions to Philippine historiography fall into three groups…” John Schumacher subsumes in 
these three groups the works cited in this part of the section. See Schumacher, John N. S.J. The Making 
of a Nation…, pp. 153-154. 
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bibliographies for Philippine studies. It also contains valuable 
information about works which have disappeared or have been omitted 
by modern scholars. 
Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal is another book by which Retana 
is known. Spanish scholars have used this book to write defeatist, 
deterministic, developmental and unidirectional histories in which there 
is chain of cause and effect from 1872 to 1898. The facts from 1872—the 
Cavite event—are connected to the revolutions of 1896 and are all 
considered as “independentist and nationalistic” in essence.20 In sum, 
Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal has been co-opted to underpin the idea 
of the overwhelming power of the religious orders, which are held 
responsible for the death of José Rizal and the onset of revolution. 
          Perhaps the repeated use of the abovementioned works of Retana, 
to the detriment of others, is related to a powerful belief among Spanish 
scholars that true history is written using primary sources. Furthermore, 
the U.S. administration bought most of the Spanish books in the market 
that were written in the nineteenth century—including all of Retana’s 
works—and thus made access to some of his other works difficult. A 
final explanation of the neglect of Retana’s other, more important, works 
is simply the lack of interest in the nineteenth century, which has still to 
be written properly. In sum, the omission of Retana’s works such as La 
                                                 
20 It is important to note that Retana’s works from the nineteenth century such as Reformas y otros 
excesos, La Política, etc, considered the reforms as the germ of separatism. La Política considered as 
cause-and-effect the revolts and the reformism. Therefore, he established, as most of the conservatives 
of the nineteenth century did, a historical linearity from 1872 to 1896 and 1898. Precisely, Vida y 
Escritos del Dr. José Rizal presents another standpoint. Retana assumes that the Spaniards made a 
blunder when they executed Rizal, but that neither 1896 nor even less 1872, were separatist revolts. 
However, modern Spanish scholars consider 1872 as the germ of nationalism and the prelude of 1896 
and the collapse of 1898. See for instance Luis Togores, Antonio Caulín, Carmen Molina Gómez-
Arnau etc. As we have seen, LeRoy subtly inferred the same deterministic history. 
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Política de España en Filipinas, Reformas y Otros Excesos, and above all 
Los Frailes Filipinos por un Español que ha residido en aquel país, have 
made scholars misread the real significance of the Spanish reforms, 
which certainly were not a “dead letter.” Our present knowledge of the 
nineteenth century does not permit us to appreciate the real impact of the 
reforms.21 For this purpose we should undertake local studies. Perhaps 
there is a clear message in Retana’s statement, which should make us 
meditate on the real impact of the reforms in the Philippines, that the 
country was really governed by the civil or secular powers. 
     
Deliberate misinterpretation of Retana’s works 
Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, Aparato Bibliográfico and the later, 
Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal, immediately became references for 
American scholars such as Robertson, Barrows, Edward Gaylord Bourne, 
Austin Craig, and of course LeRoy himself. Craig, who in 1910 wrote 
Los errores de Retana. Crítica de su libro Vida y escritos del Dr. José 
Rizal. (The errors of Retana: Critique of his book, Life and Works of Dr. 
Jose Rizal) exemplifies the trend among American scholars to dismiss 
this book since Retana makes important statements therein about the 
                                                 
21 As I have explained in introducing The Americans in the Philippines, LeRoy suppressed ad hoc La 
Política de España en Filipinas; and Reformas y otros excesos is not mentioned. Worcester had most 
of the books written by Retana, but he did not use any of them to write The Philippines Past and 
Present; Joseph Ralston Hayden did not make any allusion to Retana. We know that Barrows used 
Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino in the first edition of A History of the Philippines. In the following 
editions, that from 1925, Barrows did not use it anymore. All of them preferred to use The Philippine 
Islands 1493-1898. The trend has not changed in the present scholarly scene. All those authors who 
claim  that the Spanish regime was medieval, unable to develop to modern states, have never consulted 
Retana.  For instance, Alfred McCoy, Paul Hutchcroft, Norman Owen and John Sidel maintain 
categorically a Spanish anachronism, however they have not used any work written by Retana. Michael 
Cullinane uses Sinapismos and Aparato Bibliográfico and Glenn May use Archivo del Bibliófilo--in 
sum, those bibliographical or archival works. But I cannot see La Política or Reformas y Otros Excesos 
although these works are in American libraries. It seems that LeRoy won his crusade against Retana. 
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reforms implanted in the Philippines, and moreover furnishes a large 
bibliography on the Maura law. They needed to discredit the book in 
order to deny the modernization of the Spanish system. LeRoy’s 
influence is perceptible in Craig’s book. LeRoy had misused La Política 
de España en Filipinas, Reformas y Otros Excesos, Vida y Escritos del 
Dr. José Rizal and other works, obviously with a specific purpose—to 
demonize the Spanish colonial system, to discredit Retana, and to deny 
that the reforms happened.  Moreover, LeRoy and others did not use a 
most important book by Retana: Los Frailes Filipinos por un español que 
ha residido en aquel país (The Friars in the Philippines by a Spaniard 
who has lived in that country). There is a reason for the deliberate 
suppression. 
          Los Frailes Filipinos por un español was acquired by Worcester, 
and can be found in the Worcester Special Collection in Michigan. It also 
exists in the libraries of Yale University, Cornell University, and the 
Library of Congress.22 Thus, it was not unknown to the Americans. 
Curiously, Los Frailes Filipinos has been attributed by the Americans to 
Baltasar Giraudier who wrote an article entitled Los Frailes de Filipinas. 
Breves Consideraciones de actualidad escritas por un español 
peninsular (The Friars in the Philippines. A brief account of the present 
by a peninsular Spaniard).23 We can see that the title is similar to what 
Retana wrote, but the work of Giraudier is only a leaflet of 16 pages. 
Both works have a common approach: a spirited defense of the friars as 
                                                 
22 By writing in the catalogue Retana, Wenceslao, this title appears as one of his book. However when 
one goes into detail the book is catalogued under the name of Baltasar Giraudier. 
23 Baltasar Giraudier wrote this leaflet in 1888 coinciding with the Filipino demonstration claiming the 
expulsion of the friars. Giraudier is a clear defender of the friars and above all the archbishop Pedro 
Payo.  
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the civilizing and governing agents in the Philippines, together with a 
fierce criticism of the advent of the reforms. Retana and Giraudier echo 
the loss of pre-eminence of the friars. Giraudier reiterated that “the 
prestige of Spain depends on the prudent intervention of the clergy in the 
economic and political administration of the towns.” He denounced the 
fact that “since a few years ago the friars are being pulled away from 
these town matters by fomenting antagonism between them and the 
principales.”24 
          It is not difficult to find this idea in Retana’s works of the 
nineteenth century. Retana’s defense of the friars has in fact become the 
basis for constructing the inveterate argument that “the Spanish system 
was anachronistic, underdeveloped, medieval and despotic until the end.” 
American scholars from the very beginning have echoed arguments such 
as “the Philippine conquest was more religious than warlike,”25 inferring 
that the archipelago was maintained for three hundred years without 
soldiers—a peaceful domination, religious and moral in essence. As 
emphasized by Giraudier, this argument supported the idea that the 
Philippines was ruled by the friars and subjected to a theocracy. 
          What conventional scholarship has ignored is the other side of the 
coin, such as when Retana argues, as did Giraudier in 1888, that “. . . the 
domination of the friars has disappeared. . . .The government in general, 
whatever the political party in power, has applied many imprudent laws 
                                                 
24 Giraudier, Baltasar. Los Frailes de Filipinas. Breves Consideraciones de Actualidad. Guadalupe: 
Pequeña Imprenta del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1888, p. 16. 
25 Retana, Wenceslao E. Los Frailes Filipinos por un español que ha residido en aquel país. Madrid: 
Imprenta de Viuda M. de Minuesa, 1898, p. 9. Practically the same sentence used by Retana to describe 
the role of the friars in the archipelago was co-opted by Gaylord Bourne in the “Historical 
Introduction.” In Blair and Robertson (ed.), The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 “From the beginning the 
Spanish establishment in the Philippines was a mission…” Vol. 1. p. 48.  
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and has unthinkingly carried out reforms from 1870s onwards.”26 
American scholars and administrators have not been interested in 
developing this part of the story since it would demonstrate that the 
Spanish colonial system was similar to European colonialism and that, 
above all, it was not static and therefore in need of overhaul by the 
Americans. Besides, Retana was inferring that reform was implanted by 
liberal and conservative parties alike. The restructuring of the colonial 
system lasted until 1898. 
          Retana makes another important statement suppressed by 
historiography: “He who rules, who orders, who collects tributes, who 
has the public power, is the civil power of Spain through its 
representative. It is not true that the friars rule the country.”27 This 
statement demonstrates my argument about the new modern 
authoritarianism implanted by the Spanish government. It certainly 
contradicts the old argument about the medievalism of the Spanish 
colonial system. Retana here highlights the role of the friar clergy from 
the sixteenth to the first half of the nineteenth centuries, and how from 
1870 onwards the friars began to lose much of their prestige, privileges 
and preeminence to the rising principales. This statement could explain 
why Retana’s Los Frailes Filipinos is mistakenly attributed to Giraudier. 
But Baltasar Giraudier was not an authority in Philippine studies. In fact, 
he only became known because he was the co-owner of Diario de Manila 
with Manuel Ramírez and they both founded the printing works, 
                                                 
26 Retana, Wenceslao E. Los Frailes Filipinos…, p. 9. 
27 Retana Wenceslao E. Los Frailes Filipinos…, p. 15. 
 184 
“Ramírez y Giraudier.”28 Giraudier lacked scholarly authority, so 
therefore his work could be ignored and even be relegated to oblivion. 
Retana, on the other hand, was an authority from the 1880’s on. If Los 
Frailes Filipinos por un español que ha residido en aquel país had been 
attributed to him, the conventional argument of a mission-military 
paternalism would have been put in question. 
          The abovementioned suppression or misattribution of Retana’s 
work leads us to an even more crucial argument: that if the suppressed 
Retana is resurrected, we can challenge the myths that have been 
established about friar domination in the Philippines. Los Frailes 
Filipinos por un Español is a 1898 re-issue of Folletos Filipinos. I. 
Frailes y Clerigos.29 Retana was criticized by the friars, who did not 
subscribe to the manner in which he treated political matters.30 By 
consulting this work, we can put in question the argument made by 
LeRoy, Robertson, Barrows, Bourne and others that the Spanish reforms 
were a “dead letter.” 
          Retana the defender of the friars was an unequivocal defender as 
well of the qualities and values of the race and the patria—or what may 
be termed a “Spanish-ness.” This line of thinking can be identified in 
practically all his works, but specifically in Folletos Filipinos IV. 
Reformas y Otros excesos published in 1890. This book can be divided 
into two main parts: the first is what Retana called “reformas” and the 
second is what we can term “excesos.” Reformas y Otros excesos is a 
                                                 
28 Retana said:  “Baltasar Giraudier was a mediocre writer but a noticeable lithograph.” See Aparato 
Bibliográfico, vol.  2, p. 853, entry 1574.   
29 Retana, W. E. Folletos Filipinos. I. Frailes y Clérigos. Madrid: M. Minuesa de los Ríos, 1890. 
30 See, Aparato Bibliográfico, vol. 3, p. entry 2933,1178.  
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clear indictment against the reforms implemented by Manuel Becerra—
above all against his policy of education.  Retana uses harsh language in 
order to demonstrate that the Filipinos were not yet fit for receiving the 
reforms the Spaniards wanted to implant. In fact, Retana’s expressions 
border on racism. 
          Retana is provocative and controversial in the prologue. He starts 
complaining that his books were being censored while those with liberal 
ideas were circulating freely in the Philippines: “They allow to enter El 
Globo, El Resumen, El País, and other newspapers where the friars are 
insulted. See, therefore, how censorship protects more those who abuse it 
instead of those like me who have always defended it.”31 
          This statement is another illustration of how the alleged censorship 
of the press in the colony must be interpreted with nuance, depending 
upon the Spanish government and the governor sent to the Philippines at 
any particular time. The black legend about Spain fomented by the 
Americans in the early twentieth century was facilitated by misreading or 
omitting part of Retana’s statements or works. Instead of Spanish 
censorship suppressing liberal ideas, as LeRoy emphasized in The 
Americans in the Philippines, we have seen from one of Retana’s 
“suppressed” writings that in fact he was fuming against the censorship 
of conservative, pro-friar writings. 
          Reformas y Otros Excesos, as the title clearly denotes, 
demonstrates once more the effects that the implementation of reforms in 
the archipelago was having. In order to discredit the liberal reforms, 
                                                 
31 Retana, W.E. Folletos Filipinos IV. Reformas y otros Excesos. (Desengaños). Madrid: Librería de 
Fernando Fe, 1890, p. 8. 
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Retana uses harsh words in dismissing Manuel Becerra’s government. 
But the worst language is deployed against the Filipinos as Retana echoes 
the colonial discourse of the time about the superiority of the colonizers 
or the Whites. 
          It is important to illustrate the part of the book that I have 
identified as “Reformas” since Retana paved the way for the fostering of 
a stereotyped image of the Filipinos. The use of certain terms and the 
categorical statement that the Filipinos were unfit to do anything would 
become a truism for contemporary readers of Retana32 and above all for 
the Americans. Becerra imposed a rigid system of education since he 
thought that Filipinos were not suited to be assimilated to Spain and 
needed “education” in order to come of age. This portrayal was distorted 
by Retana who referred to the “indios” histrionically and with ridicule. 
He makes assertions such as that “the indio’s brain is useless for 
elaborating anything grandiose” or, “most of the indios have no aptitude 
for anything, they are useless” or, “that is a country of big children, more 
or less skilful, more or less pacienzudos (patient), but most of them 
lazy.”33   
          These statements did harm to the Filipinos but I need to point out 
that the dismissive terminology used by Retana to portray the so-called 
“indios” does not differ from the global ideas about “natives” in a state of 
barbarism such as were portrayed within the European imperialist 
                                                 
32 An example is  Feced, Pablo (Quioquiap). Filipinas. Bocetos y Pinceladas.Manila: Estab. Tipog. de 
Ramírez y Compañía, 1888. 
33 Retana, W.E. Reformas y otros Excesos,  pp. 23-32. I have marked the term pacienzudo –it is a 
Spanish adjective known grammatically and morphologically as “aumentativo” (augmentative). The 
opposite to the augmentative is diminutive. The use of this type of adjective is always pejorative. 
Pacienzudo in fact means –person with many patience.  
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framework. It is common to find in French or British books the idea of 
the lassitude of natives or their unfitness to contribute to anything of 
value. Moreover, we can find a common terminology being used, such as 
“the apathy and helplessness in the people.”34 These similarities in 
colonial discourse should make us think about the traditional conception 
of the Spanish colonial system. There was in fact a common European 
discourse to denote the massive contrasts that existed between Western 
countries and the tropics, or the prevalence of whiteness over the 
indigenous. This should not be an excuse to justify Retana’s views. On 
the contrary, by observing the imperial tendency to dismiss the natives 
we can see that the Spanish colonial system had actually changed its 
policy in the late nineteenth century and had parted ways with 
authoritarian colonialism, above all of the British variety.  Retana 
reflected these changes in his work. 
          We conclude our discussion of the “reformas” by examining a 
paragraph in which Retana summarizes his ideals of progress, reformism 
and Spanish-ness: 
The Philippines—a country in which floats a sui generis 
environment, saturated with reformist microbes. They are worried 
by a wish of progress without taking into consideration the special 
conditions of the archipelago and the specificity of its 
autochthonous races. [This wish of progress] is giving us and will 
have to give us, lamentably, counterproductive results. It is sad that 
some of those who have influence in the Philippines want to be 
progressives: the worst thing is that the “microbes” from there 
have come here…35 
 
                                                 
34 See for instance Ireland, Alleyne. The Far Eastern Tropics. Studies in the Administration of Tropical 
Dependencies. Hong Kong, British North Borneo, Sarawak, Burma, the Federated Malay States, the 
Straits Settlements, French Indo-China, Java, the Philippine Islands. Boston and New York: 
Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1905, p. 4.  
35 Retana, W.E.  Reformas y otros Excesos. (Desengaños), p. 16. 
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          This paragraph is really important for several reasons. First of all, 
Retana uses a distinctive terminology, playing with the reader and above 
all confusing him. I have emphasized the term “microbes,” which is used 
twice. In the first sentence, “reformist microbes” has a double 
interpretation. The key word is no doubt “reformist” since Retana is 
referring to those who execute the reforms and the defenders of such 
reforms. Here Retana shows his intransigence to the restructuring of 
Filipino institutions carried out by liberal governments. The term 
“microbe” here is synonymous with bacterium, meaning that reformism 
is an illness. “Defenders of the reforms” no doubt alludes to the Filipinos. 
Here the term “microbes” is completely pejorative, inferring that the 
Filipinos could not understand anything about reforms because of their 
being “dim-witted.” Thus, the first meaning points to the irresponsibility 
and incompetence of the Spanish government, which was following a 
policy of assimilation and attraction, while the second meaning is a new 
display of racialism, which denotes the unfitness of the Filipinos to 
become a Spanish province and Retana’s disdain for them.     
          Retana concludes this part of “reformas” with a grandiloquent 
statement, which denotes that the reorganization of the system in the 
Philippines was destroying the civilized and paternalistic work made by 
the friars. Retana was supporting his idea –already displayed in other 
works—of the loss of preeminence of the religious orders: 
In the Philippines, we start to build up a sumptuous building at the 
turn of the sixteenth century. Until twenty years ago, we had only 
concentrated on laying the foundations which, by the way, are very 
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strong because the religion is the principal material. But tied to the 
fever of the progress, we want to finish rapidly this palace.36 
 
          Retana argues that the friars had conserved the Philippines for 
Spain. This was a prevalent argument during the last years of the Spanish 
colonial system. There was an ad hoc misinterpretation that the friars 
were the only Spanish element, and therefore the only representative of 
Spanish-ness. However to this wrong interpretation is related the first 
part of the paragraph: “the fever of progress” is a key phrase, which 
would sum up the restructuring of the institutions. The Spaniards did not 
have time to finish their new building.37 
          The part I have identified as “excesos” shows the impact of what 
Retana calls the fever of progress or reformism. This excess is interpreted 
by Retana in two ways. The first type contains a new definition and 
dimension of the term “filibustero”: “I offer to the Royal academy: 
Filibustero-ra. Adjective. In the Philippines it is applied to those thirsty 
for the independence of the country. He uses all possible legal 
proceedings to reach the objectives which he pursues.38  
          Significantly, Retana’s offer is registered by the dictionary and so 
we find filibustero being defined in 189939 as “man who works for the 
emancipation of ‘our’ overseas provinces.” This definition has fallen into 
disuse. But Retana provides a deeper dimension to the term filibustero 
and filibusterismo by inferring that the latter had been fostered by 
                                                 
36 Retana, Wenceslao E. Reformas y otros Excesos, p. 34. 
37 Robles states that Spain had not time to implement the reforms of the last decades of the century. 
“Unfortunately time ran out on her.” Robles, Eliodoro. The Philippines in the nineteenth century, 
p.295.  
38 Retana, Wenceslao E. Reformas y otros Excesos, p. 47. 
39 Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana por la Real Academia Española. Décimatercia Edición. Madrid: 
Imprenta de los Sres. Hernando y Compañía, 1899, p. 460. 
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reformism and the assimilation of the Filipinos to Spain. At this point, 
Retana emphasizes another evil—the second type of “excesos”—
widespread in the archipelago, promoted by the freedom of association 
which Spain had given to the Philippines. This evil was masonry, which, 
Retana says, “has contributed and contributes powerfully to the spread of 
‘filibusterismo.’ The Spanish mason spends his life hunting mestizos and 
cuarterones40 thanks to the liberal and anti-monastic spirit.”41 
          It seems difficult, after reading Reformas y otros excesos, to 
support the traditional idea that the reforms of the late nineteenth century 
were a dead letter, that “immobilism” or the perpetuation of status quo 
characterized the Spanish system until the end. Probably, its confirmation 
of the progress made in the Philippines has caused this book to be 
omitted or misinterpreted in most of the bibliographies. Analyzed 
carefully, this book  confirms to us several aspects of the changing 
colonial system of the turn of the nineteenth century. 
          The first aspect is the “politics of attraction” followed by Manuel 
Becerra. I use this terminology in order to demonstrate that Taft was not 
the maker of that policy, since the Spaniards had implemented it before. 
Becerra legislated liberal reforms promising total assimilation to Spain 
when Filipinos came of age: diputados a Cortes (parliamentary 
representation) and libertad de prensa (freedom of the press). This 
argument is mentioned by Retana although he discredits and disagrees 
with these reforms by asserting that the Filipinos were not fit for such 
                                                 
40 Cuarteron: mestizo born in Latin America from a Spanish and mestizo. For Retana the cuarterones 
did not spread the idea of independence since as mestizo they could not tolerate being ruled by pure 
indios. See, Retana, W.E. Las Reformas y otros Excesos, p. 61. 
41 Retana, W.E., Reformas y otros Excesos, p. 62. 
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reforms. His dismissal of reformism is a tacit recognition that this was 
implanted. 
          A second important aspect is the mordant language used by Retana 
to define the so-called “indios.” His discourse is typically colonial by 
repeating stereotyped images of the natives in the tropics. Therefore this 
discourse must be encapsulated within the emergent imperial discourse 
characteristic of the European colonial powers in Southeast Asia—a 
modern European authoritarianism. It is significant to point out that some 
of the images displayed by Retana will continue to be systematically used 
during the American colonial period. 
          Last but not least is the regret of the loss of preeminence of the 
friars. This regret is again a tacit recognition that civil power had 
overwhelmed the religious: “El fraile de hoy tiene menos influjo que el 
de ayer” (The present friar has less influence than the past [friar].42 This 
categorical assertion questions the traditional argument that “the 
Philippines was a mission more than a colony until the end.”     
          The topics introduced in Reformas y otros Excesos would become 
radicalized in La Política de España en Filipinas. It is said that Retana 
left the archipelago to write in this journal, which according to Manuel 
Artigas was subsidized by the friars. We do not know if the friars did so 
directly but it was certainly close to the Unión Católica and, therefore, 
ultra-conservative and religious, in essence.  La Política de España en 
Filipinas commenced publication in January 1891 and lasted until 1898. 
The first and most radical phase of this journal was from 1891 to 1895, 
                                                 
42 Retana, Wenceslao E. Reformas y otros Excesos, p. 80. 
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when it was directed by José Feced while Pablo Feced—known by the 
nickname Quioquiap—and Retana were the redactors. In January, 1896, 
the periodical entered a second phase when Retana became its sole 
director. It was somewhat transformed and became more moderate in its 
language (since its enemies had disappeared) and treatment of political 
issues (probably because a conservative government was in power).    
          La Política de España en Filipinas was essentially political: anti-
liberal and racialist. During its first phase it became the adversary of the 
Filipino liberal periodical, La Solidaridad. La Política included many 
collaborators such as Ferdinand Blumentritt,43 Ventura Fernández López, 
Vicente Barrantes, Gonzalo Reparaz and others. 
          During the first period, its most radical, La Política carried a 
specific purpose as explained in the so-called número prospecto—
prospectus number: “Some years ago, no one remembered here [in Spain] 
the Philippines and various governments made what they wanted with 
our colony. Today things have changed…the mobility of our policy has 
made us talk about the Philippines in gatherings, cafés, papers and 
associations.”44 This statement reveals the relevance of the Philippines 
for the Spaniards as new colonial entrepôt. Moreover, there is a de facto 
recognition of the impact of reformism. To the old “statism” is opposed 
the “mobility” of the liberal governments. Therefore, one of the purposes 
                                                 
43 The collaboration of Ferdinand Blumentritt in La Política demonstrates that the controversial 
Austrian was part of intellectual debates. In 1896, Blumentritt wrote in La Política de España en 
Filipinas “Filipinas y las ideas separatistas” (the Philippines and the separatist ideas). He was to state 
categorically that the separatism in the Philippines did not have any hope. “El interés vital de toda la 
Europa pide continue el dominio español en Filipinas.” (the vital interest of Europe prays the Spanish 
dominion in the Philippines to be continued). See, La Política de España en Filipinas. Segunda Época, 
Año VI, Núm. 143, 144, 145, 15 de Agosto de 1896.  
44 Feced José and Pablo Feced and W.E. Retana. ‘Nuestros Propósitos.’ La Política de España en 
Filipinas. Número Prospecto. Madrid 30 de Enero de 1891. 
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of the journal was, precisely, to counterattack or to “combat” such 
reformism. 
          A second purpose is stated as well in this prospectus. The Feced 
brothers and Retana were willing to combat what they considered anti-
Spanish-ness emanating from the Filipino colony in Spain and those who 
supported it. In fact, La Política became the main rival of La Solidaridad 
and its main goal was to undermine this publication through the 
discrediting of the Filipinos and the use of a racialist discourse: 
Guerra, pues, sin tregua a todo lo que solidario se haga de aquellos 
crasos errores o propósitos aviesos que indicados quedan; guerra a 
toda solidaridad que algo español combata en nuestra colonia, y 
pretenda arrojar sobre ella, a título de progreso político, la túnica 
de Neso de reformas inoportunas, absurdas y perturbadoras.45  
 
(War, then, without pause against all those crass mistakes or 
malicious purposes already mentioned that solidario shall commit; 
war against all solidaridad that challenges the Spanish-ness in our 
colony and intends to cast upon it, under the excuse of political 
progress, the tunic of Neso consisting of inappropriate, absurd and 
disruptive reforms.) 
      
          Feced and Retana, showing their wit with the language, play with 
the terminology, specifically with the terms solidario and solidaridad. 
Both terms have a double meaning in this paragraph. The term solidario 
with their crass blunders or malicious purposes alludes, on the one hand, 
to those sympathetic to reformism and specifically the liberal politicians. 
By using “solidario” to define Spanish government, Feced and Retana 
were inferring that the government was assimilating the natives—an 
inferior race—to Spain. Therefore, the journal was presenting itself as the 
champion of Spanish-ness. On the other hand, solidario surreptitiously 
means the collaborators with their political and racial enemy, La 
                                                 
45 Retana, W.E. ‘Nuestros Propósitos.’ La Política de España en Filipinas. Número Prospecto. 
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Solidaridad. The use of solidario is extrapolated to all those who 
supported the Filipino colony in Spain and were sympathetic to their 
claims and their journal.46  
          As for the use of the term solidaridad the context seems less subtle 
than solidario since the Feced brothers and Retana were willing to fight 
against those who criticized Spain and Spanish-ness. By using the words 
algo español, they were identifying Spanish-ness with the ultra-
conservative and the friars. We can interpret solidaridad as the Filipino 
journal and the political party that supports the journal and reformism. 
          It is quite clear that the main purpose of the Feceds and Retana was 
to antagonize La Solidaridad. This caused their journal to become the 
antithesis of La Solidaridad. The anticlericalism of La Solidaridad thus 
becomes pro-clericalism in La Política; the reformism advocated by 
Filipino ilustrados becomes anti-reformism and pro-conservative ideas 
for Retana and Feced. The collaborators of La Solidaridad considered 
themselves prepared to become a province of Spain; Retana considered 
the Philippines had not yet come of age. Filipino ilustrados manifested 
and claimed their Spanish-ness; Retana denied their Spanish-ness and 
instead denounced their hostility against Spain. La Solidaridad and La 
Política were a forum of debate in which their collaborators confronted 
each other through mordant editorials. They expressed antagonistic ideas 
about how to govern the Philippines from the colonized point of view 
and the colonizers with a specific idea of what a colonial exploitative 
system meant. 
                                                 
46 Manuel Artigas y Cuerva infers that in this excerpt the solidarios alluded to the redactors of La 
Solidaridad. See Artigas y Cuerva, Manuel. Quién es Retana. Su antaño y hogaño, p. 43. 
 195 
          La Política was a loyal upholder of the “patria’s” interests and the 
superiority of their race and above all exuded a deep feeling of Spanish-
ness. As the journal put it, “the colonization of superior races has always 
been the only redemption of backward people…We have to Hispanize 
those Islands and make of those “naturales” human beings, with the 
essential conditions which characterize our race and our nature.”47 This 
statement simply reflects the principal idea in the new colonial discourse. 
Retana and the Feced brothers were expressing what the politicians from 
La Restauración –conservative and liberal—considered they had to do in 
the Philippines. The old paternalism was changed to an effective 
colonization of the archipelago. This was a true policy of colonization in 
the modern sense with all that it meant about the appropriation of 
cultures. The above excerpt, therefore, reaffirms the triumph of Spanish-
ness upon the “Other.” 
          Feced and Retana drew the ire of some Filipinos not only for 
discrediting them but also for defending the religious orders, which at the 
turn of the nineteenth century were identified as defenders of the status 
quo. These were the terms of the political confrontation between La 
Solidaridad and La Política and they relate to the antagonism between 
reformism and anti-reformism. 
          The second phase of La Política under Retana’s sole directorship 
no longer featured La Solidaridad as its adversary. Its procedures 
therefore changed, but not its basic standpoint. As Retana himself points 
out, those who know the background La Política “will understand that 
                                                 
47 Retana, W.E.  La Política de España en Filipinas. Madrid, January 20, 1891 Núm. 1. 
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the change in the direction of the journal cannot affect its program; only 
the procedures or development will change since those [rival] 
publications no longer exist… The initial impetuousness which was our 
mark of distinction now must turn into prudence. . .”48 It is difficult to 
discern the “prudence” Retana alludes to since in the journal’s second 
phase we find the same racialist language used to define the natives and  
the same systematic discredit of liberal governments and their idea of 
progress. 
          La Política de España en Filipinas is arguably the most important 
work written by Retana since it plots the evolution of the Spanish 
colonial structure from 1891 to 1898, and is probably its most accurate 
portrayal. La Política shows us the implementation of the most important 
reforms but lamentably the journal is not widely available. The American 
conquest of the Philippines made this journal made this journal difficult 
to access, however. In Spain, it can be found in a small library, the 
Museo-Biblioteca Victor Balaguer. For Filipino use, it is available in the 
University of the Philippines library. American scholars have actually 
enjoyed easier access to this journal since it is available in different 
universities and in the Library of Congress. But few of them have used 
Spanish sources in their accounts of the Philippines and therefore 
LeRoy’s statements continue to be authoritative. 
          To end this chapter let us briefly return to Retana’s Vida y Escritos 
del Dr. José Rizal. The campaign of discrediting Retana was begun by 
LeRoy in 1904 and continued by James Robertson and Austin Craig in 
                                                 
48 Retana W.E. La Política de España en Filipinas. Segunda época. Madrid, 15 de Enero de 1896. 
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1910. Craig interrogated Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal in his book, 
Los Errores de Retana. Crítica de su libro “Vida y Escritos del Dr. José 
Rizal.” This was written for domestic consumption in order to convince 
the Filipinos of the American commitment to their cause. 
          LeRoy’s influence is perceptible in Craig’s book since he is 
continuously cited. But Craig’s strategy is to co-opt some chapters of 
Retana’s Vida y Escritos and systematically ignore other important 
chapters. For example, I cannot see any comment, criticism or even 
mention of the chapter entitled Quinta Época (1892-1896), section three, 
in which Retana contextualized Rizal within the development of Spanish 
colonial policy in the Philippines. Craig does not mention anything 
related to colonial policy, most notably Maura’s intentions in the 
Philippines, his municipal reform law and the displacement of this law 
during Blanco’s term.49 Retana offers an excellent bibliography on the 
Maura law, which Craig ignores because alluding to it would have meant 
the tacit recognition of the re-organization of municipal institutions to 
facilitate control by the Filipinos. Absent from Craig’s book is Retana’s 
argument that the power of the provincial government was restricted and 
the friars “could speak, advice, explain, teach but not order anymore.”50 
Craig instead says that voices like Retana’s were responsible for Spain’s 
loss of the Philippines. Retana had been damned! 
                                                 
49 See Retana W.E.  Vida y Escritos del Dr. José. Rizal. Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez, 
1907, pp. 299-311.  
50 Retana W.E. La Política de España en Filipinas. Segunda Época, Año VI, Núm. 129. Madrid, 15 de 
enero de 1896. 
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CHAPTER VI: LEROY, THE FILIPINO REFORMISTS, AND 
THE KATIPUNAN 
The Taft Comission did foster the worship of 
Rizal. They were glad in 1900, to have one way of 
giving expression to their sympathies with the 
national ideals, without offesing to favor revolt. 
Rizal, and a national holiday to him was just the 
chance. Doubtless, official recognition helped the 
matter along… 
Some of the Bonifacio adherents, e.g. (the less 
well-educated men of the insurrection, the 
katipuneros in general) have sometimes resulted 
the “neglect” as they call it, of their idol… 
 
  James A. LeRoy 
 
The chapter devoted to Spanish rule in LeRoy’s The Americans in 
the Philippines concludes by extolling the propaganda for reforms 
conducted by the members of La Solidaridad, especially José Rizal. 
LeRoy pursues two main objectives in that section. On the one hand, he 
attempts to show that the Filipinos in Spain did not spread separatist 
propaganda. They simply were clamoring for progress and liberalism in 
the archipelago. On the other hand, LeRoy attempts to dismiss Bonifacio 
and the Katipunan revolt of 1896 by depicting this as a revolution based 
on crime and assassination carried out by the worst elements of the poor 
and ignorant class of Filipinos. 
          LeRoy insists that there was no connection between the 
Propaganda movement, the Katipunan, and the events of 1898 and 1899. 
He reverses the argument prevalent in the Philippines, which showed that 
the revolt of 1896 was a legitimate stage to the true Philippine 
revolution—that is, an evolution to more social and political freedom. 
LeRoy explains that 
the incidents of the so-called revolution of 1896, [was] actively 
participated in only by sections of the archipelago, and by certain 
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classes to the very considerable exclusion of others, inspired, 
moreover, by various mixed motives, among which were not 
wanting the baser ones of personal revenge and race hatred.1 
 
          LeRoy establishes a dichotomy between progressivism and 
independentism. He makes clear that the best proof of the rising Filipino 
sentiment of nationality was the campaign carried on in the eighties and 
nineties “by the more progressive element of young Filipinos.” This 
campaign to LeRoy was two-sided: on the one hand, the Spanish 
campaign for the extension to the Philippines of freer governmental 
institutions, for an “honest” administration, and for the speedy 
replacement of the friars; and on the other, the Filipino campaign for 
improvement of educational facilities, a removal of the “espionage” on 
the press and public opinion, and, above all, for an awakening of the 
lethargic masses.  
          LeRoy was accurate in defining the program of the propaganda 
movement. However, he infers that there was no progress in the 
Philippines during the 1880’s and 1890’s. In fact, he stresses the 
existence of “a medieval atmosphere of Spanish government.” In order to 
support his argument, LeRoy co-opts the Filipino newspaper La 
Solidaridad as the catalyst of assimilationist sentiments and the 
mouthpiece of a Filipino campaign against the predominance of the 
friars. “La Solidaridad,” he avers, “became an indignant protest against 
the abuses of the Spanish government and the friars, and preached social 
progress.”2 
                                                 
1 LeRoy, James A.The Americans in the Philippines, p. 63. 
2 James A. Le Roy to El Renacimiento, Durango, Mexico, 1 November, 1906. Published in supplement 
to El Renacimiento of January 17, 19, 22 and 24, 1907. Robertson, James Alexander. Annapolis. Md. 
Manuscripts. Box 2, letters November-December 1906. North Carolina: Duke University. 
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          This statement was part of the American project of public 
education through a rewriting Philippine history. LeRoy was promoting 
some events and figures, including this reformist journal, while 
neglecting others. In order to foster the idea of Spanish tyranny and 
above all censorship of the press, some journals published in the 
Philippines at the same time as La Solidaridad were ignored. The 
recognition of these publications would have put in question the ideas of 
“espionage on the press” and “friar dictatorship” furnished by LeRoy and 
still widely embraced by American historiography. 
          In addition, the exaltation of La Solidaridad was a pretext to 
minimize the importance of the Katipunan newspaper Kalayaan and the 
revolt of 1896 which came, as LeRoy states, from the illiterate and poor 
classes of the population. By positing the revolt of 1896 as coming “from 
below,” he was implying that this rebellion lacked true principles, was 
premature and badly conceived. It was in fact LeRoy who inaugurated 
the “black legend” of the Filipino revolution with its leader Bonifacio 
fomenting “a race war.” “There are stray bits of evidence,” LeRoy says, 
“that extermination had by 1895 come to be the preaching of the more 
blood thirsty leaders like Bonifacio.”3 
          LeRoy was also paving the way for his following chapter on the 
revolt of 1898 and the argument that General Luna wanted to exterminate 
all the whites. LeRoy was very selective with the Spanish terminology. 
Obviously, he bases his account of the revolt of 1896 on Spanish sources, 
mainly Sastrón, Retana, José M. del Castillo and Eduardo Navarro, who 
                                                 
3 LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines, p. 83. 
 201 
used the term “aniquilar.” As has been explained, “aniquilar” in Spanish 
is not synonymous with “exterminate” and even less so at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. LeRoy inferred that it meant “to kill en masse,” even 
though when one reads Kalayaan and other Katipunan publications there 
is no hint of this idea. Evidently, LeRoy was chalking up more 
“evidence” in order to represent the Americans as the ultimate saviors of 
the people: “It must be remembered that if the Americans had not 
interfered in 1898, the result of the aborted and badly conceived and 
premature revolt of 1896 would have been disastrous for ‘Filipino 
Reform’.”4 The Americans, then, had liberated the Filipinos from the 
Spanish reactionaries as well as the oligarchism and autocracy of 
Aguinaldo’s republic. 
          At this point, we can clearly perceive the generalizations being put 
forward in LeRoy’s narrative. He presents a distorted history by 
concluding that the reforms wished by the Filipinos would have been 
postponed indefinitely were it not for American intervention. This is part 
of his strategy, implemented by ignoring some of the sources. Governor-
General Augustin arrived with those reforms, but as we shall see, these 
reforms came too late. The Americans, meanwhile, had promised 
independence to Aguinaldo. They came and brought with them the 
desired liberalism. But the dark age would become a “golden age” only if 
Aguinaldo’s republic itself was destroyed. 
                                                 
4 Published in Supplement to El Renacimiento of January 17, 19, 22 and 24 1907. James A. LeRoy to 
El Renacimiento. Robertson James Alexander. Annapolis. Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, letters November-
December 1906. North Carolina: Duke University. Benedict Anderson in ‘Cacique Democracy in the 
Philippines’ assumes the same: “Had it not been for William McKinley, one might almost say, the 
Philippines in the early twentieth century could have fractured into three weak, caudillo-ridden 
states…”, p. 200. 
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La Solidaridad and other Filipino publications 
La Solidaridad was born in Barcelona in 1889. The collaborators 
of this journal were imbued with liberal and “autonomist” sentiments. 
Pablo Rianzares was the first owner of the journal and the first director 
Graciano Lopez Jaena, who was above all an orator, demagogue and a 
writer. Lopez Jaena was protected by acknowledged Spanish radicals 
such as Sol y Ortega, Emilio Junoy, who would defend the Filipinos and 
their reformism until the end, and other “Catalan politicians.” I have 
emphasized the term “autonomist” and “Catalan politicians” since both 
concepts played an important role in shaping the political ideas of the 
collaborators of La Solidaridad. The Filipinos in Spain were generally 
not assimilationist. What they were claiming was political representation 
and self-government. They learnt about this “autonomist” thesis in 
Catalonia, which was then experiencing an incipient nationalism. 
Catalonia was starting to construct its own political and administrative 
framework (a phenomenon which was disguised as a “discovery of its 
own identity”). Filipinos ilustrados were clamoring for a similar model to 
be implanted in the Philippines. 
           In 1890, La Solidaridad moved to Madrid since the 
Asociación Hispano-Filipina had been founded there and the 
collaborators of the journal felt that their political aspirations would find 
a wider audience in Madrid than in Barcelona. Lopez Jaena decided to 
remain in Barcelona, and Marcelo Hilario del Pilar became the new 
director of the periodical. 
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          La Solidaridad was a journal written by Filipinos, but I am not all 
that sure if it was “for the Filipinos.” The cultural level of the journal, the 
high level of the language, the political issues it tackled, lead me to think 
that this journal was written for a Spanish audience. The collaborators of 
the journal wanted to be heard as Spaniards, and above all as a Filipino 
“ilustrado” elite. Its most important and regular collaborators were 
Graciano Lopez Jaena, Marcelo H. del Pilar, Mariano Ponce (whose 
nicknames were Naning and Kalipulako), José Rizal (who used the 
nickname of Laong Laan), Antonio Luna with the nickname of Taga-
Ilog, José M. Panganiban (with the nickname of JOMAPA), and 
Ferdinand Blumentritt. 
          It seems to me that the reformist discourse of La Solidaridad was 
not as extraordinary as LeRoy tries to portray it. As a matter of fact, the 
journal is comparable with many other journals of the nineteenth century 
which became venues for political debate. It is not rare to find in the 
Spanish press satires, parodies and ironical treatments of the weaknesses 
of Spanish society—above all among the intellectuals and radicals. It was 
quite common to read satires against the clergy. The anticlericalism of La 
Solidaridad was in fact a prevalent discourse in Spain at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. 
          The real significance of La Solidaridad, it seems to me, lies in the 
fact that its history was co-opted for specific ends by American and 
Filipino intellectuals. The Americans argued that La Solidaridad 
advocated reform instead of independence. This idea was very important 
for the colonial construction of Philippine history, since the Americans 
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could then justify their occupation of the archipelago by inferring that the 
educated Filipinos, or ilustrados, only wanted more self-government, not 
independence. The argument follows that since the ilustrados knew that 
the Filipinos had not come of age, they therefore needed the tutelage of a 
progressive nation like America. Filipino intellectuals, in turn, could 
identify in La Solidaridad “the germ of Filipino consciousness” that 
would ultimately lead to the attainment of national independence. 
          As early as 1898 the Filipino revolutionary organ La 
Independencia5 praised the struggle of La Solidaridad to obtain Filipino 
self-government. The newspaper stated: 
Everybody knows our Filipino sons worked peacefully in the 
[Spanish] metropolis. Though their task was immense and the 
obstacles huge, these noble souls nonetheless, spurred on by the 
memory of the motherland, offered up their money and their lives. 
From their sacrifices emerged La Solidaridad, that Filipino humble 
journal, mouthpiece of our dreams. . .where our tears were 
deposited, with the expectation that Spanish hearts were touched.6 
           
          This excerpt is important since it was distorted by LeRoy. La 
Independencia was the organ of the Filipino Republic. The collaborators 
of this paper observed that La Solidaridad was the catalyst of Filipino 
national consciousness, although the above paragraph does not state that 
La Solidaridad was the germ of separatism. However, LeRoy gives 
Filipinos a lesson in history, stating categorically that La Solidaridad was 
reformist and therefore should not be related in any way to the “Filipino 
revolution” that would follow later. Although he is technically right, he 
infers that the educated Filipinos wanted only more social and political 
                                                 
5 La Independencia [Diario], Malabon 1898. La Independencia was the first separatist newspaper 
directed by Filipino intellectuals. Retana, Wenceslao E.  Aparato Bibliográfico, vol. 3, entry 4575, pp. 
1761-1771. 
6 ‘No tenemos la Culpa.’La Independencia.  See, Retana, Wenceslao. Aparato Bibliográfico…, vol. 3, 
entry 4575, pp. 1761-1771.  
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progress, never “independence.” He avoids the use of the term 
“independence” altogether. 
          La Solidaridad had predecessors such as Gregorio Sancianco y 
Goson, a reformist and liberal, who wrote an important and rigorous 
book in 1881, El Progreso de Filipinas. Estudios Económicos, 
Administrativos y Políticos. LeRoy knew this book and made some 
references to it in The Philippines 1860-1898: Some comments and 
bibliographical notes, published in the Blair & Robertson compendium. 
As with La Solidaridad and other books, LeRoy de-contextualized 
Sancianco’s El Progreso de Filipinas in order to demonstrate the 
underdevelopment of Spain. When Sancianco wrote the book, the main 
reforms had not yet been implemented. LeRoy exploits this fact, 
deliberately focusing on topics discussed by Sancianco that would 
denigrate Spanish rule such as “lack of public improvement and defects 
of public services, especially education and in administration of justice; 
restriction of opportunities for Filipino laborers and evils of caciquism.”7 
Yet, anticipating Lopez Jaena, Del Pilar and Rizal, Sancianco would 
press for the assimilation of the islands to Spain; “Filipino matters,” he 
said, “must be sorted out as other Spanish provinces ruled by the same 
general laws. . .”8   
          Most important among Sancianco’s writings is a rigorous article 
about the so-called “indolence” of the Filipinos. He argues that this 
inveterate assumption was a cliché. However, by reading his arguments 
                                                 
7 LeRoy, James A. ‘The Philippines 1860-1898; Some Comment and Bibliographical Notes.’ In Blair 
& Robertson (ed.), The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. Vol. 52, pp. 154-155.   
8 Sancianco y Goson, Gregorio. El Progreso de Filipinas. Estudios Económicos, Administrativos y 
Políticos. Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de J.M. Pérez, 1881 p. xiii 
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denying indolence we can glean changes in Spanish colonial policy 
designed to make their Filipino subjects economically useful. Moreover, 
the so-called indolence of the Filipinos seems to be used as a justification 
to deny the Philippines status as a Spanish province.9 In fact, during these 
decades Spain was reaffirming the status of the Philippines as “colony.” 
          Sancianco’s ideas have been eclipsed by the writings in La 
Solidaridad. His arguments regarding Filipino indolence were co-opted 
by Rizal for his article Sobre la indolencia de los Filipinos.10 This is part 
of a supression which started as early as 1898. Moreover, La Solidaridad 
has eclipsed other journals which were founded and published in the 
Philippines. This omission is interwoven with the widespread argument 
concerning the censorship of the press. I am not denying there was 
censorship but we should take into consideration the fact that there was 
more or less censorship depending on the Spanish government and the 
governor of the Philippines in place at any particular time. In this 
context, we must observe that La Solidaridad was read in the 
archipelago.   
          Another predecessor of La Solidaridad that LeRoy fails to mention 
is Diariong Tagalog published in Manila in 1882. This newspaper was 
written in Spanish and Tagalog and brought to the archipelago the new 
liberal atmosphere prevailing in the mother country. The director of 
Diariong Tagalog, Francisco Calvo y Muñoz, went to the Philippines as 
an administrative official. Diariong Tagalog defended the most liberal 
solutions for the country, such as that Filipinos could love the Philippines 
                                                 
9 Sancianco y Goson, Gregorio. El Progreso de Filipinas…, Apendix, pp. 223-237. 
10 La Solidaridad, Madrid July 15, 1890 Núm. 35, p. 464.  
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without despising Spain. As a matter of fact, La Solidaridad owed many 
of its ideas to Diariong Tagalog. On 15 June 1890, it mentioned how, 
“under the direction of Francisco Bueno, [Diariong Tagalog] defended 
the most liberal solutions for the country and with its doctrines was 
presenting liberal ideas to the Filipino people…”11 LeRoy, however, was 
not interested in mentioning Diariong Tagalog since his portrayal of 
“espionage upon the press” might then come under fire.  
          Diariong Tagalog had a brief life, but it was not the only one 
which spread liberalism in the archipelago. La Opinión12 was founded in 
Manila in 1887. This newspaper was political and literary. It had a 
section called El Mosaico (The mosaic) imbued with antifriar sentiment 
and analogous to A vuelo de Pluma from El Liberal of Madrid. Julian del 
Pozo in a very subtle way demonized the friars. Its political section was 
managed by Benigno Quiroga, a left-winger from the Liberal party who 
immediately won the sympathies of the Filipinos and enjoyed the support 
of Governor Terreros. Quiroga mounted a fierce criticism of the friars. La 
Opinión was in fact the first eminently political newspaper in the 
Philippines that antagonized the religious orders.13 This feature of La 
Opinión has been deliberately ignored and instead this newspaper has 
become remembered as an ultra-conservative defender of the status quo 
and the religious orders under the direction of Retana and Camilo Millán.   
                                                 
11 La Solidaridad. June 15, 1890, número 33, p. 392 
12 La Opinión [Diario de la mañana.] Manila, 1887. Retana, Wenceslao E. Aparato Bibliográfico,  vol. 
3, entry 4498, pp.1628-1632. 
13 La Opinión disappeared in 1889 when Retana and Camilo Millán started to work in this newspaper. 
Retana was considered a reactionary anti-Filipino and Camilo Millán belonged to the “opportunistic 
trend” –a political trend—that was furiously anti-Filipino. Obviously, the Filipino progressive sector 
left the newspaper.   
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          So what is new in La Solidaridad? La Opinión displayed its 
reformist ideas and its antifriar sentiment in Manila. It can be argued, 
however, that La Opinión was a Spanish journal published in the 
Philippines, directed by Spaniards. This would demonstrate that 
anticlerical feeling was prevalent in Liberal Spain. However, LeRoy and 
future scholars needed to show that Spain was only a “democracy in 
manner” but not in substance, and thereby build up the notion of a “dark 
age” of Spanish rule. It is quite clear that, by not mentioning this journal 
and its criticisms of the religious community in the Philippines, LeRoy 
could ascribe a certain preeminence and uniqueness to La Solidaridad 
and the idea of the predominance and power of the religious orders. 
Highlighting La Opinión would have demonstrated, on the contrary, that 
Liberal ideas and reformism had reached the archipelago.  
          There are more examples, but I would like to discuss just two more 
newspapers which were born at the same time as La Solidaridad. These 
newspapers are characterized by their popular nature. The first one, El 
Ilocano,14 appeared in Manila in 1889. Founded, directed and redacted by 
Isabelo de los Reyes, this was the first genuinely Filipino newspaper. It 
was also bilingual: Castellano-Ilocano. In a simple language designed to 
educate the public, De los Reyes discussed issues of political reform.15 
LeRoy was never to use any work written by de los Reyes since he 
considered Isabelo de los Reyes a demagogue, plagiarist and just plain 
ridiculous. The fact is, incorporating the writings of De los Reyes, as in 
                                                 
14 El Ilocano. [Quincenario] Manila, 1889. Retana, Wenceslao. Aparato Bibliográfico, vol. 3, entry 
4506, pp. 1653-165.  
15 Artigas y Cuerva, Manuel. Los Periódicos Filipinos. La más completa Bibliografía publicada hasta 
la fecha de los Papeles Públicos Filipinos. Manila: Biblioteca Nacional Filipina, 1909, p. 187.  
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the case of Retana, would have put into question LeRoy’s extremely 
partisan history. 
          The second newspaper of a popular nature was El Resumen. 
Founded by Pascual H. Poblete and Baldomero Hazañas, this newspaper 
was imbued with a nationalist spirit. Poblete demonstrated his political 
astuteness by contracting peninsular writers, and therefore remained free 
from suspicion himself. For example, Governor Despujol’s policy of 
attraction was celebrated by El Resumen, which dared to announce that “. 
. .the Philippines and its sons wish the full hispanization of the territory, 
its progress and its equality, and its assimilation in rights and duties to 
the provinces of the metropolis.”16 No one previously had said anything 
similar in the Philippines. 
          The historical prominence of La Solidaridad was really built up in 
the twentieth century and for specific purposes such as the minimization 
of Spanish reformism, the construction of stereotyped images of the 
Spanish regime, and above all, the establishment of an evolutionist 
history that begins with the emergence of national consciousness in the 
pages of this newspaper. 
La Solidaridad defined its program as follows: 
Modest, very modest, are our aspirations. Our program, moreover, 
simply, very simply, is to combat all reaction, to impede all 
regression, to applaud, accept all liberal ideas, to defend all 
progress; in a word: one more propagandist of all the “ideals of 
democracy” aspiring to rule/prevail in all the peoples de aquende y 
allende the seas. [emphasis added]17 
  
                                                 
16 El Resumen [Periódico diario.] Manila, 1890. Retana, Wenceslao E.  Aparato Bibliográfico, Vol. 3, 
entry 4511, pp. 1667-1670.  
17 With these words started the first number of La Solidaridad. 1889.  
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          This program of La Solidaridad was carried out. It combated the 
conservative reactions by making fierce criticism of an “apparent power 
of the frailocracia.” This topic was a cliché during the twentieth century 
when the Americans fostered this image. However, few scholars have 
noted the period when the collaborators of La Solidaridad applauding the 
liberal ideas and the reforms implemented in the archipelago. I have 
highlighted the phrase “ideals of democracy.” What La Solidaridad was 
claiming was not fictitious at all. Its writers lived in Spain during an 
incipient democracy, not “a democracy in manner” such as LeRoy stated 
in The Americans in the Philippines, and they wanted the Philippines to 
become a province of that democracy. Therefore, the traditional idea of 
an underdeveloped Spain should be revisited.  
          La Solidaridad was above all a political journal imbued with 
republican ideas. I have checked carefully the issues from 1889 and 1890 
and have noticed that traditional historiography has focused on just the 
following three topics treated in the newspaper: the reiterative claim for 
parliamentary representation and Spanish intransigence toward it, 
antifriar feeling, and the defense against the “methodical denigrators of 
the race.”18 LeRoy, above all, gave form and authority to a certain image 
of La Solidaridad by picking up its accounts of a lack of public 
improvements, defects in the administration of justice, defects in public 
services (especially education), and above all the lack of progress 
provoked in part by the prevalence of the religious orders. What he and 
others failed to mention is that La Solidaridad also applauded the reforms 
                                                 
18 I take this sentence from John Schumacher. The Making of a Nation. I think this statement is quite 
exaggerated.  
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of Liberal governments, published the decree of Maura, and expressed 
commitment to Spanish-ness and to Spanish political dynamism.   
          Quite clearly, the major aim of La Solidaridad was to provide a 
picture of a retrograde and obsolete Spanish system under the domination 
of the friars. Its anticlerical articles were so repetitive that the newspaper 
La Patria had to respond with an article entitled Verdades Viejas (Old 
Truths). La Patria argued that the obsession against the friars was 
conveying the now-obsolete idea that the friars were the crux of Spanish 
rule, their presence vital for the maintenance of the colonial regime.19 La 
Patria was echoing the clear demarcation that the governments of the 
Restoration had drawn between the friars, who were henceforth separated 
from all political matters,20 and the authority of the civil government. 
However, the prevailing historiography prefers to highlight the power of 
the friars in order to underpin the image of a medieval and anachronistic 
Spanish system. 
          Professor Blumentritt, a regular contributor to La Solidaridad, 
became the champion of the Filipinos and his articles, full of erudition 
although with many inaccuracies, sometimes fostered the idea of the 
preeminence of the religious orders in the archipelago, and sometimes the 
opposite—that the friars did not have influence in the Philippines.21 
          Maybe these swings of opinion were due to the fact that he was 
never in the Philippines. This data is relevant, nevertheless, to 
                                                 
19 Retana, Wenceslao E. Los Frailes Filipinos por un Español que ha residido en aquel Pais, Madrid: 
Imprenta de la Viuda de M. Minuesa, 1898, p. 46. 
20 This separation of the friars of political matters started to take place after the revolution of La 
Gloriosa.  See, Giraudier, Baltasar. Los Frailes. Filipinas. Breves Consideraciones por un Español 
Peninsular. Guadalupe: Pequeña Imprenta del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1888. Giraudier emphasized “la 
fiebre reformista” (reformist fever).  
21 La Solidaridad. Ferdinand Blumentrit, May 31, 1889. 
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understanding Blumentritt’s notion of the “mission military” paternalism 
of the Spanish system, which had disappeared by the middle of the 
nineteenth century. According to him, Philippine history tells us that “the 
friar without the soldier could not, cannot and will not be able to conquer 
and conserve the country.”22 For him and other collaborators of La 
Solidaridad the friars were to be blamed for being fierce enemies of any 
progress, adverse to the propagation of Spanish, ignorant, enemies of any 
liberal government, and an anachronism.   
          As for the denigration of the race based on the new concept of 
modern authoritarianism, Blumentritt defended the Filipino race. His 
attack on Quioquiap (José Feced) and Retana contributed to the 
emergence of La Política de España en Filipinas, the alter ego of La 
Solidaridad. What initially was a political and intellectual debate 
involving two antagonistic ideas soon came to overwhelm all other 
agendas, however. La Solidaridad attacked the friars; Retana and Feced 
fought back, defending the friar cause. The exchange became 
nonsensical, degenerating into attacks on the Filipinos who were 
considered as childish and unfit to undertake anything serious. 
          This absurdity did harm to the Filipinos and to the new model of 
colonialism that Spain was trying to implement. It distorted the real 
purposes of Spanish government in the Philippines. The debates 
surrounding the friars and racial discourse lent themselves to co-optation 
by the American regime, which transformed polemics into a real 
portrayal of the Spanish system. It facilitated the construction and spread 
                                                 
22 Blumentrit, Ferdinand. ‘Desengaños el alabardero de los frailes.’ La Solidaridad. Madrid, September 
30, 1890, núm. 40 p. 646. Desengaños was Wenceslao E. Retana’s nickname.  
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of the legends about the underdevelopment and medievalism of the 
Spanish system. 
 
End of Spanish colonial restructuring, the triumph of “obscurantism” 
          LeRoy is really careful in the last section of The Americans in the 
Philippines devoted to the Spanish regime to delimit clearly, by writing 
separate sections, the Filipino Propaganda and the Revolution of 1896 
and 1898. What we can call the “reformist campaign” would become the 
basis of the American justification to hold the Philippines. This argument 
is emphasized in LeRoy’s treatment of José Rizal wherein he concludes: 
Rizal’s novels epitomize the whole movement and give 
instantaneous photographs of the Filipino people, with their vices 
and defects all plainly delineated. Rizal was, despite his radical and 
bitter outburst against Spanish reaction, a preacher to his own 
people more than anything else; he wished to make them see that 
there must be self-reliance and individual independence before 
there could be a real national life of feeling, or the possibility of an 
independent Filipino government.23 
 
          This excerpt demonstrates LeRoy’s use of Rizal to argue that the 
Filipinos were unfit for self-government and that the “ilustrados” were 
the vox populi of the archipelago, their wishes shared by everyone. 
Correspondingly, the revolt of 1896 would be for LeRoy “a sort of 
Filipino excrescence—a minor French Revolution on the part of the more 
ignorant leaders of the lower classes.”24 LeRoy here delineates the 
dichotomy between Rizal and Bonifacio, inaugurating what has become a 
linear emplotment of the history of the nineteenth century. As Reynaldo 
Ileto states: 
                                                 
23 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, May 13, 1904. James A. Robertson 
Special Correspondence. Box 5. Washington: The Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 
24 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, May 13, 1904. 
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With ilustrado writing, then, Philippine history became intelligible, 
progressive, linear and to some extent, “purposive.” The people, or 
its vanguard intelligentsia, could help push history to its goal by 
education/ reform or revolution. Subsequent histories, both of the 
liberal and radical varieties, have reproduced this nineteenth 
century emplotment.25 
 
          LeRoy considered it essential to inform his American audience 
about the events of 1896-1898. For this purpose he used, for the revolt of 
1896, three sources: Sastrón’s Insurrección en Filipinas, Retana’s 
Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino and at times La Política de España en 
Filipinas for some irrelevant data. For 1897, he used Primo de Rivera’s 
memorial—extracting only a few notes—and his account of Biak-na-
bato; Blanco’s memorial; and some books close to the conservative trend. 
However, he omitted those parts of the arguments of these books which 
concluded that the revolt of 1896 was the result of the implementation of 
reforms, which in turn furnished the germ of separatism. 
          The events of 1896 and 1897 are discussed in many publications, 
conservative as well as liberal. LeRoy was familiar with most of this 
huge historiography, and many of these books are in the United States, 
but he was extremely selective in using them. Unfortunately, ever since 
he published The Americans in the Philippines this rich bibliography has 
all but been forgotten. Instead, it is LeRoy’s account that subsequent 
scholars built on. 
          LeRoy’s story of 1896 is a compendium of facts found in the 
abovementioned books he depended upon.26 Although these sources 
                                                 
25 Ileto, Reynaldo C. ‘Outlines of a Nonlinear Emplotment of Philippine History.’ In Lisa Lowe and 
David Lloyd (ed.),  The Politics of culture in the shadow of Capital. Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 1997, p. 101.  
26 Sastrón Manuel. Insurrección en Filipinas. Madrid [s.n.], 1901; Blanco, Ramón. Memoria que al 
Senado dirige el general Blanco acerca de los últimos sucesos ocurridos en la Isla de Luzón. Madrid 
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consider the writings of the Ilustrados as the catalyst of separatist ideas, 
LeRoy denies this argument. He makes clear the absence of any 
relationship between the writings of the ilustrados and the Katipunan 
newspaper  Kalayaan27 published by Retana in Archivo del Bibliófilo.28 
Although even the sources used by LeRoy emphasize that masonry 
became el taller donde se fundió el odio a España (the foundry where 
hatred of Spain was cast.),29 LeRoy ignores all this. Instead he 
demonstrates that the Katipunan and the revolution only germinated 
among the masses, who followed blindly their fanatical leaders. He 
dismisses the idea of “true independence” inspiring the mass movement. 
Instead, the Filipinos are depicted as prone to mysticism, secret 
organizations and the like. 
          The Katipunan was in fact perceived by the Spanish government of 
the nineteenth century as an excrescence of masonry, which had co-opted 
and fanaticized the masses. According to Spanish sources—specifically 
documents published by Retana and Sastrón’s account—Marcelo del 
Pilar advised the creation of another association in 1892, which would 
serve to attract the peasants and the illiterate. This association would be 
the Katipunan. 
                                                                                                                                            
[s.n]: Establecimiento Tipográfico,1897; Primo de Rivera y Sobremonte, Fernando. Memoria dirigida 
al senado por el Capitán general D. Fernando Primo de Rivera y Sobremonte acerca de su gestión en 
Filipinas: agosto de 1898.Madrid: Imprenta y Litografía del Depósito de la Guerra, 1898.  
27 According to Retana, this paper started to be published at the beginning of 1896. See, Retana, 
Wenceslao E. Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, vol 3. Ileto has cast light on this newspaper and on 
Bonifacio as indisputable leader of the revolt of 1896, ignored or misrepresented by Filipino 
historiography. The suppression of Bonifacio was fostered by the American educational system. See 
Ileto, Reynaldo C. Pasyon and Revolution . Popular Movements in the Philippines 1840-1910. Quezon 
City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979. 
28 Retana, W.E. ‘Documentos políticos de actualidad. Primera Serie.’  Archivo del Bibliofilo Filipino. 
Vol. 3, 1897. Retana in this volume introduces many documents related to the masonry. These 
documents establish a cause-effect among masonry and separatism. 
29 Castillo y Jiménez, José M.  El Katipunan o el Filibusterismo en Filipinas. Crónica ilustrada con 
documentos autócrafos y fotogravados. Madrid, 1897. 
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Retana, in La Política de España en Filipinas, published an article 
on 30 April 1896, and another on 15 May 1896, entitled El Separatismo 
en Filipinas. He echoed some letters sent to the newspaper El Correo by 
someone called Roque Rey, who explained the main reasons for the rise 
of separatism or filibusterismo,30 as it was called in the Philippines. 
These were as follows: the reformism which prevailed in the archipelago, 
assimilationist sentiments, masonry, republican ideas, hatred against the 
friars, and the policy of attraction followed by some governors. Retana 
was here denouncing the policy implemented by General Blanco.  
          It is important to note the last reason pointed out by Retana (who in 
fact fits the profile of “Roque Rey”): the implementation of the policy of 
attraction. LeRoy mentions the same sources in The Americans in the 
Philippines, but we cannot see the same arguments. General Blanco was 
considered responsible of the uprising of 1896 by governing with 
tolerance and ignoring the secret meetings and the rumors of the advent 
of a revolution. Blanco had to justify his acts before the Spanish senate.31 
Among his many interesting statements was that many prestigious people 
in the Philippines were not separatist. Many liberals and above all the 
republicans in fact regarded the Filipino ilustrados as reformist and 
above all assimilationist more than separatist. And besides, they trusted 
the loyalty of the Filipinos. They saw separatism as something fostered 
by conservative and friar elements. Blanco affirmed that his policy of 
attraction was one of the dictums of Spanish government and that this 
                                                 
30 I quote ad literam Wenceslao Retana who likes to use this term “filibusterismo.” –as something 
particular in the Philippines. See La Política de España en Filipinas, Madrid, 30 de Abril de 1896, 
núm. 136, Año VI Segunda Época.  
31 Blanco, Ramón. Memoria que al Senado dirige el general Blanco acerca de los últimos sucesos 
ocurridos en la Isla de Luzón.  
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policy was preventing the implantation of separatist feelings. In a letter 
of 8 November 1894, Marcelo del Pilar wrote: 
But lamentably, by judging what you deign to tell me in the letter 
of 23 July, insofar as this campaign runs, instead of our forces 
growing its dispersion is becoming evident. The shyness of some 
of them, the indifference of others (among the wealthiest, such is 
observed in the letter), are creating a huge emptiness around our 
cause…32 
 
          Blanco arrived in the archipelago with the Maura law, something 
LeRoy overlooks. In implementing this law he founded native 
institutions and gave the principalía more political autonomy by ruling 
the municipalities. He also allowed freedom of the press. This new liberal 
turn fostered, according to conservative sources, the revolt of 1896. 
          It seems, thus, that the reasons exposed by Roque Rey or Retana—
assimilationism, masonry, republican ideas, hatred against the friars—
were the reasonable consequences of the application of Blanco’s policy 
of attraction. As a matter of fact, Retana wrote inflammatory articles 
against Blanco ever since his arrival. But the most fruitful literature about 
the evils of reformism came out in 1897, and was reiterated and 
radicalized in 1898.  
Eduardo Navarro, an Augustinian, wrote an interesting book 
explaining the implementation of reforms such as the new municipal 
regime, the enforcement of a civil and penal code and the appointment of 
justices of the peace. He complained that the friars had been stripped of 
their power and that the revolt was an intrinsic effect of reformism. In a 
short period of time, scarcely five years, he says, “all the reforms we 
have mentioned [i.e., the Maura law, penal and civil code, justices of the 
                                                 
32 Blanco, Ramón. Memoria que al Senado dirige el General Blanco…, p. 76. 
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peace, etc.] were implemented; the way of life, customs and patriarchal 
laws were, in part, disrupted…”33 
          This statement seems to contradict LeRoy’s argument regarding 
the perpetuation of medievalism. He used Navarro’s book but invited the 
reader to read only the last chapter, La Masonería, and then concluded 
that the book was irrelevant! 
          Camilo Millán, a recalcitrant journalist, explained the origins of the 
insurrection in the newspaper El Español. It was caused, he said, by the 
benevolence of the Spanish government, the municipal autonomy which 
gave shape to the formation of the “Catipunan.” In short, Spanish 
reformism encouraged the separatist movement. The Maura law, said 
Millán, “gave occasion to the enemies of the Patria to avail themselves of 
the autonomy given to the new municipios in order to complete their 
organization and precipitate the events which we all deplore.”34 
          More mordant is Juan Caro y Mora in La Voz Española, a 
newspaper which was born under the banner of “The Philippines by 
Spain and for Spain.” Curiously, Caro y Mora was Filipino but 
completely hispanized. It is thought that he was under the influence of Fr. 
Evaristo F. Arias.35 He subscribed to the same causes of the insurrection 
as other authors, but introduced something new in his explanation that 
would prove very useful for LeRoy and others. “The peculiarity and 
                                                 
33 Navarro, Eduardo. Filipinas. Estudio de algunos asuntos de actualidad. Por el Procurador y 
Comisario de Agustinos Calzados. Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de M. de Minuesa de los Ríos, 1897. 
Navarro laments the loss of pre-eminence of the friars. Therefore, his book provides the underside of 
the inveterate idea of the power of the friars. See, p. 230.  
34 Millán y Villanueva, Camilo. El Gran Problema de las Reformas en Filipinas. Planteado por El 
Español –periódico diario de Manila y redactado por D. Camilo Millán y Villanueva, 1897, p. 47.  
35 Caro Mora Juan. La Situación del País. Colección de artículos publicados por “La Voz 
Española”acerca de la Insurrección Tagala, sus causas y principales cuestiones que afectan a 
Filipinas. Manila: Imprenta de “Amigos del País,” 1897. 
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novelty of this rebellion,” he said, “is the way in which it was prepared. 
The idea was essentially political—independence—and it germinated 
slowly. . .among the caciques and promoters in the lodges who gave it 
form and spread it among the fanatical masses.”36 
          No doubt, the term “cacique” in this passage is owed to Spanish 
influence, although it is not clear whether Caro y Mora’s usage of it is 
due to the influence of Las Leyes de Indias (i.e., the assumption that 
cacique = principal) or whether he refers to the cacique which emerged 
in Spain during the Restoration as a political intermediary. Be that as it 
may, Caro y Mora was giving shape to the further American deformation 
of what cacique meant, as we shall see in the next chapter. From the 
ambiguous sentence one could easily infer that the caciques—such as 
LeRoy shows in his explanation of the revolt of 1896—undermined the 
will of the poor and ignorant masses.   
          Finally, we should note the statement of José M. Castillo y Jiménez 
in 1897 that masonry had been the workshop where hatred toward Spain 
had been forged and that municipal reform had fostered this 
filibusterismo.37  
The above books condemn Spanish reformism as the “evil” that 
precipitated the revolution. LeRoy knew about and used those books but 
he provided a sectarian reading of them, omitting the chapters devoted to 
the implantation of reforms. LeRoy based most of the history of the 1896 
revolt on Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino. However, he selected carefully 
the documents of Archivo that seemed to demonstrate that the Katipunan 
                                                 
36 Caro y Mora, Juan. La Situación del País…, pp. 10-11. 
37 Castillo y Jiménez, José M. El Katipunan o el Filibusterismo en Filipinas. Crónica Ilustrada con 
documentos autógrafos y fotogravados. Madrid. 
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was organized for the assassination of the whites. It is not surprising, 
therefore, to find that LeRoy co-opted as follows the prologue of Archivo 
del Bibliófilo Filipino: “Monstrous revolution, in which, one has to say, 
we cannot see a plan, a definite aspiration or a directed intelligence, only 
cruelty produced by the mental insanity of a few ambitious men upon 
whose heads have already fallen the anathema of all civilized 
mankind.”38 Retana in the actual prologue does not accuse anyone in 
particular, but LeRoy points the finger at the masses, with Bonifacio as 
the main instigator. 
          Retana presented two kinds of documents: letters of the Guardia 
Civil (Constabulary), friars and civil governors, and documents related to 
Masonry, the Katipunan and its organ Kalayaan. The letters are 
important because they represent the views of the most conservative 
sectors and were the catalyst for the formation of American colonial 
discourse. They infer that Masonry had influenced all the inhabitants of 
the Philippines, including the masses, constituting “the bad seed that 
spread and the founding of another society called Katipunan –that is, 
reunión de notables in Spanish.”39 
          This statement, made by an anonymous civil governor, was 
essential for the American construction of the Katipunan as an “abnormal 
association of the masses.” However, LeRoy and future scholars40 would 
ignore the words of the same civil governor when he related the revolt to 
                                                 
38 Retana, W. E. Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino. Vol. 3, p. xvii.  
39 Retana, W.E. Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino. Vol. 3, p. 328. 
40 Glenn May used Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino vol. 3 in Inventing a Hero: The Posthumous re-
creation of Andres Bonifacio. He considers Retana’s work as the most valuable and reliable source to 
know the story of the revolt of 1896 and the foundation of Katipunan. However, he is very selective 
with the documents since he infers that Spanish reformism such as the Maura law was never enforced 
in the Philippines. It seems that LeRoy is still very much alive in our textbooks. 
 221 
the implantation of native institutions: “The capitanes, tenientes and 
jueces de paz [i.e., municipal officials] are the cabecillas of the 
revolution. They cannot continue unless a hard and energetic system is 
implemented in order to exhaust the bad seed that has spread…”41 The 
terminology used by this governor clearly alludes to the implementation 
of the Maura law and the implantation of justices of the peace and he 
puts the blame on them for the revolution. 
          As for Kalayaan, LeRoy overlooks the Katipunan newspaper, 
relegating it to a footnote. This is part of his narrative strategy since he 
wishes to avoid any controversy relating to “independence or 
separatism.” He mentions only one article of this newspaper—the 
“Manifiesto”—since this is attributed to Rizal. He refuses any idea of 
revolt: 
Yet the manifesto of “Dimas-Alang” (Rizal), through presenting in 
allegory the awakening of his people by “liberty” preaches mainly 
the need for an “independence of spirit” and a self-reliance on the 
part of the people themselves, and must be distorted to find 
anything countenancing immediate revolt. [emphasis added]42 
 
          There are some distortions and mistakes in this passage. LeRoy 
copied the name “Dimas-Alang” from Archivo del Bibliófilo which had 
made a mistake and used the pseudonym “Dimas-Alan.” But, Retana in 
La Política de España en Filipinas43 righted this wrong and attributed the 
article Pahayag to Dimas-Ilaw. LeRoy effects the distortion by 
attributing the manifesto to Rizal. In his aim to deny “immediate revolt,” 
he misleads the readers by claiming that Filipinos, as Rizal preached, 
                                                 
41 Retana, W.E. Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino. Vol. 3, p. 339. 
42 LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines, p. 85. 
43 Retana, W. E. La Política de España en Filipinas. Segunda Época. Año VI, Núm. 143,144,145, 15 
de agosto-15 de septiembre 1896. 
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were not prepared for independence; this independence was only of the 
“spirit.” The “manifiesto” in fact was written by Emilio Jacinto who used 
the pen-name “Dimas-Ilaw.” It seems this excerpt shows how LeRoy 
made a tendentious use of the sources. 
          The abovementioned books about the 1896 revolt appeared during 
the signing of the pact of Biak-na-bato in mid-1897. All of them have a 
clear conservative trend and were useful for LeRoy. Conversely, he 
suppressed liberal narratives of the same event. Liberal politicians such 
as Moret, or republicans such as Junoy and Pi i Margall, did not doubt for 
a single moment the loyalty of the Filipinos. For instance Pi i Margall 
continued to support the Filipino cause during the impasse of the 
revolution. He wrote an editorial in the newspaper El País dated 22 
December 1896, and re-issued in 1897, entitled “The work of the friars 
was falling into pieces,” wherein he concluded that this was for la salud 
del reino (the health of the kingdom.) 44 Pi i Margall echoes the view that 
the loss of preeminence of the friars could only be healthy for Spain and 
the Philippines. 
          Moreover Morayta continued to be supportive to the Filipino 
cause, despite accusations of being a mason and a traitor to the “patria.” 
Morayta founded in 1897 a political journal called El Republicano.45 This 
journal offered news about the Philippines but above all Morayta 
remonstrated against those who saw the revolt as a consequence of 
masonry.  La Voz de Ultramar was as well a liberal journal. Felipe Trigo 
                                                 
44 Retana, W.E. Aparato Bibliográfico, vol. 3, entry 3888, p.1382. 
45 Retana, W.E.Aparato Bibliográfico, vol. 3, , entry 3941, p. 1390. 
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provides facts that were quite different from those published by Sastrón. 
He defended the government of General Blanco.46  
          The selective co-optation by LeRoy of the abovementioned sources 
allowed him to delineate a dark age of Spanish rule that would eventually 
dominate historiography. The denial of reformism facilitated the spread 
of the idea that Spanish rule was backward and immobile. La Solidaridad 
and the writings of the ilustrados had earlier provided an image of the 
omnipotence of the friars until 1898. The image of oppression and 
tyranny under Spanish rule, built up by both the ilustrados and the leaders 
of the Katipunan, became the driving force of the separatist movement. 
Ironically, however, selective and decontextualized images of Spanish 
rule showing a quasi-medieval obscurantism nicely suited the American 
argument that the Filipinos were unfit for self-government. Therefore, the 
Filipinos needed American tutelage. LeRoy had constructed a history of 
Spanish Philippines to justify the U.S. occupation of the archipelago. 
 
What LeRoy never explained about 1897-1898 
          Moret was appointed again Minister of the Colonies and Augustin, 
Governor of the Islands. Moret, who believed from the beginning in the 
loyalty of the Filipinos, together with Augustin attempted to implement 
the reforms demanded by the revolutionaries. Sagasta gave Augustin a 
“transcendental mission”: to allow the involvement of the Filipinos in all 
public matters. Augustin appointed some Filipinos to high military 
positions: Artemio Ricarte, Baldomero Aguinaldo, Mariano Trias, 
                                                 
46 Trigo, Felipe. La Campaña Filipina. El General Blanco y la Insurrección. Madrid: Fontanet, 1897. 
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Licerio Geronimo, Enrique Flores, Felipe Buencamino and Pio del Pilar 
were among them. A Consultive Assembly was implemented headed by 
Pedro Paterno, and finally, there was the firm promise of representation 
in the Cortes. 
          Republicans and autonomists demanded that the government 
guarantee the continuity of the reforms in the archipelago. Emilio Junoy, 
who always supported Filipino claims, urged the Spanish government to 
implement the reforms immediately. He concluded: no hagáis la reforma 
del Archipielago Filipino, tarde y mal. (Don’t undertake the reform of 
the Archipelago late and badly.) 47 
          It seems that these reforms came too late since the Filipinos had 
received a firm promise of independence from American officials and 
this promise, no doubt, made the treaty of Biac-na-Bato in part a failure. 
The ilustrado Felipe Calderon, a veteran of the Malolos Congress of 
1898, illustrated these facts first in 1905 with documents of the 
revolution until 1898 and in 1907 published an account of the second 
period from 1898 to 1901.48 These documents, systematically ignored by 
American scholars, throw some light on the birth and development of 
independence feelings in the Philippines, the last attempts at Spanish 
reforms, and above all they serve to demystify some traditional 
arguments that are in fact the product of an isomorphism between past 
and present.  
                                                 
47 D.S.S., Ss. 28 de mayo  p. 889. 
48 Calderon Felipe G. Documentos para la Historia de Filipinas. Época de la Revolución. (Primera 
serie.) In Retana, Wenceslao E., Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, vol. 5, pp. 319-416. The same author 
published in 1907 Mis Memorias sobre la Revolución Filipina. Segunda etapa (1898-1901). Manila: El 
Renacimiento. If in 1905 Calderon wanted not to forget the formation of the Philippine nation, in 1907 
he tried to explain a  Philippine history from a Filipino standpoint since the textbooks only followed the 
American view. 
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          Felipe Calderon narrates in great detail how Filipinos were waiting 
for the resumption of Spanish reforms from December 1897 to April 
1898 and upon observing that these reforms were not forthcoming, 
hostilities were resumed. The war was intensified and Aguinaldo ordered 
his men to “aniquilar” (destroy) the Spanish army.49 This term has been 
[mis]translated by Americans as “exterminate.” In fact, however, the 
Spanish word “aniquilar”—in the context of Aguinaldo’s order—means 
to destroy, to ruin, not to exterminate, eliminate, or decimate. Besides, 
according Calderon’s documents, Spanish prisoners were well treated.50 
This idea of “extermination” being systematically pursued by 
Aguinaldo’s army was fostered by the Americans to justify their 
occupation of the archipelago, after having broken their promise to be the 
“champion of the oppressed people.”51 The Filipinos involved in 
negotiations, especially the “Caudillo” or “Generalísimo” Aguinaldo, 
believed in the Americans. Calderon uses the term “caudillo”— a typical 
Spanish term which means “a head who leads and commands people at 
war” or “a man who leads a guild or community.” Aguinaldo was both 
since he had been head of his village or cabeza de barangay, during the 
Spanish term and later the leader of the Filipino people. American 
writers, however, have misused this term by making it connote 
                                                 
49 Julia Cendrán Ruano, for instance assumes as the dictum of the truth  the American assumption that 
the Filipino army wanted to kill the whites. Celdrán Ruano, Julia. Instituciones Hispanofilipinas del 
siglo XIX , p. 334. 
50 Letter Felipe Calderon to Basilio Augustin, Kabite 9 junio 1898. “Emilio Aguinaldo treats very well 
the prisoners, above all the Spaniards…, p. 75. Joaquín Pellicena y López supports this argument 
although he was a recalcitrant reactionary. Pellicena y López, Joaquín. La Verdad sobre Filipinas. 
Folleto de actualidad. Manila: Tipografía Amigos del País, 1900. 
51 General Merrit justified with these words their intervention in the Philippines. Calderon, Felipe. 
Documentos  para la Historia de Filipinas, p. 7.  
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something pejorative. Aguinaldo later became stigmatized with this term 
“caudillo” denoting a boss or “cacique”.52 
          Calderon published in his compendium of documents an 
interesting letter of Felipe Buencamino, who declared himself Spanish 
and was with the Spanish government in the archipelago during the 
revolt. In fact he was the intermediary between Augustin and Aguinaldo. 
He became a prisoner of Aguinaldo who had come to distrust Spanish 
promises ever since the precedent set by Primo de Rivera and Paterno. 
Buencamino decided to join Aguinaldo’s army. He sent a letter to 
Augustin on 9 June 1898 in which he encouraged the Spanish governor 
to surrender since there was the real certainty of independence: 
I think, my General, you must capitulate as soon as possible, 
instead of surrendering in war. I have heard that our “dictator” 
intends to transport free to Spain all those who want to return to 
Spain and to provide for the livelihood and material needs of those 
who wish to remain in the country.53 
 
          Buencamino’s long letter was deliberately manipulated by Manuel 
Sastrón in his account, Insurrección en Filipinas. Sastrón selected some 
parts in order to demonstrate to Spanish readers the arrogance and 
                                                 
52 Sidel, John T.  Capital, Coercion and Crime. Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford California: 
Stanford University Press, 1999.  Sidel interpolates the past with the present in order to build up a 
linear emplotment, co-opting this term “caudillo” to endorse the idea that Aguinaldo was a strongman 
in the Philippines, besides implying de facto the connivance of Spanish system. Under the meaning of 
caudillo offered by Sidel there is a much more complex argument. See “Provincial Warlords of 
Cavite,” ‘Cavite’s Caudillo, 1901-35: General Emilio Aguinaldo.’ There is a deliberate [mis]use of the 
term, pp. 55-61. Benedict Anderson in ‘Cacique Democracy in the Philippines’ establishes a similar 
analogy. He emphasizes the term caudillo in order to define Aguinaldo: “The mestizo generals 
themselves (who included the grandfathers of Ferdinand Marcos and Benigno Aquino Jr.) began to 
follow the pattern of their American forebears, by setting themselves up as independent caudillos.” (p. 
200) This statement is essential since Anderson follows two important arguments established as early 
as 1904. On the one hand, he infers that “caudillismo” as synonymous with the present “strongmen” is 
endemic in the Philippines. Therefore, this was an evil the Americans had to confront. There is 
continuity in the predominance of the families from 1898. On the other hand, by emphasizing the 
sentence “American forebears” Anderson is encapsulating the Philippines in the Latin American 
context, and subtly stating “caudillismo” shows the resilience of the Spanish colonial structure. 
53 Calderon, Felipe. Documentos para la Historia de Filipinas…,p. 78. 
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volatility of the Filipinos; he uses the term tagalo (Tagalog) in a 
pejorative way.54 As a matter of fact, Buencamino’s letter is not arrogant 
at all. On the contrary, it displays a special affection for the Spaniards, an 
affection that Buencamino would continue to demonstrate during the 
American era.    
          Augustin received Buencamino’s letter but had to return 
immediately to Spain anyway because they had surrendered to the 
Americans. The quick capitulation engendered a flood of opinions as to 
who or what was to be blamed for the defeat: the administrative 
immorality?, the predominance of militarism?, the implantation of the 
Penal Code?, the Maura law?, or the behavior of the religious orders? 
The answer/s depended on who was explaining the story. Whatever the 
root cause, the hard fact to be swallowed was that Spain had lost the 
Philippines in a war with the Americans. 
          The Philippines was lost and Moret took a huge portion of the 
blame. “More reforms! We have to take advantage of Moret as Minister 
for the Colonies! There is no other minister more filibustero than 
Moret!,” fumed Retana.55 He always referred to reformism and the freed 
press as catalysts of the insurrection and the subsequent revolution for 
independence. Pellicena,56 pointing the finger at Primo de Rivera and 
Augustin, alluded to different reasons: the Penal Code or the Maura law. 
                                                 
54 Sastrón, Manuel. Insurrección en Filipinas, p. 460. It is interesting to note that Spanish scholars, 
influenced by this book as a loyal testimony of Philippine revolution, use the term Tagalog instead of 
Filipinos. Moreover, American scholars consider this book as “the most complete record of the 
insurrection and the war with the U.S. in the Philippines has yet been issued in Spain.” LeRoy, James 
A. The Americans in the Philippines, p. 97. This opinion about Sastrón’s continues to be prevalent 
among some American scholars. 
55 Retana, Wenceslao E. La Política de España en Filipinas. Madrid, 15 de Enero de 1898. Año VIII, 
núm. 179. 
56 Pellicena y López Joaquín. La Verdad sobre Filipinas. Folletos de Actualidad., p. 7. 
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The reformism blamed by Retana fell into oblivion, since the crisis of 
consciousness of 1898 imposed by authors such as Vital Fite,57 an 
antifriar defender of the Filipino cause, and Enrique Altamirano,58 
confused the cause of the friars with the cause of Spain. The reasons 
stated by Pellicena suffered a selective co-optation, illustrating the 
predominance of administrative immorality and the omnipotence of the 
friars and suppressing the Maura law and the Penal Code.  
          The political debate in Spain did not end in 1898. The split opened 
up in 1898 between Liberals and Conservatives was inexorably deep. In 
1904, Moret continued to insist that the Spanish had failed to adhere to 
the treaty or pact of Biac-na-Bato. Conservatives justified this by 
claiming that Aguinaldo had already signed an agreement with the 
Americans.59 At the end of the day, the political debates with their lack of 
recognition for Spanish reformism actually helped to shape and articulate 
the notion of a dark age of Spanish rule: the religious orders, the army, 
and an obsolete despotic and racialist administration, contrary to the 
assimilationist discourse of the Spanish administration, controlled the 
colonial structure until the bitter end. 
 
Epilogue: LeRoy’s account of the U.S. occupation of the Philippines 
          If we can be assured that the first chapter of LeRoy’s book devoted 
to the Spanish regime was written by him, we cannot erase some doubts 
                                                 
57 Fité Vital. Las desdichas de la patria. Políticos y Frailes.Madrid: Imprenta de Enrique Rojas, 1899.  
58 Altamirano y Salcedo, Enrique: Filipinas. Relato histórico de actos y hechos realizados en los 
últimos días de nuestra dominación. Madrid: Imprenta Ce. C. Perrin, 1902. 
59 Maura, Antonio. La Cuestión de Nozaleda ante las Cortes. Discursos del Exmo. Sr. D. Antonio 
Maura. Presidente del Consejo de Ministros. Madrid: Impresor Libertad, 1904. In this political debate, 
Moret, Junoy and Morayta were accused of supporting the Filipino cause. They were the filibusteros in 
Spain. 
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regarding the authorship of some chapters devoted to the revolution and 
the war. LeRoy supports some difficult arguments by quoting extracts 
from the Compilation of insurgent documents by Captain John R. M. 
Taylor. His handling of the issues of an alleged American promise of 
independence, the nepotism of the leaders of the Filipino revolt, and the 
“massacre” of whites, are based on Taylor’s work. Curiously, Worcester 
in The Philippines Past and Present used the same Compilation of 
Insurgent records. 60 
          Taylor’s work, then titled Insurgent War Records, was almost 
published in 1907 but certain problems intervened. In 1909, LeRoy, who 
was considered the most rigorous and objective scholar on Philippine 
history, was asked by General Clarence Edwards to review the two first 
volumes of Taylor’s manuscript, now titled The Philippine Insurrection 
Against the United States: A Compilation of Documents with Notes and 
Introductions. LeRoy responded with an excellent critique and, with his 
habitual eloquence, warned Edwards not to publish the work under the 
Washington Bureau. “I very decidedly believe this work should not be 
published as it is,” argued LeRoy,61 since he considered it not a business 
of the government to furnish an official version of history and even less 
when a part of that history was still the subject of controversy. LeRoy 
suggested the publication of the insurgent documents without “colorful” 
comments, and through a private printing house rather than the 
government’s. 
                                                 
60 Worcester makes clear what insurgent means in that context: “I use the word “Insurgents” as a proper 
noun to designate the Filipinos who took up arms against the United States.” He suppressed the term 
war. Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present, 1914. Vol. 1, p. 16 
61 James A. LeRoy to General Edwards, January 12, 1909. Robertson James Alexander. Annapolis. Md. 
Manuscripts. Box 3, Letters 1907-1939. North Carolina: Duke University. 
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           LeRoy did not differ with Taylor over ideas since both believed in 
the “benevolence” of American policy. Actually, LeRoy and Taylor 
shared several manuscripts, books, and above all, comments. Both of 
them agreed on the main points of U.S. policy and both aimed to 
discredit the insurgents and their cause. But LeRoy felt that Taylor’s 
manuscripts lacked rigor and that there were mistranslations. 
          LeRoy saw to it that this manuscript was not published in 1909. It 
is said that he was trying to prevent damage to Taft’s career and perhaps 
this is true; Taft became president in 1909. Moreover, LeRoy argued that 
Taylor’s work was clearly insufficient because it lacked a “broad and 
liberal” viewpoint. Taylor tended to make “generalizations.” Well, it is 
striking to read LeRoy’s criticism knowing that his book, The Americans 
in the Philippines, is based on the same general conclusions but LeRoy 
was able to imbue his works with scholarly arguments and references 
from Spanish books and the Filipino press. 
          Some recent scholars such as John M. Gates62 infer that the 
censorship of Taylor’s work was due to his hard criticism of many of the 
leaders of the Philippine revolution, men who in many cases were then 
working for the American government in the islands. He notes that 
Taylor’s history also contained an implicit indictment of William 
Jennings Bryan and other anti-imperialist Democrats for their support of 
Philippine independence. It seems, according to these conclusions, that 
1909 was not the year to publish this “official history.” 
                                                 
62 Gates, John M. James A. LeRoy’s Critique of John R. M. Taylor’s The Philippine Insurrection 
against the United States. Edited with a brief introduction by John M. Gates. These essay can be found 
between Le Roy’s papers at Bentley Library, University of Michigan and Robertson’s papers, at Duke 
University. 
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          Taylor learned about LeRoy’s review of his work leading him to 
complain to McIntyre in 1914 that any comments LeRoy may have made 
regarding the manuscript “should be ignored since he was a singularly 
prejudiced individual.”63 McIntyre replied that he believed Taylor’s work 
would be published. But in 1914, the bureau was not about to publish the 
work since the Democrats had won the elections and Taylor had made 
strong indictments against them. The only way to spread Taylor’s work 
was in form of an official report, which is how Worcester did it. LeRoy’s 
The Americans in the Philippines, when it appeared in 1914, used the 
documents compiled by Taylor. It is hard to say if these portions of the 
book were actually written by LeRoy or whether Taylor or Worcester had 
added some materials to LeRoy’s text in order to discredit the Democrat 
government. 
          Taylor’s The Philippine Insurrection against the United States was 
never published. It seems that in 1919 Washington again considered the 
idea of publishing it. With the Republicans back in power, Taylor’s book 
could be used in order to undermine the policy that had been 
implemented by the Democrats (under Governor Harrison) in the 
Philippines. Filipino claims of independence could be silenced by 
alluding to “the possibility of anarchy” (a pronounced theme in Taylor’s 
book) if they took over. The Library of Congress tried to locate the 
gallery-proofs of Taylor’s unpublished work. They sent a letter to 
LeRoy’s wife at Taft’s request inquiring about the whereabouts of the 
                                                 
63 Gates, John M. James A. LeRoy’s Critique of John R. M. Taylor’s…, p. 9. 
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proofs, but “it does not appear from the correspondence whether they 
were retained by Mr. LeRoy or returned to the War Department.”64 
          Before he died LeRoy had asked General Edwards not to file his 
notes. It was impossible thus to find in the War Department the proofs of 
Taylor’s work. I do not know if Mabel LeRoy had a copy but a person 
who did have one was LeRoy’s best friend, James Alexander Robertson, 
who had been influenced to take a negative view of Taylor. Maybe, this 
was the reason why Taylor’s documents could not be published in 1919. 
Taylor had been damned, as others were, by the pen of James A. LeRoy.  
          LeRoy died two months after sending his review of the Taylor 
manuscript to Edwards. This was the last time he would assist Taft, who 
would soon become president of the United States. In 1911 President 
Taft, traveling to Pontiac, reminded his audience of LeRoy’s 
imperishable work in the far-away Philippines: 
Here near the school where he graduated, I wish to pay a debt of 
gratitude to his memory on behalf of the people of his nation. He 
went to the Philippine Islands, learned the people and their history, 
and he finally gave up his life on the field of battle, because he 
there became a victim of impaired health.65 
  
          LeRoy had rendered a service to the Government of the United 
States. His work became a reference for the scholars and set a pattern for 
other books such as Charles B. Elliott’s The Philippines; Dean C. 
Worcester’s The Philippines Past and Present; Cameron Forbes’s The 
Philippine Islands, and a number of others. As time went by, LeRoy 
would be remembered as a rigorous and objective historian. No one 
questioned his role in the U.S. administration from 1900 to 1909. 
                                                 
64 Charles Moore to Miss Mabel LeRoy, November 1919.Miscellaneous correspondence 1909-1944 of 
Mabel LeRoy. James A. LeRoy papers. Ann Arbor: Bentley Library, University of Michigan. 
65 Gleeck, Lewis E. Jr. Nine years to make a difference, p. 115. 
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Ultimately, his history triumphed in the academe, never mind that it was 
a political exercise in remembering and suppressing. The Americans in 
the Philippines encapsulated nearly all the information that the historian 
needed at the time. David Barrows praised it as “indispensable to the 
serious student of history and of colonial government, superior to 
anything that has yet appeared and far above the recent works of Blount 
and Worcester, not only in the range of materials employed, but in 
judicial tone and convincing power.”66 
           In 1963, Charles O. Houston, while researching in the Library of 
Congress about James A. Robertson, came across the figure of James A. 
LeRoy. He concluded that “efforts should be made to locate LeRoy’s 
papers. Enough is contained in his correspondence with JAR and Emma 
Blair to indicate that he was a person of great importance to the 
developing American policy in the Philippines in the early years of the 
century.67 He was right. LeRoy was a person of great importance not 
only in the making of American policy but also as a scholar. His 
influence, although apparently attenuated, continues to the present day. 
He had written a “definitive” history in The Americans in the Philippines. 
Future scholars did not need henceforth to use Spanish sources to write a 
history of the Spanish regime. LeRoy gave shape to a “dark age” of 
Spanish rule, which clashed with American progressivism and liberalism. 
The modernism of American institutions would be seen to confront 
                                                 
66 Barrows David P. Review of The Americans in the Philippines. I do not know where Barrows 
published this review since I found it among James A. LeRoy papers.  
67 Houston Charles O. ‘Manuscripts and other material relating to the Philippines in the Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress.’  
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deeply-rooted Filipino habits. The Americans had inherited the problems 
of “medieval Spain.” 
          LeRoy concluded his construction of the Spanish “dark age” with 
the seminal paper, Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines, and his 
crucial contributions to Blair and Roberson’s The Philippine Islands 
1493-1898.  From 1904 to 1907, this most important compilation of 
Spanish primary sources translated into English would be directed by 
him, as his correspondence with Blair and Robertson reveals. He was to 
give “uniqueness” to the Philippines by painting an evil called 
“caciquism,” which is the subject of the next chapter.     
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CHAPTER VII: LEROY AND A CURSE CALLED 
“CACIQUISM” 
   
 
By 1901 Aguinaldo had surrendered with most 
other caciques following suit, though peasant 
resistance continued in some areas until 1910. 
 
       Benedict Anderson 
 
 
The Schurman Commission was able to outline a “dark age” of  
Spanish rule by refusing to acknowledge the progressive restructuring 
that had taken place in the late nineteenth century and instead 
essentializing the Spanish regime as “medieval and oppressor” until the 
end. Schurman stressed the “evils of Spanish centralization in 
government.” According to the Commission’s report, such excessive 
centralization had disastrous results, among them a confused mess at the 
level of local institutions. The native chiefs, said Schurman, had become 
atrophied and useless, “if not indeed transformed into instruments of 
corruption.”1  
LeRoy built on what Schurman portrayed in the report, further 
shaping the notion of a Spanish “dark age” with the publication of 
Philippine Life in Town and Country and above all, The Americans in the 
Philippines. The dark age of the Spanish regime was to be complemented 
with a deep-rooted feudal institution called “caciquism.” LeRoy defined 
this system as a syncretic form of past traditions that had persisted during 
                                                 
1 Report of the Philippine Commission, 1900. Vol. I, part IV, p. 62. 
 236 
the Spanish era and was now challenging and distorting the modernity 
introduced by American institutions. LeRoy used the Commission’s 
criticism of the evils of Spanish centralization, with its dramatic effects 
on local politics, as the basis of an essentialized portrayal of such 
politics.  
No doubt, LeRoy came across the terms “cacique” and 
“caciquism” when he went to a ranch in New Mexico in order to recover 
from his illness. There he learned Spanish history and started to acquire 
Spanish publications. It is not rare to find in these publications 
explanations about the evils of the “patria,” which suffered a cancer 
comprising “caciquism,” “political apathy,” “illiteracy,” and, as a result 
of all these ingredients, a certain “ruralism.” This language, in fact, 
reflects the literary trend prevalent at the opening of the twentieth 
century. Spain was experiencing a metaphysical crisis after the total 
collapse of the empire. The Regenerationist group2 started to define the 
Spanish incipient monarchy in terms of “oligarchy3 and caciquism.” This 
pejorative terminology became a moral denunciation of the political 
                                                 
2 Regenerationism: With the term Regenerationism is known a group of writers such as Joaquín Costa, 
Macías Picavea, Lucas Mallada and Damián Isern whose main purpose was “to regenerate” the 
country--that is, to analyze “the evils of the patria” and to find them a solution or an option. These 
authors, belonging by their age to the generation of Galdós, are linked to the middle classes, especially 
unhappy and whose ideology is characterized by a petty bourgeois reformism. All of them agree in 
criticizing the political system of the Restoration by observing it as an exhausted and corrupted system. 
This movement was patronized by sectors of middle class and intellectuals worried by political 
mobilization. The regenerationist proposed reforms from above. 
3 The term oligarchy has in Spanish two different acceptations. On the one hand, we come across the 
generic meaning –From the Greek oligoi, defines the forms of government in the power held by a 
“few” when these do not constitute an aristocracy. On the other hand, we find a second acceptation 
related to Spain and the nineteenth century. The oligarchy during the Restoration appeared as a system 
apparently of constitutional parliamentarism ruled by the growth of the political power of the middle 
classes. It was a personal regime of the politicians who, elevated to the most important posts of the 
government and the public administration, allied with an oligarchy of caciques, passes for public 
interest what really is party interest. 
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system of the Restoration. Costa,4 Gumersindo de Azcárate5 and other 
authors described the various forms of administrative and electoral 
corruption and went a step further by making judgments and complaints 
about “caciquism.” Among the facets of this system was the interference 
of the executive power in the electoral process in order “to make the 
elections”; caciquil interference in local, provincial and central 
administrations—as in the selection of positions; and the negotiation of 
“favors” claimed by clients.6 
Moreover, this literature gave form to the “cacique,” which was 
assimilated to terrateniente or hacendero (landowner), with feudalistic 
connotations. LeRoy did not bother to explore whether caciquism in 
Spain was anything deeper than what the Regenerationists explained. He 
considered the term and its definition at that time ideal for his own 
purpose, which was to reverse the Filipinization process and the 
increasing self-government of municipalities under American rule, by 
attributing the [mis]government of the towns to the local elite or 
principales who would in time be named “caciques.” Moreover, LeRoy 
was picking up other details about the “cacique” in Mexico, a very 
different context, where the term and the phenomenon were centuries-
old. In Mexico, as Friedrich wrote “the cacique is a historically egregious 
                                                 
4 Joaquín Costa was a liberal and republican. Probably the most important contribution to the literature 
was his sociological essay Oligarquía y Caciquismo como la forma actual de gobierno de España. 
Moreover, Joaquín Costa was one of the leaders of the Regenerationism. Alvar, Jaime. Diccionario de 
Historia de España y America I. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 2004.  Vol. 19, p. 438. 
5 Gumersindo de Azcárate was a democrat, an intellectual precursor of the political sciences in Spain.  
Like Joaquín Costa, Azcárate was a republican. He contributed to the development of political 
modernity with works such as Self-Government y la Monarquía Doctrinaria and El Régimen 
Parlamentario en la práctica where he exposes his ideas about the democratic and parliamentary 
liberalism.  Alvar, Jaime. Diccionario de Historia de España y America I, p. 155. 
6 Montero, Feliciano. Historia de España. Revolución y Restauración.Del Sexenio revolucionario a la 
Guerra de Cuba (1868-1898). Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2004. Vol. 13, pp. 268-269. 
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phenomenon and is widely regarded as a serious economic and legal 
problem.”7  
In Mexico, the cacique was the representante del pueblo 
(representantive of the village), a caudillo, a jefe (chieftain) or a 
hacendero. Mexico had been one of the most important colonies of the 
Spanish empire, and the Philippines, according to Pardo de Tavera, had 
been a dependent of it. LeRoy, glancing at Mexico, found the perfect 
structure within which to subsume the Philippines, identifying there, as in 
Mexico, caciquism as an inheritance of the Spanish colonial structure. 
LeRoy also discovered the earliest use of the term “cacique” in La 
Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias, the Compilation of the Laws of the 
Indies, about which we shall have more to say later in this chapter. 
The knowledge acquired by LeRoy led him to write Our Spanish 
inheritance in the Philippines, which would bring to a head the definition 
of a system, corrupt and tyrannical at the local level, as something called 
“caciquism.” The Commission report of 1903 had provided a timid 
definition of “caciquism” as “the tendency to exercise arbitrary powers 
which have not been conferred by law.”8 The following year (1904) two 
ramifications of the term caciquism appeared. One was fostered by Taft 
for The Census of the Philippine Islands, in which caciquism is defined 
as a system led by wealthy and propertied men. The other ramification of 
the term appeared in The American Historical Review, written by LeRoy 
                                                 
7 Friedrich Paul. ‘The Legitimacy of a Cacique. In Friends, Followers and Factions. A Reader in 
Political Clientelism.’ Steffen w. Schmidt, Laura Guasti, Carl H. Landé and James C. Scott (ed.). 
Friends, Followers and Factions. A Reader in Political Clientelism. Berkely: University of California 
Press, 1977, p. 267. 
8 Report, 1903, p.84. Cited in Willis Henry P. Our Philippine Problem, p. 79. 
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himself, in which caciquism is assimilated to a form of slavery!9 Taft 
made caciquism an endemic tribal feature while LeRoy considered that it 
was a Spanish legacy or at least he blamed the Spanish regime for 
conniving with the locals in fostering this syncretic institution. Both 
definitions cast different meanings on caciquism, which would converge 
in 1905 in LeRoy’s Our Spanish Inheritance.    
As a matter of fact, “caciquismo” as a system was a Spanish term 
referring to a unique and exclusively Spanish phenomenon. The 
definition of the term caciquism appears for the first time in the 
authoritative Real Academia Espanola dictionary in 1884. Therefore, it 
was a system which emerged during the Restoration. In 1898, when 
Retana wrote in La Política de España en Filipinas that the creation of 
political parties fostered caciquism and compadrazgo, he was not 
alluding to the Philippines, since there were no parties there. Caciquism 
was an offshoot of the embryonic democracy in nineteenth-century Spain 
and the alternation of the powers during the Spanish Restoration. 
However, at the turn of the nineteenth century those who were 
antagonistic towards the political parties of the Restoration started to coin 
a negative meaning of this system. This negative sense of “caciquism” 
appears in the 1908 Enciclopedia Universal: 
Excessive influence of the caciques in the villages. A political 
system in which there is no law, only the will of the caciques. 
  
As a political system the caciquism is an evil of the parliamentary 
regime which consists of abusive influence and used with bastard 
purposes, which some persons exercise in some villages.10 
                                                 
9 In the index of The Americans in the Philippines the term caciquism becomes a synonym of 
“slavery.” 




Both definitions were coined by the Regenerationists and came out 
in written form at the beginning of the twentieth century. The fact that it 
appeared in the Enciclopedia Universal, which became famous around 
the world, suggests to me that LeRoy had consulted it since the 
definitions he provides are quite close to the above. The Enciclopedia 
provides an extensive explanation of the phenomenon but there is not a 
single mention of the fact that this system was ever extrapolated to the 
Philippines.  
Spanish historiography continues to take into consideration the 
above definition given by the Regenerationists. However, a recent 
reassessment by historians has rectified some previous 
misunderstandings about “caciquism” in Spain. Historians since the 
1970s have developed the argument that the caciquil system was a 
“necessary evil” for the proper working of a democracy. Jaime Alvar 
states that 
[caciquism] is a political system, a form of socialization of the 
constitutional mechanism in the Restoration (1875-1923). It 
involves an implicit group of rules of public behaviour in which 
there is an interchange of assets and services (favors, influences, 
position and privilege). The caciques as an essential vehicle would 
build up permanent clients. These clients acted in a foreseeable 
way by giving their votes to a pre-determined party, within the 
formal framework of liberalism. Therefore before the celebration 
of elections, the result was already known.11 
 
This above definition, related to the Functionalist school,12 is a 
generalization of the phenomenon, leaving many avenues unexplored. 
                                                 
11 Alvar, Jaime. Diccionario the Historia de España y América. Vol. 19, p. 232. 
12 Functionalism: The concept of function applied to human societies is based on an analogy between 
the social and the organic life. The theory of functionalism defends the notion that the constituent 
elements from each society are explained by the functionality that these elements exert in it as a way to 
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However, if we consider caciquism as a clientelist system or a system of 
patronage, we can categorically state that this phenomenon, with its own 
nuances, could be found in the Philippines, or in any country for that 
matter (such as Filipinos would argue), although not during Spanish rule. 
The problem of caciquism arose when LeRoy turned a phenomenon that 
was positive—i.e., a system necessary for the development of 
democracies—into something completely negative and pejorative. He 
picked up the term caciquism from Spanish and Mexican literature and 
gave it a meaning akin to “bossism,” i.e., an evil that paralyzed the 
process of self-government and independence in the Philippines. The 
problems which Americans were confronting in the islands, such as 
discontentment, insurgency, political arbitrariness, and the emergence of 
the nationalists in politics, could then be identified and named as a 
phenomenon inherited from the Spaniards called “caciquism,” which 
made the Filipinos completely unfit for self-government.  From now on, 
“caciquism” would appear in the literature as a cancer threatening the 
implementation of American democracy; it would appear in practically 
all the American reports and textbooks, taking different forms although 
the argument would always be the same: demonstrating the Filipinos’ 
incapacity for self-government and independence. 
 
 Our Spanish inheritance in the Philippines 
It is not a coincidence that Taft and LeRoy were building up the 
terms cacique and caciquism in 1904. It seems from their correspondence 
                                                                                                                                            
guarantee the correct running of the community and its social reproduction. Alvar, Jaime. Diccionario 
de Historia de España y América. Vol. 19, p. 626.  
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that LeRoy introduced the term to Taft, and provided it as well to James 
Robertson for use in The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. In 1904, LeRoy 
was quite fluent in Spanish and had studied the last years of Spanish rule 
in the Philippines. He was completely familiar with the terms cacique 
and caciquism through three different sources. Zulueta was his main 
source for Spanish documents and accounts from the sixteenth century to 
the nineteenth centuries, including the Recopilación de las Leyes de 
Indias. LeRoy’s second source was La Solidaridad, issues of which 
Pardo de Tavera and Jose Albert had sent him, together with Rizal’s 
novels. Finally, we saw that LeRoy lived for eleven months in New 
Mexico and in 1904 moved to Durango, Mexico, to be the American 
Consul there. The Spaniards had used the term cacique from the conquest 
onward to define the native chieftains. Since LeRoy wanted so much to 
believe that the Philippines was an appendage of New Spain rather than a 
unique Spanish colony in Asia, he found the perfect framework through 
which he could infer that cacique and caciquism were implemented in the 
Philippines. Curiously, while Las Leyes de Indias, La Solidaridad and 
Rizal’s Noli me Tangere used the term cacique, this was never in 
reference to the Philippines. We shall discuss this at length later in this 
chapter. 
It is important to pay some attention to this incipient use of the 
term caciquism in 1904 by LeRoy and Taft for the Census of the 
Philippine Islands13 since this first meaning is inextricably related to the 
negation of self-government at the provincial and above all municipal 
                                                 
13 Census of the Philippine Islands taken under the direction of the Philippine Commission in the year 
1903. Comp. and published by the United States Bureau of the Census. Washington [Government 
Printing Office], 1905. 
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levels, since the latter was controlled by natives. The second Commission 
led by Taft had given relative autonomy or self-government to the 
municipalities that came under American control. However, the elective 
franchise was limited so as to concentrate voting power in the hands of 
the educated and wealthy residents of the towns. In reality, therefore, 
power was granted by the Americans to those classes of men who had a 
strong predisposition to accept their rule. The result was to devolve the 
control of the “pacified” towns into the hands of little oligarchies 
consisting of the most conservative men in each place. The elections 
were controlled by the American government which arbitrarily appointed 
its protégés. The term caciquism would start to be deployed but only in 
reference to the problems of the Filipino-controlled municipal 
governments. The deployment of the term cacique/caciquismo had a 
specific purpose: to deny any more self-government to the Filipinos and 
above all to defer the American promise of ultimate independence.  
Taft and his commissioners had created the perfect framework for 
designing caciquism as something endemic to the Filipinos. This 
construction justified and underpinned American “tutelage.” Taft boasted 
about having conferred a measure of freedom and self-government to the 
inhabitants greater than they had ever enjoyed in the past. But at the same 
time, he was providing the elements by which this outpouring of freedom 
could be undercut. Caciquism was to be used as convincing evidence that 
a further measure of native self-government would be impossible.14 As 
                                                 
14 Henry Parker Willis in his book Our Philippine Problem cast light about the dysfunction of the local 
government. Not only did he use the government sources but also he was in the Philippines studying 
the cases and making some interviews. This book has been relegated by American scholars to a 
secondary place. See, Willis, Henry P. Our Philippine Problem,  pp. 71-89. 
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Taft put it, “Our experience of giving self-government to these people 
has gone possibly a little bit fast and I find the governor general very 
much distressed occasionally at instances where native government is so 
bad that it is really an offense to the American government to permit 
it.”15 
In order to demonstrate the incapacity of the natives for self-
government as evidenced by the misgovernment of municipalities, Taft 
would be the first one to elaborate the arguments establishing caciquism 
as an evil: 
During the disturbed conditions in the Islands, when war prevailed 
during the years from 1898-1901, the most atrocious crimes were 
committed by taos, humble, ignorant but apparently peaceable and 
non vicious persons, simply because they were told  by “rich and 
wealthy Filipinos, or “Filipinos of official position,” that they must 
do so. This is what is called caciquism.16 
 
This excerpt contains several important issues. The first one is the 
use of the word “war” instead of “insurrection.” Taft could not suppress 
or ignore this term in 1904 since the Census of that year was the fruit of 
American  collaboration with the Filipinos in the Partido Federal who 
used the word “war” in their writings.  But Taft used the term “war” 
deliberately in order to denote cruelty and despotism. In this context 
“war” is inextricably interwoven with his explanation of “caciquism.” 
The second issue is that Taft delimited the word “cacique” to refer 
only to rich and wealthy Filipinos and those with official positions. He 
                                                 
15 Golay, Frank H. Face of Empire. United States-Philippine relations, 1898-1946, p. 121. 
16 Census of the Philippine Islands, p. 531. I am sure the definition given by Taft in the Census was 
furnished by LeRoy. LeRoy in The Americans in the Philippines defined the caciques as “the masses of 
the Philippines were at the beginning of 1898 ready to be led by the nose by their traditional “cacique” 
or, in the absence temporarily of these, by any self-constituted military leader with shoulder-strap and a 
revolver.” LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines, p. 143. Taft’s definition is practically a 
replica of this of LeRoy –the masses were blindly led by the caciques. Therefore they were 
emphasizing the ignorance of the masses which needed education.  
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was clearly alluding to the heads of local governments who had allegedly 
destroyed the will of the “poor and ignorant.” In fact, Taft confirms this 
argument by stating that caciquism was “the subjection of the ordinary 
uneducated Filipino to a boss or master who lives in his neighborhood 
and who, by reason or his wealth and education, is regarded as entitled to 
control by the ignorant tao.”17 
This definition is categorical since this subjection of the poor and 
ignorant people to their “patrons” precisely did not entitle the Filipinos to 
enjoy independence or more self-government since the uneducated who 
formed the bulk of the populace simply followed their “bosses” blindly—
a symptom of political immaturity. The dichotomy being constructed 
between uneducated/subjugated and educated/boss renders it a necessity 
to implement the American educational system in the Philippines, which 
is the mainstay of Taft’s policy. This system of public instruction will be 
the cornerstone, argues Taft, for Filipinos to reach the stage of self-
government. 
Taft’s pronouncement is a key element in the development of the 
idea of Filipino caciquism because he assimilated caciquism to ruralism18 
and moreover antedated this phenomenon to the Filipino-American war. 
The Americans could now argue that they were facing a problem already 
existing in the Philippines when they arrived in 1898. What Taft does not 
                                                 
17 Census of the Philippine Islands, p. 531. 
18 Caciquism as landlordism has survived until the present. In fact it is the logical explanation of this 
system: “American associates with the cities but caciques are landholding, rural-based feudal barons, 
with great power bind on land and personal favors to his constituents.” This definition provided by 
Lewis Gleeck in 1996 reflects the continuity of the discourse. See Gleeck Lewis. Nine Years to make a 
difference. The tragically short career of James A. LeRoy in the Philippines, p. 45. 
 246 
elucidate in this definition is whether the Americans inherited this system 
from the Spaniards or whether it was inherent in the Filipino ethos.  
There is something else which beckons the attention of the reader. 
If caciquism already existed during the Filipino-American war, as Taft 
asserts, it should have appeared in the reports of the Schurman and Taft 
Commissions. However, we cannot find the term or the definition of the 
system in these reports. Obviously, when the reports were redacted the 
commissioners were not familiar with Spanish sources; they only had in 
their disposal official documents in which the term cacique or caciquism 
never appeared in the Filipino context. The fact that those terms did not 
appear in the Commission reports should make us wonder if the system 
was really inherited from the Spaniards.  
LeRoy’s definition of caciquism in 1904 is more elaborate than 
Taft’s. LeRoy was demonstrating for the first time his knowledge of 
Spanish bibliography. He established perfectly the features of the term 
and the system by stating categorically that caciquism was something 
inherited from the Spaniards. The context for this display of knowledge 
was LeRoy’s debut into the new category of “Filipinologist,” in 
recognition of which some journals asked him to review Blair and 
Robertson’s The Philippines Islands 1493-1898. 
In April 1904, The American Historical Review published LeRoy’s 
review of volumes VII, VIII and IX of the Blair and Robertson opus. 
Volume VII contains Father Plasencia’s account of  early Tagalog 
customs. In describing Plasencia’s main arguments, LeRoy paid special 
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attention to slavery as a Tagalog or Filipino custom.19 At this point no 
relationship was being established between pre-Hispanic customs and the 
actual American administration. But LeRoy was opening a Pandora’s box 
of  future arguments to be deployed by American scholars and 
administrators about slavery, involuntary servitude and peonage, as 
something inherent in Filipino behavior and how the Spaniards connived 
with it:   
. . .Slavery was not finally and formally abolished for two and 
three-quarters centuries afterwards. As a matter of actual fact, 
however, we have to take into account that to the very close of 
Spanish rule the masses of the Philippine people were virtually 
held in serfdom by landed companies or by individuals, Spanish or 
half castes, and that the greatest obstacle to the implantation, in 
Philippine communities of today, of self-governing institutions is 
“caciquism.”20 
 
LeRoy looked at the past as origin of present since he is inferring 
that the Spaniards not only failed to abolish slavery but, worse, connived 
with it. He is also inferring that the Spaniards implanted caciquism at the 
turn of the nineteenth century, and that this coercive system had 
provoked political dysfunctions at the local level in which the wealthy 
and educated landowners had omnipotent power. This dysfunction was 
the main obstacle, argues LeRoy, for the implementation of self-
government. LeRoy was constructing a dichotomy between “bad 
Spaniards” and “good Americans.” Dean Worcester would build upon 
LeRoy’s legacy and publish a book about how slavery was something 
                                                 
19 LeRoy emphasized this ramification of caciquism as synonymous of slavery in The Americans in the 
Philippines. In fact, all the examples provided by LeRoy are interconnected with a sort of slavery. The 
first volume displays caciquism as an existent system upon the arrival of the Spaniards which had 
continuity at present. See, LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines. Vol. I,  pp. 4, 45, 143.  
20 LeRoy, James A. ‘The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898.’ Edited by Emma Helen Blair and James A. 
Robertson. Vol VII, (1581-1591); Vol. VIII, 1591-1593; Vol. IX, 1593-1597. Cleveland: The Arthur H. 




endemic in the archipelago in 1909, forcing him as Interior Secretary to 
pass the “Anti-Slavery Act.” Worcester assimilated slavery to caciquism 
and paralyzed the process of Filipino independence by publishing Slavery 
and Peonage in the Philippine Islands in 1913.21   
LeRoy subsequently defined the cacique system as follows: 
“Whereby in every village a few men of property and more or less 
education hold the rest of the population under an inherited despotism, 
imposed by ignorance and by slavery to the soil or to personal debt.”22 
Through this definition we can see how LeRoy provided Taft with some 
basic ideas that Taft would enter into the Census. However, LeRoy is 
more explicit in elucidating the picture of “a few propertied and wealthy 
men,” i.e., the oligarchy that subjugates the uneducated mass. Self-
government could not possibly be implemented under such conditions. 
The key word in this statement is “inherited,” with its categorical 
meaning that the Spaniards had implemented this despotic system related 
to ruralism. It is quite clear that the discursive association of caciquism 
and local politics was intended to paralyze any emergence of native 
politics. 
  LeRoy continued elaborating upon the system in order to associate 
“caciquism” and  caciques with the Spanish colonial past. On 22 
November 1904 he established the most surprising analogy: 
The Laws of the Indies Book 6, Title 7, Law 16, gives caciques in 
the Philippines their former governing power under the new regime 
(interesting as bearing on the evil of caciquism today in the 
                                                 
21 This topic is explained in more detail in Chapter IX.  
22 LeRoy, James A. ‘The Philippine Islands 1493-1898.’ The American Historical Review, p. 555. 
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Philippines and showing the desire to follow the analogy of 
Spanish-America, though conditions not always analogous).23 
 
This statement is highly significant for several reasons. First of all, 
we note LeRoy’s extrapolation of the word cacique to the whole empire, 
thereby encapsulating the Philippines within Latin America. Secondly, he 
de-contextualizes, misuses and misinterprets the Laws of the Indies. And 
finally, he interpolates the past into the present. 
LeRoy correctly identifies the Laws of the Indies, Book 6, Title 7 
and Laws 10, 11, 12 and others,  as being devoted to the caciques, since 
this term was used to define the native chieftains in Latin America. 
Curiously, however, Law 16 he cites as specifically dedicated to the 
Philippines is entitled Que los Yndios Principales de Filipinas sean bien 
tratados, y se les  encargue el govierno que solian tener en los otros. . .  
(that the Yndios Principales from the Philippines shall receive good 
treatment and be given the government that they used to have in the 
others. . .). Note that there is not a single allusion to the term cacique 
here, the chieftains being called principales. Principal was a term used in 
Spain and in the colonies to designate distinguished people. Principal in 
Spanish was synonymous with Ilustre or someone of eminent, noble 
background.   
  The abovementioned Law was announced in a Royal decree of 11 
June 1594 titled Zedula Real sobre que se ha entendido que algunos de 
los Yndios Principales de aquellas Yslas estan destituidos del señorío24 
                                                 
23 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, November 22, 1904.Personal Letters of 
LeRoy James Alfred, 1875-1909. Box 1. Folder 1 October 1903 to end of 1904. Ann Arbor: Bentley 
Library, University of Michigan 
24 Copia Literal de las Reales Zedulas despachadas desde el año de 1580 en Adelante de D. Francisco 
Antonio de Figueroa, escribano mayor de la Superior Gobernación de estas Yslas Philipinas, año 1751, 
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(Royal Decree concerning our understanding that some Yndios 
Principales of those Islands are deprived of their governing power). 
LeRoy read this to mean that the Spaniards were conceding to the 
Filipino principales their former authority to rule their people. Therefore 
the Spaniards were devolving power to the local principales. LeRoy in 
referring to this law thus establishes a connection between 1594 and the 
present situation faced by the Americans. The principales had enjoyed 
power, which was exercised despotically since time immemorial. 
Therefore the American administration was clashing head-on with an 
endemic evil difficult to eradicate. Colonial policy could then be built 
upon this “fact.” 
The misuse and de-contextualization of the Recopilación de las 
Leyes de Indias paved the way for a deliberate confusion about Filipino 
society which has survived to this day. This new construction built up by 
LeRoy established associations among the terms principalía, ilustrados, 
cabezas de barangay, gobernadorcillos and caciques. “Caciques” would 
assimilate all these terms.25 The guidelines for future scholars to build on 
                                                                                                                                            
p. 171-172. The Cedulario belongs to Institut Universitary d’història Jaume Vicens Vives (Universitat 
Pompeu Fabra.) 
25 Norman Owen wrote in 1974 ‘The Principalía in Philippine History: Kabikolan, 1790-1898.’ 
Philippine Studies 22 (1974): 297-324. He does not differ in his arguments from LeRoy’s in 1904 in 
which he associated principalía and cacique. Owen takes for granted that the term “cacique” was used 
in the Philippines and, besides, he defines it as “caciques enjoyed great wealth and manipulated the 
elections,” p. 302. Owen should accept that if cacique manipulated the elections during the Spanish 
term then the Maura law was implemented, something he denies a few pages later. In fact all the 
documents he uses are sources previous to 1893. This is a very subtle way to avoid dealing with the 
Maura law. He distinguishes “Ilustrados” as educated and caciques emphasizing local political power. 
This classification does not correspond with Spanish rule. Caciques as a Spanish element were quite far 
from this position. In the Philippines, such development had not taken place. The notion of caciques as 
having local political power took hold during the American rule. The problems of this paper start when 
Owen comes out with the term caciquism. He says that the sources do not provide glimmers of 
caciquism; however he invites us to view the incident involving Gobernadorcillo Antonio Laurenciano 
in 1806-07 as a flagrant case of caciquism. No doubt, Owen uses indiscriminately the term “caciquism” 
since in 1806-07 this had not even emerged in Spain and was not figured in the dictionary. Caciquism 
appears for first time in 1884. In order to emphasize a case of local dominance, Owen decides to use a 
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were being set. An evil was being constructed and brought to the notice 
of colonial officialdom. 
 
 Our Spanish inheritance versus The United States in the Philippines 
LeRoy brought the dogmatization of the term cacique and the 
caciquil system to its final stage in 1905, taking as an excuse the need to 
answer criticisms made by Alleyne Ireland against the American 
administration. Ireland’s article “The United States in the Philippines” 
was published in The Atlantic Monthly in November 1904 and his book 
The Far Eastern Tropics saw print the following year. 
It is difficult on the surface to see why LeRoy reacted so 
vehemently against Ireland since their discourses do not differ at all. In 
fact, Ireland regards the problems confronting the Americans as inherited 
from Spanish “misrule.”26 Therefore, there is no difference regarding the 
idea of “bad Spanish” although for Ireland  the contrast really should be 
made with “good British.” Ireland reiterates stereotypical images of 
Spanish rule although he ignores Spanish writings. He emphasizes the 
fact that Filipinos were unfit for independence by stating that “The only 
kind of Government which Aguinaldo could have established would have 
been a military despotism masquerading under the guise of a Republic. . . 
                                                                                                                                            
term in vogue from 1904 as “caciquism.”  In sum, Owen, by making a case study of Filipino society in 
the nineteenth century, seems to support the argument that “caciquism” was something inherited, 
despite the fact that he had problems in finding the term and if he found it, this was associated with the 
Spanish phenomenon. This paper is a clear reflection of continuity in American scholarship. 
26 Ireland, Alleyne. The Far Eastern Tropics. Studies in the Administration of Tropical Dependencies 
Hong Kong, British North Borneo, Sarawak, Burma, the Federated Malay States, the Straits 
Settlement, French Indochina, Java, the Philippine Islands, p. 188. Ireland, in fact, makes strong 
criticisms of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial systems. These criticisms are related to the 
dichotomy of Latin world versus Nordic world. Ireland praises the colonial systems implemented by 
Dutch and above all British to the detriment of France, Portugal and Spain. 
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Such a Government would have been corrupt and inefficient.”27 This 
assertion reflects the conventional colonial discourse of the early 
twentieth century that established “Orientals” as being inherently corrupt 
and in need of colonial tutelage for modern government. There are few 
differences, if any, between Ireland’s thinking28 and that expressed by 
Taft, for instance, in the Census. 
Ireland, in fact, echoes LeRoy in making the following 
observation: “It has been assumed that the people of the Philippine 
Islands, as a whole, desired independence at the time of Aguinaldo’s 
insurrection and that they still desire it. . . [In fact] ninety-five per cent of 
the people have never had the smallest wish for independence.”29 Ireland 
here subscribes to the idea that the masses were led blindly by some 
leaders. In fact, he categorically affirms that the tropical native has an 
immemorial habit of despotic rule and the masses do what is told by his 
own native “bosses.”30 Le Roy jumped on this last statement, since it 
expressed perfectly his own argument that there was a cancer in Filipino 
society which Ireland had identified as bossism. LeRoy was to add that 
the Spaniards connived with this bossism, making it practically 
irreversible. 
Despite some fundamental convergences between LeRoy and 
Ireland in their analysis of native society, the latter made three strong 
                                                 
27 Ireland, Alleyne. The Far Eastern Tropics, p. 254. 
28 Ireland demonstrates a great knowledge of “colonialism” and no doubt he could be considered as a 
pioneer. However, his book is faulty and weak concerning the Philippines. His statement about the 
possible corruption of Aguinaldo’s Republic is based on the reports which did not provide any 
alternative to believe in the contrary. The government of Aguinaldo was able to maintain order 
throughout the archipelago and to secure the rights of property as well as respect for the laws. This 
would be the underside of history, disguised by colonial discourse. 
29 Ireland, Alleyne. The Far Eastern Tropics, p. 256. 
30 Alleyne Ireland uses this term “bosses” inferring that the native was inherently despotic and 
autocratic. See Ireland, Alleyne. The Far Eastern Tropics, p. 256. 
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criticisms of the American administration that angered LeRoy. First, 
Ireland stressed the inexperience of the United States as a colonial 
master. He felt that there was a pernicious influence of American politics 
on Philippine legislation and that American officials in the colony 
suffered from a narrow vision:   
There existed an ignorance of the broad established facts in 
relation to tropical administration, and an absence of information 
as to the work of the European nations in the neighboring 
Colonies, which could scarcely fail to impair most seriously the 
usefulness of the most conscientious and hard-working official.31 
 
Overlooking the experience of the Europeans in colonial matters, 
Americans instead were implementing an experiment of converting the 
Filipinos into Americans based on their narrow observations at the 
expense of the Filipinos. Ireland, at this point, warns that the experiment 
could be a failure and “will plunge them into the most terrible political 
and social disorder.”32 Ireland was not mistaken in this assumption. The 
Americans and their experiment would create a political and social 
dysfunction which continues in the present.  
Moreover, Ireland was critical of the demagogy of American 
colonial policy. For example, Americans protested against the suggestion 
that the archipelago be called their “colony.”33 The Schurman 
Commission refused the concept of Crown Colony as implanted by the 
British. It decided instead to subsume the new possession as a “territorial 
government.” Ireland regarded this definition of the Philippines as 
territorial government as a politically-motivated disguise of America’s 
real policy, which was in fact to implement the principle of Crown 
                                                 
31 Ireland, Alleyne. The Far Eastern Tropics, p. 201 
32 The Outlook, December 22, 1904. Cited in Ireland, Alleyne. The Far Eastern Tropics, p. 278. 
33 Report of the PhilippineCommission to the President. Vol. I, 1900.  
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Colony Government. At first sight it seemed that the Americans afforded 
a larger measure of political participation to the people of the Islands. 
However, as Ireland observed, the local conditions under which the 
government operated remained completely inflexible since control of 
local affairs rested with appointed and not with elected officials. The de 
facto implementation of Crown Colony Government was more explicit at 
the provincial administrative level, which did not even pretend to reflect 
popular representation. 
Ireland’s argument about the de facto establishment of the 
principle of Crown Colony Government did harm to the Americans since 
the word “colony” was completely taboo in U.S. politics. The Americans 
had, after all, liberated the Filipinos from their Spanish colonizers. They 
were now democratizing the Philippines by attempting to transplant in 
those islands their social and political institutions. Therefore the 
Philippines was not a colony but a territorial government which was 
acquiring self-government.  
The fiercest criticism was of Ireland’s sentence, “The Americans 
believe that every race of man in every land and in every climate can 
become in time ‘a creature of schools, ballot–boxes and free political 
institutions’.”34 Ireland questioned the cornerstone of American policy in 
the Philippines—education—which was a sensitive issue since the 
Commission reports had boasted that the American administration, unlike 
the English and Dutch, was providing more popular self-government to 
its wards. As Taft put it, “The chief difference between English and 
                                                 
34 The Outlook December 21, 1904. Cited in Ireland, Alleyne. The Far Eastern Tropics, p. 277. 
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Dutch policy and ours, in the treatment of tropical people, arises from the 
fact that we are seeking to prepare the people under our guidance and 
control for popular self-government.”35 
The motto of U.S. policy was to implement popular education to 
prepare the natives for self-government. Every problem in connection 
with the control and development of the Islands would find its solution in 
the establishment of a complete system of education. However, Ireland 
did not subscribe this point of view. He believed that the first and 
principal stage for self-government was to achieve political progress 
through industrial development. 
Alleyne Ireland’s The Far Eastern Tropics should be regarded as 
the first comparative analyses of colonial policy in Southeast Asia. It is 
important to observe that in 1904, when Ireland was writing this book, 
the Philippines was considered a de facto and de iure country of 
Southeast Asia. In contrast, the trajectory of American colonial 
discourse, which developed from 1900 and became completely shaped in 
1905, was to encapsulate the Philippines in the Latin American context. 
LeRoy would be the principal architect of this discourse.     
Ireland’s criticisms of the U.S. in the Philippines triggered a 
vigorous and caustic reply from LeRoy. On 15 February 1905, LeRoy 
wrote to Barrows announcing that he had a contribution in the March 
issue of The Atlantic Monthly, 
the real object of which, under the title “Our Spanish Inheritance in 
the Philippines,” is to show how our English critics, especially just 
now Ireland, seem to think there is no need of studying the history 
                                                 
35 Ireland, Alleyne. The Far Eastern Tropics, p. 238. 
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of the Philippines, with a view to ascertaining the real elements of 
the problem we have in mind.36 
 
LeRoy was here de-contextualizing Ireland’s arguments since the 
latter was not arguing about the historical heritage of the Philippines; as a 
matter of fact Ireland and LeRoy, as we saw earlier, agreed on the dark 
heritage of Spain. What Ireland could not accept was the idea of 
transplanting to the Philippines the social and political institutions that 
had been nurtured on American soil. This he considered a colonial policy 
of blindness. This is what he perceived as the problem. But LeRoy 
responded to this criticism by twisting Ireland’s arguments around and 
presenting caciquism as the real curse plaguing the transplantation of 
American institutions.  
LeRoy’s Our Spanish inheritance in the Philippines became a 
landmark in the dogmatization of caciquism as one of the principal 
obstacles to social and political progress—a cancer inherited from the 
Spaniards. Not having enough empirical foundations, LeRoy resorted to 
rhetoric, de-contextualizing the terms cacique and caciquism by 
intermingling them with Ilustrados, ladrones, slavery and other, mainly 
pejorative, terms. Sometimes caciquism is pictured as an evil in the 
cities, and sometimes in the towns. The caciques will be the political 
class as well as the landowners. Owing to LeRoy’s paramount need to 
develop an argument to frame colonial policy, his essay—“a hasty essay” 
as he admitted to Barrows—is quite ambiguous and problematic. 
Nevertheless, due to its seminal status, we need to examine it in detail. 
                                                 
36 James A. LeRoy to David P. Barrows, February 15, 1905.Robertson James Alexander Annapolis Md. 
Manuscripts Box 2 Letters 1902-1906. LeRoy to Barrows, February 15, 1905. 
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LeRoy demonstrates in that essay his knowledge of Spanish and 
above all his reliance on definitions from Spanish dictionaries, although 
his definition of cacique was not extracted from the dictionary of La Real 
Academia Española (RAE)  since he considered this dictionary “faulty”:37 
The word cacique (old Spanish spelling cazique)  was the name for 
a chief or local magnate in Hayti when the Spaniards came there, 
and they carried the word elsewhere to describe petty local 
chieftains of the undeveloped communities in South and Central 
America, and in the Orient.38 
  
LeRoy distorts the term a little bit. The RAE defined the term for 
first time in 1729  
Señor de vasallos, o el Superior de una Provincia o pueblo de 
Indios: y aunque en muchas partes de las Indias tienen otros 
nombres, según sus idiomas, los Españoles los llaman a todos 
Caciques, que parece lo tomaron de las Islas de Barlovento, que 
fueron las primeras que se conquistaron. Es voz Mexicana que 
significa señor.39 
 
(Chief of vassals or Superior of an Indian province or town: and 
although in many parts of the Indies they have other names, 
according to their languages, the Spaniards call all of them 
caciques, which it seems they took from the Isles of Barlovento, 
which were the first conquered. It is a Mexican appelation which 
means señor.) [emphasis added] 
 
This first definition provided by the RAE is similar to that 
furnished by LeRoy. The RAE extracted the information from La 
                                                 
37 On October 20, 1904 LeRoy told Miss Blair that “The Spanish dictionary you must have in the 
library; but that is faulty.” James A. LeRoy to Emma Blair, Durango, Mexico, 20 October 1904. 
Personal Letters of LeRoy James Alfred, 1875-1909. Box 1, Folder 1. Ann Arbor: Bentley Library, the 
University of Michigan. 
38 LeRoy, James A. ‘Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines.’ The Atlantic Monthly. March 1905, p. 
341. The Philippines Life in Town and Country, p. 174. In 1949 Gregorio F. Zaide gave the same 
definition as LeRoy in 1905 “The term cacique was originally applied to a chieftain in Haiti by the 
Spaniards who subsequently carried the word to the Philippines.” Zaide, Gregorio F. Philippine 
Political and Cultural History. Manila: Philippine Eduacation Company, 1957,  p. 82. LeRoy 
esentialized the term and even the Filipinos followed these stereotyped images of the caciques. This 
means the triumph of American discourse.   
39 Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana, en que se explica el verdadero sentido de las voces, su 
naturaleza y calidad, con las phrases o modos de hablar, los Proverbios o Refranes, y otras cosas 
convenientes, al uso de la lengua. Al Rey Nuestro Señor, Don Phelipe V (Que Dios guarde) a cuyas 
Reales Expensas se hace esta obra compuesto por la Real Academia Española. Tomo Segundo que 
contiene la letra C. En Madrid: En la Imprenta de Francisco del Hierro, Impresor de la Real Academia 
Española, Año de 1729, p. 38. 
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Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias. It is not enough to extract the phrase 
“the Spaniards call all of them caciques,” because the RAE specifically 
states that this was the case “in many parts of the Indies.” Now the 
Philippine archipelago was never called “Indias.” Royal decrees always 
made the distinction by referring to the “Yndias y las Yslas Philipinas”—
the Indies and the Philippine Islands. So “cacique” was not necessarily 
found in las Yslas Philipinas. In 1780, the definition of cacique changed 
a bit: 
Chief of vassals, or superior in some Indian provinces or towns. 
Dynastes apud indos, vulgò cacique (ruler among the Indians, 
commonly cacique). By resemblance, it is called [cacique] any of 
the principales of a town. Primates populi.40 
 
This second definition made the term more specific by delimiting it 
to some “Indian provinces or towns.” This means that the term cacique 
was not used elsewhere. The second definition also assimilates cacique to 
“principal.” By 1780, some two hundred years after the conquest, the 
Spaniards were recognizing a “resemblance” between cacique and the 
chiefs of the Philippines who were called “principales” (not caciques) to 
render them the nobility they deserved. Finally, in the nineteenth 
century—1884 to be exact—the RAE included a new entry reflecting a 
phenomenon called “caciquism” in the nineteenth century as uniquely 
Spanish. In fact, the new entry coincides with the introduction for first 
time of caciquism as a “political system”: 
Cacique. (word from Caribbean) m. Chief of vassals, or superior in 
some Indian provinces or towns.|| figurative and familiar. Any 
principal person of a town who exercises excessive influence in 
political and administrative matters. 
                                                 
40 Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana compuesto por la Real Academia Española. Reducido a un 
tomo para su más fácil uso. Madrid: Por D. Joaquín Ibarra, Impresor de Cámara de S. M. y de la Real 
Academia MDCCLXXX , p. 172.  
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Caciquismo m. fam. Excessive influence of the caciques in the 
towns.41 
These last definitions are connected with the emergence of the 
Regenerationists and some important novelists such as Galdós who 
delimited the caciques to the towns. They reflect, as well, the emergence 
of a political system that consisted of the oscillation of power  between 
Liberal and Conservative parties. Be that as it may, the dictionary of La 
Real Academia Española does not specifically relate the term cacique to 
native chieftains from the Philippines. 
Spanish historical dictionaries define the term “cacique” as 
“Natural chieftain of Latin American Indios converted into the local 
authority per excellence of the indigenous people. Not only did the 
conquerors recognize their noble condition and their power but also the 
inherited feature of the institution.”42 We should take particular notice of 
the first part of this definition, natural chieftain of Latin America,  since 
this is the primitive and unique meaning from the discovery of America 
to the collapse of the empire.  The Spaniards used this term when 
Columbus arrived in Hispaniola and discovered five caciques—as the 
indigenous people called them—ruling the country. This term was co-
opted by the Spaniards and had a common usage throughout Latin 
America, as evidenced in the etymological and historical definitions.  But 
the word “cacique” was not carried elsewhere as LeRoy assumes. As we 
have stated previously, the Spaniards did not call the chieftains found in 
the Philippines “caciques.” They used, instead, the terms Dato or Cabeza 
                                                 
41 Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana compuesto por la Real Academia Española. Duodecima 
edición. Madrid: Imprenta de Gregorio Hernando, 1884, p. 183. 
42 Alvar, Jaime. Diccionario de Historia de España y América I, vol. 19, p.  232 
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de Barangay. Even the very first accounts used the term reyezuelo (petty 
ruler) or rajah.    
LeRoy extrapolated the term cacique to the Orient by de-
contextualizing La Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias. The Laws of the 
Indies only comprised those laws with general application. It is not 
surprising to find the term there. However, as I have explained before, 
LeRoy misinterpreted a specific law devoted strictly to the Philippines, 
which does not mention the term cacique whatsoever. In order to build up 
his main argument in “Our Spanish inheritance,” he decontextualized 
Law 16 so that the term cacique could seem to have been used in the 
Philippines, and that the Spaniards in 1594 conferred the power to govern 
to these Filipino chiefs. These “caciques” are described as exercising 
despotic power that was maintained through the centuries. As LeRoy 
stressed to Robertson, the co-optation of Law 16 was the origin of 
today’s evil called caciquism. 
LeRoy was not completely wrong when he inferred that the term 
cacique was used in the Philippines. He had become an expert in Spanish 
history thanks to Zulueta, Pardo de Tavera and Albert. With their 
assistance he had used the books written by Foradada, Montero y Vidal, 
Martínez de Zuñiga, Paterno and Sancianco,43 among others, in order to 
write the essay included in volume 52 of Blair and Robertson’s opus44 
                                                 
43 Foradada, Francisco. La Soberanía de España en Filipinas: Opúsculo de actualidad destinado a 
popularizar el país las salvadoras ideas relativas a esta materia, 1897; Montero y Vidal, José. Historia 
General de las Islas Filipinas: desde el descubrimiento de dichas Islas hasta nuestros días [3 Vol.], 
(1887, 1894-1895); Martínez de Zúñiga, Joaquín. Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas o mis viajes por este 
país [2 Vol.], 1893; Paterno, Pedro: La antigua civilización Tagalog, 1887; Sancianco, Gregorio. El 
Progreso de Filipinas: Estudios Económicos y Políticos, 1881… 
44 LeRoy, James A. ‘The Philippines, 1860-1898; Some Comments and Bibliographical Notes.’ In Blair 
and Robertson (ed.), The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. Vol. 52, pp. 112-207. 
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and for his book, The Americans in the Philippines. Now Montero y 
Vidal, Martínez de Zúñiga, Foradada and Paterno did use the term 
“cacique.” It is important to note, however, that all these Spanish works 
were written in the nineteenth century. These writers co-opted the word 
“cacique” to define the chieftains from the Philippines at the time of the 
arrival of Magellan and Legazpi or, in Paterno’s case, to define the pre-
Hispanic community. Paterno equated the term cacique with “datu.” No 
doubt, the use of the term cacique in these works is due to a misuse of the 
Laws of the Indies. Morga, for instance, who wrote Sucesos de las Islas 
Filipinas at the beginning of the seventeenth century, never defined the 
chieftains as caciques.45 Therefore, the term cacique as applied to the 
Philippines is a product of the nineteenth century.46 
The case of Gregorio Sancianco is quite different. The writers 
mentioned above used the term “cacique” in order to define the native 
chieftain. They do not make any mention of a system called “caciquism.” 
Sancianco, in contrast, made reference for the first time to “caciquism” 
instead of simply the term “cacique.” Sancianco was a Filipino Ilustrado 
resident in Spain during the Restoration. He was in touch with Spanish 
                                                 
45 Antonio de Morga was oidor of the Audiencia de Mexico, and later he went to the Philippines, 
becoming oidor of the Audiencia of Manila. Morga was familiar with the term cacique, since in 
Mexico was the common and official term to define the chieftains. He could have used it by analogy in 
the Philippines. However, when Morga, in the chapter VIII, defines the Filipino communities before 
the arrival of the Spaniards, he uses the terms dato, principal, jefe, rajah, regulo.  
46 Michael Cullinane considers the term cacique a product of the nineteenth century. He does not use 
Spanish sources to define the term; however, he states categorically, “In the nineteenth century the 
Spanish state in the Philippines resurrected the sixteenth century term for a locally powerful strongman 
or chief to apply to a newly emerged category of Filipino society that had carved out a provincial or 
regional power base of wealth and influence that challenged the colonial state’s capacity to control it.” 
See Ilustrado Politics. Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908. Quezon City: Ateneo de 
Manila University Press, 2003, p. 17. We can see that what LeRoy essentialized in Our Spanish 
Inheritance has been perpetuated in current American scholarship. No one resurrected a term of the 
sixteenth century to define strongmen in the Philippines since there wasn’t any democracy and the so-
called “strongmen” could not exercise their influence in political and administrative matters. Michael 
Cullinane is using a definition from Spanish cacique used in Spanish policy. 
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intellectuals and above all lived through the period when the Restoration 
was the prevalent policy in Spain. Therefore, he knew first-hand about 
caciquism as a Spanish phenomenon related to an incipient democracy.  
In his book El Progreso de Filipinas where he calls for the reform of 
rural landholdings, Sancianco states that under present conditions tracts 
of land were acquired by those covetous individuals who took advantage 
of the influences of the prevailing caciquism.47 We can see how 
statements like this would have fostered LeRoy’s argument that 
caciquism was something inherited from Spanish. But Sancianco’s 
sentence quite clearly refers to a “prevailing caciquism,” a system then in 
vogue in Spain, with which a Philippine parallel is made.  
There is still another way in which the term cacique was used in 
reference to the Philippines. In 1878 Felipe del Pan wrote Las Islas 
Filipinas. Progresos en 70 Años. LeRoy knew about this book but did 
not cite it in his works. Del Pan states in a section on municipal 
government in the Philippines: “The gobernadorcillo is sometimes the 
local boss48 of a town. This name cannot be found in the official 
documents before the last century. Previously, they were called 
caciques.”49 He infers that the term cacique was used in the sixteenth and 
the seventeenth centuries, disappearing in the eighteenth century to give 
way to the term gobernadorcillo. Del Pan is simply wrong in stating this. 
It is true that the term gobernadorcillo started to be used in the eighteenth 
                                                 
47 Sancianco y Goson, Gregorio. ‘Condiciones de la Propiedad Rústica.’ El Progreso de Filipinas. 
Estudios Económicos y Políticos,  chapter VII, p. 49. 
48 Del Pan uses the term jefe with no pejorative meaning. Jefe in this context is synonymous with ruler 
or governor. 
49 Del Pan, Felipe. Las Islas Filipinas. Progresos en 70 Años. Manila: Imprenta de la Oceanía 
Española, 1878, p. 421.  
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century, although curiously it was not defined in the dictionary of Real 
Academia until 1869, the year that the Philippines became of utmost 
importance to Spain. Before the standardization of the term 
gobernadorcillo, official documents did not use the term cacique at all. 
We are confronted once again with a misuse of the Laws of the Indies. 
Be that as it may, LeRoy was not interested in utilizing the term 
“gobernadorcillo.” He needed to present before the American public and 
future students of the Philippines a term—cacique—that could be 
mobilized for the goals of American colonial policy.  
Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines is an ambiguous and 
vague essay which leads us to wonder who are the caciques and what 
caciquism means since LeRoy provided multiple variables. It was 
precisely this vagueness that blinded the ilustrado members of the 
Partido Federal to LeRoy’s insinuation that the ilustrados themselves 
were a source of the curse called caciquism. LeRoy starts the essay by 
asserting that the chief obstacle to social and political progress in the 
Philippines Islands is “caciquism”—the term by which “bossism” is 
known in those regions.50 Although LeRoy considered “bossism” an 
inaccurate translation of “caciquism,” he regarded both terms are 
synonymous. He wanted to established analogies between bossism as an 
American phenomenon and caciquism as a Spanish-Filipino 
phenomenon. He described some common features of both such as the 
manipulation of the votes, or that bosses or caciques were political 
intermediaries much like the obliging friends in England. 
                                                 
50 Le Roy James A. ‘Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines,’ p. 340. He considers bossism not a 
good translation of caciquism in the Philippines since the rural bosses do not fit the Philippine 
conditions. 
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Indeed, bossism and caciquism were phenomena of the nineteenth 
century. They were “necessary evils” for political development. LeRoy’s 
analogy between caciquism and bossism, however, gave the former a 
connotation completely pejorative which has prevailed until the present.51 
Filipino caciquism is related to familism,52 a situation wherein a few 
families in a community would completely dominate the masses who 
depended on them in all senses. LeRoy’s picture of family/cacique 
politics mixed together usury, laziness and despotism. If we had to 
provide a suitable analogue for the term caciquism, it would have to be 
“a system of patronage.”53 Its multiple meanings would include granting 
favors, giving contracts or “making appointments” to office in return for 
political support. However, LeRoy much preferred to link caciquism with 
                                                 
51 Lewis Gleeck considers inadequate the translation of cacique as boss since the former connotes 
decrepitude and tyranny. Therefore an equivalent of cacique –according to Gleeck, following LeRoy’s 
argument- must be found in the South before the civil war. See Nine Years to make a difference, p.45. 
52 Michael Cullinane in 2003 defined the caciques as “individuals and families whose economic power 
and influence dominated certain municipalities and often extended to other parts of the province.” 
Ilustrado Politics, p. 16. Benedict Anderson has stigmatized, as LeRoy did in 1905, the analogy of 
caciquism and familism by taking as spur President Corazón Aquino’s term. Anderson makes a 
retrospective of the Aquino and Cojuanco families which emerged in 1898. By establishing this 
evolutionary history he is perpetuating the discourse –the power of the cacique family is inherent in the 
Filipino ethos coming from immemorial times. Anderson has put in vogue again the term “cacique” 
with a derogatory meaning.  See Cacique Democracy in the Philippines, p. 1998.  
53 Paul Hutchcroft in ‘Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority 
and Local Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900-1913’, assumes that “when most of colonial 
powers were building powerful bureaucracies in the capital and relying on prefectoral systems to 
centralize control over the countryside the American colonial government in Manila began the task of 
state formation with a pronounced emphasis on local autonomy and party patronage,” p. 288. This is 
the most important argument of this paper: the emphasis on Taft instituting a system of patronage. 
Hutchcroft considers this system clashed with caciquism and the feudal relations of dependence. 
Therefore he takes for granted that caciquism was a Spanish institution that the American inherited. In 
fact, he follows LeRoy’s  pattern of argument by referring to Spanish rule as an anachronism. 
Hutchcroft does not assume that caciquism is a system of patronage. For him, the bad caciquism was 
instituted by the Spaniards while the good system of patronage was implanted by the Americans. 
Hutchcroft implies caciquism as something completely pejorative and negative; however, he has not 
studied Spanish caciquism.     
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bossism as a despotic, sometimes violent, mode of domination that was 
more useful for what the Americans were constructing.54  
LeRoy’s essay establishes a cause-and-effect relationship that leads 
to caciquism becoming de facto related to local politics. Local leaders, he 
says, establish themselves in communities where only two, four, or 
twelve families out of a population of ten thousand or more live. These 
families “depend on those above them for employment or a piece of land 
to till or the money advances inevitably needed each year to till. This is 
the conception of what Philippine caciquism is in Philippine rural life.”55 
The initial picture that LeRoy paints is in fact that of “rural 
caciquism.” It harks back to the following definition given by the 
Regenerationists: “Control, in a tacit way, by an individual of an evident 
influence and fortune of the reins of power and mass media in a 
community, generally in the rural environment.”56 This is the stereotyped 
image of Spanish caciquismo fostered by the literature of the nineteenth 
century which sought to depict caciquism as a system fostered by the 
                                                 
54 Sidel John T. Capital, Coercion and Crime. Bossism in the Philippines. Sidel prefers to use the terms 
boss and bossism since they reflect a rejection of accounts stressing the putative socio-cultural legacies 
of Spanish colonial rule (caciquism). By using the terms boss and bossism he emphasizes that Filipinos 
inherited American colonial era institutions. (See p. 6.) Sidel avoids the term caciquism and tries to 
emphasize that the dysfunctional system existent in the Philippines is an American legacy from trying 
to transplant American social and political institutions. However, Sidel develops his argument by 
illustrating the Spanish nineteenth century as the time of the formation of the families or bosses. He 
infers that bossism was already prevalent when the Americans arrived in the Philippines. There is 
another contradiction in terms which recalls those of LeRoy, since Sidel resorts to the revolution –
concretely, Cavite—to explain the formation of strongmen. Therefore, we come across an argument 
that bossism was a Spanish legacy, and at the same time inherent in Filipino societal behavior. Another 
example is an Anarchy of Families. State and Family in the Philippines by Alfred McCoy, which 
establishes continuity in familiar influences in policy from the time of Spanish rule. It seems that there 
is an attempt to escape the term cacique and caciquism, since they connote something pejorative such 
as LeRoy built up in 1905. However, Americans scholars tend to emphasize the Spanish rule at the turn 
of the nineteenth century as the real producer of that phenomenon and none of them has studied 
caciquism as a Spanish phenomenon and one necessary for the good development of a democracy.    
55 LeRoy, James A. ‘Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines’, p. 340. LeRoy was establishing a first 
feature of caciquism as analogous to landlordism. This is the image which has prevailed at present. 
“Our cacique in those days was similar to the feudal barons of Europe or to our present-day 
hacendero,” Zaide, Gregorio F. Philippine Political and Cultural History, p. 82. 
56 Alvar, Jaime. Diccionario de Historia de España y América, vol. 19, p. 232. 
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terratenientes (landowners) and the caciques as omnipotent individuals 
exerting tyrannical and despotic power. To Spaniards, it is the most 
familiar image of caciquism. It seems that LeRoy co-opted this cliché of 
Spanish caciquism assimilated to ruralism, and turned it into the official 
definition of Philippine caciquism until the end of American colonial 
rule. In fact, this definition is the embryo of future arguments about 
“familism” as a fundamental characteristic of Philippine politics. 
After this first delimitation of caciquism as inherent in local 
government, LeRoy explains in great detail that caciquism was no new 
thing in the Philippines, and that it was the chief drawback to the 
effective working of the municipal code that was put into operation by 
Taft in 1901. Here LeRoy is surreptitiously pointing the finger at 
traditional Spanish institutions. By taking into consideration the fact that 
over many years caciquism was defined as a new feudalism57 this 
statement perfectly fitted LeRoy’s conception of the Spanish system in 
the Philippines as an inveterate and anachronistic system which clashed 
with a new and modern system over which the old hierarchy prevailed. 
The latter would be defined, at the beginning in private correspondence 
and later in the textbooks, as the “old cacique class or old cacique 
aristocracy.” In sum, LeRoy was justifying the arbitrary municipal policy 
implemented by the second Philippine Commission that was notorious 
for its limited suffrage and policy of “appointment from above.” At the 
                                                 
57 This definition was fostered by the Regenerationist at the turn of the nineteenth century and above all 
in the twentieth century. This idea caciquism as new feudalism could be found in many encyclopedias, 
above all in Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada Europea Americana which has become the icon of the 
Spanish language. This encyclopedia started to be prepared in 1905.  In fact, Anderson in Cacique 
Democracy in the Philippines uses among other definitions of cacique, that of hacendado. He calls the 
hacendados in the nineteenth century “feudal.” See, Cacique Democracy, p. 197. 
 267 
same time, he had found a platform from which to counter the criticism 
of Ireland and Parker Willis that the problems of U.S. administration in 
the Philippines were caused by the pernicious influence of American 
domestic politics on Philippine legislation.58    
As the essay progresses, LeRoy develops other dimensions, mostly 
ambiguous, of this newfound “key” to understanding Philippine realities. 
“Caciquismo,” he says, “is the prime feature of the village life of the 
Filipino […] Indeed one may not unfairly say that the Spanish structure 
of local government was built upon it, and fostered not only its 
continuance, but its growth in new directions. But one may not blame the 
Spaniards for the existence of caciquism; it was a native institution 
before they came, and they merely accepted it…59 LeRoy uses here the 
Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias in order to foster Caciquismo as 
something inherited from the seventeenth century. 
LeRoy portrays caciquism as inherent in the Filipino ethos, a 
habitual feature of tropical societies or a component of tribalism. At 
times he argues that the Spanish merely accepted and connived with an 
existing institution; at other times he suggests that the Spanish furnished 
this institution. There are many contradictions in his essay since, on the 
one hand, there is the survival of the old social organization, while on the 
other hand the Spaniards are said to have crushed the tribal organization. 
There was a despotic tribal rule, which was more democratic than what 
                                                 
58 Ireland Alleyne. The Far Eastern Tropics, p. 203. 
59 LeRoy, James A. ‘Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines’, p. 341. It is important to note that this 
definition provided by LeRoy will have a huge influence and will become the official explanation in 
the textbooks for schools. An example is Benitez, Conrado. History of the Philippines. Economic, 
Social, Political. This book was published in 1926. In page 128, Conrado Benitez devotes a short point 
to “Caciquism or dato rule.” Benitez follows ad literam LeRoy’s definition.  
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crystallized under Spain’s “inelastic ecclesiastical regime.” In sum, 
LeRoy could not build up a strong argument since he arbitrarily co-opted 
the term caciquismo in order to justify American blunders and above all 
their own despotism towards Filipinos. 
The most surprising argument in the essay is when LeRoy claims 
that “the Filipino propaganda of 1868-98, culminating in the ill-planned 
revolt of 1896, was in large part a revolt against caciquism.60 LeRoy 
makes clear that this revolt was ill-planed and that it was a revolt that 
“originated with the aristocracy.” The reference to an aristocracy seems 
to indicate the survival of the caciques, but this is not what LeRoy wishes 
to convey—not in this context, at least. Since the main purpose of the 
essay is to undermine the Spanish system, LeRoy squarely infers that 
Spain imposed and tolerated caciquism as a corrupt, violent and coercive 
system. His seemingly contradictory assumption that the revolt against 
caciquism originated with the “aristocracy” is connected to the new 
narrative of Philippine history that the Americans were helping to 
construct—one in which the Katipunan and Bonifacio as leader of the 
masses would be suppressed. The problem with Bonifacio, according to 
LeRoy, was that he preached a racial war, in contrast to the Propaganda 
movement, identified with Rizal, Marcelo H. del Pilar and Graciano 
Lopez Jaena, which protested against administrative and economic 
caciquism.61  
                                                 
60 LeRoy, James A. ‘Our Spanish Inherintance…’, p. 344. 
61 At this point, I think it is important to compare the different stages LeRoy develops to define the 
caciques and Benedict Anderson’s Cacique Democracy. LeRoy starts by making an isomorphism of 
past and present. The present problems of the American administration in 1905 were provoked by an 
old feudal and patriarchal system called caciquism. Then LeRoy starts his retrospective giving different 
layers of meaning to the term cacique –as a Spanish legacy, caciquism assimilated to ruralism and the 
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LeRoy shows once more his knowledge of Philippine history, 
thanks to his Filipino friends. In mentioning Del Pilar and Lopez Jaena, 
we can conclude that he had read La Solidaridad. Needless to say, LeRoy 
knew about José Rizal and his masterpiece, Noli me Tangere.  Rizal used 
the term cacique in Chapter XI of this novel, asking the question, quienes 
eran los caciques del pueblo? (who were the rulers of the town?) This 
was perfect for LeRoy’s argument. This sentence in the hero’s novel 
would become the key for those who wished to establish categorically 
that caciquismo and caciques were inherent in the Spanish system in the 
Philippines. LeRoy echoed this sentence but neglected to mention that 
Rizal was in touch with the group of the Regeneracionistas and was 
extremely influenced by Galdós, who had just finished his novel Miau, 
an indictment against caciquism. Moreover, Rizal together with 
Sancianco had lived in Madrid during the Restoration. They knew 
perfectly well the political debates in Spain and the development of 
caciquism as a distinct phenomenon of this period. 
As for La Solidaridad and its use of the term cacique and 
caciquismo, neither Lopez Jaena nor Marcelo del Pilar defined it as a 
Filipino mode of behavior at all. Even less did they affirm that the 
Spaniards had implanted or fostered caciquism in the Philippines. 
Caciquism was something perceived to be endemic in Spain at that time. 
The use of cacique and caciquismo by the above Ilustrados resident in 
                                                                                                                                            
struggle of the “ilustrados” against caciquism although they were caciques. Benedict Anderson co-opts 
Corazón Aquino’s term to make a retrospective of the past. Anderson devotes a brief section to Spanish 
colonialism and the emergence of a mestizo elite. This would be the starting point of the growth of the 
caciques. Suddenly Anderson assumes exactly the same standpoint as LeRoy in 1905 in tackling the 
growth of National Sentiment: “the inevitable insurrection did not originate with the ilustrados.” 
Although there is ambiguity in the discourse it seems for Anderson these ilustrados were potential 
caciques, while Aguinaldo was a “caudillo.” 
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Spain reveal their familiarity with Spanish policy and literature. They 
understood that the cacique was a necessary evil, a political intermediary 
between the state and the people at a time of incipient democracy. 
The longer the Filipino ilustrados were in Spain, the more familiar 
they became with the workings of caciquismo and the discussions of the 
phenomenon by Spanish intellectuals or ilustrados. Marcelo del Pilar was 
thus able to construct a simile by defining the friars “preeminence” in the 
Philippines as caciquismo monacal.62 He appropriated “caciquismo” in 
order to denounce an oligarchy of friars that allegedly ruled the 
archipelago. These examples quite clearly indicate that Filipino ilustrados 
used the term “cacique” and the system “caciquismo” by analogy with 
the Spain they knew.   
LeRoy’s argument that the revolt against Spain was planned to 
undermine caciquism became in turn a powerful argument for some 
educated Filipinos such as Albert, Pardo de Tavera and Florentino 
Torres, who really believed that they were dealing with something 
inherited from the Spanish past. What they failed to notice was that 
LeRoy was pointing the finger at them. LeRoy considered the principalía 
as bosses or caciques, and started to dogmatize the caciques as a social 
and political class. He identified the old cacique aristocracy class in the 
members of the Partido Federal. Not satisfied with that, he also 
identified the more radical members of the Partido Nacionalista as a new 
emergent class that he called the “younger men of the cacique class.” 
                                                 
62 La Solidaridad , Madrid, October 15, 1890. Num. 41. Año 2. This argument would have great 
significance in 1905, during American colonial rule. General Attorney Wilfley would echo the notion 
of caciquismo related to the religious orders. 
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To further stigmatize the Filipinos as caciques, LeRoy cites an 
issue of the newspaper El Renacimiento as follows: 
El Renacimiento, a daily newspaper published in Spanish and 
Tagalog in Manila, is conducting a campaign primarily against 
caciquism (and so, for that matter, is La Democracia, organ of the 
Federal Party). But we find a collaborator of El Renacimiento 
saying in a recent issue: There are various forms of caciquism. . .63 
 
This anonymous collaborator of El Renacimiento, whose name 
LeRoy does not mention, calls “caciques” the justices of peace, the 
municipal presidents elected through manipulation of the franchise, the 
chiefs of police, and so forth. In short, all of those positions occupied by 
natives through appointment by American officials are now labelled 
“cacique.”  
El Renacimiento was the most nationalist and pro-independence 
publication of that period. LeRoy once more displays his astuteness by 
pointing out that even this most radical newspaper echoed the Filipino 
evil called caciquismo. However, the quote invites suspicion since LeRoy 
does not mention the name of the source. Curiously, David Barrows, an 
American official, wrote a letter about caciquism entitled “Filipino self-
government.” Barrows said that the great curse of the islands was that 
personal rights were not understood. Local justice, as administered by 
Spanish-era justices of peace, was a “farce.”64 The article in El 
Renacimiento cited by LeRoy—if it was ever written—is quite similar to 
Barrow’s letter. I wonder if the anonymous collaborator of this article 
was not Barrows himself. Barrows explained in a letter to LeRoy that he 
                                                 
63 LeRoy, James A. ‘Our Spanish Inherintance…, p. 346. 
64 This letter had a definite purpose “to comment.” Barrows was very cryptic in this letter which is not 
signed and was not addressed to anyone in special.  It seems a pamphlet for propaganda. Robertson 
James Alexander Annapolis Md., box 2, Letters 1902-1906.   
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had sent to the Filipino press some remarks about caciquism. Certainly, 
his remarks coincide with the article in El Renacimiento. Unfortunately I 
cannot verify this quote’s existence because this number of El 
Renacimiento is not among LeRoy papers, and he did not mention the 
date of its publication. 
Finally, LeRoy offers a solution for eradicating caciquism as his 
counterattack on Ireland’s criticisms: “Popular education, the chief 
feature of the new regime is the greatest enemy to caciquism in the 
Philippines.”65 In short, caciquism would be abolished root and branch 
through the public school system. This would be the cornerstone of 
Taft’s policy. 
LeRoy published in the same year, 1905, Philippine Life in Town 
and Country. He devoted Chapter VI to Caciquism and Local Self-
Government. The content is the same as in the essay Our Spanish 
Inheritance in the Philippines but this chapter is longer because LeRoy 
added some long paragraphs from Rizal’s Noli me Tangere. The 
rhetorical question of Rizal, “Who are the caciques of the town?,” 
provided a key framework for LeRoy. Of course, he said, the caciques 
were the educated, the principalía, the justices of peace, local governors, 
and above all the half-Spaniards, wealthy and rich. He had established 
the discourse on Filipinos as caciques, and above all, had provided an 
answer to the problems being faced by the Americans in the Philippines. 
 
The myths of the Spanish Inheritance and the Spanish cacique 
                                                 
65 LeRoy, James A. ‘Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines,’ p. 346. 
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Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines and Caciquism and 
Local Self-Government are based in part on the emergence of the 
standard Spanish image of the cacique as terrateniente – a term which 
appeared for first time in 1803. In fact, we have seen that in 1884 the 
RAE figured cacique as “a person who in a village or region exerts 
influence in political matters.” This new acceptance of cacique paved the 
way for the emergence of a system called caciquism (sometimes also 
called cacicazgos). Caciquism was a new term that meant “excessive 
influence of the caciques in the towns.” This term fitted better the ethico-
mythical image that the Regenerationists were building up. However, 
cacicazgo—an old term included in the Laws of the Indies that meant 
“dignity of the cacique.|| Territory the cacique has”—was a more suitable 
term for capturing the feudal connotations in the prevailing literature. 
This stereotypic image was fostered at the turn of the nineteenth 
century in the literature associated with Galdós, Varela and the 
Regenerationist that pictured caciquism as a new feudalism relegated to 
the rural sphere. This cliché has not been fully questioned. On the 
contrary, up to a certain extent, it has been supported by the 
functionalists and Tuñón de Lara66 who have inferred that the caciques 
were “aristocrat landowners” and the bloc dominant during the 
Restoration. 
                                                 
66 Manuel Tuñón de Lara belonged to a republican family. He got his degree in Law in 1936, by 
starting the Civil War. He fought with the Republicans. He was imprisoned by the dictatorship of 
Franco. He had to flee to France where started his intellectual activity. He was teaching in the 
University of Pau initiating methodological renovation upon labor movement, Spanish culture and 
above all social history. Alvar, Jaime. Diccionario de Historia de España y América. Vol. II, p. 131. 
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The mythogenesis fostered by the Regenerationists started with 
Cánovas del Castillo67 and his Restauration68 gave full shape to the 
caciquil system.69 In order to govern the country, Cánovas fostered the 
grand cacique’s power, which was based on his general services to, and 
interest in, his “country.” Great oligarchs represented permanent party 
interests. During his term the party machines routinely falsified elections 
by maintaining social hierarchy and political oppression. Cánovas 
became the architect of the caciquil system and it is said that caciquismo 
was inextricably entwined with the Conservative party. This is the other 
side of the stereotypical image of this complex and difficult system. 
Cánovas was the maker, but Conservatives and Liberals made beneficial 
use of the system. This is the reason that the Restoration was a stable 
government. 
Caciquismo played a key role in stabilizing Spanish politics. In 
literature, however, the caciques were portrayed as revolting beings. 
Cacique became a synonymous with terrateniente, a landowner with 
tyrannical and despotic power, a new feudal creature at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. The image of the bad cacique, equated with 
terrateniente and having feudalistic qualities, was promoted by the 
Regenerationists and the novelists. Not surprisingly, the Filipinos who 
                                                 
67 Antonio Cánovas del Castillo was the main ideologue and politician from the Restoration, leader of 
the Conservative party. Cánovas was an intellectual and historian.  
68 It has been assumed that the Restoration was the reestablishment of an old political regime 
substituted by other. However, the Restoration was the installation of a plural democracy or liberal 
monarchy –such as José Varela Ortega defines the Restoration—similar to British parliamentarianism.  
69 The term “caciquil” emerged for first time in 1925, during the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de 
Rivera. It is important to note the appearance of this term since Primo de Rivera considered himself the 
“cirujano de hierro” (iron surgeon), the dictator advocated by Joaquín Costa. He tried to extirpate the 
caciquil system abolishing the democracy. In 1925, caciquil was defined by Galdós as “to establish 
here the hypocritical and “mansurrón” [excessive gentle] despotism which subjected the Spanish family 
to the absorbing and caciquil government of “patriciado” (aristocracy).  
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came to Spain during the 1880s and 1890s, attuned as they were to 
literary trends, began to use the terms cacique and caciquism themselves, 
associate them with phenomena or modes of behavior found in the 
Archipelago. 
These Filipinos were in touch with some professors from the 
Instituto Libre de Enseñanza, such as for example Giner de los Ríos, 
Joaquín Costa and Gumersindo de Azcárate,70 who considered 
themselves victims of caciquism and mounted fierce criticisms of the 
system by attacking the bases of the policies during that period. They 
asserted that there was no parliament, no parties, “only oligarchies.”71 
Costa, Picabea and Azcárate described caciquismo as a carry-over of the 
past, an “inorganic feudalism,” “a feudalism of a new genre, a hundred 
times more revolting than the warrior feudalism of the Middle Ages and 
by which the representative government conceals a mean creature, a 
hypocrite and bastard.”72 In this sentence, Azcárate tries to articulate his 
perceptions of his society and the weaknesses of its institutions. The 
Regenerationists constructed an ethico-mythical version of caciquismo, 
                                                 
70 The liberal policy of the Sexenio had developed the principle of free education as the academic 
freedom in the universities and freedom of initiative in the creation of schools. Cánovas del Castillo, 
during the first years of the Restoration, subjected the universities to a brutal purge, abolishing the 
academic freedom. This reform caused some professors to be expelled from the university. In this 
context, the Instituto Libre de Enseñanza was born in 1876. A group of krausist professors of the 
university founded this institution –Giner de los Ríos, Gumersindo de Azcárate, Nicolás Salmerón and 
Joaquín Costa. The Instituto Libre de Enseñanza understood education as the transmission of 
knowledge and human formation. This institution advocated above all tolerance and freedom of 
thought. Its influence in the Spanish cultural life at the turn of the nineteenth century and at the opening 
of twentieth century was substantial.  Montero, Feliciano. Historia de España. Revolución y 
Restauración. Del Sexenio Revolucionario a la guerra de Cuba (1868-1898).  Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 
2004, vol. 13,  p. 415 
71 This argument can be found for instance: in Costa, Joaquín. Oligarquía y caciquismo como forma 
actual de gobierno en España (1901); Macías Picavea, Ricardo. El Problema Nacional (1899); 
Mallada,Lucas. Los males de la patria del ingeniero or Isern, Damián. Del Desastre nacional y sus 
causas. They stated: “The present form of government in Spain is an absolute monarchy whose king is 
‘His Majesty’ the Cacique.” 
72 Costa, Joaquín . Oligarquía y Caciquismo  como forma actual de gobierno en España. Madrid: Hijos 
de M.G. Hernández, 1902, p. 24.  
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portrayed as the embryo of all the evils of the patria, and the cacique as 
the perpetrator of a personalized policy and the capture of the law by 
rural elements. Caciques undermined the will of the ignorant peasants. 
Caciquismo became a repressive, coercive and endogamous system in 
which violence was inherent and implicit. This discourse was bound to 
be absorbed by the Filipino ilustrados in Spain. 
These epic developments culminated in 1898 with an explosion of 
Spanish nationalism provoked, no doubt, by the loss of the three last 
bastions:  Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. This burst of 
nationalism led to the breaking up of Spain and the de facto emergence of 
two Spains, one of which blamed caciquismo as a source of the country’s 
backwardness, while the other Spain, generally identified with the 
southern part of the country that was basically agrarian, nurtured the 
mythical image of the cacique. 
The legend tells us that the hacendero or terrateniente73 emerged 
in Andalucia and Extremadura.74 “Cacique” denoted a despicable being, 
a wealthy man who controlled the elections, the guardia civil, the priest, 
                                                 
73 These Spanish terms have been used by Benedict Anderson, Lewis Gleek and John Larkin in the 
context of the Philippines.  
74 Andalucia and Extremadura became recurrent for many of the writers of the turn of the nineteenth 
century and above all at the opening of the twentieth century because of a strong social polarization. 
Javier Tussell opened the Pandora’s box in the 70s with a book entitled Oligarquía y Caciquismo en 
Andalucia. Tussell has given an excessive importance to the electoral process in the study of 
caciquism. He suggests a typology of the electoral districts established according to two variables, 
especially in the case of rural districts: on the one hand, a socio-economic structure emphasizing the 
property of the lands; and on the other, illiteracy. At that point, Tussell defines the caciques from these 
provinces as terrateniente andaluz or extremeño while this terminology –terrateniente—is not used to 
define the caciques from other provinces.  Many local monographs have come out following these two 
variables established by Tussell. The prevalent argument in these monographs is that caciquism was 
endemic in Andalucia because of its backwardness which paved the way for an electoral apathy.  
Jacques Maurice tries to question this argument by inferring  that caciquism in Andalucia and 
Extremadura cannot be stigmatized by common links and similar features. Maurice considers necessary 
to analyze concrete cases in order to establish why Andalucia and Extremadura lived a democratic 
deficit.  See Maurice, Jacques. ‘Patronazgo y clientelismo en Andalucia. Una interpretación.’ In Robles 
Egea, Antonio (ed.), Política en Penumbra. Patronazgo y Clientelismo Políticos en la España 
Contemporánea. Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1996, pp. 215-225.   
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the peasants; in short the cacique was omnipotent. The myth of the 
emergence of local caciques was shaped at this point. The caciquil stories 
in Andalucia reveal several modes of the relationship between the 
cacique and his friends. This could have multiple forms in the south of 
Spain, from a deferential loyalty typical of a traditional caciquismo found 
in isolated peasant communities, to the purchase of this loyalty by a 
transactional caciquismo. This portrait of Andalucia or Extremadura is 
well-known in Spain and has always been related to the dichotomy 
between north and south, development versus underdevelopment, 
modernization versus backwardness, education versus illiteracy, and the 
like. It seems that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between 
underdevelopment or the so-called “third world,” and the emergence of 
tyrannies.75 
 
Caciquismo as a Spanish phenomenon: what American historiography 
has silenced 
The ethico-mythical image of caciquism described above does not 
differ much from how LeRoy portrayed it in Our Spanish inheritance. 
LeRoy was able to plant the seeds of a representation of the Filipino 
cacique as a revolting hacendero either fostered by the Spanish 
administration or endemic in a patriarchal Filipino society. The 
assumption, therefore, was that the Americans had inherited the problems 
of the Spanish regime. However, while American historiography does not 
                                                 
75 This seems to be the argument of the 90s, above all fostered by American academe. Clear exponents 
of this linear meta-narrative which tries to present American democracy as the saviour from despotism 
are Sidel, John. Capital, coercion and crime. Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1999. Hutchcroft, Paul. Booty Capitalism. The Politics of Banking in the Philippines. 
Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1998. 
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seem to have transcended the old discourse, Spanish scholars have 
revisited caciquism and have, up to a certain extent, gone beyond the 
image fostered by the Regenerationists.  
For a long time, the critical historiography on the Canovist 
Restoration had resorted quasi ad literam to the regenerationist 
judgments and the complaints of Azcárate, Costa and others. However, in 
1970, some scholars—Tusell, Romero Maura, Varela Ortega76 among 
them—started to revisit the meaning of caciquism during the Restoration. 
They put in question the stereotypic images by transcending the moral 
connotations attached to it by the Regenerationist. These scholars, 
associated with the theoretical development of functionalism, tended, 
however, to simplify the issue by attributing the presence of caciquism to 
the lack of “political culture” in the public life of the Restoration. 
At present, a new generation of scholars has moved beyond the 
above explanations by emphasizing, among others, that caciquism was 
not monolithic at all. They are able to demonstrate that caciquism during 
the Restoration had multiple manifestations. It did not conform to a static 
system but was interwoven with an institutional structure susceptible to 
modification.77 Perhaps the most important of the new arguments is that 
caciquism was a necessary evil inherent in all democracies, “a political 
system and form of socialization of the constitutional mechanism during 
                                                 
76 All of them are famous “Hispanistas” scholars.  
77 Moreno Luzón, Javier. ‘El Poder Público hecho cisco.” Clientelismo e Instituciones Políticas en la 
España de la Restauración.’ In Robles Egea, Antonio (ed.), Política en Penumbra…, p. 167. 
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the Restoration (1875-1923).”78 The negative “new feudalism” 
connotation given by the Regenerationists has now been transcended.  
In spite of the new conceptualization of caciques as an essential 
vehicle for building up permanent clients, and caciquism as a necessary 
constitutional mechanism, the new definitions still delimit the political 
game to two parties, conservative and liberal, considered without 
ideological base. The assumption still is that there were inherent 
“clientelist” relationships maintained through favors, influences, position 
and privilege.79 The clients acted in a foreseeable way. Causal 
connections are thus established between caciquism, political apathy and 
illiteracy. 
This kind of argument reflects the contraposition of two concepts: 
“modern” and “backward.” The purpose of a caciquist mechanism seems 
to lie in organizing politics effectively so as to preserve its power.80 In 
fact, the factions which represented the caciques at a local level in the 
electoral districts had interests in the distribution of the seats. This 
distribution was made beforehand without confrontation. Thus, this 
“backward” behavior guaranteed the perpetuation of the system of 
power—the so-called turno pacífico—and disguised the absence of 
programmatic differences among the parties.  
The above explanation of caciquism ignores several important 
issues. For example, the historical definition emphasizes the existence of 
                                                 
78 Robles Egea, Antonio. ‘Sistemas Políticos, Mutaciones y Modelos de las Relaciones de Patronazgo y 
Clientelismo en la España del Siglo XX.’ In Robles Egea, Antonio (ed.), Política en Penumbra…, p. 
232. 
79This thesis is defended by Javier Tusell or José Varela Ortega who consider that there is a cause-
effect among this electoral behavior and the high indexes of abstentionism.  
80 Maurice, Jacques. ‘Patronazgo y Clientelismo en Andalucia. Una Interpretación.’ In Robles Egea, 
Antonio (ed.), Política en Penumbra…, p. 217. 
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two parties devoid of ideology, which is true up to a certain extent. But 
the 1890’s saw the birth of ideology-driven political parties whose 
sympathizers came from the most unprotected classes. Also neglected is 
the most important function of caciquism: to facilitate the process of 
modernization of Spanish society. It can be argued that caciquism was a 
necessary accompaniment to the formation of the state in order for local 
politics to connect with the life of the nation as a whole. As Pino Artacho 
states, “caciquism, according to my point of view, was a transitory 
expedient, relatively useful.”81 
Caciquismo was a complex organization. Answers as to why and 
how it had become so prominent and strong were as diverse as the views 
expressed. Caciques were said by some to be wealthy men who abused 
their wealth, and by others to be politically powerful men abusing their 
political strength. Many said that caciquismo was engineered from the 
Ministry in the Interior and could be eliminated if its destruction were 
willed at the top; to others it was the local man who was at the root of the 
matter. Depending on the analyst, too much or too little bureaucracy was 
seen as its cause. Backwardness of the economy and deep-rooted 
traditions were also at times seen as the main culprits. Caciquismo was 
said to have a socially disintegrative function and there were some, even 
among those who loathed it, who affirmed on the contrary that, all other 
things being equal, caciquismo gave cohesion to the social body.82 
                                                 
81 Cruz Artacho, Salvador. ‘Estructura y Conflicto Social en el Caciquismo Clásico. Caciques y 
Campesinos en el Mundo Rural Granadino.’ In Robles Egea, Antonio (ed.), Política en Penumbra…, p. 
193. 
82 Romero-Maura, J. ‘Caciquismo as a political system.’ In Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (ed.), 
Patrons and Clients in Meditarranean Societies. London: Duckworth, 1977, p. 53. Many of the 
definitions provided by Romero Maura belong to the Regenerationist view. 
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Most of the above definitions of cacique and caciquism which 
allow for a certain syncretism were furnished by members of the so-
called “Oxford School.”83 They started to identify 1840 as the genesis of 
the emergence of caciquism with the so-called turno pacífico84 
(alternation of the dynastic parties) between Moderates and 
Progressives—the political structure implicit in Isabelline 
parliamentarianism. As pointed out earlier, in 1840 the term caciquism 
had not been registered in the dictionary of the Real Academia. It 
appeared for the first time in 1884. Besides this important observation, 
there is another important fact brought out by the Oxford School, which 
confounds the classic argument of the Functionalists: The caciques were 
a new elite, fundamentally political, whose power did not derive from 
their resources but from their connections.85 In the 1840s an 
anachronistic aristocracy was still prevalent. Caciques were definitely not 
aristocrats. They were not necessarily even wealthy men and landowners. 
Simply put, the caciques were the intermediaries between strategic 
political networks. 
During the Restoration between 1875 and 1923, “clientelist” links 
acquired a decisive importance in empowering a mechanism of 
alternation in power inexorably interwoven with the emergence of 
patronage, which constituted a substantial part of the caciquil system. 
                                                 
83 This Oxford School of Spanish historiography was constituted by Carr, Fusi, Varela Ortega, Romero 
Maura. They challenged the traditional assumptions about Caciquismo, prevalent from the emergence 
of Regeneracionistas.  
84 Carr, Raymond. Spain 1808-1975. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, p. 366. 
85 John Sidel in order to emphasize the emergence of caciquism in Spain uses the old edition of the 
classical book written by Raymond Carr Spain: 1808-1939. Carr in 1966 had not transcended the 
secular image of cacique and caciquism furnished by the Regenerationists. It seems that Sidel wanted 
to perpetuate a notion of caciquism as a feudalistic institution. Carr later reissued this book, covering 
the history of Spain until 1975 and revisiting the argument of caciquism following the research done by 
his student Varela Ortega. 
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This system has been reduced to explain, on the one hand, behavior in 
elections and, on the other, the domination of local government, 
neglecting the fact that these elements were integrated into a global 
mechanism of the State and responded to a specific need to channel the 
access of citizens to property and common services. 
The caciquil phenomenon has revealed itself in different forms and 
on many occasions. Traditionally it has been related to electoral fraud 
and corruption but it is, above all, the logical manifestation and 
expression of a social and political structure which is displayed in 
interpersonal, patron-client ties and in politico-administrative 
relationships. This relationship made the cacique above all the 
intermediary between the central administration and ordinary citizens. 
Caciquism was not a Spanish exception, but a transitory adaptation 
of the rules of political liberalism and was inherent in an incipient 
democracy.86 It emerged with the implementation of liberalism and 
above all the suffrage, giving to the caciques a greater responsibility in 
government.87 It became an indispensable organ of national life, a 
necessary evil since as a political system it was the transition between the 
Ancien Regime and a modern state.    
The Restoration gave shape to different and multiples layers of 
caciquismo; the system certainly was not static or monolithic. 
                                                 
86 For instance, in England during the birth of the democracy emerged the “obliging friends,” analogous 
to the Spanish caciques.    
87 José Varela Ortega argues that the implementation of the suffrage in the elections preserved the 
balance between administration and party organizations which characterized the system. The 
implantation of universal suffrage during the 1890s, the local party organizations, the caciques had 
more responsibility than the government did for the organization of the elections. He calls this 
phenomenon, elections from below since the caciques attracted the masses as clients. See Varela 
Ortega, José: Los Amigos políticos. Partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración (1875-1900). 
Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia Estudios, 2001, p. 469. 
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Caciquismo with all its dysfunctions and anomalies created a national 
reality in Spain characterized by a clash between a local political culture 
and a new culture preoccupied with problems at the national level. In this 
context, the cacique was the intermediary who attracted the villagers to 
contribute or participate in the life of the nation. This attraction, 
obviously, was not always legitimate since it exploited a relationship of 
patronage—“clientelist” or paternalistic. But it was necessary in order to 
foster a national consciousness. 
The image of caciquismo as a necessary evil in Spain is completely 
different from what was presented by LeRoy and built upon by American 
and Filipino scholars after him. They prefer definitions such as Costa’s, 
which was in fact a replica of the colonial perception in the Philippines. 
Costa believed that all the laws were passed if the caciques wanted, since 
the Civil Governors confided upon the caciques in order to get the 
necessary votes and to reach the majority in the Cortes.  Costa asserted 
that the Spaniards “live subjected to the arbitrariness of a corrupted and 
corrupting minority, with no honor, Christianity, humanity. . .In Spain, 
caciquismo is a narrow system of government organized as masonry by 
regions, provinces and municipios.”88 
 Franco and his historians co-opted this portrait of Spain and 
eradicated the cancer. Lamentably, Francoism rejected a democratic 
system by promoting the image fostered by the regenerationists. Franco 
became the “iron surgeon”—the enlightened dictator advocated by 
Joaquín Costa. Moreover, he was interested in exalting novelists, 
                                                 
88 Costa, Joaquin. Oligarquía y Caciquismo como la forma actual de gobierno en España, p. 21. 
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thinkers, and critics such as Pereda, Galdós, Clarín and Blasco Ibáñez 
who wrote deep indictments against caciquismo as an evil which 
corrupted Spain. Ortega, Pérez de Ayala and Azaña would revive the 
same question in 1914, denouncing the immorality, injustice and personal 
benefit that the caciquil system gave to the oligarchies. This pessimistic 
view, prevalent until the recent past in Spain, neglected the fact that the 
Restoration gave way to the restructuring or reorganization of democratic 
institutions, which offered a new vision of how to rule Spain and above 
all how to build up a new colonialism similar to European systems. 
The emergent caciques at the turn of the nineteenth century were 
uniquely and exclusively Spaniards. In fact we could define “cacique” as 
a representative of a new political class, and “caciquism” as a feature of 
the transitional period toward democratic institutions in Spain. Caciquism 
was never implemented by the Spaniards in the Philippines and if it had 




The Impact of Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines   
Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines was a complete 
success. The paper was published with a specific mission: to paralyze the 
process of self-government and the voices of the independentistas during 
the Congressional trip which would take place in the summer of 1905.89 
The response to the criticisms of Ireland was simply an excuse in order 
not to arouse the suspicions of the Filipinos. LeRoy had supplied a very 
                                                 
89 James A. LeRoy would go on this trip as personal secretary of William H. Taft.  
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good argument to Taft: to silence the Filipino radical voices and above 
all to deviate attention away from the present conditions of the 
archipelago. Taft could claim that caciquism had betrayed the liberty 
bestowed by the Americans in the form of native-controlled local 
governments. LeRoy had inaugurated an important topic which was to 
appear again and again as a curse on Filipino aspirations toward self-
government until 1946. LeRoy had stigmatized the Filipino political 
leadership as caciques, and had moreover demonstrated that the 
Spaniards were guilty of creating or connived with this system. The 
Spanish system was made out to be static and despotic until the very end. 
LeRoy sent his paper to Barrows and to his Filipino friends in the 
Partido Federal. Although LeRoy considered the latter as part of the 
cacique aristocracy, they were to understand caciquism as a Spanish 
inheritance (as LeRoy depicted it) but in the context of its Spanish usage. 
LeRoy was to abuse and misuse this term until he died.  
When Barrows read the article he sent a letter LeRoy in order to 
congratulate him. “I got the copy of the Atlantic Monthly with your 
article therein and read it with a great deal of interest,” he wrote, “The 
subject is one that has interested me of late and is, I think probably the 
most important social problem with which we have to deal here in the 
Philippines.”90 Barrows proposed to eradicate this curse through the 
establishment of publish schools. He viewed local justice as administered 
by justices of peace as an important source of the caciquism scourge. He 
also gave the term a new ramification already noted by LeRoy—
                                                 
90 David P. Barrows to James A. LeRoy, May 31, 1905. Robertson, James Alexander. Annapolis. Md. 
Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. North Carolina: Duke University. 
 286 
caciquism as related to usury—another meaning that would be 
expounded on by future scholars. However, Barrow’s explanation of 
what caciquism meant posed some questions in his   mind. He said to 
LeRoy: 
Many of them [justices of peace] are engaged in the business of 
collecting debts: A man will approach them who has secured on 
some poor wretch an obligation which has multiplied several times 
in a relatively short time; the justice of peace agrees to collect it for 
a contingent proportion and, like the man in the biblical parable, he 
is hauled before the magistrate whence he is delivered into jail… 91 
 
The caciques did not collect any debt in Spain, and caciquism was 
not related to usury, as we have seen. The dimension of cacique behavior 
given by Barrows fits perfectly with the role of the bosses in the United 
States. This would imply that, in fact, caciquism was a system introduced 
by the Americans. However, it is important to remember that the justices 
of peace emerged during late Spanish rule with the implementation of the 
new Civil and Penal Code. One of the tasks of the jueces de paz was 
precisely to collect taxes and debts. Barrows de-contextualizes the task of 
the jueces de paz and, at the same time, implies that this behavior was 
inherited from the Spaniards. 
LeRoy also sent his article to Florentino Torres and Jose Albert. 
He justified the publication of the paper by claiming that he was refuting 
the arguments of Alleyne Ireland, who doubted the capacity of the 
Filipinos for self-government.  LeRoy completely distorted Ireland’s 
argument in order to gain the understanding and sympathy of some 
Filipinos. For example, he wrote to Torres: 
                                                 
91 David P. Barrows to James A. LeRoy, May 31, 1905. 
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You will receive my article “The Spanish Inheritance in the 
Philippines.” I wrote this after reading the articles of our censor, 
Mr. Alleyne Ireland. He compares our procedures in the 
Philippines with those of what the English have made and are 
making in their colonies and always unfavorably for us. Our 
procedures are different; we want the development of the Filipinos 
instead of the territory.92 
 
LeRoy stresses that the Americans are different from the English in 
wanting “development” for the Philippines rather than territorial 
occupation. Taft’s promise, “the Philippines for the Filipinos,” is 
reiterated here. In his letter to Jose Albert, LeRoy added another 
dimension to his critique of Ireland: 
I sent my contribution about “The Spanish Inheritance in the 
Philippines.” The idea I had in mind by writing it was to refute the 
findings of Professor Alleyne Ireland about the present government 
in the Philippines and about the capacity of the Filipinos for future 
improvement. I wanted to demonstrate with historical facts the 
defects of the previous social regime in the Philippines.93 
 
LeRoy here is trying to convince his friend that caciquism was 
something inherited from Spain and so the Filipinos were not guilty of 
creating that situation. Privately, however, he called his ilustrado friends 
caciques and in fact considered them in his paper as instruments for 
perpetuating the old Spanish order. LeRoy was successful in disguising 
his criticism of his Filipino friends. They did not suspect that they had 
become the icons of oligarchism and a cacique aristocracy. Albert, for 
instance, congratulated LeRoy for the article; “The question that you 
raise concerning caciquism as the fruit of the old administration, is a 
                                                 
92 James A. LeRoy to Florentino Torres, Durango, Mexico, 23 February 1905. Robertson, James 
Alexander. Annapolis. Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. 
93 James A. LeRoy to Jose Albert, Durango, Mexico, 23 March 1905. Robertson, James Alexander. 
Annapolis. Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. 
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crucial one. My people like others cannot just strip themselves of this 
inheritance whenever they so wish. It requires time.”94 
The Filipino conservatives tacitly accepted that caciquism was 
endemic under the existing social conditions in the Philippines. They did 
not realize that LeRoy was misrepresenting some of them as bearers of 
evils that would justify continued American tutelage. This 
misrepresentation of the educated Filipinos as caciques was meant by 
LeRoy to convince American public opinion of the necessity to hold the 
Philippines. The newspapers, the academe, books, reports and speeches 
echoed the major points in LeRoy’s paper, ensuring that caciquism would 
henceforth become a recurrent issue. This work would consecrate LeRoy 
as an authority and the most accurate scholar on Philippine matters. 
“If I am to single out one chapter which has given me the most 
new light,” wrote the President of the University of Michigan to LeRoy 
“I shall choose that on the caciques.”95  No doubt, the cacique argument 
was illuminating for the president of the University of Michigan. It 
offered the perfect platform from which to justify the shortcomings of the 
American government in the Philippines. LeRoy’s crusade against 
caciquism and the caciques was followed by other American scholar-
officials who echoed the opinions prevalent in the United States. 
In July 1905 the U.S. Attorney General Wilfley made a speech that 
the newspapers El Mercantil and the Daily Bulletin decided to publish 
                                                 
94 Jose Albert to James A. LeRoy, May 22 1905. Robertson, James Alexander. Annapolis. Md. 
Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. 
95 James R. Angell –President of the University of Michigan—to James A. LeRoy, Ann Arbor, 
December 7, 1905. Personal Letters of LeRoy James Alfred, 1875-1909. Box 1. Ann Arbor: Bentley 
Library, University of Michigan. 
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because of it relevance to “the Philippine problem.” Wilfley’s speech 
presented even more dramatic dimensions of the curse called caciquism: 
The Attorney General Wilfley ascribes to Filipino bandits and 
caciques the main causes of the restlessness and public disorder 
observed in the provinces. The ladron is a figure quite well studied 
in order that the Americans become familiarized with internal 
conditions and get to know where his power and influence lie; in 
turn, caciquism is hardly known.96 [emphasis added] 
 
This last sentence by Wilfley is paradigmatic since his definition of 
caciquism is a “galimatias”. If for LeRoy, caciquism, is something 
inherited and sometimes inherent in the Filipinos, for Wilfley, caciquism 
is an institution that is universal in the archipelago and inherent in the 
Filipino people. In fact, Wilfley assures his reader that “caciquism was an 
old Malay institution.”97 He believes that it is the duty of the United 
States to eradicate the power of the caciques since this evil is 
contributing to the present discontent and disorder. Suddenly, caciquism 
has become synonymous with ladronism; both terms are co-opted from 
the Spanish language, with pejorative connotations. Caciquism is related 
to the aristocracy. It originates from the wealth, education, and religious 
and political conditions that fostered ladrones and latrofacciosos. Wilfley 
was simply articulating the same arguments that Taft had stated privately.  
I have emphasized the terms ladrones and latrofacciosos. We can 
see that Wilfley was presenting an image of “bad Spanish rule” through 
                                                 
96 Daily Bulletin, reproduced by El Mercantil Manila, July 13, 1905. LeRoy, James A. papers. Box 2. 
97 E.W. Kemmener, Professor at Princeton University, uses Wilfley’s argument of caciquism to explain 
the corruption in the elections and to demonstrate that the Filipinos were not still prepared for self-
government, since the political bosses were a dominant factor in the archipelago. The ambiguities 
presented by LeRoy and Wilfley about caciquism are still prevalent since sometimes this is related to 
the rural areas and sometimes caciques are the political class. Kemmener’s paper is an accurate 
reflection of the triumph of the discourse by presenting Spain as a yoke of medievalism. His sources 
are Barrows, LeRoy, Blair and Robertson and American reports. LeRoy had been successful.  
Kemmener, E.W. ‘The Progress of the Filipino People toward Self-government.’ Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, 1908, p. 72.  
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the use of Spanish terms that implied that the Americans were dragging 
the yoke of Spanish medievalism. The Americans were successful in 
stereotyping these terms in the Philippines. Caciquism was a Spanish 
word for a Spanish phenomenon that was never implanted in the 
Philippines. However, after 1905 this cliché of the Spaniards as the 
makers of caciquism would become stereotyped in American books. 
Ladronism is not really a Spanish word. It derives from the 
Spanish “ladrón” (thief). Ladronism was introduced by American writers 
with reference to Latin American corruption. As a matter of fact, 
ladronism was the equivalent of caciquism in some countries of Latin 
America.  The use of the term shows us how the Americans encapsulated 
the Philippines in Latin American by using the same terminology there. 
More interesting is the use of the term latrofaccioso, a conjoining of 
latrocinio (action or habit of robbing) and facción (designates a group of 
those who rob). This term latrofaccioso was used in the eighteenth and 
the nineteenth centuries as a synonym of bandolerismo. By deploying the 
terms ladronism and latrofaccioso, the Americans turned these 
phenomena into Spanish legacies in the Philippines. 
   Wilfley stresses that the most powerful caciques at present are 
the authorities in charge of municipal governments. Wilfley thus 
subscribed to the same argument as Taft’s, LeRoy’s, Worcester’s and 
others in the future. The evil existing in the municipalities was the direct 
result of the laws created by the U.S. commission. The Americans, 
however, could not admit that the real cause of the difficulties in the 
municipalities was the misguided implantation of their own institutions. 
 291 
The inhabitants of the towns and above all the municipal governors could 
not adjust easily to the new system. Furthermore, there was a strict 
restriction of the franchise in local elections. All this would be turned 
into a powerful argument by the Americans against the alleged evil of 
indigenous government, necessitating the postponement of self-
government and independence. 
Wilfley’s argument about inept municipal officials leads him to 
conclude with a revealing statement: “Among the caciques, there are 
wealthy aristocrats and ilustrados.98 And from the enlightenment by the 
caciques another institution has been created—the “inahin,” a society 
dedicated to robbing carabaos.”99 Wilfley here suggests that the cacique 
aristocrats have such great control over the masses that they can be 
directed towards illegal activities. 
Despite the inaccuracies in his speech, Wilfley was correct in some 
of his conclusions. He stated that caciquism had been furnished by the 
policy implemented by McKinley since he had given official positions to 
inept natives. However, Wilfley denies the fact that the laws and arbitrary 
policy of appointment implemented by McKinley was fostering a system 
of patronage. 
El Mercantil fiercely criticized Wilfley’s argument about 
caciquism. Instead, this newspaper praised Our Spanish Inheritance in 
the Philippines, but not for LeRoy’s ambiguous arguments that made 
caciquism sometimes a Filipino, and sometimes a Spanish, coercive 
                                                 
98 The term is ambiguous since we can assume that Wilfley is alluding to the Filipino Ilustrados or 
those educated. However, in this context, it seems Wilfley means “educated.” The establishment of a 
relationship between cacique and ilustrado would not be new. 
99 El Mercantil, Manila, July 13 1905. 
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institution. On the contrary, El Mercantil astutely argued that LeRoy 
considered Filipino caciquism to be “not as oppressive as American 
bossism.” El Mercantil’s argument made sense: if the Filipinos were 
caciques, then the Americans were bosses, and therefore these kinds of 
systems were inherent in any society; in any case, the bosses were more 
violent and arbitrary than the caciques. 
El Mercantil assumed that caciquism was a municipal mechanism, 
a “product of our country,” and an important catalyst of peace and order. 
Do we take this to mean that the Filipinos tacitly accepted caciquism as 
an indigenous institution? This assumption, however, conceals an 
important argument. Taft and his commissioners had started to accuse 
Aguinaldo and his Filipino Republic of being the catalyst of caciquism. 
Therefore, El Mercantil was providing a counterargument to such 
American criticism by inferring that the government of Aguinaldo was 
able to maintain order and to secure the rights of property as well as 
respect for the laws. Thus, if this indigenous government furnished a 
caciquil system, then caciquism provided order and peace—i.e., it was a 
necessary evil. This idea is quite different from that outlined by LeRoy, 
Wilfley and other American officials and scholars. 
Knowing the trajectory of El Mercantil, one wouldn’t be surprised 
to read these positive arguments about caciquism. El Mercantil was a 
Spanish-Filipino newspaper to which the political and labor campaigner 
Dominador Gomez contributed. For this, in fact, he was awarded an 
extraordinary prize. Gomez was one of the voices clamoring for 
immediate independence. He emphasized that if caciquism ever existed, 
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it was a system inherent in any country. We must also understand that El 
Mercantil was the organ of the Spanish community in the Philippines.100 
Its writers were completely familiar with the Spanish provenance of the 
term and the phenomenon.  LeRoy, however, did not seem to notice the 
disguised criticisms in El Mercantil. He never commented on the 
argument that if caciquism were indeed a Filipino institution, then it 
certainly worked better than American institutions. 
The most sweeping criticism of the notion of caciquism as a 
Filipino institution came from a group of prominent Filipinos who, on 28 
August 1905 presented to a visiting U.S. delegation the Copia del 
Memorial pidiendo La Independencia de Filipinas presentado ante la 
Comitiva Taft. (Copy of the Memorial asking for The Independence of 
the Philippines presented to Taft’s Party). The list of signatories calling 
themselves ciudadanos Filipinos included Baldomero Aguinaldo, 
Galicano Apacible, Dominador Gomez, Vicente and Justo Lukban, 
Vicente Ilustre, Alberto Barreto and Teodoro Sandiko,101 all of whom 
were either veterans of the war or campaigners for independence. In fact, 
this memorial was suppressed by Taft for claiming for immediate 
independence, and was never published. The ciudadanos Filipinos can be 
considered as an incipient nationalist party, although they were criticized 
by later nationalists. 
Ilustre and Barreto were the group’s spokesmen before the visiting 
U.S. congressional party. Ilustre advocated immediate independence, 
                                                 
100 Retana, Wenceslao E. Aparato Bibliográfico de la Historia General de Filipinas, 1906, Vol. 3, entry 
4614, pp. 1794-1798. 
101 It is important to note this memorial was signed by Filipino educated and some peasants. 
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presenting this memorial to that effect.102 The message of the memorial, 
however, was quickly de-contextualized by the Americans, who rejected 
it categorically. Later on, some Filipino nationalists, taking the cue from 
the selective American reading and citation of the document, would 
reject it themselves. Since the document was never published, it could 
not be consulted directly except by a few with access to the original. 
Let us examine carefully the arguments of the ciudadanos 
Filipinos. In asking for immediate independence, they offered as proof of 
the people’s capacity to rule themselves the existence in the islands of a 
“clase directora” (directing class) governing the “popular masses”: “It is 
undeniable that in the Philippines there exist what is called a clase 
directora, a small portion of individuals with positions in the present 
government, and a popular mass that is governable.”103 This depiction of 
society was de-contextualized by Taft who dismissed the memorial as 
part of an incipient “oligarchism.” LeRoy suspected that Barreto and 
Lukban were behind this plain declaration for aristocratic government as 
the only possible government in the Philippines. Taft and LeRoy together 
argued that this clase directora was, in the final analysis, the 
personification of caciquism.  
          These arguments by Taft and LeRoy had their raison d’être but 
were quite distant from reality. The ciudadanos Filipinos argued for a 
government run by a “clase directora” by making reference to the 
                                                 
102 Maximo M. Kalaw considered Copia del Memorial “was in one respect unfortunate.” Kalaw 
Maximo M.  The Development of Filipino Policy. Manila: P.I. Oriental Comercial Company, 1927, p. 
283. 
103 Copia del Memorial pidiendo la Independencia de Filipinas presentando ante La Comitiva Taft, 
August 28, 1905, p.3. Le Roy James A. papers. Box 2. Ann Arbor: Bentley Library, University of 
Michigan. 
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Filipino Republic of 1898 as de facto governed effectively by such a 
class or body of individuals. They described how the “political capacity” 
of Filipinos was demonstrated during the “ephemeral life” of the Filipino 
Republic, which “ruled with total tranquility, where the orders from 
above were executed and obeyed by the masses.” It’s true, they admitted, 
that economic welfare was lacking during the Republic, but that was 
because of the “abnormal state of affairs” then (i.e., the war against the 
Americans).104 Obviously, this argument was not acceptable for the new 
Philippine history that LeRoy and other Americans were constructing. 
Aguinaldo’s government and the Filipino Republic had to be depicted in 
terms of a despotic oligarchy ruling over the masses who obeyed blindly. 
The criticisms by Taft and LeRoy gravitate around two important 
issues brought out by the ciudadanos Filipinos in their memorial. First 
was the assertion that the Americans were not carrying out their duties 
such as McKinley had promised—to tutor the Filipinos in establishing a 
stable government. On the contrary, said the ciudadanos Filipinos, the 
Americans were promoting instability by “implanting an inadaptable 
government into the Filipinos’ own environment. The understanding was 
that the government to be established had to have features that were fully 
Filipino.”105  
The second and the most important issue was about caciquismo. 
The  ciudadanos Filipinos felt that the Americans were using the issue of 
caciquism to undermine the political capacity of the Filipinos. They 
disputed this argument with an important and provocative explanation: 
                                                 
104 Copia del Memorial…, pp. 3-4. 
105 Copia del Memorial…, p. 4 
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Caciquismo could not have existed in this country, where the 
enslavement that characterizes it has found minimal expression. It 
has not existed as a unique tradition of the country. And if later it 
was found to exist here, precisely it was at the time when the 
country was about to be independent. This is commonly the case in 
other free countries.106 
 
In other words, they were denying that caciquism was something 
endemic in the Philippines. They were arguing that caciquism was a 
typical system of patronage inherent in any country or society 
experiencing the transition from one stage to another, and that it appears 
in different ways in different societies. 
In sum, the ciudadanos Filipinos considered it unfair for the 
Americans to reject their political capacity by blaming them for 
something called caciquism. Needless to say, Taft disliked this memorial 
and above all its negation of caciquism—a topic that the Americans 
usually trotted out whenever they had to reject Filipino demands for  
complete self-government. Besides, Taft was rather concerned about the 
last sentence that they wrote in capital letters: IMMEDIATE 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS WITH 
DECLARATION OF PERPETUAL NEUTRALITY. 
The ciudadanos Filipinos were using a language in vogue at that 
time. By clase directora they meant a political ruling class. At the turn of 
the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century the political 
ruling class in Spain distributed among the parties was defined as clase 
directora. This expression developed into clase dirigente. Now dirigente 
is the old Latin active participle and it means the same as directora.  In 
fact, both words are synonymous but language usage over time has given 
                                                 
106 Copia del Memorial…, p. 5. 
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them differing associations: the term dirigente is strictly related to 
politics while director-ora is interwoven with business and academe. In 
using the term clase directora, the ciudadanos filipinos were not 
referring at all to any form of oligarchism or caciquism. LeRoy, however, 
misrepresented them as a cacique class, probably following Joaquín 
Costa who stated in 1901: “Oligarcas y caciques constituyen lo que 
solemos denominar clase directora o gobernante, distribuida y encasillada 
en partidos.” (Oligarchs and caciques constitute what we usually define 
as a directing or governing class, distributed and pigeonholed in 
parties.)107 
The examples of El Mercantil and the Ciudadanos Filipinos show 
us that the Filipinos had a deep knowledge of politics. They had lived 
through the development of Spanish democracy and her system of 
patronage. They understood the important role that Spanish caciquism 
played in the consolidation of the state. This is the reason they advocated 
caciquism as necessary in the development of the state and congruent 
with national stability. However, LeRoy set a precedent  and trend for the 
future through his observation that caciquism was an atavism evoking 
syncretic forms of past traditions that had persisted to challenge and 
distort the emerging American modernity. LeRoy succeeded in 
paralyzing the process of self-government, silencing voices such as 
Dominador Gomez’s and suppressing the Memorial. The topic would 
emerge again in 1914 in the move to halt the policy of Filipinization and 
in 1921 to deny the Filipinos independence. LeRoy had established the 
                                                 
107 Costa Joaquín. Oligarquía y caciquismo…, p. 4. 
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CHAPTER VIII: ENCAPSULATING MEDIEVAL PHILIPPINES 
IN LATIN AMERICA--THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 1493-1898 
 
I ordered “The Philippine Islands” for the 
Ethnological Survey and also for this bureau. 
We have received here about seven volumes. I 
have been somewhat disappointed in the 
series, taking it on the whole. It does not 
publish originals untranslated, and its resume 
of documents, as it calls it, is absurd. 
 
       David P. Barrows 
 
 The Philippine Islands 1493-1803 was the fruit of the most 
ambitious project by the Americans to rewrite the history of the 
Philippines after their occupation of the islands. It began in 1902 
although at that moment it was confidential.1 It seems that the gestation 
in that year of a project to publish a multivolume compilation of Spanish 
primary sources translated into English was not a coincidence. In 1902 
the archipelago, on paper, was pacified. It was opportune, since the 
Philippines was constantly in the headlines, to publish a work covering 
the three centuries of Spanish rule in order to understand some present 
troubles which the United States was facing. However, in 1902 there was 
not a single American scholar with expert knowledge of Philippine 
history. Therefore, the Arthur Clark Company, publishers of the 
compilation, had to rely on “Americanistas” to select the documents, to 
translate them and finally to provide a historical introduction to the work. 
                                                 
1 Emma Blair on June 25th, 1902 wrote to Edward Ayer announcing this project and asking for 
information. It is quite clear that Miss Blair was the brain of this project, despite all the honors going to 
Robertson. Ayer Edward Papers, folder 7. Chicago: Newberry Library. 
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The historian selected to tie together this multivolume compendium was 
Edward Gaylord Bourne2 of Yale University. 
 The selection of Bourne would give The Philippine Islands 1493-
1803 a specific shape. As an expert on Latin America in the sixteenth 
century, Bourne’s perspective enabled the Philippines to be encapsulated 
into Spanish America and considered as an evangelization mission. This 
is the reason the multivolume work starts in 1493. Bourne gave it the 
stamp of rigorous historical objectivity since he did the analyses, 
demonstrating how to test historical statements in a practical way. 
 The organization of the multivolume work reflects two important 
phases in its construction. The first five volumes were put together 
according to the criteria laid down by Bourne, which was to provide the 
American public with “trustworthy” documents. For accuracy’s sake, 
they even considered publishing the Spanish originals together with the 
English translations. The critical review of these initial volumes by James 
LeRoy, published in The American Historical Review, led to a complete 
change of the work’s format. LeRoy became the director of the project 
from volume 6 onwards. The sixth volume, in fact, contains an “editorial 
announcement” that the compilation would cover the whole span of 
Spanish administration. At that point, the history project became part of 
the American administrative machinery. LeRoy would dictate which 
documents to publish and which ones to ignore. At the same time, he was 
closely in touch, as we have seen, with the architects of U.S. colonial 
policy in the islands. 
                                                 
2 Many are the books written by Bourne but maybe the most important work was a small book entitled 
“Spain in America,” published in 1905.  
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 This chapter examines how The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 was 
constructed, and how the initial criticisms made by LeRoy were 
transformed into praises for the work and its authors. We shall show that 
from volume 6 onwards the prefaces and the documents selected have a 
specific purpose: to discredit the Spanish administration through the 
omission of certain works, the de-contextualization of others, and the use 
of certain epithets to define the Spanish bureaucracy and the natives. For 
this purpose, I shall then focus on two significant works that can be 
regarded as examples of suppression, de-contextualization and ad hoc 
mistranslation. 
 
The Philippines Islands, 1493-1898: its gestation and editors 
 
In the spring of 1902 a new company called The Arthur H. Clark 
Company of Cleveland Ohio was formed. Its objective was “to set upon a 
course of seeking out and encouraging talented historians, developing 
individual projects, and publishing a body of works on American history, 
biography and narrative.3 Clark immediately arranged with Archer B. 
Hulbert to initiate a series of books entitled Historic Highways of 
America. He then met with James A. Robertson and Emma H. Blair, with 
whom he had worked on a book project previously, and convinced them 
to undertake the publication of a second major series to be titled The 
Philippines Islands, 1493-1803.4 Because the Philippine islands were 
                                                 
3 Clark, Robert A. and Patrick J. Brunet. The Arthur H. Clark Company. An Americana Century 1902-
2002.  Spokane, Washington: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 2002, p. 15. 
4 With Volume sixth, the dates for inclusion changed to “1493-1898.” To cover all the years under 
Spain. 
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constantly in the headlines as a result of the Spanish-American War, all 
parties felt that this project had a good chance of commercial success.5 
The full title of the multivolume compendium was: The Philippine 
Islands 1493-1898. Explorations by Early Navigators, Descriptions of 
the Islands and their Peoples, their History and Records of the Catholic 
Missions, as related in contemporaneous Books and Manuscripts, 
showing the Political, Economic, Commercial and Religious Conditions 
of those Islands from their earliest relations with European Nations to 
the beginning of the Nineteenth Century. Translated from the Original. 
One of the priorities of this work was to present Spanish documents and 
manuscripts to the public “with the intention and hope of casting light on 
the great problems which confront the American people in the 
Philippines; and of furnishing authentic and trustworthy material for a 
thorough and scholarly history of the islands.”6 
To announce the publication of primary documentary materials for 
the public is rather ambiguous since a priori the main purpose of such 
works is to provide material for scholars. At least, this was the expressed 
purpose of putting together Spanish collections of primary sources such 
as Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino.7  Then the editors connect the 
documentary collection to “great problems” which confront the 
American people. What do they mean? The answer is provided by the 
editors in their prefaces. By reading them one is drawn to the conclusion 
                                                 
5 Clark, Robert A. and Patrick J. Brunet.The Arthur Clark Company…, p. 29. 
6 Blair, Emma Helen and James Alexander Robertson. (ed.) , ‘General Preface.’ The Philippine Islands 
1493-1898. Ohio, Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1903-1907. Vol. 1.  
7 The Philippine Islands is a replica of Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino edited by Wenceslao E. Retana. 
Blair and Robertson published some of the documents included in Retana’s work and they translated 
into English. 
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that the Americans had inherited the problems left by the oppressive, 
immoral and tyrannical Spaniards. These epithets can be found 
practically in all the prefaces.8 Moreover, the editors systematically 
furnish the idea that “slavery” was a pre-Hispanic institution maintained 
by the Spaniards. For instance, in introducing the documents in volume 8 
the editors state that “a revolt of the Zambales and Negritos of Western 
Luzon is quelled and the surviving insurgents are dispersed or 
enslaved.”9 Blair and Robertson do not add any more comments. They do 
not explain under what circumstances the Spaniards enslaved the indios. 
This is one of the problems of The Philippine Islands. The prefaces are 
mere descriptions, mostly quite biased, of the documents without 
explaining the intricacies of Spanish administration. No wonder LeRoy 
considered the prefaces an unnecessary waste of space.”10 
Blair and Robertson devote four volumes to the years 1493-1580. 
During these years Philip II did not send any Royal Decrees to the 
islands. However, the editors do not explain why there is this lack of 
official documents for this period. They assume that the Philippines was 
then a civilizing mission more than a colony, thus the absence of Royal 
Decrees.  
This presumption disguises important arguments related to the 
1580 annexation of Portugal by Philip II. This important event paved the 
way for the imperialism of the second half of Philip II’s sovereignty. It 
gave the Spanish administration the freedom to implement a true political 
                                                 
8 Blair, Emma H. & James Alexander Robertson. The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. Cleveland, the 
Arthur H. Clark Company 1903-1907. See for instance the prefaces of volumes 6, 7, 8 or 10.  
9 Blair & Robertson  ‘preface.’ The Philippine Islands 1493-1898,  vol. 8, pp. 9-10. 
10 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson , October 8, 1904. James A. Robertson papers. Box 5. 
Washington: The Library of Congress. 
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base in the Philippines. Until that time, any movement could arouse the 
suspicion of Portugal which thought that the archipelago was within its 
demarcation line, and they were right. Therefore, in examining the first 
period of Spanish rule we must take into consideration the fact that 1580 
to 1589 was a developmental phase leading to the consolidation of the 
Philippines as a colony from 1590 to 1602. 
The lack of official (i.e., Royal) documents until 1580 led the 
editors Blair and Robertson to co-opt the black legend of the Spanish 
conquest. They assumed, through the documents sent by bishop Salazar, 
that there was a radical social and economical transformation in the 
native communities and that the native population was seriously 
decimated. On the contrary, careful analysis of the first twenty years 
from the arrival of Legazpi to Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas (1590), shows 
that this was a period of the coexistence of both societies.11 
As for the incidence of slavery, the editors were making an 
isomorphism with the present in order to foster the notion that this 
institution was endemic in the archipelago. We will recall that the alleged 
slavery12 practiced by the caciques was regarded as a serious impediment 
to the implantation of the spirit of American institutions in preparation 
for self-government. Blair and Robertson provide many examples of 
slavery tolerated or connived in by the Spaniards. In the example given 
above, when they state that the Spaniards enslaved the insurgents, they 
                                                 
11 Cano, Glòria. La Formación de una Colonia: Filipinas 1569-1614.  
12 As has been explained in a previous chapter, James A. LeRoy in The Americans in the Philippines 
considered caciquism and slavery as synonymous. In 1913, Dean C. Worcester would furnish the same 
argument in Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands. 
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do not explain to the readers that Spanish policy tolerated “slavery” in 
cases of “justa Guerra” (just war). 
The thrust of the editorial selection of documents and events was to 
demonstrate that the problems of the present—i.e., pacifying and 
administering the islands—were inherited from the Spaniards. The 
examples provided are inextricably related to the matter of “trustworthy” 
and “authentic” material. As will be explained in detail later, the material 
was not new, since most of the documents had been published in other 
collections. Blair and Robertson provided many friar accounts and a few 
royal decrees, mostly extracted from La Recopilación de las Leyes de 
Indias. Obviously, the material was authentic but highly selective. 
Another problem was the mistranslation, decontextualization, and 
misinterpretation of the documents and the facts they contained, 
especially when LeRoy collaborated with the editors.  Despite these 
serious problems, The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 became, and is still 
considered to be, the best and most comprehensive source of historical 
materials on the Philippines during the Spanish regime.13 
    
Emma Helen Blair (1851-1911) 
It is surprising that practically a hundred years after the completion 
of this work we hardly know anything about its editors. Emma Blair 
obtained her Bachelor of Arts probably at Ripon College. She had a 
mastery of French and Spanish, which paved the way for a scholarly 
                                                 
13 Churchill, B.R. ‘The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, edited by Emma Helen Blair and James 
Alexander Robertson’ in Philippine Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Quezon City: Philippine 
Social Science Council, 1993 , vol. II, p. 79. I owe this information to Professor Yoshiko Nagano, who 
sent me this document.   
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career. Teaching did not satisfy her, however, and so in 1877 she joined 
the staff of the Christian Statesman, a Milwaukee newspaper. She took 
up graduate studies at the University of Wisconsin in 1892, and later 
joined the library staff of the Wisconsin Historical Society as assistant 
librarian. In 1894 Blair resigned from the library staff to work as chief 
assistant to Dr. Twaites.14   
I know Miss Blair could understand French but I have not found 
any evidence that she could speak, read or even understand Spanish, 
although she is said to have translated many of the documents. Miss Blair 
was at the beginning the brain of the team and, in fact, in June 1902 she 
wrote to Ayer: 
I have just made arrangements with a publisher for the issue of a 
series (covering more than fifty volumes) to comprise documents 
relating to the early history of the Philippines. . . the period 
covered will be from 1493 to 1803. I have sent to Spain my 
associate editor [James A. Robertson].15 
 
Blair was the first one to complain when LeRoy criticized the 
initial volumes of this compendium, and she it was who also drew 
LeRoy, then Consul at Durango, into the project itself. It seems that in 
1909 the University of Wisconsin awarded Blair an M.A. degree, honoris 
causa. This is practically all the information we have about her. E. 
Arsenio Manuel adds a bit more information which is mainly 
hagiographic, such as for instance that the motives which influenced 
Miss Blair to undertake this work were in great measure philanthropic.16 
This philanthropy had a clear aim: to provide the main reference source 
                                                 
14 Arsenio Manuel E.Dictionary of Philippine Biography. Quezon City: Filipiniana Publications, 1996. 
Vol. 4, p. 98. I owe this information to Professor Yoshiko Nagano.  
15 Emma H. Blair to Edward E. Ayer, June 25, 1902. Ayer Edwards papers, folder 7.Chicago: 
Newberry Library. 
16 Manuel, Arsenio E.Dictionary of Philippine Biography., p. 98. 
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for Philippine history (the only one of any value at all in the English 
language) and to make the Philippine question one of great importance in 
American national life.17 She wanted to “assist in solving the problems of 
governing the Islands.”18 She died of cancer in September 1911, just days 
after having received an advance copy of volume one of her Indian 
Tribes of the Upper Mississippi Valley—her last contribution to 
scholarship.19 
 
James Alexander Robertson (1873-1939) 
Better known than Miss Blair, probably owing to his commitment 
to the American administration, James A. Robertson is identified as an 
American translator, scholar and bibliographer. In 1892 he entered 
Adelbert College, Western Reserve University in Cleveland, specializing 
in Romance languages and obtained his Ph.B. in 1896. 
The heavier part of the burden of collecting materials for The 
Philippine Islands 1493-1898 fell upon Robertson’s shoulders. This took 
him in 1902-1907 to the archives and libraries of Spain, Portugal, France, 
Italy, England and the United States in search of original editions, rare 
prints, and manuscripts. He contacted historians, bibliophiles, and other 
such experts in the various countries he visited to seek help in evaluating, 
translating, and annotating the works he had selected, or in writing 
introductions to the various materials gathered. Robertson himself did a 
                                                 
17 James A. LeRoy to Emma Blair, Durango, Mexico, November, 1903.Personal letters of LeRoy 
James A. Box 1. Ann Arbor: Bentley Library, University of Michigan. 
18 Editorial of the Wisconsin State Journal. 
19 Clark, Robert A. and Patrick J. Brunet.The Arthur H. Clark Company, p. 80. 
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great deal of translating and annotating.20 Arsenio Manuel states that 
Robertson contacted historians and experts in several countries. 
Curiously, in the case of Spain, Robertson made contact with Wenceslao 
Retana, Eduardo Navarro, Pablo Pastells and Giner de los Ríos. Retana 
and Navarro could have helped him to understand the nineteenth century 
since both considered the revolt of 1896 as the result of the reformist 
policy implanted in the archipelago. However, LeRoy advised Robertson 
and even Arthur Clark against consulting Retana. The Jesuit Father 
Pastells was more useful for he could provide support for the idea of a 
Spanish regime that was more a mission than a colony. And as for Giner 
de los Ríos, this prominent educator and philosopher had nothing to do 
with the Philippines but he was one of the makers of the new educational 
system in Spain that eventually was transplanted in the archipelago.21 
Following LeRoy’s advice, Giner de los Ríos would be ignored for the 
obvious reason that his education reforms would raise questions about 
the cornerstone of American rule: education. 
 Robertson’s work was considered significant and he became 
Doctor because of his achievements. He received praise from LeRoy, 
Manuel Artigas22 and above all A. Curtis Wilgus, who wrote Hispanic 
American Essays. A Memorial to James Alexander Robertson. While 
Miss Blair passed practically unnoticed, Robertson kept in touch with 
                                                 
20 Arsenio, Manuel E. Dictionary of Philippine Biography, vol. 2 pp. 304-313. Other important source 
to know James A. Robertson is Wilgus Curtis, A. Hispanic American Essays. A Memorial to James 
Alexander Robertson. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1942. 
21 Francisco Giner de los Ríos suffered the university purge during the Restoration. He was one of the 
founders of La Institución Libre de Enseñanza. This institution introduced in Spain the most modern 
pedagogical and scientific theories which were developing around Europe.  
22 Artigas y Cuerva, Manuel. Quien es Retana. Su Antaño y Hogaño. Reseña Bibliográfica. Manila: 
Imprenta y Litografía de Juan Fajardo, 1911. 
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LeRoy who from 1904 was practically dictating the shape of The 
Philippine Islands from volumes 6 to 52. Recommended by LeRoy to 
Taft and Superintendent of Education Barrows, Robertson reached the 
apex of his career with his appointment as chief librarian of The 
Philippine Library.  
When Robertson became the head of the Philippine Library he 
wrote a history of the library and its holdings. This account is really 
interesting since it demonstrates de facto the political character of 
Robertson: imperialist. Through this history of the library he mounted a 
strong criticism of Spanish rule as having suffered from lassitude and 
decrepitude. As with the whole system of Spanish institutions, the library 
under the Spanish regime was criticized by Robertson as broken down 
and practically non-existent. 
Robertson does not mention that the Filipino ilustrado, Pedro 
Paterno, was the librarian during Spanish rule. This brings us to the issue 
of misinformation or the suppression of information in his history of the 
library. It has been mentioned that during the short-lived existence of the 
Republic the first Filipino library was established with rich Spanish 
material acquired or confiscated from the Religious Orders. Robertson 
deliberately ignores this topic since there is another theme running 
through his account: a categorical definition of Filipinos as “ignorant and 
fanatics,” which demonstrates their unfitness for self-government. 
Robertson becomes more explicit and proud when he explains how 
the Philippines Library was born. The library was founded in California 
as a private enterprise by an association called the American Circulating 
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Library Association of Manila. Lack of funds compelled the association 
in 1901 to seek government assistance. By Act No. 96 of the Philippine 
Commission enacted on 5 March 1901 the library was acquired by the 
government. The management and control of the library was by U.S. 
government appointment, as were all the positions in the Philippines 
despite the introduction of self-government during the Taft era. Needless 
to say, the library’s board was constituted by Americans with some token 
Filipino.23 
No doubt, the most impressive accomplishment of Robertson was 
his editorship of The Philippine Islands. However, there is a second 
important feature of his career, which enhanced his prestige among 
scholars—his acquisition in 1913 of the Filipiniana Collection of La 
Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, considered as the best such 
collection in the world. Robertson explains this process in great detail 
since he considers the purchase a personal achievement. According to 
him the collection had been offered as early as 1906 to the Library of 
Congress for the sum of 400,000 pesos. In 1913 the offer was renewed to 
the Government of the Philippines to which the Company finally sold the 
Collection for 200,000 pesos. 
The story is a little bit different in actual fact. As has been 
mentioned in earlier chapters, the Americans were really keen to buy all 
the books and above all rare manuscripts related to their newly acquired 
archipelago. The condition of “rareness” became synonymous with 
prestige, no matter what the content was. La Compañía decided to take 
                                                 
23 Robertson, James A. History of the Philippine Library and its Materials. By James Alexander 
Robertson, Librarian, Philippine Library. Robertson papers, box 21. Duke University. 
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vantage of this American buying spree. It started to foster and spread the 
idea they were really the maecenas of a valuable Filipiniana collection, 
and no doubt it was such. In 1904, José Sánchez y Garrigós, librarian of 
the La Compañía collection, insinuated to Wenceslao Retana, who was 
then working for bookseller Pedro Vindel, that the company was willing 
to sell its collection. 
In response, Retana began to elaborate a clever strategy to attract 
the attention of the American government. “I really believe in the 
business,” he wrote, “but to make a great deal [of money], there are two 
specific things to do in advance: furnish it with ‘rareness’ and catalogue 
it with absolute magnificence.”24 This is precisely what La Compañía 
and Retana did from 1904 to 1906. In fact, during these years La 
Compañía increased its collection, buying Vindel’s collection, which 
included many rubbish manuscripts and quite useless papers, but they 
were “rare.” This purchase, predictably attracted the attention of 
American private collectors and above all, experts such as Robertson. 
The strategy would take full shape in a scientific and erudite way. 
Retana put together an important catalogue which would be published in 
1906—Aparato Bibliográfico de la Historia General de Filipinas 
deducido de la colección que posee en Barcelona La Compañía General 
de Tabacos de dichas Islas, in three volumes. He made an excellent job 
of cataloguing the collection of La Compañía, making references to 
many other works. He built up a bibliographical masterpiece which 
would be emulated in the two last volumes of The Philippine Islands, but 
                                                 
24 W.E. Retana to Sánchez y Garrigós, March 3, 1904.Papers de la Companyia General de Tabacos de 
Filipines. Barcelona: Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya. 
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unfortunately Blair and Robertson lacked the rigor and above all the 
knowledge that Wenceslao Retana possessed. His Aparato Bibliográfico 
was subtly spread in prestigious academic circles.  
Edward Ayer of the Newberry Library and the Library of Congress 
itself became immediately interested in acquiring this collection but one 
of the most explicit wishes of La Compañía was to sell the collection to 
the Philippines. This is the reason that in 1906 La Compañía asked for 
400,000 pesos from Washington. They knew beforehand that the Library 
of Congress would not pay that large sum. Then in May 1907 Retana and 
Sánchez devised a new strategy—a powerful campaign to mobilize 
opinion in Filipino newspapers.  Finally, the Filipiniana collection of La 
Compañía was acquired by the Philippine Library as La Compañía had 
wished, expecting someday to witness the birth of La Biblioteca 
Nacional de Filipinas.25 
James Robertson never checked carefully the works included in 
Retana’s Aparato Bibliográfico and took for granted that he had acquired 
all the rare materials, which gave him prestige. But in fact many of the 
books listed—really important ones—were at Yale University from 1902. 
It was part of Retana’s “marketing” strategy to make references to many 
other works not actually in the La Compañía collection. 
  There is one last important feature of Robertson’s career not 
included in his biographies. During his term as librarian of the Philippine 
Library, Robertson became embroiled in a controversy regarding 
documents which he had acquired, translated and later published. These 
                                                 
25 Letter of the history of the collection of La Compañía to Philippine Governor General. Companyia 
General de Tabacos de Filipinas Papers. ANC.   
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documents were purported to be pre-Hispanic, but were later proven to 
be fraudulent. This document is the pre-Hispanic Criminal Code of the 
Philippine Islands, published in The Pacific Ocean in History by H. 
Morse Stephens and Herbert E. Bolton under the MacMillan & Co. 
imprint. The publication of this book was the result of a big and 
important Congress called Panama-Pacific Historical Congress which 
took place in July 1915.26 Two important aspects of Robertson’s 
contribution need to be emphasized. On the one hand, the fake document 
enabled Robertson to put forward the persuasive argument, prevalent in 
The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, in support of the black legend of the 
Spaniards: that they consciously destroyed Philippine native institutions 
and customs such as in Latin America. This idea did not originate with 
him. He owed it to his friend James LeRoy who had told him, “I must 
still believe that the Spaniards, at least the friars, did consciously 
endeavor to destroy native institutions and customs, as they certainly did 
in Mexico, and as they did wherever else.”27 Robertson was paying 
tribute to the de facto architect (by 1904) of The Philippine Islands. 
The second aspect of Robertson’s chapter worth mentioning is that 
the document he used ultimately got him stuck in contradictions. In 
explaining the constitution of the native institutions and mode of 
government he used the classical terminology found in the Spanish 
documents: chief (dato) or regulo/reyezuelo (petty king). But suddenly 
                                                 
26 David P. Barrows participated as well in this Congress with a paper entitled “The Governor-General 
of the Philippines under Spain and the United States. Other participants were Charles H. Cunningham 
and William L. Schurz, old collaborators as James A. Robertson of Edward Ayer and contributors to 
the encapsulation of the Philippines in Latin America. 
27 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico 24 August, 1904. James A. Robertson 
papers. Special Correspondence Box 5.  
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Robertson changed his argument, made an isomorphism between past 
and present, and began to infer that  
Very early the Spaniards began to employ the American word 
cacique when speaking of the leaders, and this word has survived 
even to the present time and is in constant use. Indeed, the power 
of the leader among the ignorant people is still almost as great, if 
not actually as great, as at the time of Spanish colonization.28 
 
Since there was nothing in the documents that proved this, 
Robertson was simply spreading the discourse of caciquism built up by 
his friend LeRoy. His assumption that the term cacique was spread to the 
Philippines flew in the face of his own translations of Morga’s Sucesos 
de las Islas Filipinas, Plasencia, and other Spanish authors from the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century who, as I have pointed out before, 
never used the term cacique to define the native “leaders.” Even the term 
“leader” in this context is an anachronism. Robertson should have used 
the term “chieftain” since he was presenting a retrospective account of 
Spanish rule. The second part of Robertson’s paragraph above is a clear 
allusion to the de-contextualization of the Laws of the Indies that has 
enabled Philippine caciquism to have a deep lineage. LeRoy had told 
Robertson to use Law 16 by which the Spaniards gave “caciques in the 
Philippines their former governing status.”29 He was reading back into 
the past the notion of an evil caciquism that was being constructed and 
deployed by the American colonial administration.  
                                                 
28 Robertson James A.  ‘Social Structure of, and Ideas of Law among early Philippine peoples; and a 
recently discovered pre-Hispanic criminal code of the Philippine Islands.’ In H. Morse Stephens and 
Herbert E. Bolton (ed.), The Pacific Ocean in History. Papers and addresses presented at the Panama-
Pacific Historical Congress held at San Francisco, Berkeley and Palo Alto, California July 19-23, 1915.  
New York: the McMillan Company, 1917, p. 168. 
29 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, November 22, 1904. James A. Robertson 
papers. Special correspondence. Box 5. This argument has been explained in the chapter seventh. 
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Robertson concluded his argument about caciquism by asserting 
that this bad trait of the past was doomed before the advance of 
education. In sum, his contribution to the Stephens and Bolton book was 
designed to promote the emerging colonial discourse about Filipinos 
being unfit for self-government and therefore needing American tutelage.  
Other more important facet of Robertson’s paper deserves our 
attention: his data related to caciquism as the consolidation of native 
despotism during the pre-Hispanic era. Robertson presented caciquism as 
a strong institution before the arrival of the Spaniards. Without any 
discussion of debt bondage or forms of dependency, he emphasized the 
common practice of “slavery” in Filipino communities or barangays. The 
context of this bold assertion was the new bill just passed by the U.S. 
Congress condemning peonage and slavery in the Philippine territory. 
Robertson at this point was mobilizing history to support the efforts of 
another American scholar-official, Dean C. Worcester, whose career we 
shall examine in a later chapter. Ultimately, Robertson’s historical 
contribution buttressed the notion that tyranny, despotism and corruption 
were endemic features of the ethos of the Filipinos since time 
immemorial. 
Despite these distortions and even the use of a fraudulent 
document, Robertson kept his reputation intact. In fact, modern 
historiography lays the blame for this forged document on a Filipino, 
Jose E. Marco, curiously omitting the fact that Robertson had 
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enthusiastically spread the contents of this document.30 Perhaps Marco 
had simply furnished the Americans with the kind of authentic past that 
they badly needed to bolster their policies. In any case, Robertson has 
escaped being tinged by this scandal. He continued a hectic life, teaching 
in North Carolina and becoming the editor of The Hispanic American 
Historical Review. He continued to contribute to the writing of a new 




The First Criticism of The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 
In 1904, The American Historical Review published the first 
critical review of The Philippine Islands 1493-1803, which by that time 
had run to five volumes covering the years 1493 to 1583. As mentioned 
previously James LeRoy was the reviewer of this work. 31 According to 
him, 
Five volumes have now appeared of this, the most extensive 
undertaking ever made in Philippine history. Volume I…though 
entirely pertinent (the desire to reach spice islands by a western 
route led to Magellan’s famous voyage of discovery), one feels that 
                                                 
30 Glenn May in 1997 talks about this code as a Filipino invention: “Jose E. Marco, a shadowy figure 
from Occidental Negros, revealed that he had uncovered a nineteenth-century manuscript written by a 
certain Father José M. Pavón that included translations of the code. Scott’s scrutiny of the sources 
revealed that no reliable evidence existed concerning the first code and that the manuscript by Pavón 
which was filled with anachronisms and absurdities, was a crudely executed forgery. In addition, Scott 
concluded that more than half a dozen other supposedly old documents uncovered by the same Jose E. 
Marco –all of which, like Pavón manuscript, were filled with data about the pre-hispanic Philippines –
were likewise “deliberate and definite frauds.” Inventing a Hero, p. 8. Glenn May dismisses Jose E. 
Marco but the person who translated and spread this document was James A. Robertson. However, 
May does not mention the name of Robertson and even less that this translation is at Yale University 
under the title The Robertson translation of the Pavon Manuscripts of 1938-1939. The project to 
translate and provide these documents to the scholars was funded by the Newberry Library.  
31 I mention The American Historical Review since this is the only journal I have found. However, 
LeRoy says to Barrows that he had written reviews of The Philippine Islands 1493-1803 for The Nation 
and The Evening Post. James A. LeRoy to David P. Barrows, Durango, Mexico, November, 1903. 
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it was not strictly necessary to go so in detail into the documentary 
history of this never-settled controversy.32 
 
LeRoy was right; it was unnecessary to be so detailed, but above 
all the documents presented by Blair and Robertson were not new.  They 
were relatively easy to access since they had already been published in 
the previous century. An example is the Colección de Documentos 
inéditos relativos al descubrimiento de las antiguas posesiones españolas 
de América y Oceanía or Colección de Documentos y Manuscritos 
compilados por Fernández de Navarrete. 
The problem with LeRoy’s criticisms above is they seem more a 
justification than a true critique of the Blair and Robertson volumes. He 
says that “the editors of this series found themselves confronted at the 
very outset with a vast amount of such material which was all the more 
confusing in that it was so ill-assorted and undigested.”33 This assertion 
is untenable. As I have stated, the documents in those five initial volumes 
had already been published in different Spanish and Portuguese 
collections and anyone who has actually used these collections will 
immediately realize that LeRoy’s depiction of them as a “vast amount of 
ill-assorted and undigested material” is simply inaccurate. 
The real problem with Blair and Robertson’s volumes 1 to 5 is the 
lack of royal decrees. These decrees were compiled by Spanish clerks in 
“cedularios” (collections of royal decrees), which dealt with matters of 
government, administration of justice, the treasury and war. These royal 
decrees are important in order to understand the nature of Spanish 
                                                 
32 LeRoy, James A. The American Historical Review. Volume IX, October 1903 to July 1904. New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1904, p. 149. 
33 LeRoy, James A. The American Historical Review, p. 150. 
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colonial rule until 1853. These “cedularios,” which have been largely 
overlooked by scholars, reveal to us the nature and extent of secular 
power in the Philippines. Blair and Robertson’s volumes do not contain 
any of these royal decrees, only the instructions to governors. 
  It would not have been very difficult for Blair and Robertson to 
access the cedularios. Why their neglect of such material? Was it more 
important, perhaps, for them to ignore the royal decrees and thus be able 
to conclude that the Philippines was more a mission than a colony? For 
this purpose, Blair and Robertson would have had to depend on the friar 
missionaries’ accounts, which they did. LeRoy even complained about 
the abuse of the friars’ accounts, even inferring that Blair and Robertson 
were being misled by someone who had been a “hireling of the friars.” 
At this point he was surreptitiously attacking Retana.   
But LeRoy fell into a contradiction in terms since he accused Blair 
and Robertson of depending on these friar sources and then a few lines 
later he stated categorically that Philippine history had been written 
almost exclusively by friars.34 Therefore, it seems that the accusations  
made by LeRoy about the deficiency in the selection of the documents 
were more a criticism of those who were then advising Blair and 
Robertson—for instance, Wenceslao Retana and Edward Bourne—rather 
than the lack of skill on the part of the editors. One can sense, reading 
this mild rebuke, that LeRoy was offering himself as an alternative 
adviser for the project! 
                                                 
34 LeRoy, James A. The American Historical Review, p. 151. 
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  The other criticism made by LeRoy concerned the annotations, or 
lack of them: “Herein particularly are the volumes thus far issued weak 
(in addition to minor mistakes caused by a too servile following of 
Retana and other fallible authorities).”35 This sentence is a clear 
discrediting of Retana. But let us pursue this matter of annotations 
further. In volume 5, Blair and Robertson published a document titled 
“Fray Salazar on Affairs in the Philippine Islands.” This was extracted 
from Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino36 in the preface to which the 
compiler, Retana, affirms that Bishop Salazar had become the Las Casas 
of the Philippines by protecting the natives. Blair and Robertson quote 
Retana’s words in their Preface, adding that the interference of Bishop 
Salazar in civil affairs provoked hostility between the ecclesiastical and 
secular powers.37 LeRoy co-opted this argument to infer that this hostility 
was prevalent from the time of conquest up to the very end of the Spanish 
regime. He suggested that the editors write this kind of annotation. 
Blair and Robertson were correct in illustrating this controversy 
between the two powers, religious and secular. This hostility erupted 
because the religious orders during the decade of the 1580s had lost their 
initial dominance in the archipelago’s affairs. This was the historical 
view that the knowledgeable Retana was pushing, but LeRoy had to 
neglect or dismiss it since it was antagonistic to the American discourse 
about the perpetual reign of the bad friars. 
                                                 
35 LeRoy, James A. The American Historical Review, p. 152. 
36 Retana, Wenceslao E. ‘Relación de las cosas de los Filipinos, hecha por Fr. Domingo de Salazar.’ 
Manuscrito Inédito, 1583.  Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino. Vol. 3.  
37 Blair & Robertson. ‘Preface.’ The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. Vol. 5, p. 9. 
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  LeRoy concluded his critique by justifying the deficiencies of The 
Philippine Islands: 
That the editors of this work have launched it without time for 
sufficient preparation is the criticism to be made upon it, and a 
serious criticism it is. But it cannot fail to be a most valuable 
series, from every point of view, at this moment in our national 
history, and especially in view of the almost total lack of available 
publications on Philippine history in the English language.38 
 
LeRoy was right and Blair and Robertson’s multivolume work has 
indeed become the most valuable reference of its type despite its 
inaccuracies. This was the only time that LeRoy would criticize The 
Philippine Islands, although he continued to review the work. That’s 
because LeRoy himself would become the most important architect of 
the documentary series after volume five. 
LeRoy corresponded with David Barrows and Clemente Zulueta 
about his criticisms of the first five volumes. He told Barrows that the 
editors were trying to do things too much in a hurry:  
This series will be of great value as the only fairly satisfactory 
means of reference in our libraries to the main already published 
data of Philippine history. But the editors have not had time to 
survey the field and form a fair judgment on the content and value 
of the material with which they have to work. The editorial sources 
on the subject are all poor and for the scholar, their work will be of 
small value.39 
 
LeRoy confessed to Barrows that the work was pretentious that ten 
or twelve volumes would have been enough. It is interesting to encounter 
LeRoy’s statement that the work was poor and of small value, since after 
a hundred years of its existence, Blair and Robertson’s multivolume is 
still considered as the most valuable compendium of primary sources on 
                                                 
38 LeRoy, James A. American Historical Review, p. 154. 
39 James A. LeRoy to David P. Barrows, Durango, Mexico November 1904. Personal letters of James 
A. LeRoy. Box 1.  
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the Spanish period. But LeRoy’s statement is based on the standpoint that 
Blair and Robertson did not have time to analyze their work and that they 
were translating sources already known. 
Barrows, on his part, felt disappointed with the series “taking it on 
the whole.” “It does not publish the originals untranslated,” he 
complained, “and its resume of documents, as it calls it, is absurd.”40 The 
originals were not published for two reasons. The first is that most of the 
documents were already in published form, meaning to say they were not 
primary manuscript sources. The second reason is that Blair and 
Robertson had problems with the transcription of primary sources, 
misunderstanding and misinterpreting their content. Although Robertson 
said to Ayer, “our transcript is in many cases better than the original 
now,”41 the fact is that the transcriptions were poor and inaccurate. 
An example of the editors’ problems is their handling of the Bando 
para que se manifieste el oro sacado de las sepulturas de los Indios.42 
The transcription made by Robertson is deficient and the translation 
suffers because of the faulty transcription. Here is an excerpt: 
El muy ilustre Miguel Lopez de Legazpi Gobernador y Capitan 
General por su Majestad de la gente armada del descubrimiento de 
las Yslas dixo que por quanto a su noticia ha venido que muchos 
soldados españoles y marineros han abierto en esta Ysla de 
“Cuba…”43 
 
(The most illustrious Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, his majesty’s 
governor and captain-general of the people and fleet of the 
                                                 
40 David P. Barrows to James A. LeRoy, March 1904. Robertson, James Alexander. Annapolis. Md. 
Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906.   
41 James A. Robertson to Edward Ayer, June 24, 1908. Philippine Islands. Transcript miscellaneous. 
Newberry Library.  
42 This Bando was translated by Robertson “Order to make declaration of the gold taken from the 
burial-places of the Indians.’ Blair and Robertson  (ed.), The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. Vol. 2, pp. 
172-173. 
43 Robertson, James A. Philippine Islands. Trancript miscellaneous, Newberry Library. 
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discovery of the Western Islands…many Spanish soldiers and 
sailors have opened many graves and burial-places of the native 
Indians in this island…)44 
 
By comparing the above transcription and its translation we see 
that the Spanish document makes clear that Legazpi was both the 
governor and captain of those who traveled with him. However, 
Robertson translates Governor and Captain of the people and fleet by 
making a clear distinction between the two. We note also that 
Robertson’s transcription of the original document is confused by 
“Çubu” (such as in “Cebu”) and was rendered in the first documents as 
“Cuba.” It seems that Robertson doubted his transcription as well since 
he decided to omit the problematic name of the island and to render it 
instead as “this island.”  
The bando (proclamation) concludes as follows: “…se hecho 
vando en forma de derecho por voz de ‘pito atambor’… (…the contents 
of this edict were proclaimed in the form prescribed by law, by the voice 
of Pito Atambor…)45 Robertson here confuses the ritual of the 
proclamation, or “obedecimiento,” with the name of a person. In fact the 
transcription should say “se hecho bando en forma de orden ‘a voz, a pito 
y atambor’”46 (the bando was proclaimed by voice, by whistle and by 
drum). This was the Spanish ritual in all the towns. However, Robertson 
thought that this expression was the name of the person who proclaimed 
                                                 
44 Robertson, James A. The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. Vol. 2, p. 172. 
45 Robertson, James A. The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, Vol. 2, p. 173. 
46 Atambor was used in old Spanish meaning instrument and the person who played drums. Atambor 
and tambor mean the same but the former has disappeared from the language.   
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the order and he added in a reference “this name is given as ypolito 
atanbor.”47 
Probably the most valuable comment on The Philippine Islands, 
which has passed unnoticed, was made by the Filipino scholar Clemente 
Zulueta. In October 1903 Zulueta wrote to LeRoy: “I have read your 
criticism of the five volumes of the Philippine collection of Blair and 
Robertson and I find it mild. They cannot complain to you [about the 
review] and they are not justified to do it. The editors could have 
perfected it if they were not in such a hurry.” 48 
Zulueta had met Robertson in Seville and offered him some 
important observations about the documentary collection. But Robertson 
did not want to listen to a Filipino. Zulueta considered the collection 
useless since most of the documents had been already published.49 He 
observed that there were important omissions in the work and mistakes in 
the selection of the documents. Zulueta in fact pointed out several 
mistakes such as the publication of Pigaffeta’s account. He told LeRoy 
that Blair and Robertson had taken Pigaffeta’s manuscript from the 
National Library of Paris. This manuscript was an inaccurate copy. “The 
original of Pigaffeta,” Zulueta clarified, “was published by C. Annoretti 
                                                 
47 Blair and Robertson. The Philippine Islands…,vol. 2, p. 173, footnote 84. 
48 Clemente J. Zulueta to James A. LeRoy. Seville, 9 de Octubre de 1904. Robertson, James Alexander. 
Annapolis, Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, letters 1902-1906.  
49 Colección de Documentos Inéditos relativos al descubrimiento. Madrid, 1864-1884. Six volumes of 
this collection contain documents on the Philippines; Colección de Documentos inéditos. Segunda 
Serie published by the Royal Academe of History in 1889. Two volumes exclusively contain 
documents on the Philippines; Colección de los viajes y descubrimientos  que hicieron por mar los 
españoles desde el siglo xv. Fernández de Navarrete; Colección de documentos inéditos para la 
historia de Chile by F. Medina, 1888. The three first volumes exclusively contain documents of 
Magellan, Legazpi etc; Colleçao de noticias para a histories e geografia dos naçoens ultramarinas. 
Lisboa, 1812; Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino. 
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(Milan 1800). Walls and Merino translated into Spanish Anoretti’s 
edition. I gave notice of all these issues to Robertson.”50  
It seems that either Robertson or LeRoy eventually followed 
Zulueta’s advice and in volumes 33 and 34 reproduced the Italian edition 
of Pigaffeta in Italian and English. 
Zulueta observed to LeRoy other mistakes in Blair and Robertson’s 
initial volumes which to him rendered the work inaccurate. LeRoy 
responded to this observations by Zulueta as follows: 
What you tell me about The Philippine Islands of Blair and 
Robertson is extremely interesting. I am writing the reviews of this 
work for “The Nation” and “The Evening Post” and for “The 
American Historical Review.” The publisher Mr. Clark of 
Cleveland Ohio thinks that I have been a little bit hard with the 
collaborators; however he admits many things I have said are 
certain. 51 
 
Zulueta was willing to write down all his observations and publish 
them in the newspapers. But it seems that LeRoy intended to prevent 
Zulueta from carrying this out by justifying the alleged mistakes. He 
replied to Zulueta: 
Miss Emma Blair, one of the collaborators, admitted my criticisms 
and explained to me some of the difficulties they have had. She 
confessed that they did not have time to check the documents of 
Philippine history nor to prepare a useful work for the students. 
She says that the idea hers.52 
 
We do not know if Zulueta—somewhat of a purist scholar—ever 
accepted these excuses. He died unexpectedly in 1904. His command of 
Spanish bibliography is reflected in volume 52 of the compendium, 
where LeRoy uses Zulueta’s knowledge, shared through their 
                                                 
50 Clemente J. Zulueta to James A. LeRoy. 9 de Octubre de 1903. 
51 James A. LeRoy to Clemente J. Zulueta. October, 1903. Personal Letters of LeRoy James Alfred 
1875-1909. Box 1, Folder 1.  
52 James A. LeRoy to Clemente J. Zulueta, November, 1903. Personal Letters of LeRoy James Alfred 
1875-1900. Box 1, Folder 1.     
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correspondence, to write The Philippines, 1860-1898. Some Comments 
and Bibliographical Notes. 
Arthur Clark and Emma Blair were offended by LeRoy’s 
criticisms. Blair wrote him a letter stating categorically that she and 
Robertson were not influenced by anyone in the selection of the 
documents and that the inaccuracies or mistakes were the fault of 
translators unable to give uniformity to the work. Be that as it may, being 
the object of LeRoy’s critical pen did not stop Blair and Robertson from 
inviting him to join the project. From November 1903 to 1907, LeRoy 
was the architect of The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, turning it into a 
work of historical propaganda in the service of the U.S. colonial 
administration. 
 
LeRoy as collaborator in the penumbra 
Volume six changed completely the shape of the compilation. 
Suddenly, the editors announce that “So many and urgent requests have 
come to us, from subscribers and reviewers, for the extension of this 
series as shall cover the entire period of Spanish domination."53 This 
announcement is a bit surprising after reading LeRoy’s criticisms. As far 
as I know, the only review of the series was written by LeRoy. Therefore, 
he must have been the one who requested coverage of the entire period of 
Spanish rule. The selection of the documents pertaining to the nineteenth 
century and the covering essay written by LeRoy were to provide crucial 
explanations of the problems that the Americans were facing in the 
                                                 
53 Blair and Robertson. The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. Vol. 6. 
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Philippines. These are the “official documents” which will explain the 
Spanish nineteenth century. This sudden change is inextricably related to 
the collaboration of LeRoy himself in the making of the new The 
Philippine Islands 1493-1898. 
The influence of LeRoy is not immediately perceptible in the work. 
He collaborated, as did Edward Bourne, in writing an essay. The 
conclusive evidence about LeRoy’s involvement is found in the 
correspondence of James Robertson. These shed light on LeRoy’s role in 
the making of this work and above all in volume 52, which was entirely 
constructed by him. 
Emma Blair was actually the first one to write to LeRoy in relation 
to the latter’s critique. LeRoy apologized for this and showed his 
predisposition to make suggestions relative to material for the nineteenth 
century. “You will understand,” he wrote, “how my experience in the 
islands helps me to visualize even early events in the Philippine history. I 
shall feel free to write you at any time when an idea occurs me.”54 Here 
he was introducing himself as an expert in Philippine matters. This aura 
of authoritativeness made Blair depend on LeRoy not only regarding the 
material to publish but also about translation issues. 
There is a letter which de facto and de iure shows the incapacity of 
the editors to properly transcribe and translate the documents. Blair wrote 
LeRoy seeking his assistance in the translation of some documents 
                                                 
54 James A. LeRoy to Emma H. Blair, Durango, Mexico, November, 1903. Personal Letters of LeRoy 
James Alfred 1875-1909. Box 1, Folder 1. 
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related to the instructions for the Manila Galleon and the encomiendas.55 
Blair sent him an inaccurate transcription and LeRoy predictably 
rendered a deficient translation. 
Blair replied, “I should guess that the expression tae or pesos 
muertos meant something like a ‘gratuity’.” It appears that there was 
some difficulty in translating the term pesos muertos. LeRoy would not 
have found the expression “peso muerto” in the dictionaries since this 
acceptation appears for first time in the RAE in 1984, meaning maximum 
goods freight expressed in metric ton which includes besides the weight 
of commercial freight that of food, water etc.56  Blair therefore could not 
have found this expression in any Royal Decree or document from the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. LeRoy was probably guessing that 
the correct transcription was “pesos gruesos” a new coin which had a 
value of ten “reales” of silver. This expression appears in the RAE in 
1737. That is why he associated it with another denomination of coinage, 
the tae. But this confused Blair even more. 
 I have found in royal decrees interconnected with encomiendas 
and repartimientos the expression plazas muertas, which means to 
occupy a position left by another soldier. This expression was quite usual 
in old documents. Be that as it may, LeRoy interpreted this expression in 
monetary terms and he even said that in the Academy’s dictionary, there 
was an entry for “muertas” as indicating that money comes without 
having earned it. This entry does not exist in the Academy dictionary. 
                                                 
55 Volume XVII contains part of the Laws regarding to the commerce. The laws do not follow 
chronological issue and they are not the originals but a summary of the Recopilación de las Leyes de 
Indias. Blair and  
56 See Rea l Academia Española Diccionario de la Lengua Española. Madrid: a-guzpatarra, 1984. 
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Nevertheless, LeRoy’s interpretation of the sentence inferred some 
corruption on the part of the Spanish bureaucracy. 
“My guess at the expression limpios de coste y costa sobre el 
principal coste would be ‘charges or deductions’.”—here LeRoy 
continues with his politically-charged translations of apparently faulty 
transcriptions. Coste y costa is an adverbial locution which means price 
and expenditures without any benefit—nullo lucro sine lucro. LeRoy, 
instead, separates both terms as if they were different concepts. Coste y 
costa mean the same but together conform to a new meaning. Practically 
all the doubts presented by Blair related to the Manila Galleon and 
encomiendas were interpreted and translated by LeRoy according to 
some similar terms that appeared in La Recopilación de las Leyes de 
Indias. Actually, most of the official documents used by Blair and 
Robertson belong to the Leyes de Indias. This fact led to LeRoy’s 
conclusion, as indicated to Blair: “It seems quite plain to me that 
Philippine revenue and expenditures were closely regulated from 
Mexico.” 
LeRoy could not sort out all the problems and so used 
generalizations in order to respond some questions posed by Blair. 
Finally, he asked for Blair to look for the term “tepuzque” or tepusquez 
(copper). This term appeared in the first royal decree regulating trade on 
11 January 1591. Blair and Robertson took this law from the 
Recopilación making a mistake in the date and assuming that this law 
was enacted on 11 January 1593.  The sentence in Spanish was “he 
mandado, que de ninguna parte de las dichas Yndias vaya a la China 
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navio alguno…y que en ellos no puedan llevar mas de doscientos 
cinquenta mill pesos de ‘tepusquez’…”57  
Blair and Robertson omitted part of the royal decree and translated 
this sentence as from New Spain not more than two hundred and fifty 
thousand pesos de “tipusque” shall be taken in the vessels…58 The 
editors do not make any reference to the word tepuzque which they 
transcribed as “tipusque.” This term was Azteca and was a coin of scant 
gold mixed with copper which disappeared in 1591. Then it is difficult to 
find this term after that year. 
After this initial exchange LeRoy did not write anymore to Blair. 
She was to be relegated to a secondary role. LeRoy instead commenced a 
frantic correspondence with Robertson advising and warning him about 
the documents that should be published. This relationship started in 
January 1904 when LeRoy wrote a significant letter to Robertson 
advising him, the editor of the series, to publish certain documents and 
warning him about certain unreliable scholars. This type of exchange 
cumulatively turned The Philippine Islands into an isomorphic 
compendium to provide historical explanations and excuses for the 
present problems of the United States. 
This “purpose” behind LeRoy’s involvement is illustrated in his 
advice to Robertson about a royal cedula of 1751: “You will find this 
mentioned more particularly in an article of mine on the friars in the 
Political Science Quarterly for December 1903. My authority for it is 
                                                 
57 Copia Literal de las Reales Zedulas despachadas desde 1580 en adelante…,p. 128. 
58 Blair & Robertson. The Philippine Islands, Vol. XVII, Law XV, p. 31. 
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simply La Democracia, the Federal Party organ of Manila.59 Robertson 
included this royal cedula in volume 48 entitled Usurpation of Indian 
lands by friars and the influence of LeRoy can be found in his reference 
to the fact that “. . .these abuses which occurred in the middle of the 
eighteenth century. . .have been repeated in our own time (up to 1897) 
with an outcome favorable to the friars.”60 Robertson was dwelling on 
the problems of 1897 in order to demonstrate that the revolt of 1896 was 
an insurrection against the power of the friars. This was a key argument 
of LeRoy’s, intended to bolster his construction of the dark Spanish past. 
Among LeRoy’s most crucial pieces of “advice” to Robertson was 
that he should use the Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias as the Spanish 
creed.  Also highly significant was his sending Robertson a copy of the 
proceedings of the first Cortes of 1810, stating: 
It would be of interest for your purposes to quote “part of the 
proceedings” of the first Cortes of 1810 showing three 
representatives of the Philippines present. The objection to this on 
the part of a Philippine delegate himself shows the undeveloped 
state of the Philippine archipelago.61 
 
This is an important excerpt since there is a deliberate co-optation of 
the documents. LeRoy encouraged Robertson to show only part of the 
proceedings which would display the sense of Spanish backwardness 
bringing thus into focus the notion of an “undeveloped state” until the 
end of the Spanish regime. Robertson dutifully included part of the 
                                                 
59 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, January 27, 1904. James A. Robertson papers. Special 
Correspondence. Box 5.   
60 Blair and Robertson. The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, vol. 48, p 28. 
61 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson January 27, 1904,   p. 3. 
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proceedings in a volume, giving it the title “Representatives of Filipinas 
in the Spanish Cortes.”62 
Not only did LeRoy advise about documents or books but he also 
judged the reliability of some authors. As has been noted, he felt an 
animosity towards Wenceslao Retana for several reasons. Retana had 
access to very valuable collections and documents and he had been the 
most important bibliographer and historian on Philippine matters. He was 
truly an “authority.” Robertson was in fact assisted in Spain by Retana 
and the first five volumes of The Philippine Islands contain some 
documents from Retana’s Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino. LeRoy tried to 
dissuade Robertson from using Retana’s works arguing that 
Retana is charged with being a hireling of the friars…and his 
writings, so far as I have had occasion to use them, are vitiated 
almost on every page… He is, to my certain knowledge, many 
times absolutely untrustworthy as some of his works are for 
consultation. I hold everything obtained from him as suspicious.63 
 
What LeRoy was concerned about was that Retana’s views could 
be dangerous for the construction of an American discourse on the 
Philippine past. He was right in considering Retana as a hireling of the 
friars. Retana was a conservative. However, underneath his “frailismo” 
we can find a deep understanding of the nature of Spanish colonial policy 
in the Philippines. LeRoy specifically warned Robertson against using La 
Política de España en Filipinas because “the organ [is] subsidized for the 
purpose of combating the campaign of Spaniards and Filipinos for a 
liberal regime in the Philippines. In short, I have very little respect for his 
                                                 
62 Blair and Robertson. ‘Appendix.’ The Philippine Islands, vol. 51. 
63 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, January, 1904, p. 4. 
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reliability.”64 LeRoy managed to convince the editors that Retana was 
unworthy of citation on all political or controversial matters, being 
“mentally despicable, a cheat, a turncoat, and hireling [of the friars].”65 
There are only two volumes of The Philippine Islands devoted to 
the nineteenth century. These are based on secondary sources and for the 
last thirty years of the Spanish rule, the Arthur Clark Company simply 
relied on LeRoy’s essay which was written to discredit La Política de 
España en Filipinas. For Retana’s anti-reformism campaign in the 
Philippines precisely shows us the underside of the story—that the 
reforms were actually implemented. 
The alternative to Retana would be Barrows. LeRoy’s advised 
Robertson to “get in touch with Dr. David P. Barrows who started out as 
superintendent of schools for Manila, was for a time Chief of the 
Ethnological Bureau, and is now Superintendent of Public Instruction for 
the archipelago stationed at Manila. He has studied Philippine history.”66 
Barrow’s imprint can be detected in several volumes of The Philippine 
Islands, but it is volume 46 that particularly reveals Barrow’s 
collaboration. Robertson devoted the appendix of that volume to 
education. We face again an interpolation of the past into the present 
since there is an exaltation of the American system under the title 
Education since American occupation. In reading and analyzing this 
appendix one can only conclude that it was written by LeRoy instead of 
Robertson. The reader gets to see clearly that The Philippine Islands had 
                                                 
64 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, January, 1904, p. 4. 
65 James A. LeRoy to David P. Barrows. Durango, Mexico February 5, 1905. Robertson, James 
Alexander. Annapolis. Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. 
66 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, January, 1904, p. 5. 
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become a useful propaganda tool for the Americanization of the 
archipelago.  
There are several signs that point to LeRoy’s intervention in the 
compilation. The first is praise of the cornerstone of American colonial 
policy. Passages such as the following are clearly his “voice”: “It is the 
chief glory of the American connection with the Philippines, that no 
sooner was their easy conquest an assured fact than attention was 
directed toward the education of the peoples who came under the control 
of the western democracy.”67 
This praise for America is also a denigration of the Spanish system 
of education whose methods LeRoy and Robertson considered 
antiquated. This backwardness is blamed for the poor condition of Spain. 
They must have known, however, that this was a simplistic view. In 
Robertson’s biography it is mentioned that he was assisted in Spain by 
Giner de los Ríos, the founder of Instituto Libre de Enseñanza. This 
Institute was from 1876 on the centre of gravity of a movement to reform 
Spanish culture and the channel for the introduction of the most advanced 
pedagogic and scientific theories. Rizal, Del Pilar and other Filipino 
ilustrados were in touch with the intellectuals in this institution.  
The second piece of evidence that this short paper was not written 
by Robertson is its argument that the best work on education was done by 
the Jesuits. LeRoy explained this in detail to Robertson in one of his 
letters: 
[The Jesuits] introduced chemical and physical laboratories for the 
first time to the islands; they conducted the new normal schools 
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designed by the reform governments eventually to secularize at 
least primary education; they founded the Manila Observatory, 
probably the first of its sort in the Orient…68 
 
This account seems a contradiction since there is tacit recognition 
that Moret’s reforms in education were carried out in the islands—
something that LeRoy denies. 
The last piece of evidence LeRoy offers is surprising since there is 
an allusion to El Renacimiento and the attempt to maintain in the 
Philippines the Latin model. The short paragraph devoted to Leon Maria 
Guerrero coincides with the letter sent by LeRoy to El Renacimiento in 
1907, in which he states that “The party which follows the intellectual 
leadership of Leon Guerrero (director of El Renacimiento) is quietly 
resisting what they call Anglo-Saxonization. . .”69 
LeRoy concluded his letter by explaining to Robertson who the 
caciques of the Philippines were. In his private correspondence the 
caciques were always the collaborators—the members of Federal Party—
who supported from the very beginning the Americans. 
In February LeRoy made an important suggestion that  eventually 
became the cornerstone of The Philippine Islands and the historiography 
that followed upon it: 
Referring again to your query as to the portions of the 
“Recopilación de Leyes de Indias” worth reproducing in the 
Philippines series, I suggest that the injunctions from Isabella the 
Catholic and Philip II as to the conversion of the natives being the 
primary object of Spain would be worthwhile.70 
 
                                                 
68 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, January 1904, p. 6. 
69 Blair and Robertson. The Philippine Islands, vol. 46, p. 367. 
70 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, February 18, 1904. James A. LeRoy 
papers.  Special Correspondence, Box 5. 
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That this advice was followed can be gleaned in the multivolume 
work since the stress from the very beginning is that the Philippines was 
under the domination of the friars. LeRoy specifically suggested to 
Robertson that he draw upon only those portions of the Laws of the 
Indies that demonstrate that the Philippines, as with the other Spanish 
dominions, was more a mission than a colony. This is how Bourne had 
framed the initial volumes. But LeRoy suggested the use of La 
Recopilación de Leyes de Indias for another reason, which we have 
already pointed out: this valuable source could be used to present 
caciquism as something inherent in the archipelago. This argument can 
be traced in the volumes which treat of native customs in the archipelago. 
Perhaps the most important suggestion made by LeRoy was to 
devote just half a volume or even less to the events of 1896-97, the revolt 
against Spain. In fact, he would ultimately be the author of the essay 
which covers these years. He considered that to really develop the history 
of this movement, one had to go back to about 1863 when the modern era 
began in the Philippines. It was in connection with this that he made a 
most paradigmatic statement, which has since become a dictum for most 
American and even Filipino scholars: “Of course, the various reform 
programs of liberal revolutionary governments in Spain must have some 
attention; but these, and the 1872 revolt are really to be relegated to a 
secondary place.”71 
The Spanish regime was to be always a reference point for the 
Americans in establishing the significance of their occupation of the 
                                                 
71 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson. Durango, Mexico, May 13, 1904. James A. Robertson 
papers. Special Correspondence, Box 5. 
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islands and in positing their intervention as a necessity in order to 
educate the Filipinos. This reference point would always therefore be 
distorted for the sake of the present and the reform period would have to 
be ignored, as it is in The Philippine Islands and in other textbooks. 
Furthermore, in order to achieve this purpose the work of Retana and 
other authors would be distorted or omitted. 
The pattern of late nineteenth century past that LeRoy wanted 
Robertson to develop is contained in the following statement: 
But in the eighties and nineties the propaganda for reforms, 
conducted on the part of the Filipinos, especially in Spain, laid the 
foundation for the later more radical movements in the islands 
themselves, though it was itself not a separatist propaganda. I think 
you will find it more worth while to trace the propaganda in the 
writings of Rizal, Lopez Jaena, Marcelo del Pilar than to devote 
especial attention to the katipunan, a sort of Filipino excrescence –
a minor French revolution on the part of the more ignorant leaders 
of the lower classes.72 
 
Volume 52 is an actualization of this paragraph since the whole 
volume was in fact designed by LeRoy. He cast light on these years in 
The Philippines 1860-1898 –Some comments and bibliographical notes. 
He also presented a document which illustrated the reformist campaign 
of the ilustrados: Constitution of the Liga Filipina. LeRoy and The 
Philippine Islands were thus giving shape to a debate, ongoing up to the 
present, concerning Rizal versus Bonifacio. Their emphasis was on the 
notion that the educated class did not really want independence, since the 
Philippines was not prepared, and that those who wished for 
independence were the masses dragged along by some caciques. In sum, 
                                                 
72 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, May 13, 1904, p. 2. 
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The Philippine Islands was to relegate to oblivion the Spanish reforms, 
highlight the ilustrado movement, and dismiss the Katipunan. 
LeRoy’s praise of the members of the Propaganda movement was 
selective. He was prejudiced against Pedro Paterno and Isabelo de los 
Reyes, judging their writings in the light of his political animadversion 
towards them. In his letter to Robertson, he describes De los Reyes as  
the merest superficial and facile user of words, a plagiarist, 
pretender and fakir in politics; one will hardly expect scholarly 
work from him in writing of other sorts. He has just sense enough 
not to make such an ass of himself as Paterno, but he is a bad type 
of superficial Filipino.73 
 
LeRoy was warning Robertson not to admit the works of Paterno 
and De los Reyes into the compendium. His prejudices extended to other 
important scholars of his time such as Foreman and Sawyer. Both of 
them had been critical of the American occupation. John Foreman’s 
edition of 1899, as we have seen, was the most controversial in affirming 
that there was a draft of an American promise of independence made to 
Aguinaldo. This edition was, of course, systematically discredited by 
American scholars.  
The last suggestion of the year 1904 concerned the Informe 
(Report) of Sinibaldo de Mas. An excerpt from this Informe was included 
in volume 52, translated and abstracted by LeRoy. Mas was an 
Orientalist who was based in India for two years and observed closely the 
British colonial model in operation there. In his report, Mas was 
encouraging the re-structuring of the Spanish colonial regime in the 
Philippines along British lines. His projections of the transformation of 
                                                 
73 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, August 10, 1904. James A. Robertson 
papers. Special Correspondence, Box 5. 
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the colonial model were followed by Victor Balaguer. LeRoy excerpted 
from the voluminous Informe only those parts that emphasized the 
backwardness of the archipelago (i.e., to illustrate the idea of a Spanish 
dark age). This is an example of the de-contextualization that often took 
place in selecting, excerpting, and translating documents for the Blair and 
Robertson compendium. 
The hectic correspondence of 1904 continued during the following 
years until LeRoy’s early death. We can conclude that by 1904 LeRoy 
had worked out the shape of the further volumes of The Philippine 
Islands 1493-1898. Even the last document published by the editors, The 
Friars Memorial of 1898, was included at the request of LeRoy. From 
1905 onwards, apart from recommending to Robertson newspapers, 
reports and books which conformed to the bibliographical index, LeRoy 
involved himself in political affairs. Robertson could carry on with the 
completion of The Philippine Islands following LeRoy’s template. The 
multivolume work was no longer to be considered as something of “small 
value.” LeRoy’s henceforth positive reviews of the succeeding volumes 
are reflected in the following comment by Barrows: 
I have noticed your reviews in “The Nation” and I think they are 
exceedingly wise and impartial statements of the value of these 
books. I think the volumes are of great value and should lead to an 
awakening of interest in the history of the Islands.74 
 
Barrows was not praising the task of Blair and Robertson. He was 
referring to the new, hidden, role of LeRoy in the making of the 
                                                 
74 David P. Barrows to James A. LeRoy. March 5, 1904. Robertson James Alexander. Annapolis, Md. 
Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. 
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compendium. This acknowledgement is more pronounced in another 
letter Barrows sent to LeRoy:  
I have been receiving the Blair and Robertson series very regularly. 
I think I now have fourteen volumes from your hands. I have been 
enjoying them very much. There are many letters and documents 
which they got in Seville which I had not seen and which are 
certainly of value.75 
 
The sentence “I think I have fourteen volumes from your hands” is 
quite explicit. Barrows is not inferring that LeRoy had sent him the 
volumes, since he was a subscriber from the very beginning. What 
Barrows meant by this sentence was that LeRoy had become an indirect 
collaborator making the compendium a serious and rigorous work. 
 
A surreptitious and subtle discourse  
A deep analysis of The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 could be by 
itself a thesis since the prefaces from the sixth volume onwards became a 
tool for anti-Spanish propaganda. We find epithets like “oppression,” 
“tyrannical,” and “backwardness” in reference to Spanish rule. The 
preface to volume 51, for example, dismisses the usefulness of Spanish 
accounts: 
In 1828 was published at Calcutta an interesting book entitled 
Remarks on the Philippine Islands, 1819 to 1822, by an 
Englishman.76 It throws much light on conditions in Manila at that 
time, and is of special value as coming from an enlightened 
foreigner, rather than a Spaniard.77 
 
                                                 
75 David P. Barrows to James A. LeRoy. September 29, 1904. Robertson James Alexander. Annapolis, 
Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. 
76 This Englishman from whom Blair and Robertson did not know the name was Henry Piddington. See 
Zaide, Gregorio F. Documentary Sources of Philippine History, two vols. National Book Store, INC, p. 
xi. 
77 Blair and Robertson. ‘Preface.’ The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, vol. 51, p. 14.  
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The prefaces demonstrate the evolution of the work towards 
enabling a full understanding of the problems that the Americans were 
facing in the Philippines. The thrust of the documents presented by Blair 
and Robertson was that these troubles were inherited from the Spaniards. 
In order to analyze Blair and Robertson’s multivolume work 
properly I have selected two Spanish documents which illustrate the 
fragmentation of the work and the omission of important documents that 
would have made us understand better the first period of Spanish rule. 
The documents selected by Blair and Robertson show the Spanish 
administration as oppressive and antiquated. We find in the treatment of 
them a deliberate case of mistranslation, misinterpretation and de-
contextualization. 
The two documents I will analyze are Affairs in the Philippine 
Islands by Domingo de Salazar, Manila, 1583; and Foundation of the 
Audiencia.  Some attention will be paid, moreover, to the Historical 
Introduction written by Edward Bourne, professor at Yale, and The 
Philippines 1860-1898. Some comments and bibliographical notes 
written by LeRoy. The collaboration between Bourne and LeRoy enabled 
The Philippine Islands to be represented as a rigorous and objective 
work, since both scholars were prestigious authorities on Spanish 
colonial administration. 
  
Edward Gaylord Bourne 
 The fact that Edward Gaylord Bourne inaugurated this work is 
quite significant. It demonstrates de facto that in 1902, when the project 
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was conceived, there was no Filipinist in the United States of sufficient 
stature to write a history of the archipelago. For Gaylord Bourne was not 
an expert on the Philippines. He was a professor in the department of 
history at Yale University, and an Americanist—in fact, the first 
significant American scholar on sixteenth century Latin America. He 
designed his book Spain in America primarily to inform the American 
reading public of those features of Hispanic colonial history pertinent to 
the history of the United States. The emphasis of Gaylord Bourne’s work 
lay in Spanish north America, but he was additionally concerned with the 
transmission and modification of European institutions.78 He was well 
known because of the originality and acumen with which he interpreted 
sources, the objectivity of his observations, and the critical insights he 
applied to Spanish colonization prior to 1580. He went a long way 
towards escaping the Anglo-Protestant biases that plagued the histories of 
Spanish America, and this makes him seem the first scientific historian 
on that topic in the United States. 
Despite the fact that Gaylord Bourne was a scientific historian 
initiating a scholarly reaction in the United States against the “black 
legend” of Spanish cruelty and fanaticism, his “Historical Introduction” 
does not pursue this topic in detail beyond the sixteenth century. Instead 
the thrust of Gaylord Bourne’s “Historical Introduction” was to 
encapsulate the Philippines within a Latin American framework by 
inferring that the same institutions and the same structure of Spanish rule 
were implemented in the Philippines. 
                                                 
78 Gibson, Charles and Benjamin, Keen. ‘Trends of United States Studies in Latin American History.’ 
American Historical Review, LXII (July 1957), pp. 856-857.  
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The influence of Gaylord Bourne can be readily perceived in the 
first five volumes of The Philippine Islands which at that time was 
designed to only embrace the period from 1493 to 1803. The first five 
volumes cover 1493-1583 and reproduce reiteratively documents that are 
related more to the conquest of Latin America than to the Philippines. 
Over the period of ninety years that are covered, only nineteen have an 
actual connection with the Philippines. These years are characterized by a 
deep organizational and legal emptiness, where some criteria of rule were 
imposed from far away and have little or no relation to effective control. 
Spain ruled the archipelago taking into consideration that the events 
which took place there were the result of political indefiniteness and 
indetermination about what to do with the islands.79 Gaylord Bourne did 
not understand the first years of Spanish rule in the Philippines in this 
way. Instead he set a precedent by giving shape to a discourse still alive 
in our textbooks—that the Philippines was an appendage of New Spain 
(Mexico): “The Philippine Islands in situation and inhabitants belong to 
the Asiatic world, but for the first three centuries of their recorded 
history, they were in a sense a dependency of America.”80 
In this paradigmatic statement, Gaylord Bourne was dogmatizing 
the history of the Philippines. As has been shown, Zulueta in 1904 wrote 
to LeRoy stating categorically that the Philippines did not depend—as 
some scholars were inferring—on Mexico or New Spain. But LeRoy 
ignored this view coming from a serious Filipino scholar, and so the 
traditional idea that the Philippines was a mere appendage of New Spain 
                                                 
79 Cano, Glòria. La Formación de una Colonia: Filipinas 1569-1614, p. 67. 
80 Gaylord Bourne, Edward. ‘Historical Introduction.’ Blair & Robertson (ed.), The Philippine Islands 
1493-1898, vol. 1, p. 21. 
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was born and remains alive today in Spanish, American and Filipino 
textbooks as a result of the continued use of The Philippine Islands as a 
source in the United States and the Philippines (the case of Spain is due 
to other reasons). 
By making an isomorphism between past and present and echoing 
the prevalent debates concerning the status of America’s new possession, 
Edward Gaylord Bourne tried to offer a scholarly explanation of the 
problems which the United States was confronting in the archipelago. He 
surreptitiously, through the selection and interpretation of the documents, 
stigmatized Filipino society as inherently despotic, stating outright, for 
example, that “the authority of the chief of the barangay was despotic.”81 
Bourne based this statement on Morga’s Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas. 
But Morga in his chapter VIII describes the pre-Hispanic society without 
using the terms “despotic” or “tyrant” at all (p. 371). In fact he did not 
make any value judgment in describing the pre-Hispanic society. But 
Gaylord Bourne, as other American scholars later, was keen to portray 
the existence of an underdeveloped society, conveying thereby to 
American readers and scholars the idea that the Filipinos were unfit for 
self-government. 
Scholars such as Benjamin Keen82 have argued that Gaylord 
Bourne initiated a scholarly reaction in the United States against the 
black legend of Spain. It is hard to perceive this “reaction” in his 
historical introduction to the Philippines. What it is noticeable, instead, is 
Gaylord Bourne’s perpetuation of the image of Spanish medievalism in 
                                                 
81 Gaylord Bourne, E. ‘Historical Introduction,’ p. 38.  
82 Gaylord Bourne, E. Spain in America 1450-1580. with a new introduction and supplementary 
bibliography by Benjamin Keen. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1962, p. x.  
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the Philippines, the inveterate idea of  “statism,” the decline and 
decrepitude of the Spanish regime which paved the way for the 
prevalence of bribery and corruption, and last but not the least, Gaylord 
Bourne abused some Spanish sources such as La Recopilación de las 
Leyes de Indias, misused other sources such as Antonio de Morga, and 
omitted some important Spanish works by asserting that there were 
hardly any works devoted to the Philippine Islands despite the fact that 
Yale in 1902 had acquired a very important collection of Spanish books 
from La Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas. This is the reason 
most of the bibliography used by Gaylord Bourne in this “Historical 
Introduction” are travelers’ accounts—works that can be quite inaccurate 
which should be used as sources of information and not as a dictum of 
the truth.   
Gaylord Bourne’s arguments lead me to conclude that, contrary to 
Keen’s observation, there is in fact a perpetuation of the Spanish black 
legend in Gaylord Bourne’s treatment of the Philippines. He subscribed 
to the argument that nineteenth-century Spain had not experienced an 
evolution towards modernity in contrast to other European countries. 
Spanish conservatism at home “gave little opportunity for the 
development of a class of energetic and progressive colonial officials and 
financial corruption honeycombed the whole colonial civil service.”83 
This argument becomes a tautology in subsequent pages. Terms such as 
corruption and bribery are applied in different contexts to define Spanish 
or Filipino behaviors. Gaylord Bourne was in fact shaping the discourse 
                                                 
83 Gaylord Bourne, E. ‘Historical Introduction,’ p. 47. 
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that all the problems the Americans were confronting in the Philippines 
were inherited from the Spanish period. 
Gaylord Bourne based his assumption of Spanish “decrepitude” on 
two important arguments that would have far-reaching effects. On the 
one hand, there is the argument that “from the beginning, the Spanish 
establishment in the Philippines was a mission and not in the proper 
sense of the term a colony.”84 Gaylord Bourne substantiates this idea of 
an “evangelizing mission” by inferring that the religious orders 
dominated the archipelago until the total collapse of the empire. He was 
shaping the notion of a static medievalism characterizing the whole 
Spanish period. 
The other argument, up to a certain extent fostered by the notion of 
medievalism, is that the same structures of rule were maintained from the 
sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. By not recognizing that Spanish 
colonialism was also evolving, and that a re-structuring of the 
administration and civil service occurred in the nineteenth century, 
Gaylord Bourne was supporting the idea of a fixed, centralized, and 
corrupt civil service under Spanish rule. He probably based this argument 
on the Schurman report.    
Gaylord Bourne makes some mistakes with the terminology. From 
the eighteenth century up to 1893, the towns were headed by a 
gobernadorcillo. The implementation of Maura’s law changed this term 
to “capitán.” Gaylord Bourne does not distinguish these terms and states, 
                                                 
84 Gaylord Bourne, E. ‘Historical Introduction,’ p. 48. 
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“the gobernadorcillo was commonly called “capitán.”85 The statement 
should be, on the contrary, “the capitán continued to be called 
“gobernadorcillo.” This mistake may look insignificant but it 
demonstrates that Gaylord Bourne was an expert on the sixteenth century 
and had quite a few things to learn about the nineteenth. Moreover it 
illustrates the persistent belief in the “immobilism” of Spanish rule, 
leading Gaylord Bourne to ignore or suppress the implementation of 
major changes like the Maura law. Gaylord Bourne could have done 
some research at Yale library since at that time the library already had, 
for instance, La Política de España en Filipinas and Filipinas: estudio de 
algunos asuntos de actualidad, not to mention Maura’s reform law 
published by Paterno and Artigas. Reading Spanish was not a problem 
for Gaylord Bourne. The problem was a refusal to treat the Spanish 
period with sympathy and objectivity. 
I consider the conclusion of Gaylord Bourne’s “Historical 
Introduction” as the culmination of the historical anamorphosis which 
became the dictum of the truth and would dictate the pattern of Blair and 
Robertson’s opus. Gaylord Bourne categorically asserted that the 
Filipinos had been living in the middle ages and now were facing a new 
world with the Americans’ arrival. Having been maintained in a state of 
backwardness by Spain, they certainly could not be independent now. 
In sum, Gaylord Bourne probably demystified the black legend of 
Spanish rule in Latin America but he laid the foundations for the 
stereotypic images of Spanish rule to be implanted in American writings. 
                                                 
85 Gaylord Bourne, E. ‘Historical Introduction,’ p. 57. 
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Blair and Robertson’s multivolume work supported these clichés with the 
choice and translation of the documents they published. We should not 
forget that they devoted 43 volumes in all to the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. 
 
Affairs in the Philippine Islands.  
In 1897, Retana published in his documentary compilation Archivo 
del Bibliófilo Filipino a manuscript titled Relación de las cosas de las 
Filipinas hecha por Domingo de Salazar. This document had not been 
published previously. Blair and Robertson were familiar with Retana’s 
compilation. After meeting Retana personally in Spain, Robertson 
became interested in this particular document since it pictured Salazar as 
the Las Casas86 of the Philippines—a religious who fought against the 
Spanish oppression of the natives. This document would lend support to 
the black legend of the Spanish conquest. The editors introduced the 
document as follows: 
The coming (in 1581) of the zealous and intrepid bishop, Domingo 
de Salazar, was a red-letter day for the natives of the islands. The 
Spanish conquerors are ruthlessly oppressing the Indians, caring 
but little for the opposition made by the friars; but Salazar exerts as 
far as possible his ecclesiastical authority, and besides urges the 
king to shield those unfortunate victims of Spanish rapacity.87 
 
                                                 
86 Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, a Spanish colonist, a priest founder of a Utopian Community was a 
scholar and historian. Las Casas was the first one in denouncing the encomienda system and he asked 
the abolishment of the system paving the way for the promulgation of Las Leyes Nuevas which 
advocated for a good treatment of the indigenous. Las Casas has been considered as the first defender 
of human rights. He has been called the Father of anti-imperialism and anti-racism. The role of Las 
Casas has been magnified by modern scholarship. Las Casas as Vitoria were part of the new theories 
that emerged in the sixteenth century, related to Salamanca School. These theories were interwoven 
with the idea of governing an inferior race which needed the paternalism of a superior civilization. 
Cano, Glòria. La Formación de una Colonia: Filipinas 1569-1614. 
87 Blair and Robertson. ‘Preface.’The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, vol. 5, p. 9. 
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This statement in the preface denotes the despotism of Spanish rule 
from the beginning. The editors, however, do not explain how this 
Memorial emerged and the important implications it would have for the 
future of the colony. Blair and Robertson were not wrong when they 
assumed that oppression and rapacity were rampant in 1581. Gonzalo 
Ronquillo had implanted a despotic government that allowed the 
enslavement of the natives. His policy of exploitation had provoked a 
serious economic dislocation and social discontentment. This was the 
situation Fray Domingo de Salazar encountered when he arrived in 
Manila. He wrote the Memorial in this context. 
As Blair and Robertson state in the preface, this memorial talks 
about the abuses committed against the natives, the injustice in the 
collection of the tribute, tribute collected in pacified and heathen villages, 
the economic situation and the reasons for these conditions, and so forth. 
Fray Salazar made important allusions, with comments, to some chapters 
of Ordinances such as Ordenanzas sobre Descubrimiento, Nuevas 
Poblaciones y Pacificaciones (Ordinances about the discovery, new 
populations and pacification) signed in Bosque de Segovia on 13 July 
1573. On page 19 of the Memorial,88 Salazar stated to the king that 
ordinances sent to the Philippines were not observed, and he started to 
cite the transgressed chapters of the ordinances: “Chapter 36 of the 
Ordinances of Bosque de Segovia says ‘And these shall be populated by 
Indios and naturales to whom the gospel can be preached; this is our 
                                                 
88 Retana., W.E ‘Relación de las Cosas de Filipinas, hecha por Fr. Domingo de Salazar.’.Archivo del 
Bibliófilo Filipino, vol. 3, p. 19; Blair and Robertson. ‘Fray Salazar on Affairs in the Philippine Islands. 
The Philippine Islands, vol. 5, p. 229. 
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primary aim in undertaking the new discoveries.”89  On the contrary, says 
Salazar, “the governors do little for the conversion of the Indians, but 
much for their own profit.”90 
The chapters cited by Salazar coincide de facto with the 
Ordinances of Bosque de Segovia. We should note, however, that these 
Ordinances were signed in 1573, whereas Salazar’s Memorial was 
penned in 1583. Spanish and American scholars echo the importance of 
this Memorial by considering Salazar as the main defender of the Indios. 
Curiously, what Blair and Robertson omitted is that when Salazar wrote 
his Memorial, the Ordinances of Bosque de Segovia had not been 
enacted in the Philippines. In fact, the Ordinances were enacted only in 
1599; the year before, the king had threatened to punish all those who 
would transgress them. The Philippines, until this date, were ruled 
according to the Leyes Nuevas (the New Laws for the Indians).  
Obviously, the question arises that if the Ordinances had not 
reached the Philippines, how could Salazar have mentioned them? 
Salazar had been in Mexico for a long time before moving to the 
Philippines and there had become familiar with these Ordinances. This 
question leads to another: why did the Spaniards implement these laws 
twenty-six years later. It is difficult to answer this question, but it seems 
that the non-promulgation of these laws was related to an ineffective 
settlement at the beginning. It was only much later, as problems in the 
                                                 
89 ‘Real Zedula de Ordenanzas sobre Descubrimientos, Nuevas Poblaciones y Pacificaciones. Copia 
Literal de las Reales Zedula…, p. 97. 
90 Blair and Robertson. ‘Fray Salazar on affairs in the Philippine Islands,’ vol.5, p. 231. Retana, W.E. 
‘Relación de las cosas de las Filipinas…, vol.3, p. 21. 
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metropolis and the formation of imperial policy were sorted out, that an 
effective settlement could finally be established in the archipelago.  
The promulgation in 1599 of these Ordinances is interconnected as 
well with another important issue. Far from the traditional idea, stated by 
Robertson and LeRoy, that the Spaniards had decimated or to all extents 
and purposes destroyed the indigenous communities (the co-optation of 
this Memorial, in fact, directs the reader to this conclusion) the Spaniards 
actually co-existed with the old communities until 1589. There was no 
total disruption. These ordinances of Nuevas Poblaciones were enacted 
precisely to confer a new form to the traditional communities. The laws 
were to reorganize the old communities into provinces, towns and 
districts and soften the terms of conquest, now to be called “discovery,” 
or submission, which would now become “pacification.”  
To epitomize this point, Salazar, as has been noted, was compared 
by Blair and Robertson to Las Casas and was even called Las Casas de 
Filipinas. But Fray Salazar actually never challenged the encomienda 
institution the way that Las Casas did in America; he never objected to 
the imposition of the taxes that were implicit in the system. True, Salazar 
was championing certain rights of the natives, but he drew a clear line 
between natives who were Christians and those who were heathens and 
therefore devoid of rights.91  
                                                 
91 A clear evidence Salazar never challenged the encomienda system is his arguments: No man could 
demand tribute unless he had a right to do it; there must exist a true and legitimate right from which 
this right depends; there are only two legitimate titles: political and temporal government and 
supernatural and divine government; the tribute refers not only to the payments of a temporal man, but 
also to the duty that the Christians have with the patria…This last statement demonstrates that Salazar 
accepted the encomienda system and the taxation system inherent in the encomiendas. Thus, his 
arguments about the rights of the indigenous were related to a definition of the indigenous between 
Christians and heathen; subjected versus non subjected peoples. See Hanke, Lewis and Agustin, 
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The omission by Blair and Robertson of the real circumstances 
surrounding the promulgation of these ordinances was caused by their 
misuse of La Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias. Salazar’s Memorial 
led them to conclude that the Laws of the Indies were never obeyed, that 
therefore these were a dead letter. Robertson needed to believe that the 
Spaniards had destroyed native institutions and customs. He could not 
regard the Leyes de Indias as evidence of a fair Spanish policy in the 
Philippines. 
 
The case of the Audiencia 
More important than Salazar’s memorial was the publication in 
volumes 5 and 6 of the Ordinances of the foundation of the Audiencia 
(High Court of Justice) of Manila in 1583.92 It has been taken for granted 
that this institution remained in force, with only minor modifications, 
until the collapse of the Spanish empire. The co-optation of the 
Ordinances from 1583 has concealed the fact that these Ordinances were 
replaced, not “renewed,”93 in 1595 with the reestablishment of the 
Audiencia. 
Blair and Robertson introduce this topic as follows in the preface 
to volume 5: “In 1583 occurred two most notable events: one of these 
was the appointment for the Islands of a royal audiencia, or high court of 
justice, especially ordered by the king to watch over and shield the 
                                                                                                                                            
Millares. Cuerpo de Documentos del siglo XVI. Sobre los derechos de España en las Indias y Filipinas. 
Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1943. pp. XLVII-XLIX.  
92 Blair and Robertson. ‘Founding of Manila Audiencia.’ The Philippine Islands, vols. 5 and 6.  
93 Blair and Robertson mistranslated the term renovar by renew instead of “replace.” This 
mistranslation justified the assumption that the same ordinances were used again in 1595.  
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Indians.”94 Blair and Robertson had collected the ordinances from the 
Archivo de Indias in Seville. The preamble of the establishment of the 
Audiencia supposedly states: “We have accorded the establishment, in 
the city of Manila of the island of Luzon, of one of our royal audiencias 
and chancillerias, in which there shall be a president, three oidores 
(auditors), a fiscal and the necessary officials.”95 
Bourne states in his Historical Introduction that the 1583 audiencia 
was composed of four oidores when in fact there were three.96 This 
mistake demonstrates the poor and unsynchronized research made by the 
editors. Blair and Robertson based their argument on the laws found in 
Seville; Bourne extracted his conclusions from La Recopilación de Leyes 
de Indias. The Audiencia from 1595 actually had four oidores. 
The fact is, the 1583 Audiencia in Manila never existed. There 
were no specific ordinances to establish such an Audiencia in the 
Philippines at this time. The archipelago was still in its developmental 
phase. Philip II had not enacted any instruction to governors since the 
king and the Consejo de Indias were still studying carefully how the 
Philippines should be ruled. Therefore, the so-called ordinances of the 
Audiencia of 1583 were in fact taken from the Ordinances of 1563 
enacted for the Audiencias of Quito, Charcas and Panama and called 
generales (general) for their generalized application. The same 
ordinances were dispatched in 1565 to Chile and Lima to establish 
audiencias there; in 1568 to Guatemala and Santa Fe; in 1572 to Nueva 
                                                 
94 Blair and Robertson. ‘Preface.’ The Philippine Islands, vol. 5, p. 9. 
95 Blair and Robertson. ‘Foundation of the Audiencia of Manila,’ vol. 5, p. 274.  
96 Oidor means attorney minister who in the Audiencias listened and sentenced cases and trials. Blair 
and Robertson translated it as “auditor.” The translation is incorrect since an auditor was an accountant. 
The best translation could be “judge,” with nuances. 
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Galicia and finally in 1583 to Manila to establish the Audiencia there.97  
The generalized nature of the ordinances ensured their non-
implementation in the Philippines. The individual sections were so 
indefinite and ultimately deemed inapplicable to the realities found in the 
islands. 
We know that the document on the establishment of the Audiencia 
was obtained by Robertson in Seville. Robertson was assisted in the 
archives by Pedro Torres y Lanzas. At that time, Torres y Lanzas was the 
archivist of Archivo de Indias. He knew perfectly well that apart from 
these ordinances of 1583, there were new ordinances enacted in 1595 
since he quoted them in Catálogo de los documentos relativos a las Islas 
Filipinas existentes en el Archivo de Indias de Sevilla precedido de una 
Historia General de Filipinas by Pablo Pastells.98 Robertson does not 
seem to have done anything to find these ordinances of 1595. He took for 
granted that the 313 sections of the establishment of the Audiencia of 
1583 were used again for its reestablishment in 1595. This idea emerges 
upon reading the instruction to Pedro Tello. Section 53 of this Instruction 
(Blair and Robertson omitted the number of each section) is entitled 
“Real Audiencia.” The king ordered the establishment of the Audiencia 
and gave Pedro Tello new sections. Blair and Robertson overlooked this 
point. They assumed that Pedro Tello came with the same ordinances. 
However, they fell into a contradiction in the preface of the volume by 
presenting a document purportedly without historical value entitled Royal 
                                                 
97 Muro, Romero Fernando. ‘Las Ordenanzas de 1596 para la Audiencia de Filipinas.’ Anuario de 
Estudios Americanos XXX, Sevilla, 1973, pp. 2-3.  
98 Torres y Lanzas, Pedro. Catalogo de los documentos a las Islas Filipinas existentes en el Archivo de 
Indias de Sevilla. Barcelona: Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, 1925. Vol. IV, doc. 4896, p. 
49. 
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Audiencia established: “On November 2699 following the king issues a 
decree re-establishing the Audiencia of Manila, and appointing as its 
president the new governor of the islands, Francisco Tello, sending him 
“detailed instructions. . .”100      
It seems according to this statement that Pedro Tello had “detailed 
instructions” for the reestablishment of the Audiencia, and apparently, 
Blair and Robertson knew this. But it was better to neglect this new 
Audiencia in order to confer an aura of “medievalism” upon the Spanish 
administration. Besides, Blair and Robertson could justify this neglect 
since the books or accounts they had used, from the seventeenth century 
onwards101 did not help to demystify their argument about the reuse of 
the same sections. On the contrary it seems that the books supported their 
argument. They are laconic and mention the Audiencia briefly. There is 
an allusion to the establishment in 1583 and its reestablishment in 1595. 
It is precisely this vagueness in the explanation which has led to the view 
that the same sections were reutilized since there is no mention of a new 
judicial corpus. For instance, Martínez de Zúñiga states 
The Royal Audience was established for first time in the city of 
Manila in 1584 at the request of Fray Domingo de Salazar…it was 
abolished in 1591 by Alonso Sanchez’s informe and Gómez Pérez 
Dasmariñas…Salazar travelled to Spain in order to achieve the 
reestablishment of the Audiencia which was re-established in 
1598.102 
 
                                                 
99  ‘Audiencia y sus ordenanzas’ (Audiencia and its ordinances) was issued in May 25th 1595. See 
Copia Literal de las Reales Zedulas despachadas desde el año 1580 en adelante. 
100 Blair and Robertson. ‘The Audiencia of Manila Established.’The Philippine Islands, Vol. 9, p. 15. 
101 Morga, Antonio. Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas; Martínez de Zúñiga, Joaquín. Estadismo de las Islas 
Filipinas; Mas, Sinibaldo de. Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1842;  Montero y Vidal, 
José. Historia General de Filipinas. Desde el descubrimiento de dichas Islas hasta nuestros días etc.  
102 Martínez de Zúñiga, Joaquín. Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas. Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda M. de 
Minuesa de los Ríos, 1893, p. 243. .  
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This excerpt is full of mistakes since the audiencia was not 
abolished by Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas. The abolishment was the result 
of a tacit agreement between the ecclesiastic and secular powers. It was 
abolished in 1589 and re-established in 1595. The reestablishment is 
precisely related to the consolidation of secular power. 
Sinibaldo de Mas quotes almost verbatim the same assumption, 
although he was more explicit, adding that the abolishment of the 
audiencia was connected to a problem of competition and mutual 
interferences between the audiencia and the governor.103 Montero y Vidal 
assumes the same.104 Therefore, these authors do not contradict the 
genealogy introduced by Blair and Robertson. 
We can better understand the subtle process of mistranslation by 
examining in detail the Instruction to Governor Pedro Tello. On 27 May 
1596 King Philip II dispatched the Instruction to Tello. The translation 
by Blair and Robertson of Section 53 of this instruction entitled Real 
Audiencia is as follows: 
53- And inasmuch as I have exercised especial care in maintaining 
all the kingdoms and provinces subject to me in peace, tranquillity, 
and justice, for this same purpose and object I established an 
audiencia in that city and province, in order that everything might 
be governed by means of it, and justice administered with the 
universal equality, mildness and satisfaction that are desirable. 
After its establishment I ordered it to be suppressed, as experience 
proved it to be unnecessary in a land so new and unsettled. In its 
place I sent a governor and although his administration was 
excellent, yet inasmuch as that community has grown and, it is 
hoped, will continue to grow I have thought it advisable to found 
and establish the said audiencia again. Accordingly, after having 
appointed you in the place of Gomez Perez, your predecessor, I 
have determined to establish the said Audiencia again. It shall be 
                                                 
103 Mas y Sanz, Sinibaldo de. Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1842 Madrid [sn]: 1843, 
pp. 51-56. 
104 Montero y Vidal, José. Historia General de Filipinas, desde el descubrimiento de dichas islas hasta 
nuestros días. Madrid: Imprenta y Fundición de Manuel Tello, 1887, p. 88 and p. 133.  
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located in these districts, in order that their government may be 
similar to that of the other kingdoms under my dominion. I have 
appointed for it persons as oidores, a fiscal and other officials. I 
have renewed the former ordinances by which the said Audiencia 
was founded.105 
 
The key statement in this section is the sentence I have renewed 
the former ordinances. At this point, Blair and Robertson added a 
reference: “see the document here referred to, at the end of volume 5 and 
completed in vol. 6.”106 The gist of this sentence, and probably the 
catalyst for assuming the same ordinances were used again, is found in 
the verb “renew” and the adjective “former.” The sentence in Spanish is 
“Y para ello he proveído las personas de oydores, fiscal, y otros 
oficiales, y renovado las ordenanzas pasadas. The etymology of the 
word “renovar” comes from the Latin renovare. There were exactly six 
entries of the term in the RAE of 1737.107 By taking into consideration 
that this sentence was written at the end of the sixteenth century, the 
appropriate meaning is “novar” or “subrogar,” to replace, to appear in a 
new form or to improve. And since the document links renovar with the 
adjective [ordenanzas] pasadas (former), the implication is that the 
former ordinances were replaced or improved, and not simply 
reactivated. 
The sentence in Spanish is clear and should be rendered as “I have 
replaced or improved the previous ordinances.” Blair and Robertson 
                                                 
105‘ Instrucciones a Gobernadores’, Section 53, p. 221. Copia Literal de las Reales Zedulas…;; Blair 
and Robertson. ‘Royal Instruction to Tello.’ The Philippine Islands, vol. 9 pp. 257-258. I have used 
Blair and Robertson’s translation. I do not subscribe to this translation and it is part of the argument of 
this section. This is the reason I have changed the term auditor and I have used the Spanish original 
“Oidor.” I have highlighted the sentence which has provoked the mythogenesis of the use of the same 
ordinances. 
106 Blair and Robertson. ‘Royal Instruction to Tello,’ vol. 9, footnote,  p. 257 
107 Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana, en que se explica el verdadero sentido de las voces…, p. 574. 
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decided nevertheless to translate renovar as “to resume.” This reflects 
either a lack of skill or a deliberate political purpose—probably a 
combination of both. It is possible that Blair and Robertson or LeRoy did 
not consult the RAE on this since LeRoy considered this dictionary 
“faulty.”108 We can be sure that the three of them never consulted the 
first edition of the RAE. Whatever the precise reasons, the choice of “to 
resume” was more useful for their—or should I say LeRoy’s—strategic 
goal. As we have seen, Blair and Robertson regularly consulted LeRoy 
concerning their doubts. 
The combination of mistranslation and misinterpretation that I 
have demonstrated above continues to pass unnoticed. The “Foundation 
of the Audiencia” and the “Instruction to Tello” are official royal decrees 
and therefore deemed important for the writing of Philippine history. 
Scholars have unfortunately taken for granted that these documents 
published by Blair and Robertson are reliable.109 
The Audiencia of 1595 was re-established with twenty-two new 
sections. This is the reason Philip II said, “I have replaced or improved 
the previous ordinances.” The Audiencia such as implemented in 1583 
could not develop properly in the Philippines for several reasons. First of 
all, as I have mentioned, the sections of the audiencia of 1583 come from 
the Ordinances of 1563 of Quito, Charcas and Panama. These places had 
                                                 
108 James A. LeRoy to Emma Blair, Durango, Mexico, October 20, 1904. Personal Letters of LeRoy 
James Alfred 1875-1909. Box 1, Folder 1. 
109 The most important example is Charles Cunningham who published in 1919, The Audiencia in the 
Spanish Colonies. As Illustrated by the Audiencia of Manila. Godian Press, 1971. Cunningham has 
been the only one to explain the institution of the Audiencia. He was assisted by Robertson and he was 
influenced by the multivolume and the Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias. Cunningham furnishes the 
argument the 313 sections were used again. This book has become a reference for scholars and has not 
been questioned. Cunningham was in Seville and knew perfectly the archives and the documents. He 
was working for Edward Ayer.  
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longer political and economical experiences as colonies than the 
Philippines. Not surpringly, the articles did not fit realities in the 
archipelago. The Philippines had an intrinsic peculiarity. It was still a 
relatively new colony in a developmental process. This political 
indefiniteness is reflected in the royal decrees, ordinances and so forth. 
During the decade of the 1580s the system was still too confused to 
establish in Manila an institution such as the Audiencia. The population 
concentration into villages had not taken place yet; the taxation of 
tributes had not been fixed; and above all the sections of the 1583 
ordinances did not fit the specific functions of the officers. Most of these 
hindrances started to be solved between the abolishment of the audiencia 
and its reestablishment. From 1589 to 1595 the Philippines had become 
politically, economically and socially defined. This topic is extremely 
complex and should have been explained by Blair and Robertson but 
instead they furnished grounds for further speculations regarding the 
audiencia. 
A paradigmatic case is the only work devoted to the audiencia of 
the Philippines, Charles Cunnigham’s The Audiencia in the Spanish 
Colonies: as illustrated by the Audiencia of Manila.  This book 
emphasizes what Blair and Robertson ignored although allowed us to 
glimpse through their sentence, “Although the audiencia was 
subsequently abolished for a few years, it was re-established in 1598 and 
the same articles were used again.”110 There are two errors fostered here 
by Blair and Robertson. The first is a simple mistake—the date of the 
                                                 
110 Cunningham, Charles H. The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies. As Illustrated by the Audiencia of 
Manila. New York: Godian Press, 1919, p. 49.  
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reestablishment as 1598 instead of 1595. The second, lamentably 
prevalent until the present, is the affirmation that “the same articles were 
used again.” Using volumes 5 and 6 of Blair and Robertson’s 
compendium, Cunningham naturally concluded that Philip II did not send 
new articles for the audiencia. The myth had been thoroughly shaped by 
1919, when Cunningham published his book. 
Blair and Robertson suppressed the Audiencia of 1595 since its 
recognition would have meant the acceptance of the view that by 1595 
the archipelago had been consolidated as an effective colony more than a 
missionary enterprise. This would have clashed with what Gaylord 
Bourne had suggested in his Historical Introduction.  
The ordinances of the Audiencia of 1595 were enacted in Toledo 
on 25 May 1595. The ordinances of 1583 had been replaced.111 Sánchez 
Bella asserts that the 1595 ordinances were general in character and 
could be applied elsewhere.112 So although designed with the Philippines 
in mind, the 1595 ordinances were transported, with modifications, to the 
reestablished audiencias in Chile in 1609 and Buenos Aires in 1661. 
Therefore, not only was an improved audiencia sent to the Philippines in 
1595, with twenty-two new sections, but it also seems that this audiencia 
was so effective that it became the cornerstone for the foundation of 
others. Contrary to Blair and Robertson’s assumption, which fostered the 
idea of anachronism and medievalism, the Audiencia of Manila was the 
most modern of the empire. 
                                                 
111 Schäfer Ernesto. El Consejo Real y Supremo de las Indias II. La Labor del Consejo de Indias en la 
administración colonial. Nedeln Graus, reprint, 1974, p. 92.  
112 Sánchez Bella. Ordenanzas para los tribunals de Mexico. Madrid, 1973, pp. 229-230. 
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By comparing the ordinances from 1595 with those from 1583 one 
can immediately see the differences. Those published by Blair and 
Robertson had 313 sections. In 1595 there were 335 sections. These 
twenty-two new sections were designed to address the specific problems 
of the Philippines. The first significant difference can be found in the 
preamble which introduces a new magistrate, thus creating four oidores. 
More interesting, however, is the following section devoted to 
Jurisdiction of the President and Magistrates in Civil and Criminal 
Cases. Seven new ordinances (3-10) were included in this section, all of 
them defining the roles and duties of the President, the Church and 
Magistracy. This was intended to eradicate the problem of the secular 
and religious authorities interfering with each other, a common problem 
in the past. The ordinances of 1583 had been too ambiguous on this 
matter. In contrast, section 9 of the 1595 Audiencia goes straight to the 
point: “. . .my Royal Jurisdiction shall not meddle in the 
ecclesiastical.”113 Subtly, the king was preventing the church from 
interfering in civil power (and vice versa, of course). He was setting 
limits to the old preeminence of the friars. 
The most substantial development over 1583 can be seen in Affairs 
of Government. These new ordinances demonstrate a tacit will to 
consolidate the Philippines and to implant an effective civil control over 
the archipelago. With this purpose in mind, the sections relating to 
Ecclesiastical cases were reduced to only one. The stress was now to be 
on effective civil government. 
                                                 
113 Copia Literal de las Reales Zedulas despachadas desde el año 1588 en adelante, p. 272. 
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Although 22 Philippines-specific sections were introduced in 1595, 
the rest of the ordinances, which had general application, were little 
changed from the 1583 version. By comparing these unmodified sections, 
however, we can get some idea of how Blair and Robertson translated the 
Spanish to suit their purpose. The most flagrant case is section 71 from 
1583, equivalent to section 80 from 1595, belonging to the chapter 
Indians and matters relating to them. What Blair and Robertson 
translated as “that the said Indians shall be better treated,”114 is in the 
Spanish original “que los dichos Indios sean muy bien tratados”—“that 
the said Indians shall be very well treated.” The meanings of these two 
sentences are not exactly the same. Blair and Robertson, by using the 
word “better” imply that the natives have been mistreated before. The 
sentence in Spanish, on the other hand, implies a heightened paternalism 
on the part of the Spaniards. Blair and Robertson’s perspective is 
supported by their translation of another sentence: “Item: Our said 
president and auditors shall always take care to be informed of the crimes 
and abuses.” The term “crime” exaggerates actual conditions since the 
Spanish word in the document is excesos, which should be translated as 
“abuses.” And what Blair and Robertson translate as “abuses” is, in the 
original, malos tratamientos, better translated as “mistreatement.” These 
do not seem to be innocent mistakes of translation. 
The subtle biases in Blair and Robertson’s translation practices 
tend to pass unnoticed because they are set in the context of other 
documents that support similar meanings. Here we can see the logic of 
                                                 
114 Blair and Robertson. The Philippine Islands, vol. 5, p. 298. 
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their publication of friar accounts such as Bishop Salazar’s memorial, 
which dwelt on the abuses committed by the encomenderos, governors, 
alcaldes mayores and so forth. The mistreatment of the natives as even 
worse than slaves, is the central theme in such accounts. We can see how 
Blair and Robertson’s mistranslations were meant to augment the friar 
documents, altogether presenting a stark image of bad Spanish 
colonizers. 
 A pattern begins to surface as we examine Blair and Robertson’s 
choice of documents to include in their compendium, and even their 
choice of English words in the process of translation to convey the 
meanings they preferred. A past as origin of the present was being 
constructed. The message was that the despotism of the Spaniards would 
end with the arrival of the “saviors” who would redeem or liberate the 
Filipinos from tyrannical Spain through their policy of “benevolent 
assimilation.” Not to be forgotten is the fact that the publication of the 
Audiencia and related documents coincided with the new involvement of 
LeRoy in the Blair and Robertson documentary project. It was LeRoy 
who insisted to Robertson about the need to document the “Spanish evil.” 
Finally, let us examine how “cacique” figures in the Audiencia 
documents and how Blair and Robertson handled this issue. Section 74 
from the 1583 Audiencia (equivalent to section 83 from 1595) states: 
Ytten que ninguna Justicia ordinaria del distrito de la dicha Audiencia se 
entremeta â privar los caciques de sus cacicasgos. (“Itten that no 
ordinary Magistrate of the district of the said Audienca shall meddle in 
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depriving the caciques of their dominion.”)115 Blair and Robertson 
translate this section as “Let not the judge of first instance in the district 
or our said Audiencia meddle with depriving the caciques of their 
caciquedoms.”116 At this point, they cite the word cacique and in a 
footnote explain its etymology: “A word originating in Hayti, signifying 
‘princes’ or ‘chiefs,’ quite naturally extended by a Spanish clerk or 
secretary to the chiefs of Filipino tribes.” 
This maneuver is related to LeRoy’s intervention and his advice 
“to bear the evil to the present.” There is no evidence whatsoever of any 
Spanish clerk or secretary extrapolating the term cacique to the 
Philippines. Also surprising is the translation of cacicazgo as 
“caciquedoms” when it could be translated as territories, granjerías, 
haciendas, dominions and so forth. The term “caciquedoms” was more 
effective for the new discourse being shaped about the Filipino elite. 
Cacicazgo comes from the sixteenth century meaning “dignity of the 
cacique or noble among the Indians and also it is taken for territory or 
dominion which he has.”117 But Blair and Robertson decided to translate 
cacicazgo as “caciquedoms” in order to assimilate it to the term 
“caciquism” that had recently been coined by American officials in the 
Philippines. They were attempting to make these different terms 
synonymous so that “caciquism” could be regarded as an inheritance 
from the Spanish era. 
                                                 
115 Copia Literal de las Reales Cedulas…p. 291. 
116Blair and Robertson. The Philippine Islands, vol. V, p. 299.  
117 Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana en que se explica el verdadero sentido de las voces…, 1729, p. 
38. 
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In order to establish the cacique’s existence in the past Robertson, 
as we have seen, misrepresented the Audiencia and the Leyes de las 
Indias. The specific section on caciques in the Audiencia was one of the 
“general applications” for the whole empire that eventually became 
incorporated into the Laws of the Indies [Lib. 6, Tit. 7, L.4]. This is the 
only reason the term cacique appears. This was taken without 
modification from 1563 when these ordinances were first redacted. At 
that time, the Philippines had not even been conquered yet. Therefore the 
subject of caciques and cacicazgos was inapplicable to the Philippines. 
Robertson seemed anxious to demonstrate that since the sixteenth 
century the Filipinos were virtually held in serfdom in encomiendas, the 
equivalent of landed estates. Curiously, this was regarded in Robertson’s 
time as the greatest obstacle to the implantation of self-governing 
institutions in the municipalities of America’s new possessions. In all 
likelihood the above translation was furnished by LeRoy. 
The Audiencia and the mythology surrounding it are an example of 
the kind of knowledge generated by The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. 
In spite of being considered the single most voluminous collection of 
primary sources dealing with the Spanish period in the Philippines,118 it 





                                                 
118 Phelan, John L.Free versus compulsory labor: Mexico and the Philippines 1549-1648. Comparative 
Studies in Society and History I; 2. The Hague, 1958. 
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LeRoy on the Philippines, 1860-1898 
The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 culminates with an essay written 
by LeRoy on the second half of the nineteenth century.119 Volume 6, 
which announced that the multivolume series was to cover up to the 
nineteenth century, informed readers that “For the history of the 
nineteenth century we will present various important decrees, reports and 
other official documents; and provide a clear, careful and impartial 
synopsis of some of the best historical matter.”120 As a matter of fact, 
Blair and Robertson did not publish important decrees, reports or official 
documents pertaining to the nineteenth century. The history of that period 
was to be explained through LeRoy’s long piece, “The Philippines 1860-
1898: Some comments and bibliographical notes.” 
LeRoy by that time was considered an authoritative scholar and 
bibliographer; in fact he had risen to become the leading American 
authority on Philippine affairs. His essay in the compendium’s final 
volume was to cover “all the important literature of the Philippines down 
to 1906.”121 It is practically the same bibliography as found in The 
Americans in the Philippines. As a matter of fact, this essay is a summary 
of his magnum opus. LeRoy selected part of the literature in order to 
stress the anachronism of the Spanish system (which all documentary 
series was all about) and sought in the essay to “bear some evils to the 
                                                 
119 It is impossible to summarize in this section the bibliography presented by LeRoy. I am going to 
mention those books that Zulueta recommended to LeRoy. Le Roy used some of Zulueta’s 
recommendations and comments while those he discredited precisely became the alternative to his 
history of the Philippines and to the American bibliography. 
120 Blair and Robertson. The Philippine Islands, Vol. 6, p. 8. 
121 Gleeck, Lewis E. Jr. Nine years to make a difference, p. 67. 
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present.” He discredited important works that provided alternative 
perspectives, such as La Política de España en Filipinas, Archivo del 
Bibliófilo Filipino, Foreman’s The Philippine Islands and others.  From 
1903 to early 1904 LeRoy had received from Clemente Zulueta a lot of 
information about Spanish books written at the turn of the nineteenth 
century. This provided him with an arsenal of bibliographical 
information, which he would use in this essay. Zulueta could not 
complain since he died in 1904. 
LeRoy developed this essay carefully since he considered it 
essential “to have the events of 1896-1898, and to a great extent from 
1860 to 1898, pretty well treated, for an American audience.”122 He 
explained to Robertson that the great mistake of Americans was not to 
inform themselves as to what was going on in the Philippines. His 
strategy to solve this problem was deceptively modest: 
My elaborate (comparatively so, at least) discussion of the closing 
years of Spanish rule is one dictated by the ignorance of the 
American public. For the period of Spanish rule, I have no right to 
tax my readers with more than general conclusions; if they choose 
to pursue it, I present them with bibliographical data.123 
 
LeRoy’s approach in The Americans in the Philippines was also 
pursued in this essay. He provides general conclusions for the reader and 
a select bibliography to back up the broad picture for those who wanted 
to read more. 
LeRoy starts the essay with a conclusive affirmation: “The 
‘modern era’ in the Philippine Islands –which indeed, in certain respects 
did not really begin until after the establishment of American rule—
                                                 
122 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson.,Durango, Mexico August 24, 1904. This letter can be 
found in James A. LeRoy papers and James A. Robertson papers. Special correspondence, Box 5.  
123 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, August 24, 1904. Special Correspondence, Box5.  
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coincides with the last half of the nineteenth century.”124 Here he begins 
to apply his most effective strategy for writing the history of the last 
years of the Spanish colonial administration. The modernization of the 
country only took place when the Americans arrived. Yes, there was 
some kind of modernization during the “old regime” but this was 
undermined by a certain impulse to perpetuate the medieval conditions 
that had characterized the old order. This follows the outlines of what he 
had said to Robertson—“of course the various reform programs of liberal 
and revolutionary governments in Spain must have some attention.”125 
He would devote some attention to Spanish reformism. As a matter of 
fact, he assumes that there was very considerable progress during 
Spanish rule from 1860 onwards. But the reforms were only partial, often 
impractical, or in any case ill-adapted to Philippine conditions: 
Abuses of administration continued under so-called liberal periods 
as well as in times of full clerical domination. . .The course of 
progress was so irregular and uncertain as to lend justification to 
the feeling of the Filipinos that they were being treated with 
insincerity.126 
 
LeRoy does not miss any opportunity to infer the existence of an 
intrinsic corruption during Spanish rule, which ensured that the reforms 
were a dead-letter or only a promise. By stressing the abuses of the 
Spanish administration he was explaining how the Filipinos had 
developed within this evil system, and how the resulting culture of abuse 
and corruption has become a hindrance to the implantation of American 
                                                 
124 LeRoy, James A. ‘The Philippine 1860-1898. Some comments and bibliographical notes.’ The 
Philippine Islands, vol. 52, p. 112. 
125 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, May 13, 1904. James A. Robertson 
papers. Special Correspondence, Box 5. 
126 LeRoy, James A. ‘The Philippines 1860-1898…, pp.149-150. 
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institutions. LeRoy in this essay presents a dichotomy between bad 
Spanish and good American. 
As for LeRoy’s argument about irregular progress in the 
archipelago, he bases this on Filipino literature, specifically the 
newspaper La Solidaridad according to which the reforms implemented 
by liberal governments became paralyzed whenever the conservatives 
won the elections. LeRoy reiterates in this essay arguments that he had 
already put forward in his book and articles. Their singular conclusion is 
that the Philippines had been ruled by an ecclesiastical, medieval, and 
“halting” Spain—in practically every way the opposite of what the 
United States was. 
The importance of this essay lies as much in LeRoy’s notes and 
comments about other sources of information about the Philippines. He 
warns the readers of errors by authors he dislikes, and gives special 
praise to American reports and books written by certain foreigners. He 
offers a guide to which bibliography to use (and which to reject) in order 
to write a “true and objective history.” 
LeRoy, for example, highlights Feodor Jagor’s book as the dictum 
of the truth. Jagor was a German living in the Philippines in 1860 who 
published Travels in the Philippines in 1873.  This book was 
indispensable, says LeRoy, since Jagor encouraged reforms in the 
Philippines and provided an illuminating account of the paternalism of 
Spanish rule.127 While the experience of Jagor is important, the fact is 
                                                 
127 He sees Jagor as a prophet since he translated this book from Spanish and LeRoy interpreted some 
excerpts as showing that Jagor foresaw the clash of the Spanish regime. He devotes long paragraph to 
Jagor’s book in The Americans in the Philippines. 
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that from the time of his stay in the Philippines up to 1898 the country 
went through a modernization of its institutions. 
LeRoy also recommends to his readers the 1842 Informe sobre las 
Islas Filipinas by Sinibaldo de Mas.128 He came across this Informe 
through Zulueta who in 1904 informed him that “Mr. Mas is the only 
Spanish who has judged with acceptable criterion the Philippine 
question.” What Zulueta probably meant was that Mas had made clear to 
the Spanish government that the parameters of the colonial system in the 
Philippines had better be reviewed and reformed or Spain would lose the 
archipelago.129 However, LeRoy de-contextualized Mas’s Informe by 
regarding the author’s conclusions as prophetic of the future of the 
Philippines. Mas’s advice was in fact heeded by the Spanish government, 
which tried to implant new colonial parameters but did not have time to 
see the reforms through. 
LeRoy recommends Montero y Vidal’s work for a general 
understanding of Spanish Philippines history. In 1902 Zulueta had 
explained to him that “Montero y Vidal cannot be considered as a 
history. This is the work of a compiler and nothing else. However, 
Montero y Vidal’s work is, as a chronological account, the best. From 
this standpoint it is an excellent work.”130 LeRoy uses practically the 
same words to define Montero y Vidal’s Historia General de Filipinas: 
                                                 
128 The same volume 52 of The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 starts with Internal Political Conditions 
of the Philippines 1842. This is an abstract written and translated by LeRoy of Informe sobre el estado 
de Filipinas en 1842 [3 vols] written by Sinibaldo de Mas. 
129 Josep M. Fradera is who has been studying Sinibaldo de Mas. See La importància de tenir colònies. 
El marc històric de la participació catalana en el complex espanyol d’ultramar. In Catalunya i 
Ultramar. Poder i negoci a les colònies espanyoles (1750-1914). Exposició del 10 de maig de 1995 
fins al 31 d’octubre de 1996. Barcelona: Museu Marítim. Drassanes de Barcelona. 
130 Clemente J. Zulueta to James A. LeRoy. September 20, 1902.  Robertson, James Alexander. 
Annapolis, Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. 
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“And though it is the best Philippine historical work for reference 
purposes, it is, after all, hardly more than a chronology of important 
events and compilation of official orders and projects.”131 
LeRoy does not provide any reference acknowledging his debt to 
Zulueta. He takes Zulueta’s knowledge as his own. In any case, LeRoy 
wanted to recommend this general history because it followed the 
conservative view. Montero y Vidal refused all liberal reforms in the 
Philippines. Instead he extolled the role of the friars.  
LeRoy provides a very selective bibliography for the 1896-1897 
revolt. He had asked Zulueta to furnish him official documents from 
1896 to 1899. Since Zulueta did not find Spanish publications containing 
official documents he offered the following suggestion: “The Memoria of 
General Blanco is full of errors. The only works I recommend to you are 
‘La Política de España en Filipinas’ and ‘Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino.’ 
These works contain the telegraphic dispatches, reports, etc., everything 
rigorously official.”132 
Zulueta never knew that LeRoy would use the information he 
provided to write an essay like this, and to include it in a series—The 
Philippine Islands—which Zulueta, it will be recalled, considered useless 
and full of errors. He thought that LeRoy wanted this information to 
write a book about the Philippine revolution sympathetic to the Filipinos, 
which is why he offered him to send LeRoy all the books he needed. 
LeRoy affirms that the Spanish press such as La Política de 
España en Filipinas and El Heraldo de Madrid furnished original 
                                                 
131 LeRoy, James A. ‘Rhe Philippines 1860-1898…., p. 135. 
132 Clemente de Zulueta to James A. LeRoy, January 31, 1904. James A. Robertson papers. 
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sources of information about the revolt. He again used the same words 
and information that Zulueta provided him. 
Zulueta, as well, commented on Sastrón’s Insurrección en 
Filipinas as follows: “You can save yourself the trouble to read it. He has 
arranged and organized some news from the Manila newspapers .”133 
LeRoy in his selective list of books about the insurrection includes 
Sastrón and adds, “Composed of accounts and documents drawn mainly 
from the press of Manila.”134 
LeRoy’s essay has become a reference for scholars wanting to 
know about the last four decades of Spanish rule. Owing partly to this 
work LeRoy was and continues to be recognized for his bibliographical 
knowledge. In contrast, the Filipino and indio Clemente J. Zulueta, who 
provided him with much of this knowledge, is almost totally unknown or 
is only mentioned as a Federalista.135 I am sure that Zulueta sent him 
other books together with his comments; I have only pointed out those I 
have direct evidence about. 
LeRoy was a magician in de-contextualization. After presenting a 
long list of sources provided by Zulueta he focuses his attention on the 
1897 Pact of Biak-na-bato. He emphasizes Primo de Rivera’s Memoria 
but only extracts a few notes from it, then provides a full synopsis, with 
quotations, of the history of the pact of Biac-na-bato. His main aim in 
this exercise is to discredit Pedro Paterno: 
                                                 
133 Clemente de Zulueta to James A. Leroy, October 9, 1903. Robertson, James Alexander. Annapolis, 
Md. Manuscripts. Box 2, Letters 1902-1906. 
134 LeRoy, James A. ‘The Philippines 1860-1898..., 195. 
135 Cullinane, Michael. Ilustrado Politics. Filipino Elite responses to American rule, 1898-1908. 
Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 2003..  
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That Paterno at least knew this, that if Aguinaldo did not he was 
tricked by Paterno and others, that $200,000 disappeared 
somewhere between Primo de Rivera, Paterno and a few other 
possible beneficiaries; with this account and the documents in our 
War Department, the history of affairs is pretty clear—necessary 
reforms.136 
 
LeRoy reinforces his argument by repeating the claim of former 
Governor Primo de Rivera, whose declaration before the U.S. Senate was 
translated by the War Department, that he never promised reforms for the 
Philippines. Moreover, Rivera said that he had given money to Paterno, 
which subsequently vanished. LeRoy supports this account since it 
discredits both Paterno and Aguinaldo. As has been explained, Primo de 
Rivera was replaced by Governor Augustin who in fact instituted the 
stated reforms. But LeRoy conveniently omits this part of the story. He 
ends his account abruptly with the claim of “necessary reforms.” The 
reader can only conclude that Spanish reforms never reached the 
Philippines.  
LeRoy notably only comments about books which Zulueta had 
expertly commented on to him previously. Moreover, he relegates to 
footnotes other important books. Understandably some of these 
marginalized books were those deemed not useful for, or even hostile to, 
his construction of Philippine history. But the second reason for their 
relegation to the footnotes is that Zulueta, who died in 1904, could no 
longer provide him with comments thereafter. 
LeRoy’s essay, needless to say, discredits authors who criticized 
American occupation or who became serious opponents of the American 
                                                 
136 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson. Durango, Mexico November 22, 1904. James A. Robertson 
papers. Special Correspondence, Box 5. 
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construction of the Spanish colonial past. He managed, for example, to 
silence John Foreman who passed from being an authority for the 
Americans to an unreliable author. The problem emerged when Foreman 
re-issued his The Philippine Islands in 1899. Some information Foreman 
furnished displeased the Americans. LeRoy discredited Foreman in his 
correspondence with Robertson in 1904. He tried, as he had done before 
with Retana, to dissuade the editors to use or to recommend Foreman’s 
book. When LeRoy wrote this essay, Foreman had just reissued his book 
covering the American occupation until 1906. Foreman strongly 
criticized the American system, above all the claim to democratize the 
Philippines: 
The democratic doctrine suddenly launched upon the masses is 
changing their [Filipino] character. The polite and submissive 
native is developing into an ill-bred, up-to-date wrangling 
politician. Hence rule by coercion instead of sentiment is forced 
upon America, for up to the present she has made no progress in 
winning the hearts of the people.137 
 
Foreman attacked the American government by accusing them of 
fostering bossism and, above all, of implementing a coercive system 
which forced Filipinos to accept the American occupation at least tacitly. 
It seems that these words displeased LeRoy, who judged Foreman’s book 
to be  inaccurate. However, Foreman used as sources the American 
reports themselves. Hence, he was as reliable as LeRoy since both 
explained the American occupation through official sources. 
As for Retana, this author could be a serious danger since his 
works reflected the new Spanish colonial restructuring that LeRoy 
                                                 
137 Foreman, John. The Philippine Islands. A political, geographical, ethnographical, social and 
commercial history of the Philippine Archipelago. Singapore: Kelly and Walsh, Ltd, 1906, p. 9. 
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wanted to erase from the record. LeRoy, as in his other works, refers to 
the “few reform decrees remaining thus dead letters in the 
Philippines.”138 He illustrates the Maura law but, as he did in The 
Americans in the Philippines, he suppresses the large bibliography 
dedicated to highlighting this law, reducing this bibliography to a single 
work: the Report of the Schurman Commission! 
 LeRoy also warns the reader against Paterno’s book, Régimen 
Municipal de las Islas Filipinas: “This work is at least not merely 
ridiculous, as are this author’s writings on an imaginary primitive 
religion and civilization.139” At the time LeRoy wrote his essay, Paterno 
was running for a seat in Laguna province. Perhaps LeRoy wanted to 
subvert Paterno’s political career by undermining his intellectual 
reputation. 
LeRoy’s objective in constructing the essay was to present to the 
readers of the Blair and Robertson documentary series a clear and well-
ordered review of Spanish rule in the Philippines “with keen but 
impartial comments.”140 LeRoy was anything but impartial, of course. As 
we have seen, his essay promoted American imperialism in the 
Philippines by establishing an opposition between the American present 
and a past Spanish regime that was cleverly stereotyped and turned into 
an unassailable truth. LeRoy’s comments and bibliography provided a 
timely reference point for the construction of a new Philippine history 
under American rule. We can see the outlines of this history in the 
following passage from the essay: 
                                                 
138 Le Roy, James A. ‘The Philippines 1860-1898…,’ p. 152. 
139 LeRoy, James A. ‘The Philippines 1860-1898…,’ p. 154. 
140 Blair and Robertson. ‘Preface.’ The Philippine Islands, vol. 52, p. 13. 
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Of course, the various reform programs of liberal and 
revolutionary governments in Spain must have some attention; but 
these and the 1872 revolt are really to be relegated to a secondary 
place. But in the eighties and nineties the propaganda for reforms 
conducted on the part of the Filipinos, especially in Spain, laid the 
foundation for the later more radical movements in the islands 
themselves, though it was itself not a separatist propaganda. The 
katipunan was a sort of Filipino excrescence on the part of more 
ignorant leaders of the lower classes. 
 
Epilogue 
The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 was an economic failure. The 
Arthur H. Clark Company lost a lot of money with this enterprise. As 
Arthur Clark explained to Ayer, “I am sorry to tell you confidentially that 
my venture in the publication of The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 has 
been a serious financial loss to me, in fact I have lost $20,000.000 upon 
it.”141 Despite this loss the company was not forced to close as Domingo 
Abella states in the preface to the reprint of the multivolume work.142 The 
Arthur H. Clark Company continued to publish Americana books. The 
American public, however, did not see the Philippines as part of 
“Americana” and even libraries refused to buy this multivolume work. 
Judged on its own merits, the work had serious defects that 
alienated potential readers and buyers. It was fragmented and inaccurate, 
with 43 volumes devoted to the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries 
which are explained through friars’ accounts or secondary sources; and 
only seven devoted to the eighteenth century—also inaccurate and with 
lots of present interpolations—and finally just two volumes devoted to 
                                                 
141 Arthur Clark to Edward Ayer, March 15, 1909.Edward Ayer papers. Personal correspondence. 
Chicago: Newberry Library. 
142 Abella Domingo. ‘Preface to the reprint of the first reissue.’ The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. 
“The Arthur Clark Company was forced to close shortly thereafter for economic reasons.” p. viii. 
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the nineteenth century, which were tendentious, partial and sectarian. For 
these and other reasons, the series could not sell on its own. 
The U.S. government and the academe ultimately intervened to 
alter the work’s fate. An important campaign was mounted to introduce 
the multivolume work in all the universities. American scholars began to 
cite The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 in all the bibliographies as the 
most valuable collection of primary sources. The future Filipinist would 
come to depend on this multivolume and, with the Americanization (and 
stress on English) of the educational system in the Philippines, Filipinos 
themselves would need this multivolume to in order to know about their 
history, no matter that this history was partial, distorted, and profoundly 
anti-Spanish. A work that was considered at the beginning to be of little 
value as far as Zulueta, LeRoy, Barrows and Pardo de Tavera were 
concerned, has become the “best and most comprehensive source of 
historical materials on the Philippines during the Spanish term,” 
according to John Leddy Phelan.  
Because of nearly a century now of using the Blair and Robertson 
compendium, stereotyped images of the Spanish regime are difficult to 
de-construct. It is difficult even to try retranslate the documents by going 
back to the transcripts used by Blair and Robertson, which are lodged in 
the Newberry Library, because even the originals are untrustworthy.143 In 
any case, there seems to be no end in sight to the continued use of The 
Philippine Islands 1493-1898. It was re-issued in 1962 and again in 
                                                 
143 Robertson James Alexander, 1873-1939. Transcripts of Selected Documents pertaining to the 
History of the Philippines between 1493-1843. There are 24 volumes of transcriptions, 23 of them are 
devoted to the sixteenth and seventeenth century and only one to the eighteenth century. Most of these 
documents were mentioned in the volume 53 and some of them published erroneously. The 
transcriptions are inaccurate. These transcripts are in Newberry Library, Chicago. 
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1973. Filipino archivist Domingo Abella’s preface to the 1962 reprint is a 
eulogy to James A. Robertson and Emma H. Blair. Abella insisted on the 
cultural value of The Philippine Islands and stressed that “It is the only 
collection of historical sources in English available to our scholars and 
students who are unable to read the originals in Spanish.144 This view of 
“Blair & Robertson” is contrary to the assessments made by earlier 
Filipino scholars like Zulueta, Pardo de Tavera, Albert and others, who 
had actually lived through Spanish times. Abella’s perception reveals the 
triumph of Americanization in the Philippines. But he was merely stating 
what most scholars, even today, believe. 
In 1973, Alfredo and Benjamin Ramos and Jorge M. Juco 
approved a project to again re-issue The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. 
Together with Abella’s these reprints made available to new generations 
of American and Filipino students “primary sources translated into 
English.” The preface to the 1973 reprint even reiterates the justifications 
given by Blair and Robertson for the selection and publication of the 
documents: 
The Americans were to govern a people whom they had very little 
knowledge of. They wanted to train the Filipinos in the art of self-
government, but the problem was how and where to start. The 
information regarding the culture and capacity of their wards were 
contradictory. The Spaniards reported that the Filipinos possessed 
a limited ability.145 
 
The language in the prefaces to the 1962 and 1973 reprints reflect 
the triumph of the policies of Taft era and the influence of LeRoy works. 
The Americans arrived in the Philippines to find a people that needed 
                                                 
144 Abella, Domingo. ‘Preface to the reprint of the first re-issue.’ Blair and Robertson (ed.),  The 
Philippine Islands 1493-1898, 1973, p. ix 
145 Abella, Domingo. ‘Preface.’The Philippine Islands,1973, p. xxiii. 
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uplifting, presumably because the Spanish regime had done nothing for 
them. The last sentence about the limited ability of the Filipinos reflects 
the accounts of the friars and other conservative works, which Blair, 
Robertson, and LeRoy favored. 
While these reprints of Blair and Robertson’s multivolume work 
have become a standard reference work in English for Americans and 
Filipinos, Spanish scholars do not use it. Partly it is because they have 
access to the true primary sources in their archives, but partly it is also 
because they consider this work as part and parcel of the American 
imperial enterprise. There are some projects to demystify the relevance of 
The Philippine Islands by publishing the original documents and 
comparing the original Spanish with Blair and Robertson’s translations. 
But the work of undoing what Blair, Robertson, LeRoy and others have 
built up, and of providing alternative constructions, has really only just 
begun.                
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CHAPTER IX: THE CLOSE OF AN ERA 
 
The power of the cacique or landed boss to 
retain his tenants attached to the soil in a 
condition somewhat resembling peonage is 
lessening year by year, as the small man grows 
more self-confident and independent.1 
 
       Francis Burton Harrison 
 
The Taft era marked a milestone in the construction of American 
colonial discourse. Three coordinates of Philippine history were 
generated from 1902 to 1914. The first one was the representation of 
Spanish colonial administration as essentially medieval, following upon 
the idea that “The conquest of the Philippines was essentially a 
missionary conquest.”2 A second coordinate was the notion that the 
colonial government was patterned on that of Spanish America. And the 
third coordinate was that “Caciquism or bossism government by local 
aristocrats was the prime feature of village life in the islands during the 
entire period of Spanish rule and existed long before their arrival.”3 
These arguments were provided by James A. Robertson for the 
Encyclopedia Britannica in 1920. They emerged with the publication of 
Blair and Robertson’s The Philippine Islands and the article written by 
James A. LeRoy in 1905, “Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines.” 
Therefore, although 1913 marked the end of the Taft era, the colonial 
                                                 
1 I have selected this excerpt since this is the underside of the history explained in this chapter. One 
wonders if the continuance of the Filipinization policy would have eradicated landlordism. The official 
history, precisely, presents us a reversal of this story – that the Filipinization fostered caciquism or 
landlordism.  
2 Robertson, James A. The Encyclopedia Britannica, 1920, p. 397.  Robertson James Alexander. 
Annapolis. Md. Manuscripts. Box 6, Articles and Notes. North Carolina: Duke University.  
3 Robertson, James A. The Encyclopedia Britannica, p. 398. 
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discourse generated by this era was in fact to be intensified in order to 
block the advance of independence for the Filipinos. 
1914 was a fruitful year for the publication of books warning about 
the dangers of the Filipinization of the archipelago. LeRoy had 
elaborated a system called “caciquism” in 1905, Worcester was to perfect 
it in 1914 with the publication of Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine 
Islands and above all the influential book, The Philippines: Past and 
Present. The cacique system was further stigmatized as a system of land 
holding, rural-based feudal barons with great power over the land and its 
people. 
 
Worcester’s crusade to paralyze the process of independence 
Taft and LeRoy, as we have seen, built up a picture of an evil 
called caciquism. They were ambiguous about it. LeRoy on the one hand 
subsumed into the category of caciques the federalists, the landowners, 
the rich and educated, the military leaders, and so on. Taft, on the other 
hand, considered caciques as the wealthy and propertied men. Taft, 
wisely, to support his argument looked back to the “Filipino insurrection” 
to define caciquism. He put the blame on rebel officials who destroyed 
the will of the poor taos in order to make them commit the most atrocious 
crimes.4 This argument surfaced in most of the textbooks which appeared 
in 1914. Taft could no longer rely on LeRoy who had died in 1909. The 
alternative was Dean C. Worcester, who built up the caciquism 
phenomenon even further, adding  new features that assimilated 
                                                 
4 The Census of the Philippine Islands. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905. 
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caciquism to slavery, involuntary servitude and peonage. Between 1908 
and 1914 Worcester became involved in a bitter contest with the 
Philippine Assembly and the nationalist press. On the grounds of 
protecting individuals from virtual slavery, he mounted a campaign to 
secure the enactment of legislation which would explicitly penalize 
slavery, involuntary servitude and peonage anywhere in the Philippines.5 
In 1909, the American-led Commission approved the bill proposed 
by Worcester. The Filipino-dominated National Assembly, however, 
disapproved it. Its leader, Manuel Quezon, a veteran of the Philippine-
American war, felt that the passage of this law would be an insult to the 
Filipino people, implying a tacit agreement that slavery existed in the 
Philippines. 
Despite his failure to get the bill of 1909 passed, Worcester did not 
give up and even less did Washington back down when Taft observed 
that they could not stop the process of independence. In 1910, 1911 and 
1912 similar bills were passed by the Commission and rejected by the 
Assembly. Worcester penned strong statements regarding the situation in 
order that the issue might be forcibly brought to the attention of the 
American people. According to Hayden, in his introduction to the 1930 
edition of Worcester’s The Philippines: Past and Present, for three years 
the strong statements provided by Worcester were eliminated from his 
reports before publication.6 The publication of the reports with 
Worcester’s statements would imply the tacit recognition that the 
                                                 
5 Worcester, Dean C. ‘Slavery and Peonage.’ The Philippines Past and Present. New York: The 
Macmillan and Company, 1914, Chapter XXV, pp. 509-543. 
6 Ralston Hayden J. ‘Slavery made a Crime.’ In  Dean C. Worcester. The Philippines Past and Present. 
New York: The Macmillan and Company, 1930, Chapter VII, p. 59.   
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Americans were unable to eradicate the so-called slavery, and instead 
were conniving with it. 
Let us examine the context in which the anti-slavery bill was 
finally passed. Several important events took place in 1912, which made 
it a crucial year for American and Philippine politics. The Democratic 
Party platform of 1912 reaffirmed the position of the party “against a 
policy of imperialism and exploitation in the Philippines” and favored 
“an immediate declaration of the nation’s purpose to recognize the 
independence of the Islands as soon as a stable government can be 
established.”7 
In addition to this declaration of intentions by the Democrats, on 
20 March 1912, William A. Jones, a Congressman from Virginia and 
Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs, introduced in the House 
of Representatives a bill that sought to “establish a qualified 
independence for the Philippines, and to fix the date when such qualified 
independence shall become absolute and complete.”8 Congressman 
Jones, after whom the Jones bill was named, promised independence at a 
fixed date, July 4, 1921. 
Taft obviously disliked this bill. He had been re-nominated by the 
Republicans for the Presidency of the United States. But Roosevelt 
bolted the party to lead the Progressives, thus guaranteeing the election 
of Woodrow Wilson. The Jones Bill would be welcomed in the 
Philippines and all the political parties would unanimously adhere to the 
                                                 
7 Watson Curry, Roy. Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy 1913-1921. New York: Bookman 
Associates, 1957, p. 67. 
8 Blount, James H.  The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912. New York: G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1913, p. 640. 
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Jones Bill. The Partido Progresista (a faction of the old Partido Federal) 
and the Partido Nacionalista unconditionally accepted the provisions of 
Jones bill. Both parties sent to the United States some Commissioners for 
the “recognition of their independence.”9 
Woodrow Wilson’s victory in the 1912 elections brought an end to 
Taft’s predominance in politics. He was fiercely criticized by the 
government he had set up in the Philippines. His argument about the 
Jones bill, which he termed a “suicidal and highly defective” measure,10 
was seriously questioned. Taft and some of his officials such as Forbes 
and Worcester continued to argue that to confer independence upon the 
Filipinos meant to hand power over to an oligarchical minority. Taft 
informed the U.S. Congress that 
A present declaration even of future independence would retard 
progress by the dissension and disorder it would arouse. I not only 
assert, but I shall undertake to prove by incontrovertible facts, that 
the government which the United States has imposed upon the 
Filipinos and under the dominance of which they are now forced to 
live, is an oligarchy of the most intolerable, despotic and 
unrestricted character.11 
 
Jones accused Taft’s government of implementing in the Islands an 
irresponsible and odious autocracy by misinforming the United States of 
the real state of the Philippines. Jones criticized this autocracy for having 
systematically denied self-government to the Filipinos, paralyzing the 
Filipinization of the civil service, hiding the graft committed by some 
American officials who continued to receive their high salaries, and 
above all the misappropriation by some officials of the public revenues of 
                                                 
9 Osmeña, Sergio. La Unidad del Pueblo Filipino. Discurso del Hon. Sergio Osmeña, Febrero 3 y 14, 
1913. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1913, pp. 14-15. 
10 Jones, William A.Misgovernment in the Philippines and Cost to the United States of American 
Occupation. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913, p. 2. 
11 Jones, William A. Misgovernment in the Philippines.., p. 4. 
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the Insular Treasury. Given the attacks on the Taft government by 
individuals like Congressman Jones and considering that the Democrats 
would govern the country for four years at least, we should not be 
surprised by the publication in 1914 of Worcester’s Slavery and Peonage 
in the Philippine Islands. This book would become a powerful weapon 
for a Republican counter-offensive to discredit the Filipino nationalists. 
 It is important to add that the above speech of Jones severely 
questioned the conduct of Dean Worcester. Worcester allegedly had 
endeavored “to bring to bear repressive measures in the United States 
upon the press favorable to Philippine independence similar to those 
exerted by him upon Manila newspapers.”12 Worcester was accused of 
preparing a campaign of antagonism towards, and vilification of, the 
Filipinos, the Democrats and the anti-imperialists. 
In this context of mounting unpopularity, Worcester wrote his last 
report in which he recommended that a final effort be made to secure the 
concurrence of the Philippine Assembly in the passage of the legislation 
prohibiting slavery and peonage. La Vanguardia responded to Worcester 
with an editorial entitled, “There is no such Slavery.”13 La Vanguardia 
asked a rhetoric question, “Does slavery exist at present in the Christian 
                                                 
12 ‘Petition of Frank B. Sanborn, Frederic Starr and others to the President, the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States in Congress’ in Jones, William A. Misgovernment in the 
Philippines… p. 28. 
13 ‘There is no such Slavery.’La Vanguardia, Tuesday, October 29, 1912. The whole editorial was 
published by Worcester in his Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands, pp. 35-38. La 
Vanguardia became the successor of El Renacimiento even more radical than the former. In fact in 
1912 during the anniversary of  the American occupation of Manila called forth an editorial containing 
the following passage: 
“There are not a few who have considered that date the anniversary of tyranny and bad faith 
which entered the waters of Manila in disguise under the fascinating ensign of liberty and 
redemption…” 
See Forbes W. Cameron. ‘Appendix XXII.’ The Philippine Islands. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928. 
Vol. 2, pp. 487-488. 
 385 
provinces of the Archipelago? The answer to this must be in the 
negative.” 
La Vanguardia suggested the following reasons why the 
Commission wanted so badly to pass this law and to prohibit so-called 
slavery: 
A law prohibiting the slavery in the Philippines presupposes the 
existence of this social condition, which could constitute an 
argument against our aspirations to a free life. The fact is that a 
people who devote themselves to certain primitive practices do not 
deserve the benefit of self-government.14 
 
La Vanguardia felt that the attempt to pass this anti-slavery law 
was also a subtle maneuver to paralyze the process of increasing self-
government. The newspaper asked why “the government only noticed the 
existence of an abnormal phenomenon at this late hour after twelve years 
of governing.” 
Worcester was not willing to give up and this time he did not wait 
for a reply and instead sent to the printers his report, Slavery and 
Peonage in the Philippine Islands, with the connivance, of course, of 
Governor William Cameron Forbes. While Forbes was in the United 
States on leave,15 he criticized the attitude of the Filipinos on the slavery 
question and organized a campaign to convince the Americans of the 
necessity to retain the Philippines. Forbes, Taft and Worcester were 
paving the way for a counterattack on the Jones bill. An effective tactic 
they used was to provide cases of flagrant oligarchism linked to a system 
of slavery and involuntary servitude. 
                                                 
14 ‘There is no such Slavery.’ La Vanguardia, October 29, 1912. 
15 See Salman, Michael. The Embarrassment of Slavery. Controversies over Bondage and Nationalism 
in the American Colonial Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 2001, pp. 181-198. 
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In July 1913, Forbes and Worcester exchanged correspondence 
about the matter of slavery in the Philippines. Worcester explained to  
Forbes that he had obtained more witnesses from Isabela, Misamis and 
Romblon. Moreover, he could rely on the testimony of the Constabulary. 
Forbes, this time, gave his acquiescence to go ahead with the report: 16 
Dean C. Worcester has completed recently an exhaustive 
examination regarding the slavery situation in the Islands which 
will be printed and copies mailed to Washington, D.C.  He finds 
human beings are bought and sold. There are slave traders in 
Pampanga and he has secured names, dates, prices and all details 
of numerous instances including a number of slaves held in 
Manila…there is nothing in the law to enable us to punish traders 
or purchasers unless illegal detention can be proved…17 
 
The published report was sent to Washington and to individuals in 
the United States. On 25 August 1913, a long Associated Press dispatch 
went out from Washington giving the substance of Worcester’s statement 
and on that very day newspapers in all parts of the United States 
informed the country that slavery and peonage existed in the Philippines.  
This report was a serious blow to any expectation of independence 
for the Filipinos. The passage of the law prohibiting slavery and peonage 
took place during the transition from Taft’s presidency to Wilson’s. For 
Taft and the Republicans, passage of this law meant they could advocate 
indefinitely for American tutelage in the Philippines. Worcester’s crusade 
proved successful and the Filipino nationalists were completely 
discredited before American public opinion, which unanimously 
                                                 
16 Forbes will echo this fact in his book The Philippine Islands published in 1928 in two volumes and 
reprinted in 1945. “The Honorable Dean C. Worcester, Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine 
government, was stirred to activity in this matter and he prepared, printed, and sent out a pamphlet 
which he described as “arranging in logical sequence a small part of the written and signed testimony 
of Filipinos and Americans, declaring that slavery and peonage exist in the Philippines.” Forbes W. 
Cameron. The Philippine Islands. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1945, p. 239.  
17 Cablegram sent the Government of the Philippine Islands Executive Bureau. Sewar, Washington. 
Confidential, July 14, 1913. A copy was sent Dean C. Worcester the following day. 
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condemned the human trafficking in the Philippines, and even before the 
world.  
Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands was written with a 
specific purpose in mind: political propaganda. Published in April 1913, 
it clearly was meant to check any attempt on the part of the Democrats to 
concede independence to the Filipinos. It also served as a platform for 
Worcester to respond fiercely to his critics such as La Vanguardia and its 
article, “There is no such slavery,” and Manuel Quezon and his report, 
“The Filipinos as legislators.” His discussion of slavery and peonage was 
really a vehicle with which to mount propaganda against the 
Filipinization process and eventual independence. 
Quezon, for example, wrote: “Governor-General Forbes draws the 
conclusion that the premature withdrawal of the United States would 
result in the establishment of an oligarchy composed of small and 
favored ruling classes who would oppress the masses.”18 This was not 
true, he insisted. Worcester responded to Quezon’s argument by calling it 
“puerile.” He accused Filipino politicians like Quezon of being 
thoroughly insensitive towards problems like slavery: “The Filipino 
politicians have persistently sought to conceal the truth and befog the 
issue. There is not now, nor has there ever been, among Filipinos of the 
‘ruling class’ anything approaching a general sentiment opposed to 
slavery and peonage.”19 
                                                 
18 Worcester, Dean. C. Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands. Manila: Government print, 
1913, p. 38. 
19 Worcester, Dean C. The suppression of involuntary servitude in the Philippines. Dean C. Worcester 
papers.  
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Statements like Worcester’s above brought to the attention of the 
American public a condition of endemic tyranny among Filipinos who 
are able to buy and sell their fellow creatures for cash. Worcester remarks 
upon the term “ruling class,” defining it as an oligarchy, the government 
of a few which connived and tolerated slavery and peonage. As LeRoy 
had done in 1905, Worcester de-contextualized and misinterpreted the 
Spanish term clase directora, which educated Filipinos considered as a 
necessary enlightened body of individuals whom the masses could look 
up to in the complex process of obtaining self-government. A political 
discourse which used terminology in vogue at the turn of the nineteenth 
century was misused by Worcester to demonstrate instead the essential 
corruption of the Filipino elite. Furthermore, he could not resist the 
temptation to identify this class as another type of Filipino caciques 
whose influence makes it impossible for democratic institutions to take 
root: 
The willingness of the caciques to hold the common people in 
debt, servitude, and peonage, and the lack of power on the part of 
their victims successfully to resist them, render impossible the 
establishment of truly representative institutions in the Philippine 
Islands at this time.20 
 
Worcester condemned slavery in the Philippines but he clearly 
confined his discussion of this phenomenon to the non-Christian tribes. It 
was the issue of peonage that sparked more controversy because this 
system was deep-rooted among Filipinos Christians, was common and 
widespread in numerous provinces and prevalent in nearly every 
municipality in the Philippines. 
                                                 
20 Worcester, Dean C. The suppression of involuntary servitude in the Philippines, p. 8.  
 389 
Worcester defines peonage as “the condition of a debtor held by 
his creditor in a form of qualified servitude to work out a debt.”21 By 
delimiting the prevalence of peonage to municipalities, Worcester aimed 
to render “peonage,” “caciquism” and “usury” practically synonymous. 
Also, this was a splendid opportunity to condemn de facto the system of 
local native government as LeRoy did in 1905. 
According to Worcester, 
The rich and powerful man, commonly known in this country as a 
“cacique,” encourages the poor man to borrow money from him 
under such conditions that the debt can never be repaid, and holds 
the debtor, and frequently the members of his family as well, in 
debt servitude for life.22 
 
Not only is Worcester here associating peonage with caciquism but 
he also infers that peonage, because of its identification with caciquism, 
is something inherited from immemorial times. We again come across 
the suggestion that the Spanish regime is the referent for explaining 
present problems. For this purpose, Worcester uses two coordinates: the 
first is his assertion that the Spanish connived with this system of 
peonage; and the second (and most important) is his co-optation and de-
contextualization of the Spanish term “peonaje” itself.  
Worcester states clearly that during Spanish rule slavery was not 
recognized as a legal institution, “but there was no determined effort to 
eradicate it, and the course to be pursued in any given case was in 
practice left largely to the discretion of the government officer 
concerned.”23 Therefore, despite the different royal decrees which 
                                                 
21 Worcester, Dean C.Slavery and peonage in the Philippine Islands, p. 53. 
22 Worcester, Dean C. Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands, p. 52. 
23 Worcester Dean C. The Suppression of the Slavery in the Philippines, p. 1. Worcester was familiar 
with Spanish historiography on the Philippines and he de-contextualized the facts. As it has been 
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prohibited slavery and peonage, according to Worcester these decrees 
were a dead letter. Slavery and peonage therefore persisted and the 
Americans, alas, inherited these evils.  
The term “peonage” has become standardized in the Anglo-Saxon 
world, above all in the United States where the system was widespread in 
the Southern plantations from 1901 to 1945.  “Peonage” however is not 
an English word. Worcester co-opted a Spanish term and gave it a 
pejorative connotation. As in the case of caciquism, the term peonage 
was never used in the Philippines by the Spaniards and the system was 
not imposed by them. 
Worcester created a perfect definition of “peonage” as a system of 
involuntary servitude based on the indebtedness of the laborer—peon—
to his creditor. Since this system was prevalent in Spanish America, 
especially in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador and Peru, Anglo-Saxon 
scholarship has established a parallelism among the different systems 
known as encomienda, repartimiento and mita, therefore tracing their 
origins to as far back as the Spanish conquest. These systems 
implemented by the Spanish conquerors were systems of forced labor. In 
the Philippines it was called servicios personales or polos but this was 
not related to the system of peonage or debt bondage at all. Peonage is 
inextricably linked to the emergence of the plantation system in the 
nineteenth century. Thus, peonage was widespread in Latin America after 
Spain lost her colonies there in 1821. Peonage in Mexico, for instance, is 
related to the Hacienda system.  
                                                                                                                                            
explained the slavery was forbidden as early as 1571, but the Spaniards enacted a condition under 
which the slavery was permitted and even compulsory –in case of “justa Guerra.” 
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The dictionary of La Real Academia Espanola (RAE) defines 
encomienda, repartimiento, mita or polo as the forced labor that the 
Indios had to render to the Spaniards, with nuances relating to different 
areas. Curiously, we cannot find any analogy made with the term 
“peonaje” (this is the spelling in Spanish). The term “peon” in Spanish 
has different meanings—the most spread is laborer—with not one being 
pejorative. However, there is an old meaning of the word: infantry 
soldier.24 From this old sense of peon derives the term “peonaje” which 
means “a group of infantry soldiers.” There is no connotation whatsoever 
of debt bondage in the Spanish word.    
We will recall how LeRoy made political capital out of the term 
cacique and its associated system, caciquism, by inferring that they were 
institutions inherited from the Spanish era, and their continued existence 
was frustrating American attempts to instill social and political progress 
in the Philippines. Worcester practiced the same maneuver using the term 
peonage instead of bondage. He inferred that peonage and slavery were 
inherent in the pre-Hispanic Filipino community—for this he cites 
Plasencia and Morga.  
Worcester’s definition of peonage inaugurated a new ramification 
of the term cacique which has prevailed up to now. Cacique became a 
money-lender, a usurer, a rich and powerful hacendero or big landowner. 
Worcester conferred an omnipotent power to the caciques and started to 
describe them as despicable beings who used coercion, threats and their 
prestige to keep their serfs under subjection. Worcester further 
                                                 
24 In varieties of English used in Southeast Asia a “peon” is usually an office boy, an attendant or an 
orderly. Historically it also means a policeman or foot soldier –such as in Spanish. 
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stigmatized the term cacique by relating it to hacenderos. Moreover, he 
inferred that caciquism would never be eradicated because it was linked 
to other corrupt activities such as gambling.25 
Worcester’s report did not leave impassive to the Filipinos who 
reacted immediately. The Philippine Assembly was forced under threat 
to vote the passage of anti-slavery bill. Arthur Earnshaw26 explained in 
great detail to Worcester that “[Manuel Quezon] made no reference to the 
fact that the law had been forced from them under threat.”27 Quezon, 
indeed, never mentioned that he voted for the passage of this law under 
threat. Worcester had obtained, thanks to his friend Bourns, the personal 
and police history of important Filipinos, above all those who were to be 
members of the Philippine Assembly. This is what the record stated 
about Quezon: 
Court of First Instance, Tayabas 
1899 - Charged with shooting prisoners while Major, insurrecto 
army. 
Recommended to be Provincial Fiscal of Mindoro by Pardo de 
Tavera 
Judge Paul W. Leneberger recommends that Quezon be requested 
to resign 
December 7, 1904 - Charges of attempted rape, abduction and 
various act of abuse sustained on administrative investigation. 
Aggravated cases of authority. 28 
 
We do not know if these charges were true or not, or what 
Worcester actually did with the information, but no doubt they could 
have been the perfect spur to force Quezon to support the passage the 
                                                 
25 The worst vice of the poor was gambling. In order to get money they asked from the caciques and by 
not repaying the debt, they became serfs. Worcester, Dean C. Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine 
Islands, p. 63. 
26 I have been unable to find information of Arthur Earnshaw. I know he was close to Quezon and his 
name only appears in Worcester’s book The Philippine: Past and Present. 
27 Arthur Earnshaw to Dean C. Worcester, Manila, 16 November, 1913.Dean C. Worcester papers. Box 
1. Personal Correspondence. 
28 ‘Personal and police history of deputies to the First Filipino Assembly,’ October 19, 1907.Dean C. 
Worcester Papers. Volume 11, Folder 11.18.  
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Anti-Slavery Law. The fact is, Quezon convinced his fellow Filipinos by 
reversing the argument and showing how Filipinos were mature and 
civilized by passing a law categorically forbidding slavery. Earnshaw put 
it well to Worcester: 
The sub-stratum of his argument towards its close was not what the 
people of the United States would think about the Filipinos but 
“What about the other nations”? What would they think of a 
country that did not have such a law in their books? And therefore 
the law should be passed so as to let the world at large see that they 
were a civilized people, thus evidently paving the way for 
independence.29 
 
Obviously Quezon and most of his fellow Assemblymen were 
worried lest this issue be used as a powerful argument against 
independence or increase of autonomy. The Filipino people were being 
represented as “still far removed from that stage of civilization.” These 
Filipinos, of course, knew better. Despite Worcester’s arguments about 
the existence of slavery in the Philippines and his insistence that there 
had been no laws prohibiting it, the Philippine Assembly members—
mostly educated during the Spanish era—knew that Worcester was 
wrong. They knew about the different royal decrees enacted by the 
Spaniards explicitly prohibiting slavery as early as 1571, allowing it only 
in cases of  “just war.” But Worcester, in the tradition of LeRoy, Blair 
and Robertson, could readily mobilize the black legend of Spanish rule 
and argue that these decrees never really took effect. The Republicans, 
with Worcester as their main authoritative voice, were determined to 
demonstrate that slavery was endemic in Filipino societies. 
                                                 
29 Arthur Earnshaw to Dean C. Worcester, November 1913. Dean C. Worcester Papers. Box 1.  
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The Filipino press took up the issues raised by Slavery and 
Peonage in the Philippine Islands. The newpapers La Vanguardia, El 
Ideal, La Democracia, El Mercantil and La Consolidación Nacional all 
disputed Worcester’s arguments about the existence of slavery in the 
Philippines. They deemed the report to be part of a strategy to discredit 
Filipinos in the eyes of the world, and they were right. Worcester and 
Forbes were implementing a well-devised campaign to demonstrate the 
volatility and incapacity of Filipino politicians and they were successful. 
As one of them put it, “If it can be proved that the Filipino is essentially 
volatile in his nature and cannot hold by necessary things without having 
somebody on hand to insist upon it, it will be a serious argument against 
the extension of further political powers to the Filipinos.”30 
The campaign to demonstrate the “volatility” of the Filipino seems 
to have affected Quezon, who was vilified by some American officials 
and had to bear the stigma of someone whose adherence to the 
independence cause was unstable. McIntyre wrote that “Quezon had to 
speak passionately for independence in public to maintain his reputation 
as a nationalist in the Philippines, but in private he was ready to conform 
to the views of Taft, Wilson and Roosevelt.”31 This statement has 
become a dictum of the truth. One must be careful, however, of 
McIntyre’s assertions since he was involved in the false resignation of 
Worcester. 
                                                 
30 This excerpt corresponds to a letter addressed to General Edwards in November 11, 1911. The letter 
is not signed and I am not sure if it was written by Forbes or Worcester. This letter was confidential 
and I found it fragmented. The specific mission of this letter was to discredit the Nationalist Party 
dismissing the arguments of the party such as antagonism of race, the ephemeral Filipino republic, 
public order and likes. Dean Conan Worcester papers, volume 11.  
31 Letter McIntyre to Gilbert. Cited in Salman, Michael. The Embarrassment of Slavery…, p. 192.  
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I found a fragment of a letter among the James A. Robertson 
papers. The letter belongs to someone from the Partido Progresista. I 
suspect it was written by José Albert and translated into English.  The 
members of this party believed that an independent government would 
subject the docile Filipino to a despotic authority.32 Therefore, if Albert 
wrote this statement, he was following the position of the Republican 
Party. But the most important thing about this letter is its assumption that 
all the Filipino leaders demanded independence when they spoke before 
the masses but in private  they argued that Filipinos were not prepared for 
the establishment and preservation of a Republic. The letter states: 
I believe it is for the best interest of the Filipinos that the present 
relation with the United States be continued until the work, now in 
progress, of educating the masses has practically been done. These 
are, in substance, my political creeds and I am not “only” voicing 
the sentiments of the Progresistas but also those of all sober-
thinking Filipino leaders, though many of them, for political 
expediency, seem to profess and even agitate for IMMEDIATE 
INDEPENDENCE.33 
 
Be that as it may, whoever wrote this statement made clear that the 
desire for independence alone was not enough to maintain and preserve a 
democratic form of government since Filipino traditions, habits and 
customs—in which debt of servitude was included—were oligarchic. 
This statement paves the way for the notion of a dual loyalty or a 
symbiotic relationship between Filipino politicians and their American 
patrons, in what has been called “compadre colonialism.” However, it 
seems to me that this letter was deliberately misinterpreted in order to 
                                                 
32 I assume that this fragmented letter or this statement was written by José Albert, since he was called 
Dr. Albert, and in a passage of the letter he explained during Aguinaldo’s Republic someone told him 
“My dear doctor.” Moreover it was written in Spanish and translated in English and there are deliberate 
omissions.   
33  The author of this letter writes in capital letters this sentence. He emphasizes along the letter in 
capital letter the term “independence.”  
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furnish a political strategy to prove that Filipinos were volatile and 
therefore their independence must be deferred.  
All the newspapers echoed features of Worcester’s report and all of 
them concluded that this report had political ends. They believed firmly 
that Worcester had concentrated, in his work, upon discrediting the 
Filipinos, by concealing from the American public the Filipinos’ actual 
state of fitness to govern themselves. He constantly made reference to the 
ignorant natives until he had made his American readers believe that the 
Filipinos indeed were a mass of half-naked head-hunters.34 
 The Filipino campaigners and their newspapers were right. A 
report without sufficient foundation became a salutary lesson to subvert 
any attempt to gain independence. An example is the Cablenews-
American which stated in 1913: “Worcester slavery reply astounds 
country, embarrasses independentists, congressional investigation 
possible. . .ridicules independence. Wilson visitors today object ultimate 
not immediate independence.”35 
It is believed that this heated debate led Worcester to resign his 
position. Most historians of this period conclude that Worcester’s crusade 
against slavery led to the end of his political career, being forced by 
Washington to resign. The reality is quite far from this. A confidential 
letter sent by Forbes to Washington suggests otherwise: 
Dean C. Worcester tenders resignation, to take effect March first. 
Believes can accomplish more for Filipino people out of the 
service than in it under coming administration. Will remain here to 
complete book called quote The Philippines, Past and Present End 
of quotation which will answer Blount’s book and remarkable 
                                                 
34 This excerpt could be extrapolated to other newspapers. This concretely belongs to La Vanguardia, 
October 2, 1913. 
35 ‘Leading Daily of the Philippines.’ Cablenews-American. Dean C. Worcester’s papers, Vol. 2, 1913.  
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series of films and slides showing past and present conditions. 
Then return to the United States for lecture season, speaking as 
often as possible. . . .His book and lectures in the United States will 
be of greatest possible value in coming campaign.36 
 
The real objective of Worcester’s resignation was to return to the 
United States in order to propagate an image of the Philippines and the 
Filipinos that would lower American support for the Filipinization and 
independence movements. As soon as he arrived home the University of 
Michigan congratulated him for his Slavery and Peonage in the 
Philippine Islands which was judged to be interesting and provocative: 
As you have doubtless noticed, the American newspapers are 
giving considerable space to the discussion of your conclusions, 
one fact becoming more and more obvious as the discussion 
continues: that is that you have set before the new governor general 
and his supporters a hard nut to crack.37 
 
The crusade begun in the Philippines to paralyze the process of 
more autonomy or independence for Filipinos would prove more 
effective in the United States. To counter the pro-Filipino policies 
undertaken by Governor Harrison, Worcester delivered a course of 
lectures in Washington, New York, Yale and Harvard in which he 
described the conditions in the archipelago. Universities were now 
participating in the development of a colonial discourse. 
 
The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission and The Philippine 
Problem  
Once Taft lost the elections he began a campaign of discrediting 
the Filipino independence campaigners and above all the new 
                                                 
36 Letter Cameron Forbes to Secretary of War, January 24, 1913. Dean C. Worcester papers. Box 1. 
37 Francis W. Kelsy from the University of Michigan to Dean C. Worcester, September 15, 1913. Dean 
C. Worcester paper. Box 2.  
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administration in the Philippines. His campaign was supported by the 
publication of other books in 1913. Daniel R. Williams wrote The 
Odyssey of the Philippine Commission and Frederik Chamberlin, The 
Philippine Problem 1898-1913. Taft, Williams and Chamberlin were 
determined to heighten public awareness about the achievements of 
Taft’s policy and to warn the American people about the dangers of 
independence for the Filipinos. In arguing this they drew on images of 
peonage, oligarchism and caciquism as endemic features of the 
Philippines which made its inhabitants unfit for independence at least in 
the near future. All three also engaged in propaganda against the rival 
Democratic Party.38 
The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission is a clear-cut case of 
Republican haste in countering Blount’s book, the anti-imperialist 
literature, and above all any attempt at Filipinization or self-government. 
In the introduction Williams informs us that the book, except for its last 
chapter, is a fragmentary account of the letters that he wrote home at the 
time of the Taft Commission’s visit to the Philippines. Williams makes 
clear the intention of this book: to inform to the general public of the big 
problems Taft and his commissioners had to confront. He claimed that 
“no book has yet appeared describing the establishment of civil 
government in the Philippines, nor conveying an adequate idea of the 
difficulties encountered and overcome by the Commission in its work.” 39  
                                                 
38 1913 was important for the emergence of some publication related to the Democratic Party. Emma L. 
Teich compiled some articles Selected articles on Independence of the Philippines. However, the most 
important work would be The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912 written by James H. 
Blount. The Philippines Past and Present will be the alternative to this book.  
39 Williams, Daniel R. The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission. Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co., 
1913, preface, p. v. Williams is deliberately ignoring Our Philippine Problem written by Parker Willis 
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 There are many other such claims in this book. Another surprising 
one is the assertion that 
Our country was fortunate in having such statesmanlike men sent 
to meet and solve such big problems, and any contribution which 
will help our people to further realize and appreciate this fact, and 
at the same time deepen their interest in the welfare of our Filipino 
wards, cannot come amiss.40 
 
The introduction emphasizes the altruistic goals of the Americans 
in the Philippines. Williams is not clear about “such big problems” that 
the Americans had to sort out, but one can suspect that these problems 
were inherited41 from Spanish rule, “inherited” being a term used 
frequently in the new campaign against Filipino independence. There is 
not a single recognition that the Americans benefited considerably from 
Spain’s accomplishments. The inherent paternalism of the Americans is 
reflected on the phrase “welfare of our Filipino wards.” The use of such 
terms infers the necessity to protect and tutor the “Filipino wards” who 
had yet to come of age. There is a clear message that Filipinos were not 
prepared for self-government, Democrat propaganda notwithstanding.  
Williams illustrates the despotism of the natives by claiming that 
those who sought American alliance had suffered persecution and 
vexations at the hands of the insurrectionists—this argument surfaces in 
just about all the stories published by the Republicans.42 Williams does 
                                                                                                                                            
who made a deep analysis of the establishment of civil government in the archipelago. Parker had 
criticized fiercely Taft “autocracy” by considering it arbitrary. This is the reason Williams omitted this 
book. Moreover, Williams was a close friend of James A. LeRoy who had written a review discrediting 
Our Philippine Problem. 
40 Williams, Daniel R. The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission, p. v. 
41 Since LeRoy came out with the argument “the Americans inherited the Spanish problems” in 1905 
many scholars have echoed in 1913, 1914, 1920s, 1940s and so on. The discourse has prevailed until 
the present, and this argument can be found  in Glenn May’s book Social Engineering in the 
Philippines. The aims, execution and impact of American colonial Policy 1900-1913. Westport Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1980, preface, p. xvi 
42 Williams, Daniel R. The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission, p. 106.  
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not provide any new argument in this book despite the claims in his 
preface. However the work has become a reference for American 
scholars. In the same way that LeRoy, Barrows, Atkinson and 
Chamberlin praised the Taft Commission in 1905 and blamed the 
“others”—i.e., Spaniards and Filipinos—Williams assumes the same 
inveterate arguments. LeRoy concluded that the Spanish had left a legacy 
to the Americans called caciquism. Williams subscribed to this argument, 
and even expanded it: 
Had Spain purposely created a condition to embarrass us she could 
not have done it more completely. Not only did we inherit an 
insurrection, and a church problem upon which her own 
government was wrecked, but the whole administrative machinery 
is so antiquated and disorganized as not to admit of patching or 
repair.43 
 
The first sentence reveals the traditional argument that the “big 
problems” the Americans had inherited were in fact the Spanish 
problems. The second sentence is a denial of the Filipino-American war. 
During the years 1913 and 1914 the term “war” would be suppressed 
from the textbooks. Williams infers that the insurrection begun in 1896 
continued until 1902. The last part of the sentence categorically affirms 
the anachronism of the Spanish administration and reflects the legacy of 
LeRoy’s writings. This sentence establishes Spanish medievalism as the 
fundamental challenge to American modernization.    
The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission concludes with a 
chapter describing the twelve years of Taft’s era. It starts by rebuking 
those who claim that the Philippines is a burden for the Americans, 
referring to the anti-imperialists and James Blount who advocated that 
                                                 
43 Williams, Daniel R. The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission, p. 110. 
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the U.S. leave the Philippines.44 Williams provides a counterargument to 
those who accused Taft and his Commissioners of misinforming the 
American general public. He states, “What the United States have done 
in the Philippines is an open book which all who will may read.”45 He 
then starts to enumerate point by point the achievements during the 
twelve years of the Republican term in the Philippines. In the prosaic list 
provided by Williams there is no mention of a single blunder committed 
by American rule in the Islands.  
Finally, in order to demonstrate that the Filipinos were not 
prepared for self-government and even less for independence Williams 
emphasizes some important references to the issue made by Republicans 
and Democrats. One was the lecture given by Wilson at Columbia in 
which he stated categorically, “We cannot give them self-government.”46 
The publication of this lecture by Williams, and later on by Worcester 
and other partisans of the Republicans was to prove their contention that 
the discourse of the Democrats was filled with nice words but really 
empty. 
The Philippine Problem 1898-1913 was written by Frederic 
Chamberlin who had already contributed to the altruistic ends of the 
American occupation in 1903 with a book entitled The Blow from 
                                                 
44 James H. Blount became an alternative to the imperialist discourse in 1907 when he published 
Philippine Independence -When?  This article was a criticism of Taft’s policy in the Philippines. Blount 
echoed several important issues such as consciousness of racial unity in the Philippines, and a general 
consensus in the definition of independence. He asserted that the Filipinos were governed against their 
consent. This article gave way to a second published in North American Review: Philippine 
Independence-Why? Blount considered the Philippines was a costly burden, a nuisance and a danger 
for the United States. He urged to get rid of them “as soon as may be honourably possible.,” p. 385. I 
owe this information to Professor Josep M. Delgado.  
45 Williams, Daniel R. The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission, p. 332. 
46 Williams, Daniel R. The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission, pp. 352-354. 
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Behind.47  If Williams’s book was addressed to the general public, 
Chamberlin wrote this book for students who needed to know the 
Philippine problem “for a mastery of the subject upon all its broad 
lines.”48 Some of the chapters are a summary of his first contribution to 
the official discourse.    
For Chamberlin The Philippine Problem literally begins in 1898, 
therefore the marker is Spanish rule again. He misrepresents the Spanish 
era, assuming from the very beginning that “the church was supreme.”49 
Another point Chamberlin belabors is the innate corruption of the 
Spanish officials.50 The twin notions of evangelizing mission and innate 
corruption are in fact derived from Blair and Robertson’s multivolume 
work; by 1913 this had become a basic reference for Philippine history. 
Students would learn from reading Chamberlin’s book that Spanish 
rule was an anachronism that kept the Filipinos in a state of ignorance 
and fanaticism. This misleading history of Spanish rule is linked to a pre-
Hispanic history and a survey of Filipino behavior. The most remarkable 
facet of this patchy history is its denomination of the Ilustrados as gente 
illustrada—important for the connotations that Chamberlin gives to this 
class as potential caciques. For inextricably related to his discussion of 
gente illustrada is his argument that slavery and peonage were endemic 
in the Filipino communities, and that peonage degenerated into 
                                                 
47 Chamberlin, Frederick. The Blow from behind or some features of the anti-imperialist movement 
attending the war with Spain. Boston:  Lee and Shepard, 1903. Chamberlin was the first one in 
criticizing the contention of the democrats in 1903 and counter-argued that the anti-imperialist 
argument of the Constitution of the United States did not provide a government for colonies. 
48 Chamberlin, Frederick. The Philippine Problem 1898-1913. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 
1913, p. vii. 
49 Chamberlin, Frederick. The Philippine Problem 1898-1913, p. 8. 
50 Chamberlin, Frederick. The Philippine Problem 1898-1913, p. 12. 
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caciquism. Chamberlin here clearly echoes the arguments of Worcester 
and Taft. He was also counterattacking some of the pro-Filipino 
arguments in Selected articles on independence for the Philippines.51 
Chamberlin’s principal argument is contained in the following 
passage: 
In many instances, a man spent his whole life in the slavery of an 
unscrupulous and better educated native, to pay no more than a few 
dollars. That is the device that is called peonage in other lands. In 
the Philippines it is caciquism, an institution that exerted a far 
greater effect upon its victim, who felt obliged to obey any 
command of the master, no matter what its nature might be.52 
 
I have highlighted the terms “peonage” and “caciquism” since 
Chamberlin’s haste to discredit the Filipinos and the Democrats made 
him commit some significant blunders. He assumes that peonage is the 
condition of a debtor held by his creditor in the form of qualified 
servitude to work out a debt— this is the same argument as Worcester’s 
in his Slavery and Peonage. But Chamberlin goes a step further by 
making peonage synonymous with caciquism. Although Worcester stated 
that peonage was practiced by some caciques, he never assumed their 
equivalence. We can see how subsequent commentators like Chamberlin 
could further build up this evil called caciquism once the discourse had 
been established. 
Chamberlin, taking the cue from a lecture by Taft before the 
students of The Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences, further argues 
                                                 
51 Teich, Emma L. (ed.), The Abridged Debater’s Handbook Series. Selected articles on Independence 
for the Philippines. Minneapolis: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1913. Emma L. Teich included in this 
compilation ‘The Philippine Independence’ by Sergio Osmeña. She extracted this paper from the 
Congressional Record. This paper had been already published in Dickinson Report in 1910 in 
Appendix C, Letter of the Nationalista Party and in Manila under the title Memorial Político del 
Partido Nacionalista (1911). The American public could read for first time the underside of the 
meaning of caciquism since Osmeña made clear that caciquism, or whatever the name given to it, was 
endemic in all societies.  
52 Chamberlin Frederick. The Philippine Problem 1898-1913, p. 48 
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that to the condition called caciquism “must be ascribed the terrible 
crimes committed by natives from 1896 to 1900”—the insurrection 
against the Spaniards and the war with the Americans. Chamberlin was 
suggesting that granting independence to the Filipinos would provoke an 
internecine conflict, which would lead to the formation of an oligarchy- 
or cacique-dominated government. 
Chamberlin’s last chapter, “The Problem in 1913,” is an obvious 
rejoinder against the recent victory of the Democrats. He starts by stating 
“we have performed veritable prodigies of altruism”53 as evidenced, for 
example, by the Filipinization of government that began as early as 
Taft’s Commission. But what does Filipinization really mean? 
Chamberlin then argues that the gente illustrada constitutes an oligarchy 
in the Philippines. He quotes excerpts from Manuel Quezon’s speeches to 
illustrate this. Would the United States want to hand over power to this 
group? We can see how American colonial discourse operates in the 
following remarkable statement: 
With all the wealth, all the learning, and with caciquism, the gente 
illustrada before we came had a grip upon the other ninety per cent 
of their fellow Filipinos as absolute as that of master over slave. 
The ambition of the gente illustrada, the ten per cent every turn, is 
not the independence of the Philippines, but the independence of 
the gente illustrada.54 
 
Independence would de facto be only for a minority, ten percent, of 
Filipinos. Chamberlin supports his argument by recalling Aguinaldo’s 
Republic. The gente illustrada evokes memories, he says, of the 
Aguinaldo years from 1896 to 1901 when Filipinos formed an ephemeral 
                                                 
53 Chamberlin, Frederick. The Philippine Problem 1898-1913, p. 191. 
54 Chamberlin, Frederick. The Philippine Problem 1898-1913, p. 218. 
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independent government. Chamberlin dismisses this era by echoing 
Taft’s address before the Chamber of Commerce in New York: “it was a 
rule of assassination and cruelty. It was even more despotic and 
oppressive than the Spanish Government had ever been.”55 This negative 
invocation of Aguinaldo’s Republic can be regarded as Chamberlin’s 
retort to the following image of the Republic found in  Selected articles 
on independence for the Philippines: 
The people of the Philippine Islands had control of their own 
territory; they had restored order and peace; they had planned a 
Republican form of government and framed a Constitution…the 
charges against Aguinaldo have been refuted again and again on 
the authority of the advocates of imperialism.56 
 
In sum, Chamberlin’s argument displays again the duality “bad 
Filipinos and Spaniards” versus “good Americans” and above all helps 
him to conclude that self-government and ultimate independence are 
unthinkable taking into consideration the natural traits of the Filipinos as 
potential caciques. 
These three books, Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands; 
The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission and The Philippine Problem 
are a collective example of how the Republicans had put in motion all the 
mechanisms to silence the voices of the Democrats in the academe. All of 
these mechanisms were designed to emphasize the evils inherent in the 
“others”—Spanish and Filipinos—and specifically to delimit political 
oligarchism and rural caciquism as the main problems. Both systems are 
inextricably related since the caciques would become the intermediaries 
between municipal and provincial governments. Williams and 
                                                 
55 Chamberlin, Frederick. The Philippine Problem 1898-1913, p. 220. 
56 ‘Reprint Independent 51: 2995-3000,’ November 9, 1899. In Teich, Emma L. (ed.), Selected Articles 
on Independence for the Philippines, p. 14. 
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Chamberlin pointed out another important issue: the prevalence of a few 
families in the provinces which monopolized power and dragged down 
the ignorant masses. These families are related to the notion of “gente 
illustrada,” and later scholars would further mix up these terms with 
oligarchy and caciquism. The overriding message is the same in all: we 
cannot possibly grant independence to this severely flawed society. 
 
Worcester: The Philippines Past and Present 
1913 was a year of impasse. As we have seen, the Republicans 
were trying to defer the process of Philippine independence but Wilson, 
the new President, had not come up with a conclusive policy for the 
archipelago either. 1914 saw the triumph of Filipinization by which the 
most important positions in government were to be occupied by 
Filipinos. The Republicans frantically tried to distort the new era in the 
Philippines by spreading rumors of business depression, political purges, 
grave native uprisings and like, in order to demonstrate the Filipinos’ 
unfitness for this measure of self-government allowed by Wilson. In this 
context, Worcester’s book The Philippines Past and Present would 
become the catalyst of American discourse against Filipino self-rule. It 
was much discussed in newspapers, clubs and universities. It became 
compulsory reading specially after Joseph Ralston Hayden reissued it in 
1930 with some important changes.57 
                                                 
57 David P. Barrows reissued in 1914 his History of the Philippines. There are no changes as in the 
1907 edition. Barrows had no time to include A Decade of American Government in the Philippines 
1903-1913. This was prepared as additional chapter of History of the Philippines. Barrows’ book was 
part of the propaganda effort but he is more scholarly than Worcester. The posthumous work of James 
A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines was also published in 1914. 
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Worcester resigned when Harrison became Governor General of 
the Philippines. It seems that this was a logical move since Worcester 
was a recalcitrant defender of Republican policies implemented in the 
colony. Some have speculated that he resigned because of the publication 
of Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands. But as we have seen, 
Worcester left his position because he was more useful in the United 
States. He was to carry out a fierce campaign which had as its main 
objective the negation of Filipino national aspirations. 
The Philippines Past and Present is an indictment against James 
Blount and his The American Occupation of the Philippines, which met 
great demand, with second edition finalized in late December. Taft and 
Forbes were anxious that Blount’s charges about the illegitimacy of the 
U.S. acquisition of the Philippines and his argument that the Taft era was 
despotic and exploitative for the Filipinos, be countered in print. Dean 
Worcester was deemed to be the best person to manage this owing to his 
first-hand experience in the Philippines, his skill in handling controversy, 
and his temperament. 
Worcester displays all these skills as early as the first chapter titled 
“View-Point and Subject-Matter” where he explains the reasons for 
publishing the book. He intends to inform the public audience of the real 
conditions prevalent in the archipelago. He is concerned since, in the 
United States, there is a preponderance of false and misleading 
statements about the Philippines. This falsehood is spread primarily by 
“those persons with whom the climate disagrees and who in consequence 
are invalided home, and those who are separated from the service in the 
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interest of the public good, who return to the United States and get an 
audience there. . .”58 The reference here is to James H. Blount, one of the 
targets of the book. The other concern of Worcester is his deep belief that 
the inhabitants of the archipelago were confronted by a grave danger. At 
this point he does not explain the reasons, but he will make them clear 
along the way.  
After Worcester justifies his view-point he states outright” 
It is my intention to correct some of the very numerous 
misstatements which have been made concerning past and present 
conditions in the Philippines. I shall quote from time to time such 
statements, both verbal and written, and more especially some of 
those which have recently appeared in a book entitled “The 
Americans Occupation of the Philippines, 1899-1912,” by James 
H. Blount.59 
 
Blount had written a critical history of the American occupation of 
the Philippines, The American Occupation of the Philippines 1899-1912, 
which  was actually financed by Manuel Quezon. Blount argued that the 
American occupation of the Philippines was illegitimate and that the 
implantation of American civil government was despotic and 
exploitative. He accused the Taft administration of practicing censorship 
and misinforming the government and the American people. 
Blount had examined a vast amount of official documents, above 
all the material related to the Filipino-American war. Probably the 
sharpest argument he supported was that the Filipinos deserved and were 
prepared for independence. He substantiated this by presenting a 
different view of Aguinaldo’s government, which he considered well-
organized despite its ephemeral rule. 
                                                 
58 Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present. New York: The MacMillan Company, vol. 1, 
1914, p. 13.  
59 Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present, p. 14. 
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Worcester attacked these arguments by inferring that they were a 
hyperbole built up by “his bitter personal animosities.” Therefore, they 
could not be taken seriously. As for the materials used by Blount, 
Worcester accused him of misusing documents by neglecting important 
reports. He was willing to fill in the gaps that Blount had left. For this 
purpose, Worcester introduced to his readers the Philippine Insurgent 
Records60 provided by Captain John R. M. Taylor. These records, 
according to Worcester—and future scholars have echoed him—were to 
become the most valuable information on the Filipino “insurgency.” 
Worcester highlights the term “insurgent”; “I use the word ‘Insurgents’ 
as a proper noun, to designate the Filipinos who took up arms against the 
United States.”61 
Worcester’s insistence upon the use of the term “insurgent” is 
highly significant: He was categorically denying the Filipino-American 
War. Whereas Blount had called the event a “war,”62 for Worcester, 
upheld by Taylor, it was an “insurgency.” Worcester might have been 
paving the way for a clarification of the ambiguous terminology 
generated by the Commission Reports and reiterated by propagandistic 
textbooks. The Commission Reports, by delimiting the “problem” to the 
Tagalog provinces, categorized the war that was then raging as an 
“insurrection.” Textbooks, however, were ambiguous and some of them 
                                                 
60 It has been explained in the sixth chapter how this work was never published. However, it is 
interesting to note in 1907 the work was to be called The Insurgent War Records. In 1909, when 
Clarence Edward asked for LeRoy to review the first two volumes, Edwards called them Insurgent 
Records. The term “war” had disappeared. Dean C. Worcester will introduce the records definitely as 
Philippine Insurgent Records. 
61 Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present, p. 16, foot-note 1. 
62 Blount devoted three chapters to this topic. Otis and the War; Otis and the War (continued) and 
McArthur and the War. Blount, James H. The Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912. 
 410 
used the term “war.” Barrows himself, a superintendent of education, has 
a section in his history textbook entitled “War with the Americans.”63 He 
clearly states that it was a war. However, several pages later, in 
explaining the Taft Commission, Barrows devotes a brief section to the 
end of the “Insurrection.” This is the sort of “confusion” that Worcester 
finally sought to put an end to by categorically defining the events of 
1899-1901 as an “insurgency.” 
In concluding the section on “subject-matter” Worcester revisits 
the present situation in the Philippines: 
. . .a new administration is bestowing on Filipino political offices, 
and giving them opportunities, for which they are as yet utterly 
unprepared, thus endangering the results of years of hard, patient, 
self-sacrificing work performed by experienced and competent 
men.64 
 
Worcester wanted to show to the American public that the 
Filipinos were not prepared for the positions that they had attained under 
the Democrats. He was willing to reveal unpleasant facts which had not 
been disclosed in order to inform Americans, “who were entitled to know 
the truth,” of the dangers of the present situation of the Philippines. This 
excerpt categorically states that the Democrats were destroying what Taft 
and his men had built up during the first thirteen years of U.S. 
occupation. 
One of the “unpleasant facts” that Worcester would reveal was the 
tyranny and despotism of Filipino leaders as shown during the ephemeral 
                                                 
63 Barrows, David P. A History of the Philippines. New York: World Book Company, 1907, pp. 298-
299. 
64 Worcester, Dean C. The Philippine Past and Present, p. 15. 
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republic—behavior which could recur by conceding the independence of 
the Philippines: 
I shall then show that these leaders never established a government 
which adequately protected life and property, or gave to their 
people peace, happiness or justice, but on the contrary inaugurated 
a veritable reign of terror under which murder became a 
governmental institution.65 
 
Worcester would provide the underside to Blount’s history which 
defended Aguinaldo’s government by considering it well-established. 
Aguinaldo and his people knew exactly what they wanted, wrote Blount, 
“At all the times and in all places they made it clear that independence 
was the one thing they had pledged.”66 He added that the Filipinos were 
more capable of self-government than the people of Cuba. Worcester 
reversed the argument, portraying Aguinaldo and his government as 
perpetrators of oligarchic rule, assassination, and oppression. He would 
“prove” his allegations by drawing upon still another flawed 
compendium of documentary sources about Philippine history: Taylor’s 
Insurgent Records. 
The edition of Worcester’s book published in 1914 became an 
immediate success. It is important to note, however, that the book was re-
issued in 1930, edited by Joseph Ralston Hayden who added some 
chapters and also decided to omit some important parts of Worcester’s 
original text. 
In the 1930 preface Hayden informs the reader that “In preparing 
this revision of the work the editor has sought to avoid making any 
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66 Blount, James H. The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912, p. 284. 
 412 
changes that would impair its value as an historical document.”67 
However, he did make some changes that impaired the value of 
Worcester’s book. For one thing,  he purged those parts of the first 
chapter “View-Point and Subject Matter” that referred to Blount’s work. 
Hayden intended to suppress discussion of any alternative history of the 
American war and occupation of the Philippines. He emphasized that 
there was no war, only an insurgency provoked by those Filipinos who 
took up arms. From 1930 on, under the sponsorship of Professor Joseph 
Ralston Hayden, Worcester book would become a classic work of 
reference. 
The Philippines Past and Present is far from being a history of the 
Philippines; it is a flagrant isomorphism of past and present. It draws 
upon history to demonstrate that a native administration in the country, or 
an immediate grant of independence, would squarely lead to an 
anarchical and corrupt government. To support this argument Worcester 
starts his narrative in 1898, arguing that nobody connected with the 
American government ever held out false hopes to Aguinaldo. This 
argument was not new to Worcester, since as early as 1899 he had 
delivered a speech at the Hamilton Club of Chicago arguing that 
independence was never promised by the Americans.68 His aim then was 
to silence the voices of the anti-imperialist camp. 
This time around Worcester had again important reasons to revisit 
that topic. Blount had presented some details that seemed to substantiate 
                                                 
67 Ralston Hayden J. ‘Preface to the edition of 1930.’ Dean C. Worcester. The Philippines Past and 
Present, 1930, p. v. 
68 See Worcester, Dean C. Some Aspects of the Philippine Question. Hamilton Club of Chicago. Serial 
Publication, number 13. 
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the dishonored promise of independence made to Aguinaldo by 
American consular officials and military personnel. Worcester 
challenged Blount’s claim by pointing out that the alleged promise was a 
misinterpretation and mistranslation of event by the intermediary 
between Pratt and Aguinaldo. Worcester based practically his whole 
rebuttal of Blount on excerpts from the Philippine Insurgent Records.69 
In actual fact, Worcester used Sastron’s book, Insurrección en Filipinas, 
from which he had translated two chapters. Taylor, however, had 
included excerpts from Sastron in his compilation of records, and this is 
what Worcester cited. His argument seemed more rigorous by quoting 
The Philippine Insurgent Records rather than a Spanish source! 
Topics such as the denial of any promise of independence, the 
collaboration of the “insurgents,” or episodes about the “insurgency” 
treated in other chapters devoted to this period—all these were really 
secondary to Worcester. They were co-opted in order to bring the past to 
bear upon present conditions in the Philippines. By digging into history, 
Worcester was trying to overturn the argument of some Filipino 
politicians that the United States had destroyed a republic in the 
Philippines and erected an oligarchy. Worcester was determined to prove 
that this oligarchy actually had its foundations in Aguinaldo’s 
government. 
                                                 
69 It is important to note that Ralston Hayden, in the edition of 1930, corroborated Worcester’s  
argument that Aguinaldo was never promised independence by any American official. Ralston Hayden 
based his argument on LeRoy, Elliot, Kalaw and Fernandez. He emphasized the argument of Kalaw 
and Fernandez in order to demonstrate that despite they were Filipino scholars they substantiated 
Worcester’s argument. Obviously, in 1930 Filipino scholars had been educated under the American 
tradition and above all, Barrow’s book had become like a bible to them. 
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The Partido Nacionalista (Nacionalista Party) for several years 
had been claiming that the Malolos government demonstrated the 
capacity to establish an independent national life. Blount in his book 
supported this claim, showing how Aguinaldo managed to build up an 
organized government in which public order prevailed. In 1913, the 
legitimacy of Aguinaldo’s government became part of the rhetoric of the 
speeches of Quezon and Osmeña in order to demonstrate that Filipinos 
could rule their destinies now as they did in 1898. 
In this context, we need to understand the new rhetoric of the 
Republican platform, which for first the time attempted to define two 
systems endemic in the Philippines: oligarchism and caciquism. The 
Philippines Past and Present is an important text in this regard since it 
succeeded in giving past and present native governments the stigma of an 
oligarchy. Worcester’s narrative about the Filipino Republic was 
intended to demonstrate how a sudden withdrawal of the United States 
would degenerate into an anarchy. Three chapters in all develop this 
argument, based on Taylor’s documents. Worcester draws up a perfect 
frame for his narrative since by co-opting and de-contextualizing past 
facts, the transition to later chapters dealing with present conditions 
becomes quite smooth. The common nucleus of the various chapters is 
“murder as a government agency”—the title of one chapter. 
Probably the most important statement in the book is found in the 
chapter entitled “Did we destroy a republic?.” This title is a direct 
reference to Blount’s argument that the imperialists destroyed the 
Filipino Republic. By taking the Filipino Republic as the starting point, 
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Worcester was able to develop the argument that immediate 
independence would result in oligarchism. “While the government of 
Aguinaldo was called a republic,” Worcester states, “it was in fact a 
Tagalog military oligarchy in which the great mass of the people had no 
share. Their duty—to obey without question the orders the masses 
received from the military heads of their provinces.”70  
What became a “dictatorship” in 1898 was redefined in 1914 as 
“Tagalog military oligarchy.” This new terminology came to prevail 
during the American administration and up to a certain extent we can 
extrapolate it to the present, since the Filipino government today is still 
defined routinely as “oligarchic government.” Worcester was also able to 
establish an analogy with caciquism as this was understood in 1905. The 
oligarchic government of Aguinaldo destroyed the will of the masses 
who blindly obeyed without questioning the orders received from the 
military heads of the provinces. 
Worcester adds that these military heads, who perpetrated outrages 
during the Republic, are still around today, powerful in their respective 
communities. Through these asides, Worcester ushers in another 
important issue: the centralization of the Filipino government and 
compadrazgo. Centralization was imposed by Aguinaldo in 1898. He 
provided a strong and highly centralized military dictatorship 
in which under the form of election provision was made for the 
filling of all offices by men devoted to the group which had seized 
control. All elections were subject to Aguinaldo’s approval and 
every province was under the command of a military representative 
of his who could and did call upon the civil authorities for such 
supplies as he deemed fit. All the real power was vested in the 
                                                 
70 Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present, 1914. Vol. 1, p. 269. 
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central group and the central group was composed of Emilio 
Aguinaldo and his public and private advisers.71 
 
Worcester here warns the American public that this kind of 
independent “government” Aguinaldo had established could return if the 
Democrats gave them the chance. Murder would once again be rife but, 
worse, “among the persons to be tortured and murdered would now be 
those Americans who failed to escape seasonably. Sooner yet ‘the united 
Filipino people’ would split up on old tribal lines and fly at each other’s 
throats.”72     
Volume 1 of The Philippines Past and Present gives shape to the 
idea that “oligarchism” was the main political feature of the 
Philippines.73 It is important to note that Hayden’s edition of 1930 did 
not change a single word of the abovementioned arguments since the 
Americans still considered the Filipinos unprepared for independence at 
that time.  
Volume 2 develops the thesis that “caciquism” was the main 
feature of politics at the local level. For this purpose Worcester devotes a 
long chapter to slavery and peonage based in part on his book devoted to 
these institutions. He adds in support of this topic three previous chapters 
on the non-Christian tribes as the real sources of slavery and peonage. 
                                                 
71 Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present, p.427. 
72 Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present, p. 240. 
73 The arguments presented by Worcester about Aguinaldo’s Republic have not changed that much. 
The tone is not as fatalist as that coming from Worcester. However the content is quite similar with a 
language that is more sophisticated. Topics such as centralization and oligarchic government give 
shape to a linear emplotment. See for instance: Milagros C. Guerrero.‘The Provincial and Municipal 
Elites of Luzon during the Revolution, 1898-1902.’ Guerrero asserts that the government of Aguinaldo 
was based on the co-optation of local elites in order to give prestige his republic. Furthermore, she 
infers, by marking 1893 as the main foundation of Aguinaldo’s Republic, that Aguinaldo implanted a 
centralized government, such as the Spaniards had done. However, she misses the impact of the Maura 
law, precisely intended to create a de-centralized government. The Spaniards and Aguinaldo had no 
time to demonstrate whether they would have been successful. 
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Worcester assimilates caciquism to slavery and peonage. LeRoy in 
1905 had developed the ideas that caciquism was the chief obstacle to 
social and political progress. Worcester, in 1914, states a similar point: 
Without hesitation I assert that their existence [slavery and 
peonage] in the Philippine Islands is the greatest single problem 
that confronts the government of the United States in its efforts to 
build up a respectable and responsible electorate and establish 
representative government.74 
 
Worcester infers that slavery and peonage were caused by 
caciquism which prevailed in every municipality. His argument is 
supported by witnesses who maintained that caciquism still prevailed in 
parts of some provinces such as Cagayan. This new caciquism presented 
by Worcester restricted “complete and real liberty.”75 He establishes 
caciquism as the main institution of peonage, and  caciques as the rich 
and powerful men who are the true perpetuators of peonage.   
This new dimension of caciquism as a surviving institution in all 
the municipalities is reinforced by Worcester’s chapter, Philippine 
Lands. “Cacique” is identified with landowner and “peon” are the 
tenants: 
The cacique does not wish his laborers to acquire land in their own 
right, for he knows well enough that if they did so they would 
become self-supporting, and it would cease to be possible for him 
to hold them as “peons” as is commonly done at present.76 
 
Starting with a historical account of the Republic of 1898, 
Worcester develops an argument that makes oligarchy and caciquism the 
main curses of the Philippines today (1914). Oligarchy had murder on the 
government agenda; caciquism restricted real liberty. Oligarchy and 
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76 Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present, p. 830. 
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caciquism are interwoven to establish the peculiar form of government in 
the past (the Malolos republic) that should not be allowed to reinstate 
itself in the future. 
Worcester concludes his book with the present: Is Philippine 
independence now possible? This rhetorical question has a categorical 
answer--no! He had devoted more than nine hundred pages to deny the 
possibility of a “yes” answer. As if this were not enough, Worcester 
added more arguments against independence in this final chapter. Ninety 
percent of the population were ignorant, credulous and fanatical, he 
pointed out. The clash between a small, intelligent, educated, and 
opportunistic class of Filipinos who wanted independence and the 
ordinary Filipino masses who did not even know what independence was, 
surely banishes the thought that the Philippines should be given 
independence now. 
 
Worcester’s  press campaign  
Worcester’s campaign against independence did not cease with the 
publication of his book but continued with a press campaign. In fact his 
influence was to be felt until 1921, since he was the architect of the 
conclusions reached by the special Wood-Forbes mission to the 
Philippines. This new campaign until 1921 was to have several stages. 
The first one took place immediately after his book’s publication. He 
used the press to spread rumors of native uprisings and revolt plots and to 
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describe the workings of an endemic oligarchism in order to defer the 
independence of the archipelago as established by the Jones Bill.77  
 The most important article was published in The Independent.78 
This article is the final outcome of a draft entitled “Some Dangers of the 
Present Philippine Situation.” Worcester justifies the American 
occupation of the Philippines since during the Spanish days the Filipinos 
were steeped in ignorance and superstition. Therefore, they needed 
American tutelage. He lists all the problems the Americans had to 
confront when they decided to hold the archipelago. He pays special 
attention to the civil service,  following a historical sequence from 
Spanish times to Governor Harrison. He deliberately de-contextualizes 
the Spanish administration by assuming that the Spanish practice of 
selling some public offices had degenerated into an endemic corruption. 
This sale of offices was governed by strict rules, but its de-
contextualization at the hands of Worcester paid off--he was able to 
highlight the magnanimity of the U.S. administration that cleansed the 
archipelago of such evil traditions. Worcester could always latch on to 
the widely accepted binary opposition “bad Spanish and Filipinos” versus 
“good Americans.”  
Worcester’s discussion of the history of the civil service gave him 
the perfect excuse to distort and demonize Harrison’s policy. The worst 
                                                 
77 See, for instance: New York Evening Journal. December 31, 1914:  Independence for Philippines 
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December 31, 1914: Facts about Revolt plot of Filipinos. Evening Post December 31, 1914: Worcester 
heard on Philippines Bill gives private information recent disturbances. Times: Worcester warns of 
Filipino dangers –Recent outbreak serious. He co-opted the press to create a distorted image of the 
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78 Worcester, Dean C. ‘Danger of the Present Philippine situation.’ The Independent, February 23, 
1914. Dean C. Worcester papers. 
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thing Harrison did, he says, was to appoint natives who were now 
destroying Taft’s good work. He augurs that the Filipinization of the civil 
service would fail and the damage done would not be repaired easily; “It 
will take years of patient endeavor to overcome the harm already done 
and the fact that politics was controlled [by Filipinos] even for a time, 
and the fear that they may control it again, will be a lasting obstacle to 
the restoration of the lost morale of the Philippine civil service.”79 This 
argument would be used by Leonard Wood to justify his reactionary 
policy by which the Americans were to regain control over the main civil 
service positions.  
In July, Worcester, co-opting the Mexican question, wrote an 
article for The Outlook warning of the dangers of Filipino 
independence.80 He advocated establishing in Mexico a government akin 
to what had been implanted in the Philippines by McKinley, Taft and 
Roosevelt. Mexico was suffering from the same defects as the 
Philippines, said Worcester, since it had been a Spanish colony as well; 
no wonder its officials were inept and corrupt. The present disorder in 
Mexico serves as a warning that Philippine independence would lead to 
revolutionary disorder necessitating outside intervention. 
After President Wilson ordered the U.S. occupation of Vera Cruz, 
Mexico, in April 1914, Worcester wrote approvingly that American 
military and civil experience in the Philippines could provide 
experienced personnel and a model for the task of establishing good 
                                                 
79 Worcester, D.C. Danger of the present Philippine situation. Section entitled wrecking the civil 
service.  
80 Worcester, D.C. ‘The Mexican question in the light of Philippine experience.’ The Outlook, July 11, 
1914 
 421 
government in another country such as Mexico. In this article not only 
did Worcester plead for the retention of the Philippines but he also 
advocated the Filipinization of Mexico!81 
This series of articles about rumors of revolt and the dangers of 
Filipinization were to continue in 1915. In fact, there is a second stage of 
this press campaign, from 1915 to 1921, that consisted of a systematical 
discrediting of the new policy implanted by Wilson and Harrison. 
Worcester sought to prove to the American public that the Filipinos were 
unable to understand Harrison’s policy. The Americans had to know that 
there was no royal road to independence; “Not only are the 90 per cent of 
the Filipinos unfit to take care of themselves, except in the crudest semi-
civilized way, but the educated 10 per cent who must control do not even 
understand self-government in the sense in which Americans use the 
term.82 
Worcester was showing the American public that the Philippines 
was peopled by savages and ignorant people who had to be led into 
civilized society by the American administration. After demonstrating the 
unfitness of the Filipinos for self-government, Worcester attacked 
Harrison and his policy of “retrogression.” Worcester provided a canvas 
on which to portray loyal Americans as being displaced by incompetent, 
corrupt Filipinos, with devastating consequences. An example of this an 
article in the journal Schenectady entitled “Native rule danger.” 
Worcester epitomizes “native rule” in Manuel Tinio, a former General in 
Aguinaldo’s army who had been appointed to direct the Bureau of Lands. 
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82 Worcester, D.C. ‘Our Trusteeship in the Philippines.’ New York Tribune, Monday January 4, 1915.  
 422 
Worcester argued that Tinio was incapable of running this bureau 
because, being a member of the wealthy class, Tinio must want a 
continuation of “peonage,” whereas his American predecessor was a true 
democrat:  
Very many wealthy Filipinos who are large land owners dislike to 
have the less fortunate people secure land preferring to keep them 
tenants […] Capt. Sleeper had generally interested himself in 
instructing the poor and ignorant as to their rights and in assisting 
them to assert those rights.83 
 
Captain Sleeper had been in charge of the Bureau of Lands, 
battling caciquism and peonage. This fact, says Worcester, made him 
unpopular among the Filipino politicians. Tinio, in contrast, protected the 
wealthy Filipinos to the detriment of the poor, thus maintaining peonage 
as institution. As we shall see, Hayden in 1947 considered Tinio a petty 
tyrant who promoted caciquism. 
Worcester’s press campaign culminated in 1915 with two articles 
published by Public Ledger National Editorial.84 These articles are the 
outcome of a draft entitled “Philippine Independence and the Jones Bill.” 
Worcester starts off “Philippine Independence” by citing the preamble of 
the Jones Bill which states that Philippine independence would be 
recognized as soon as a stable government could be established therein. 
McKinley, Roosevelt and Taft had expressed the same wish before but, 
wonders Worcester, how can the stability of a government could be 
determined in advance? His question was not rhetorical at all. “We 
cannot honorably leave the Philippines,” he says, “until a just and 
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efficient representative government is established there and the people 
have showed reasonable ability intelligently to maintain it.”85 
Once again the Republic is trotted out: Experience has shown, says 
Worcester, that during the independence of the Philippines in 1898 the 
government became a “cruel and arbitrary military oligarchy.” 
Independence now would produce the same kind of government.  
Besides, Worcester supports the idea that the desire for independence 
was far from universal. He was to spread the idea that “Many of the 
politicians loudly demand independence in public, although many of 
them frankly admit in private that they do not want real independence.”86 
Statements such as this were to generate a long-lasting argument 
about the nature of “compadre colonialism.” Worcester was right, but he 
was broadcasting the thinking of a few instead of the many. The 
American government in the Philippines was fond of transforming 
particular facts into generalized truths. Schurman and Taft, for example, 
spread the idea that most of the Filipinos were supporting the American 
occupation when in fact they had only interviewed a few individuals. 
Now Worcester was suggesting that independence was only a rhetorical 
device or strategy on the part of the Filipinos but he was actually 
referring to a few isolated cases. The notion of “compadre colonialism” 
was necessary for Worcester’s persuasive argument that the Philippines 
could not survive without the protection of the United States and that the 
intelligent Filipinos knew it. Meanwhile, the vast majority of the people, 
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illiterate and superstitious, had their hopes pinned on their continued 
protection by the United States. 
Worcester had distorted the situation by taking isolated cases and 
transforming them into a dictum of the truth. But campaign had its 
desired impact on public opinion and the morale of the Harrison 
government. It may appear that after 1915 Worcester’s campaign ended 
since he returned to the Philippines as a businessman. In reality, 
Worcester continued his Republican campaigning in the shadows. His 
fight to defer the independence of the Philippines culminated in 1921 
with his draft of the report of the special Wood-Forbes mission. 
 
Worcester and the special report of Wood-Forbes 
In November 1920, the Republicans regained power and Warren 
G. Harding was set to take over as new President of the United States. As 
was usually the case with a party change in government, a special fact-
finding mission to the Philippines was sent. Called the Wood-Forbes 
mission, it generated a special report in 1921 that Worcester himself 
drafted. Its impact would be tremendous. 
From 1913 to 1920 President Wilson had implanted in the 
archipelago a policy of Filipinization, conceding to Filipinos the most 
important positions in the civil service. In 1916, the Jones Bill was 
finally passed and the U.S. Congress promised independence as soon as a 
stable government would be established. On 7 December 1920 the 
departing President Wilson announced that 
The people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining 
a stable government and have fulfilled the condition set by the 
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Congress as precedent to a consideration of granting independence 
to the Islands. It is now our liberty and our duty to keep our 
promise to the people of those islands by granting them the 
independence.87 
 
Wilson handed over to the Congress reports and documents which 
demonstrated that the Filipinos were able to maintain a stable 
government. Harding was quite opposed to independence but he followed 
the rituals in order to ease relations with the Filipinos, suggesting that 
independence was still on the agenda. He then took steps against it. In 
March 1921 he sent a special mission to the Philippines to observe in situ 
if a stable government had been established. He appointed William 
Forbes (Governor-General until 1913) and General Leonard Wood to 
head the mission. Its findings were published in October of that year. 
It seems that the conditions found by Wood and Forbes were not as 
dramatic as the report portrays in its final conclusions and 
recommendations. Probably they found a rather stable government in 
operation and did not know how to reverse the argument in order to 
portray a chaotic situation which would prove the unfitness of the 
Filipinos for self-government and ultimate independence. This, at least, is 
what the Republicans wanted to hear. 
Worcester states that on 13 July he received a letter from General 
Wood requesting from him “a statement of [his] judgment and 
suggestions relative to the general administration of government in these 
islands, the character and ability of officials and the effectiveness of their 
work.” Wood and the other members of the Mission were anxious to 
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have Worcester’s “well considered opinion on the future policy of the 
United States in regard to the Philippines.”88 Now this is a puzzling 
request. One wonders why General Wood needed suggestions and 
judgments “relative to the general administration of government” if he 
had just been there for several months observing its workings. Was what 
Wood saw in the Philippines more stable than what the Republicans 
would have liked? 
Worcester not only was asked to give his judgment and 
suggestions, but he was eventually invited to elaborate upon the draft of 
the Mission’s report. Much of what he contributed was incorporated in 
the final report. 
Worcester started out by analyzing the “Administration of Justice.” 
He concluded that Governor Harrison had undermined the important task 
undertaken by Taft and now the judges had become indolent and corrupt. 
Filipino judges, in the first place, lacked ability and were insufficiently 
trained. The report repeats Worcester’s words: “In later years the same 
care has not been exercised.”89  
The language of the report is not as vehement as Worcester’s. For, 
in order to make his arguments more effective, Worcester illustrated 
them with examples. He used the same structure as in his previous works: 
to make out of a particular case something general or even universal. He 
gave special emphasis to the “administration of insular, provincial and 
municipal finances.” He focused on the “very great present unfitness of 
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the Filipino to take charge of the financial administration.” He dwelt 
upon the scandal in the Philippine National Bank.90 The Special Report 
was to devote three pages to the Philippine National Bank. 
“The building up of an efficient and capable body of government 
officers and employees,” wrote Worcester, “was the practical result of 
the enactment and strict enforcement of an adequate civil service law, 
and was one of the most substantial benefits accruing to the people of the 
Philippine Islands as the result of American rule.”91 This was during the 
Taft era. Harrison and his Filipinization policy, however, by employing 
natives had caused a deterioration in the quality of the public service. The 
special report emphasizes this point by Worcester in the same manner.92 
The report tried to avoid publicizing some controversial issues 
exposed by Worcester. One can nevertheless read between the lines. 
Worcester had portrayed “graft” as “a prerequisite” to the performance of 
the duties of the government; “The public service in these islands has 
become rotten with graft from the bottom to a point dangerously near the 
top can be fully substantiated.”93 
This prerequisite of graft was complemented by fraud in elections 
and the endemic oligarchism of Filipino politicians. Worcester explained 
that fraud in connection with elections was endemic. However electoral 
fraud had grown to such proportions that it had generated an oligarchic 
government: “These islands, so far as they are governed by Filipinos at 
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this time, are governed by an oligarchy which has been steadily 
entrenching itself and increasing its power.”94  
The hand of Worcester in the Mission’s report is revealed pretty 
clearly in the details about electoral fraud. The Wood-Forbes report 
points out that control of the election machinery was in the hands of the 
dominant parties and that electoral inspectors were just their hirelings. 
But the people were unaware of their civil rights regarding elections. 
Fraud in elections can be explained, says the report, in terms of a 
patriarchal society in which “caciquism” and “familism” held sway:  
The social organization as exists is of patriarchal form 
characterized by a strong clan feeling and centuries of leadership 
by a few influential individuals known as “caciques. The 
subservience of the people to these leaders has not yet been 
supplanted by new ideals.”95 
 
Wood and Forbes were stating that caciquism was something 
inherent in Filipino behavior. Caciquism conjoined with “familism” led 
to a situation in which democracy could not possibly flourish. Wood and 
Forbes point out that there was little evidence of a party system with 
competing programs. Instead there was a bitter contest among families. 
The omnipotence of familism in the Philippines, says the special report, 
made elections something to be fought out among personalities rather 
than on principles.96 These observations and arguments are 
characteristically Worcester’s. These issues are still being debated today. 
Worcester analyzed other topics which are reflected in the special 
report. In the last two sections of Worcester’s report—which would 
become the “general conclusions” and “recommendations” of the special 
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report—he states categorically that Filipinos were lacking in “executive 
ability”: 
While some government positions are filled by honorable and 
efficient Filipinos it is undoubtedly true that the majority of the 
Filipinos holding important positions lack sufficient executive 
ability to perform their work successfully. The work of 
government bureaus is in general seriously in arrears. Filipino 
executives have generally shown themselves particularly weak in 
the administration of insular, provincial and municipal finances, 
and graft is very prevalent.97 
 
The main points of this paragraph surface in one of the conclusions 
of the Wood-Forbes report. Wood and Forbes, however, delete the word 
“graft,” using instead a more polite language: “marked deterioration due 
to the injections of politics.”98 
Worcester concluded by making important recommendations for 
the future government of the Philippines. The first step is to eliminate the 
incompetent employees of the bureaus, who happen to be Filipinos. He 
suggests the reinstatement of competent Americans to be put in charge of 
the more important bureaus of the government. Furthermore, “It is of 
fundamental importance that the next Governor-General should be a 
strong man who will insist upon and will exercise his rights.”99 
Worcester was appealing for the restoration of a strong government like 
Taft’s and this would be reflected in the Mission’s report. 
The report of the Wood-Forbes mission did not entirely convince 
Washington and it certainly failed to impress the Filipinos. Worcester 
had to defend and justify the report in December 1921. In the end he 
succeeded in having his way, for General Wood was appointed 
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Governor-General of the Philippines. Worcester had been able to 
influence Philippine affairs in the penumbra. He died in 1923 but his 
legacy was picked up by Daniel R. Williams and above all, Katherine 
Mayo, whose books were to effectively mobilize support for the anti-
Filipino policies of Leonard Wood’s administration.              
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CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION - TRIUMPH AND PERPETUATION 
OF THE DISCOURSE 
  
 
As early as January 1922 the Wood-Forbes report was challenged 
by a Filipino, Isauro Gabaldon. A member of the House of 
Representatives, Gabaldon complained that the report was arbitrary and 
had failed to prove the unfitness of the Filipinos for self-government. 
Above all, he said in his speech to his fellow representatives, “The 
recommendations are autocratic, militaristic and reactionary.”1  
Gabaldon recalled that President Harding had promised Quezon 
that in no case would a backward policy be pursued. However, the 
Wood-Forbes report recommended a return to an imperialistic policy. In 
fact, this policy would be implemented through the appointment of 
General Leonard Wood as Governor-General.  
Wood showed indifference to the pro-independence labors of the 
Filipino officials who were compelled to go on independence missions to 
the United States. He believed, after all, that the Philippines should never 
be independent. 1924 would prove to be an important year for him. 
Representative Manuel Roxas sent a mission to the United States to 
remind Congress of the promise it made in 1916 to recognize Philippine 
independence as soon as a stable government could be established. Roxas 
emphasized that the Filipinos had been successful in establishing and 
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maintaining a stable government. He urged the Americans to take a final 
and definite action granting the Philippines their independence.2 
Wood replied to Roxas that, while he sympathized with the desire 
of the Filipino people for independence, they were not yet prepared to 
assume such a responsibility, either from the standpoint of instructed 
public opinion, preparedness for defense, a common language or 
economic resources. Wood stated in an article in the Free Press: 
I am convinced the true situation in the Philippines is not 
understood either by Congress or the American people who have 
been misinformed and deceived by misleading propaganda and 
information which has been circulated by the Independence 
Mission’s Press Bureau and others and I urge that the fullest 
opportunity for a hearing be given to those who have lived here 
long years.3 
 
Wood spurned Roxas’s mission for independence and argued that 
the Filipinos as a whole appreciated to be under the flag and government 
of the United States. In any case the leaders, as a whole, were not yet 
ready for independence; “They admit freely that a considerable number 
of years will be required before the people will be prepared for 
independence, either from the standpoint of national defense or 
resources.”4 
Wood asked the U.S. Congress to ignore the claims made by some 
agitators and disseminators of false and misleading propaganda. His 
statements appear to have been effective. Wood also successfully 
engendered divisions within Philippine politics as attempts were made to 
determine responsibility for the alleged shortcomings of Filipino leaders 
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(as outlined in the Wood-Forbes report). The Nacionalistas soon were 
being accused by the Democrata Party of forming an oligarchy. Wood’s 
strategy was helped along by the publication of some important books. 
One writer stood out as a champion of Wood’s administration: Daniel R. 
Williams. 
The United States and the Philippines 
Williams set out on a rather familiar tack. He sought to prove the 
incapacity of Filipinos for self-government and ultimate independence. 
He highlighted the graft and corruption that followed upon the 
Filipinization movement, as well as the ignorance of the masses. His 
book, The United States and The Philippines, can be regarded as the heir 
to Worcester’s The Philippines Past and Present. It follows the same 
contours as Worcester’s book, with some similar arguments pursued. 
Aside from fostering Wood’s imperialistic policy, Williams also set out 
to demolish [ex-Governor] Harrison’s The Cornerstone of Philippine 
independence and Charles Edward Russell’s The Outlook for the 
Philippines.5 
Williams’ book is a history of the past in the present. We can 
distinguish different sequences in this book: The first can be termed the 
“dark age of the Philippines” which covers the Spanish era and 
encompasses the “Tagalog oligarchy.” Then there is the “golden age” 
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which covers Taft’s era, followed by the “wrecking” during Harrison’s 
term. And then, finally, there is a “new hope” under Wood’s term. 
Williams does not contribute any new arguments in his book. He simply 
follows upon or builds on what Worcester had laid down earlier. He 
opposes the independence of the country by putting down Filipino 
politicians as a mere oligarchic class and above all he fiercely criticizes 
the Nacionalista Party and its leader, Quezon, who is called “dictator.” 
Of course Williams, like Worcester in The Philippines Past and Present, 
addresses the issues of caciques and oligarchy. Caciques, he says, are 
different from oligarchs in that their activities remain confined to local 
communities.   
The dark age for Williams, not surprisingly, was the long-lasting 
medievalism of Spanish (mis)rule. As he puts it, “In Manila the process 
of ‘cleaning up’ and of replacing a sixteenth century civilization with 
some of the decencies and opportunities of modern life, began almost 
with the day of [American] occupation.”6 This argument, repeated in 
nearly all the books devoted to the American project, conforms to the 
observation Reynaldo Ileto has made about the discourse of Barrow’s 
textbook: 
[Barrows’ History of the Philippines] exhibits the emplotment of 
Philippine history along the medieval-to-modern axis or time-line. 
In textbooks of this genre American tutelage, or fatherhood, or big 
brotherhood fits in naturally, leading Filipinos out of the medieval 
age through the development of a modern state peopled by modern 
individuals or citizens whose passions have been subordinated to 
reason.7 
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Williams felt that the Filipino people have every reason to thank 
Providence that the American flag did remain in the archipelago, since 
the Americans led Filipinos out of Spanish medieval administration and 
the oligarchy of the Republic at Malolos. Obviously a heritage of 
medievalism and oligarchism offers no evidence of the ability to 
establish self-government and even less to attain independence. Such 
dark age conditions would end with the arrival of Taft and his 
commissioners who, with the help of the most conservative and 
intelligent element of the native population—i.e., those who tacitly 
accepted American tutelage—implanted an established government. The 
achievements of Taft would lead to a “golden age” in the Philippines. 
Harrison and his policy of Filipinization mark the wrecking of 
Taft’s achievements. Williams puts emphasis on these years, devoting to 
them two chapters entitled “The wrecking of a Government.” Williams is 
tendentious and misleading, discrediting the Nacionalistas who are 
accused of implementation a politics of patronage. “Educated Filipinos,” 
he writes, “talk, eat, and sleep politics, their newspapers being devoted to 
little else. The actual tendency is to affiliate with the party which controls 
the patronage.”8 
Although “patronage” is inherent in any country and appointments 
are natural even in a meritocracy, Williams gives these practices a 
derogatory or negative meaning in the Philippine context. He criticizes 
Quezon and Osmeña of dictating appointments. He infers that these 
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political leaders furnished introduced cronyism and nepotism in the 
Philippines. Of course he does not use terms such as “cronyism,” which 
belongs to a later period in history. But precisely the connotations he 
gives to a term like patronage allow it to be associated with present-day 
cronyism. 
Williams also brings up the subject of “honesty.” He reminds the 
reader that “One of the things America was supposed to instill in the 
Filipinos above all else was a sense of civic honesty to punish with 
severity every infringement of political rights.”9 Quezon, Osmeña and the 
Nacionalistas had transgressed civic honesty by flagrantly resorting to 
fraud in elections, committing graft in financial matters and furthering 
peonage or caciquism at the local level. Williams congratulates the 
Wood-Forbes report for bringing out these problems and wisely 
explaining to the American people why Filipinos were not yet fit to 
safeguard their own interests. 
Williams cannot really prove the unfitness of Filipinos to govern 
their own country. As a matter of fact, his main argument for discrediting 
Filipino governance is to dwell on the corruption scandal that resulted in 
the bankruptcy of the Philippine National Bank, using the word 
“retrogression” to describe the mess. These are the points raised by 
Worcester in the draft of the Wood-Forbes report. 
Williams’ The United States and the Philippines concludes with a 
reference to what we can recognize now as two key sets of figures in 
American colonial discourse: caciques and oligarchs. Williams 
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definitively identifies caciquism as a local phenomenon. Now since local 
or municipal governments were run by native officials, readily 
assimilated into the category of caciques, caciquism therefore was 
endemic in Filipino society. These local bosses were the ones thwarting 
American efforts to democratize society: 
Liberty means “equal laws for all, a recognition of civil rights, and 
exemption from the exercise of arbitrary power.” It is this we have 
given the Filipinos—except as thwarted by local caciques—and 
which we are seeking to preserve to them against a small coterie of 
their own people who seek to control the Government, free from 
all interference.10 
 
At this point, the caciques in the towns have a fully derogatory 
connotation. LeRoy’s efforts to instill this meaning in 1905 had borne 
fruit. But there is another, even greater, danger to democracy—the “small 
coterie” that seeks to control the Government, free from American 
interference. This coterie is precisely the group of Filipinos that seeks 
independence; the masses themselves are ignorant and indifferent about 
independence. This “small coterie” is none other than the political 
oligarchy. The thrust of Williams’ argument is that the Americans should 
stay around and protect the people from both evils—caciques and 
oligarchs. 
Williams’ book could be questioned or dismissed as official and 
biased since he had been the personal secretary of Bernard Moses, one of 
Taft’s commissioners. However, his arguments found support and were 
even extended in Katherine Mayo’s The Isles of Fear, published in 1925. 
This influential book gave full shape to the discourse on caciques in the 
Philippines during American rule. Through it we can readily see how the 
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discourse had taken shape over the twenty years since James LeRoy 
crystallized it in 1905. 
  
The Isles of Fear 
Katherine Mayo’s book The Isles of Fear: The Truth about the 
Philipppines, established the dominant image of the Philippines for 
millions of American readers in the late 1920’s. The title is reminiscent 
of Worcester’s Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands in the 
suggestion that a terrible and frightening side of the islands, previously 
hidden, is about to be revealed. In format, as well, there is a similarity 
with Worcester’s book since Mayo’s narrative is also anchored in 
particular cases that are graphically described. 
Mayo bases her whole book on the investigation and description of 
the “caciques” in the Philippines. There has been a well-established 
hierarchy of caciques in the archipelago since immemorial times, she 
says. They range from the bottom to the high levels of society. Caciques 
make up the political oligarchy; they are the usurers, landowners, money-
lenders—in fact, except for the ordinary taos practically the rest of the 
population was cacique, making caciquism the moral malady of the land. 
They are all pictured as despicable beings in the book. 
Mayo recognizes two types of Filipinos: the Malay tao and the 
mestizo cacique. The power of this book lies in the author’s use of  
personal testimonies, which give a certain credibility to the narrative. 
Usually it is the Malay tao that speaks, at the risk of his life, about the 
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evils perpetrated by the mestizo caciques. Mayo portrays herself as a 
selfless spokesperson for those oppressed by caciques: 
I want to inform about you and your country to my own people. 
Whatever you say and whatever my eyes see, I will do my best 
faithfully to convey to them without any color and favor. And if 
you desire it, in reporting you I will withhold your name, although 
to do so weakens testimony.11 
… 
I wish to declare  that I have made what amends I can for exposing 
its author by printing it. That is to say, I shall be informed by cable 
of, after its publication, any reprisals, direct or indirect, are begun 
upon the man who has risked his life to lay his people’s case before 
America.12 
 
We must not forget the political context in which Mayo exposes 
the truth about the cacique-dominated society. The last sentence above is 
tendentious since Mayo implies a “reign of terror” in the Philippines in 
the aftermath of a decade of Filipinization. As a matter of fact, the title 
Isles of fear implicitly suggests this backdrop of “reign of terror.”  As 
Worcester did before, Mayo makes generalizations out of a few particular 
cases. One wonders if the people she interviewed were not co-opted ad 
hoc to exaggerate the facts and damn the so-called caciques. We mustn’t 
forget that the Schurman and Taft commissions made use of testimonies 
by the most rude and ignorant informants in order to demonstrate the 
Filipinos’ unfitness for self-government.  
From the very beginning the reader can see that the book is 
subservient to American imperialism and that its main objective is to 
reverse the process of independence for the archipelago: 
For some few years past, we, the American people, have been 
vaguely aware of a sensation of “unrest” in the region of the 
                                                 
11 Mayo, Katherine. The Isles of Fear. The truth about the Philippines. New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, 1925, p. 4 
12 Mayo, Katherine. The Isle of Fear…, p. 77.  
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Philippine Islands –and of Voices, once and again, asking for 
Philippine independence.13 
 
By “sensation of unrest,” Mayo is referring to the demoralized 
condition of the Insular government that Leonard Wood discovered when 
he took over. This demoralization was due to the policy of overhasty 
Filipinization by Wood’s predecessor. She explains in detail that the fruit 
of Filipinization was a legislature composed of caciques who used 
nepotism and graft to attain and hold on to power. 
There are eight chapters which describe to mainly the American 
reading public what Mayo observed and heard and above all what 
cacique meant and who caciques were: 
Malays as they are, no caste system exists among them. And they 
show but two classes–the cacique, or moneyed class, which bosses 
and from which all politicians come; and the tao, or peasant class, 
which is bossed and which has, in practice, no voice whatever in 
governmental or political affairs.14 
 
This definition does not differ from that furnished by LeRoy in 
1905. He presented a picture of a cacique class but was still ambiguous 
about its features. Mayo is quite clear in her identification: cacique is a 
person who has one occupation—“politics;” one industry—usury; and 
one hobby—gambling. Cacique was a mestizo Chinese or mestizo 
Spanish who exploited and oppressed the ordinary tao. 
In order to display before American public opinion the despotism 
of the caciques—the cause of fear in the isles—Mayo uses conspicuous 
titles for attracting the readers. Under the chapter “The mark of the 
beast,” for example, she explains the basic units in politics. She states, 
                                                 
13 Mayo, Katherine. The Isle of Fear…, p. 3. 
14 Mayo, Katherine. The Isle of Fear…, p. 10. 
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typically, “The political unit in the Philippine Islands is the little 
cacique—the small local boss. This is the key fact in the make-up of 
Filipino-conceived control.”15     
After defining the political unit—the little cacique—Mayo 
establishes a hierarchy of caciques since these small bosses take their 
orders from caciques bigger than them. At the top of this pyramid of 
caciques, municipal and provincial, there are the Big Caciques who have 
their seats in Manila. These Big Caciques have been elected through the 
intervention of the small caciques who use usury and peonage as 
channels to control public opinion. Mayo illustrates this pyramidal 
structure making use of particular cases to demonstrate that the cacique 
imposes his will through terror. This is the reason she titled this chapter 
“The mark of the beast.”  
If caciquism for Katherine Mayo was the moral malady of the land, 
then usury16 was its curse. Mayo shows how usury was endemic in the 
archipelago, an existent curse before the arrival of the Spaniards. She  
supports her arguments by using as a reference Blair and Robertson’s 
multivolume work. This makes her work appear scholarly.  
                                                 
15 Mayo, Katherine. The Isle of Fear… p. 11. The reader can find many similarities between Katherine 
Mayo’s Isles of Fear and John Sidel’s Capital, Coercion and Crime. The titles are quite conspicuous 
and directly lead the reader to a specific narrative. My attention is called to the definition of the 
political unit and Sidel’s chapter devoted to “Small town bosses.” Although Sidel uses a post-colonial 
and modern language, and he avoids use of the term cacique, he builds up his book following quite 
closely Mayo’s structure and narrative.    
16 In 1929, Serafin E. Macaraig in Social Problems devoted a chapter to usury. Macaraig follows 
Mayo’s argument by stating that “usury is undoubtedly one of the greatest social problems in the 
Philippines.” Macaraig –then assistant Professor of sociology at the University of the Philippines—is 
an example of the triumph of the Americanization during the decade of the twenties. The Wood-Forbes 
report means a landmark for the policy of adjustment of the archipelago. Macaraig, like Mayo, 
establishes an analogy between caciquism and usury. Macaraig, Serafin E. Social Problems. Manila, 
P.I: The Education Supply Co, 1929, p. 396.   
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Mayo establishes connections among usury, caciques, slavery, and 
peonage. All of the different components of the colonial discourse 
developed since LeRoy’s time are now brought together and interlinked, 
such as in the following paragraph: 
The power of the political chiefs in Manila depends on the power 
of the ward politicians, each in his own little place all over the 
land. The main grip of these minor caciques lies in the practice of 
money-lending at [levels of] usury, which makes them masters of 
the lives, including the votes, of the people.17 
 
It is important to remind ourselves of the political context of 
Mayo’s “innocent” descriptions. Her emphasis on the caciques as the 
masters of people’s lives and votes is a subtle reference to Governor 
Harrison’s legislature dominated by natives, which was by Mayo’s 
definition a cacique legislature that fostered the money-lenders instead 
of, say, setting up an agricultural bank or allowing rural credit. 
Perhaps the chapter that best enables us to understand the book’s 
intention to reverse the process of self-government and independence, is 
“Vultures in the Sky.” Mayo follows, practically ad literam, Worcester’s 
arguments in The Philippines Past and Present. This chapter aims to 
justify the good purposes of the Americans to the detriment of the 
Filipinos. Mayo specifies the cacique as hacendero (big landowner), just 
as Worcester had defined him in Slavery and Peonage. She justifies the 
implementation of the Public Land Act18 of 1904 and considers it as a 
                                                 
17 Mayo, Katherine. The Isle of Fear…,, p. 29. 
18 At this point it is important to note that in 1989 another journalist, Stanley Karnow, wrote a book 
entitled In Our Image. America’s empire in the Philippines which tried to show why the Americans 
failed to implement democracy in the Philippines. One of the reasons Karnow gives was that the 
Americans inherited the problems that the Spanish left behind in the Archipelago. Karnow asserts that 
“Spain left another heritage, in the form of land grants to Spanish settlers –which passed on to the rich 
Filipino mestizos families, created the oligarchy that wields power today,” p. 13. Karnow stresses the 
idea that caciquism or oligarchism was endemic before the arrival of the Americans, therefore he 
supports the argument furnished in 1905 by LeRoy. But it is significant to establish a parallelism 
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good law, which made liberal provisions for the small landowner. 
However, this good law was infringed upon with the arrival of the 
Democrats who handed governmental control over to the natives:  
The Bureau of the Lands felt the effect promptly. The American 
Director of Lands, known as one of the most efficient men in the 
Insular service, was removed in favor of a young “cacique,” himself 
a large landowner of Nueva Ecija.19 
 
The reference is to Manuel Tinio, of course, but Mayo does not 
mention his name at any time. She alludes to him as that man or cacique 
director who urged for his own “purse” and the purses of other caciques, 
the passage of a new Land Act. This new law allegedly destroyed the 
livelihoods of poor Filipinos who could not then escape from slavery.  
In sum the Americans did their best for the advancement of the 
Filipino people, Mayo states in the finest literary language. Whatever 
was done to their harm, loss and oppression was done by the Filipino 
himself. This categorical statement is supported by some witnesses, such 
as the one who is quoted by Mayo as saying that “The American 
government is the best we ever had. But our politicos—our caciques—
they want the independence from America in order to get more personal 
power for themselves.”20 
Through her account of “the truth about the Philippines,” Mayo 
was informing the reader that the U.S. administration in the Philippines 
under Leonard Wood was rescuing the Filipinos from actual ruin. The 
                                                                                                                                            
between the role played by Katherine Mayo in 1925 in supporting the American political involution to 
imperialism; and Stanley Karnow who wonders if Cory Aquino, descendant of one of these oligarchic 
families from the Spanish era, would be able to implant a true democracy in a society where the 
customs and traditions are too deep-rooted. Karnow with this example at point was to justify why 
American failed to transplant its institutions –a strong domination of the oligarchy.  
19 Mayo, Katherine. The Isle of Fear…, p. 50. 
20 Mayo, Katherine. The Isle of Fear…, p. 74. 
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American system was far from the cacique system exemplified by the 
behavior of the oppressive Filipino politicos. Wood was liberating the 
Filipino masses from the “retrogression” suffered during Harrison’s 
administration. Mayo was implicitly calling for a return to the old 
methods instituted by Taft. And no way should the Americans leave, for 
the immediate result would be strife, disorder and bloodshed. 
The Isles of Fear became a success and Mayo got to popularize her 
views even more by publishing articles in newspapers and magazines. 
The Washington Post published, for example, “Mountaineers of the 
Philippines, anxious that America keep the Isles, see warfare under 
Filipino rule.” This article was extracted from her book. She asked the 
rhetorical question, what would happen if the “mountaineers” desired the 
independence of the Philippines, the establishment of native government 
and the withdrawal of America? The response to this question is 
contained in her testimonies, which are made to collectively protest: “If 
America goes we shall be exploited and maltreated worse than the 
Spaniards ever maltreated the Filipinos.”21 
The pattern developed by Mayo is familiar to us by now: a 
dichotomy between “bad Filipino and Spaniard” and “good American.” 
She had contributed to the misrepresentation of the Christian Filipinos as 
tyrannical, despotic, oppressor and corrupt; while the non-Christians 
were simply shown as semi-savage tribes.  
                                                 
21 ‘Mountaineers of the Philippines, anxious that America keep Isles see warfare under Filipino rule.’ 
The Washington Post, 1926. Dean C.  Worcester papers.  
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The decade of the twenties22 produced other important publications 
which emphasized “the renaissance of the Taft era” and above all the 
Americanization of the archipelago. The arguments about caciquism as a 
malady of local government had triumphed and a new generation of 
American-educated Filipino scholars such as Serafin Macaraig 
considered caciquism as their own pathology.23 
 
The Philippines A Study in National Development the culmination 
of the discourse 
The development of the discourse, whose genealogy started during 
the Schurman Commission and took shape with James LeRoy, 
culminated with Joseph Ralston Hayden’s The Philippines A Study in 
National Development, published in 1947. This book was addressed 
mainly to political science students and other scholars. This work was to 
be part of Hayden’s courses on colonial policy—such as “Modern 
Imperialism.” Some chapters clearly follow the pattern established in 
1905 by LeRoy, a reference in Hayden’s courses.  
We observed in an earlier chapter that the Schurman report gave 
shape to the traditional image of the “dark age” of Spanish rule. Hayden 
supported this image and quoted the Commission report at length: 
The Report of the First Philippine Commission contained the 
following observations upon the general government of the Islands 
at the end of the Spanish regime: “It failed to accomplish even the 
primary ends of good government—the preservation of the peace 
                                                 
22 David P. Barrows published a revised edition of History of the Philippines. Barrows was to devote a 
chapter to the retrogression of the Filipinization. This book was published in 1925 and 1926; Nicholas 
Roosevelt (1926): The Philippines: A Treasure and a Problem; William Cameron Forbes waited until 
1928 to publish The Philippine Islands. Forbes was to support the policy implemented by Stimson –the 
new governor-general of the Philippines. 
23 Macaraig, Serafin E. Social Problems. Manila P.I: The educational supply, 1929. 
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and order, and even the administration of justice; nor can there be 
any doubt that it provided an engine of oppression and exploitation 
of the Filipinos…”24 
 
Hayden set out to produce a new study of Filipino politics, 
escaping from the structure of conventional textbooks. But whenever he 
probed deeply into the dysfunctions in the development of Filipino 
politics, he always seemed to encounter their origins in the Spanish 
regime. 
Moreover, we have seen in this thesis how James LeRoy 
effectively introduced to the American public a social and political 
malady called caciquism that could be blamed for the problems they were 
having in governing the Philippines. Hayden referred to this topic 
throughout his book. Caciquism and caciques are illustrated specifically 
in the chapter devoted to local self-government. Hayden considered local 
politics as an arena dominated by petty tyranny.  
However, we must note an important difference in Hayden’s work. 
This book was written after the independence of the Philippines in 1946. 
Thus, he is subtler in the language he uses, although the content is the 
same.  
Hayden begins his book by boasting about the successful 
experiment introduced in the Philippines: 
The American-Philippine relationship has, on the whole, been 
happier and more fruitful than any other which has existed in 
modern times between a dominant and a dependent people. 
Although mistakes have been made by the sovereign power, it may 
be fairly said that the US has applied the principle of trusteeship in 
dealing with the Philippines. 25 
 
                                                 
24 Ralston Hayden J. The Philippines A Study in National Development. New York: The Macmillam 
Company, 1947, p. 895. 
25 Ralston Hayden, J. The Philippines A Study in National Development., p. 19. 
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Seemingly, there is a tacit recognition that the Americans had 
made mistakes. However, this admission is only partial since the 
mistakes are only conferred upon Harrison’s term. The experiment in 
Filipino self-government introduced by Governor Harrison led to 
involution and retrogression by leaving in Filipino hands too much 
responsibility for which they were not prepared. Hayden notes this 
“blunder” in the preface. But he will not miss the chance to look at 
Harrison’s term in other chapters. 
The first chapter follows the pattern of the official history of the 
American regime and this is, in fact, the emplotment of the book. Hayden 
introduces the Filipino people under the guise of an ethnographic survey. 
The discourse does not differ from those displayed by earlier American 
reports. Hayden concludes in this section that “the most important 
political consequence of the diversity of tongues in the Philippines is that 
the absence of a common language is an impediment to the development 
of national and democratic institutions in the Islands.”26  
After the granting of independence, authoritative writers like 
Hayden were still presenting a picture of a fragmented country populated 
by heterogeneous people, a hindrance to the normal development of a 
democracy. The educated, wealthy, and powerful Filipinos in all parts of 
the Archipelago possessed a common language, English or Spanish, plus 
local languages while the masses still had effective command only of 
their local idioms. This is one of the reasons, Hayden says, why the 
wealthy and educated have become the bosses or caciques of their towns, 
                                                 
26 Ralston Hayden, J. The Philippines A Study in National Development, p. 18. 
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and the despotism of these caciques was what hindered the development 
of national and democratic institutions. In fact, Hayden tried to present an 
image of political disunity in the archipelago. 
We have seen that Hayden in the preface admitted some mistakes. 
However, several pages later he praises the achievements of the 
American government. He highlights education as the cornerstone of the 
American administration. Lamentably, education had not shown itself to 
be a solution at the local level: 
Yet through influence over the justice of the peace courts and other 
agencies of local government, through the operation of laws 
favoring the usurer and the land grabber, and even more as a result 
of the tenacity of ancient customs, the rich exploit the poor, and the 
barefooted tao still stands in a world removed from the 
sophisticated ilustrado upon whom he is economically and 
politically dependent.27 
 
At this point Hayden starts to develop two important arguments. 
The first one is that inherent in Philippine society is the tendency towards 
an oligarchic government based on “personalism”—a word Hayden uses 
quite often through his book. The second argument is that Filipinos still 
engage in the corruption inherited from the centuries of being under 
Spanish administration. 
These arguments in the first chapter are developed in detail in the 
chapter titled Local Self-government. This chapter, according to Hayden, 
is fundamental to understanding why the American institutions implanted 
in the Philippines did not take work in the end. Hayden explains that 
Filipino self-government was traditionally rooted in the barangays, the 
original settlement units. When the Americans occupied the archipelago, 
                                                 
27 Ralston Hayden, J. The Philippines A Study in National Development, p. 23. 
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they were confronted with these deep-rooted political units. They could 
not eradicate traditional customs in these political units. Instead, they had 
to adapt their policies to local Filipino behavior.28 
Hayden emphasizes throughout the book the power of the barrios 
(i.e., barangays) and municipalities, which are defined by him as “the 
arenas in which leaders and families fight for power; and almost every 
voter is a partisan of one faction or the other.”29 The argument was not 
new. The Wood-Forbes report had similarly emphasized the strong 
power of the local families and the prevalence of “personalism.” This 
cultural feature of personalism, says Hayden, ensured that national 
politicians were virtually local heroes and the champions of their towns 
and provinces. It all starts at the municipal level; “For the common man, 
political favors or oppression come most often from the mayor, the chief 
of police, the justice of the peace or the local boss.”30 Hayden 
constructed a picture of Philippine politics as a pyramid of personal 
                                                 
28 This argument emerged by Ralston Hayden will have continuity in the 1970s at the University of 
Michigan with the book entitled Compadre Colonialism. Norman Owen in ‘Philippine Society and 
American Colonialism’ emphasizes the fact the Americans had to sacrifice an efficient implementation 
of their institutions in order not to alter Philippine society, pp. 6-7. 
29 Ralston Hayden J. The Philippines A Study in National Development, p. 261. Alfred McCoy in An 
Anarchy of Families produces the same argument in 1994: “The volume’s familial approach to 
Philippine politics carries with it a series of linked hypotheses: (a) the family-based oligarchies are, to 
state the obvious, a significant factor in Philippine history; (b) that relations among these elite families 
have a discernible influence on the course of Philippine politics; (c) that elite families, organized on 
complex patterns of bilateral kinship, bring a contradictory mix of unified kinship networks and a 
fissiparous, even volatile, factionalism into the political arena; and (d) that the interaction between 
powerful rent-seeking families and a correspondingly weak Philippine state has been synergistic; 
McCoy, Alfred W. (ed.), An Anarchy of Families. State and Family in the Philippines. Quezon City: 
Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994, p. 19. McCoy uses a more sophisticated language to define 
the same type of political behaviour as Ralston Hayden did in 1947. Both of them agree that familism 
and factionalism are interacting factors for the maintenance of the flawed political structure of the 
Philippines. These interacting factors have created a weak state which ensured failure of the 
implementation  of American democracy in the Philippines. In the case of McCoy, Cory Aquino’s 
administration failed to implant a true democracy since she herself was part of the family-based 
oligarchy.  In sum, Filipino traditions could not be surmounted by the Americans. The failure in the 
making of a showcase of American democracy is attributed to deep-rooted Filipino modes of 
behaviour. There is not a single mention of the idea that the Americans needed and used for their own 
political and economic purposes the so-called family-based oligarchies by furnishing their power. 
30 Ralston Hayden, J. The Philippines A Study in National Development, p. 262. 
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relationships, reinforced by economic dependence or oppression. This 
pyramidal structure is reinforced by the prevalence of usury and graft. 
Another image presented by Hayden in the “local self-
government” chapter is that of a centralized administrative system. This 
centralization was a heritage from the Spanish regime.31 As we have seen 
in previous chapters, this argument was not new. Hayden echoes other 
authors who repeated this point over the fifty years of American rule. 
This categorical assertion is enabled by the tacit negation of the Maura 
law which attempted, and up to a certain extent achieved, the creation of 
a decentralized administration in the Spanish colony. It was the 
Americans who, in fact, again centralized the administration by 
exercising a large amount of supervision over the municipalities through 
the provincial and insular authorities. 
In any case, according Hayden, the tradition of Spanish 
centralization undermined the development of local autonomy which the 
Americans and Filipinos desired. Centralization has proven to be very 
difficult to reduce both because it is “an ingrained Filipino practice” and 
because it has served the necessary purpose of keeping the less-advanced 
municipalities and provinces up to a minimum standard of honesty and 
efficiency.32 
Hayden bemoans the fact that there was an increase of 
centralization during the American regime. This was one of the negative 
                                                 
31 McCoy in An Anarchy of Families emphasizes this argument of a powerful central bureaucracy 
furnished by the Spanish regime, which American inherited and extended. He states: “American 
colonials extended the powers of the central bureaucracy they had inherited from Spain.,” p. 11. 
Needless to say, McCoy is denying the implementation of Maura law. The Americans found an 
incipient decentralized administration, precisely the underside of their argument. 
32 Ralston Hayden, J. The Philippines A Study in National Development, p. 268. 
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effects of the Filipinization period under Harrison: “As power has passed 
into Filipino hands the trend towards the autonomous and democratic 
control over local affairs which was the distinguishing characteristic of 
American policy with reference to local government down to 1913, 
seems to have been reversed.”33 There is an implicit suggestion here that 
the Filipino leaders themselves reversed the move towards autonomy in 
local government introduced by Taft in 1901. Filipinos themselves 
undertook to centralize their administration, betraying the altruistic 
intentions of the Americans and reverting to a practice of Spanish times. 
Hayden’s argument about centralization as an effect of 
Filipinization had a definite purpose: to insist upon the persistence of 
caciquism or bossism in Philippine politics. The persistence of this evil is 
illustrated by a specific case, brought out by Worcester and emphasized 
by Williams and Mayo—that of General Manuel Tinio,34 director of the 
Bureau of Lands during Harrison’s term. While Hayden recognized a 
certain degree of quality in Philippine local government, he lamented the 
fact that most of provinces still suffered a measure of weakness in local 
government. He draws an example from Nueva Ecija, a province which 
“has long been known as a centre of caciquism. For years the political 
                                                 
33 Ralston Hayden, J. The Philippines A Study in National Development, p. 309. 
34 In 1981, Lewis Gleeck stated that “General Tinio was not only the supreme cacique of Nueva Ecija, 
but because of his absolute domination of the province came to symbolize, for the outside world from 
Katherine Mayo to Ralston Hayden, the very prototype of the species.” Nueva Ecija in American 
Times: Homesteaders, Hacenderos & Politicos. Historical Conservation Society XXXIII, Manila, 
1981, p. 130. Gleeck devotes a section entitled General Tinio, the Prototype of the cacique. Gleeck, in 
order to foster the figure of General Tinio as the supreme cacique, cites ad literam Ralston Hayden’s 
argument. For Gleeck, Hayden had put the case lucidly and emphatically with respect to the sources of 
powers of the office and those of a cacique like Tinio. This example demonstrates de facto the 
continuity of the discourse engendered by Worcester in The Philippines Past and Present. There is not 
any allusion to the creation of a misleading narrative with the aim of reversing the period of 
Filipinization. Be what as it may, if General Tinio were the prototype of the cacique we should not 
forget that Tinio’s power was fostered by the Americans, specifically William Cameron Forbes.   
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machine of the province was under the control of General Manuel 
Tinio.”35 
Hayden illustrates the case of General Tinio using statements of 
witnesses—just as Worcester and Katherine Mayo had done 
previously—in order to categorize Tinio as a local tyrant whom few 
Filipinos dared to resist. Indirectly, Hayden was arguing that greed, 
brutality and power came together in the practice of local government. 
These abuses of misgovernment, tyranny and dishonesty are identified 
with Governor Harrison’s term of office. Indeed, asserts Hayden, when 
Filipinos were completely in control with scarcely a pretence of 
American supervision and inspection, the quality of local government 
declined. Even Governor Leonard Wood was unable to prevent or to 
punish violations. Local government had become a bastion of tyranny 
and an anarchy in the Islands.36 
Hayden regrets that the era of reform inaugurated by Leonard 
Wood was too brief to fully purge the system of certain unfortunate 
qualities that resulted in handicaps to good government everywhere. And 
unfortunately these handicaps had been accentuated by a Filipino 
tradition and experience of local rule shaped by their long history. A 
considerable number of the 15 per cent of the people at the top were still 
able to use the agencies of local government to control and exploit some 
members of the 85 per cent at the bottom.37 The message is pretty clear: 
although the Americans tried, they could not eradicate an endemic 
                                                 
35 Ralston Hayden J. The Philippines A Study in National Development, p. 278. 
36 Ralston Hayden, J. The Philippines A Study in National Development, p. 281. 
37 Ralston Hayden, J. The Philippines A Study in National Development, p. 287. 
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Filipino disease. What the ills of local government showed was the 
persistence of caciquism. 
In sum, Hayden was following the practice established in the 1920s 
of demonizing the Filipinization of the administration under Harrison’s 
governorship. He instead praised the revitalization of Philippine 
administration during Wood’s term, which was characterized by the 
fostering of the spirit as well as form of American government. Hayden 
notes approvingly that the reversal of the Filipinization movement gave 
way to the further Americanization of the archipelago.  
Finally, we need to look closely at what Hayden said about party 
politics in the Philippines, for this inaugurated an important issue that 
would be taken up by later scholars. Hayden concluded that the party 
system of the Islands was organized and functioned primarily with 
reference to just two things: the independence issue and the personalities 
of a handful of leaders. Hayden seems to infer that this type of party 
system was fostered by the advent of President Wilson’s administration. 
Party policies were shaped, it seems, primarily with reference to the 
overshadowing issue of independence rather than to the everyday 
problems of Philippine life; thus, “to a considerable extent Philippine 
parties were abnormal as compared with modern parties in an 
independent state.”38 Political scientists like Carl Landé, as we shall see, 
would build on this idea later. 
In 1946 the Philippines had come of age, to follow the discourse 
inaugurated by Taft in 1900. As if to mark this event, Hayden’s The 
                                                 
38 Ralston Hayden, J. The Philippines A Study in National Development, p. 324. 
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Philippine A Study in National Development was published around this 
time. For Hayden’s book also represents the coming of age, or the 
triumph, of the discourse on Filipino politics inaugurated in 1905 by 
LeRoy’s Our Spanish Inheritance. Its not-so-subtle message was that 
Filipinos were finally independent, but the Americans still considered 
them unfit for this independence. Deeply-rooted Filipino traditions, 
customs, habits and a historical heritage had resulted in an independent 
but dysfunctional political regime in which an oppressive and tyrannical 
system called “caciquism” still prevailed.  
In 1963 Charles O. Houston,39 Professor Emeritus of Social 
Science at the Western Michigan University made the following 
observation about American scholarship during the early decades of the 
century: 
The Library’s collection is extremely rich in the period 1898 and 
contains as well matter on the preceding period which reflects the 
interests and biases of Americans who were concerned with 
Philippine affairs in the opening years of this century. Enough was 
discovered to make necessary and almost complete revision of the 
history of the period 1898-1934, and which makes tendentious or 
misleading most works printed about the Philippines since 1900.40 
 
This powerful statement by Houston, who was then doing research 
in the Library of Congress, does not seem to have been picked up by 
other scholars. I have tried in this thesis to revisit the period from 1898 to 
1946 through textbooks, journals, newspapers, primary sources and 
personal correspondence. The official history is tendentious and 
misleading, indeed, but despite Houston’s strong words the decade of the 
                                                 
39 Charles O. Houston  earned a doctoral degree in absentia from Columbia University in 1952 while he 
was teaching at the University of the Philippines. He also served as associate curator at the Smithsonian 
Institution in Washington D.C. 
40 Manuscripts and other material relating to the Philippines in the Manuscript Divisions, Library of 
Congress. 
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1960s witnessed a continuity of the discourse. I would like to close this 
thesis by examining two important books that follow the legacy of 
Hayden (and those before him) although using post-colonial language 
and ostensibly new methodological and theoretical frameworks.  
Mary Racelis Hollnsteiner,41 a pioneering Filipino political 
scientist, argues in her book, The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine 
Municipality, that political parties coalesced around important elite 
families of the towns which traced their rivalries back to the Spanish era. 
Her argument lends support to earlier views about the prevalence of 
family ties in local political contests. Hollnsteiner also states that 
elections were not much more than just “factions forming about certain 
personalities.”42 
Hayden had said the same thing in the 1940’s. After seventeen 
years of independence Filipinos in Hollnsteiner’s time still were unable 
to transcend their party platforms based on loyalty, debts of gratitude, 
patron-client relationships, and the like. Hollsteiner’s study in turn had an 
influence on Carl Landé, whose Leaders, factions and parties. The 
Structure of Philippine politics has become a standard reference for the 
study of Philippine politics. 
Landé’s work should be contextualized within the emergence of 
Southeast Asian Studies in the United States. Landé, with the 
encouragement of Harry Benda, inaugurated a framework for Philippine 
                                                 
41 Hollnsteiner,  Mary R. The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality. Community 
Development Research Council. University of the Philippines, 1963.   
42 Hollnsteiner, Mary R. The Dynamics of Power…,  p. 40. 
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studies while at Yale University which would be widely used and cited.43 
Beneath the new vocabulary of Political Science, however, we can 
readily identify in Lande’s work the arguments put forward earlier by 
Hayden. “Leaders,” after all, can mean the same as Hayden’s 
“personalities,” while the other two terms—factions and parties—are 
prevalent in Hayden’s statements about local self-government being 
plagued by factionalism and an abnormal party system.   
Hayden’s asserted that political parties in the Philippines were all 
the same in being only interested in the issue of independence rather than 
problems of normal life. Landé also sees the two major political parties in 
the Philippines as being really “quite identical.”44 Whereas Hayden 
assumed that the party system was built upon personal interest instead of 
principles, Landé asserts that 
Behavioral patterns rooted in the Philippine kinship system is 
structured less by organized interests groups or by individual who 
in politics think of themselves as members of categories, i.e. of 
distinctive social classes or occupations, than by a network of 
mutual aid relationships between pairs of individual— dyadic ties 
with significance for Philippine politics are vertical ones bonds 
between prosperous patrons and their poor and dependent clients.45 
  
Landé’s “dyadic ties” between patron-client corresponds to the 
stereotypical relationship narrated by Hayden in his Local self-
government where the patron is the cacique and the clients are the 
exploited taos. The patron-client relationship is arguably the same as the 
relationship established by Worcester between the caciques and his 
peons—that is, Worcester’s famed peonage system. The patronage 
                                                 
43 Carl Lande was to influence scholars as Glenn May, Alfred McCoy, John Sidel and Paul Hutchcroft 
who have followed a similar pattern. 
44 Landé, Carl H. Leaders, Factions and Paties. The structure of Philippine Politics. Monograph Series, 
No. 6. Southeast Asia Studies Yale University, 1964, p. 1.   
45 Landé, Carl H. Leaders, Factions and Parties…, p. 1. 
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system is, in fact, licit and legitimate. Caciquism is, in fact, a patronage 
system. However, the discourse of dyadic ties from the sixties and the 
genealogy of caciquism from 1905 onwards, have given these terms 
connotations that are completely derogatory.  
Hayden in 1947 stated that the municipalities were “the arenas in 
which leaders and families fought for power, and almost every voter was 
a partisan of one faction or the other.” Landé in 1964 states, “The 
character of Philippine parties is determined more by local considerations 
than by national ones.”46 Therefore, the building blocks of the national 
political party system were the local parties, such as Hayden showed in 
1947. 
Landé emphasizes the domination of the families using a more 
sophisticated language: “Local faction is an amorphous cluster or 
constellation of political leaders or families and their respective followers 
drawn together by a web of personal ties.”47 This statement links up to 
Hayden’s argument that the Philippine parties were abnormal as 
compared to modern parties in an independent state. Landé stresses this 
abnormality noted by Hayden by dating the Philippine party system back 
to the Spanish regime or system, which accentuated the power of families 
in the Philippines. 
Landé’s interpretation of history after the U.S. takeover of the 
islands boils down to the fact that “the Americans began to prepare the 
Philippines for eventual independence by entrusting Filipinos rather 
quickly with the control of a wide variety of representative 
                                                 
46 Landé, Carl H. Leaders, Factions and Parties…., p. 6. 
47 Landé, Carl H. Leaders, Factions and Parties…, p. 7. 
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institutions.”48 The words “rather quickly” seem to be a reference to the 
Filipinization policy of Harrison. But overall the statement is quite 
misleading since the Americans were not actually preparing the Filipinos 
for their independence. On the contrary by giving control to the natives 
they entrenched their power over the Philippines. As early as 1900, as we 
have seen in previous chapters, the U.S. administration encouraged a 
patronage system by using its powers of appointment. As LeRoy 
explained in 1905 to Roosevelt, they must use the “patron,” “boss” or 
“cacique” for “our interest,” to increase American control. The system 
implanted by the Americans was legitimate. The problems arise when 
they systematically deny that they themselves furnished the institutions 
of “patronage” or “caciquism” since their intention was altruistic.  
In sum, Landé shows that despite the vigorous attempts at change 
by American administrators and the constant infusion of American ideals 
and institutions for nearly half a century, the political institutions of the 
Philippines were, are, and always will be, the natural product of a tropical 
Asiatic people who for three hundred years were governed by the 
Spanish. 
We must not underestimate the continuous assumption, from the 
works of LeRoy to that of Landé, that the long duration of Spanish rule 
had left a lasting imprint on the way Philippine politics would take shape 
in the twentieth century. It is therefore not surprising that further 
scholarship on Philippine politics in the seventies and eighties would 
continue to extrapolate to the Philippines certain Spanish or Latin 
                                                 
48 Landé, Carl H. Leaders, Factions and Parties…, p. 28. 
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American terms—e.g., caudillo, caudillaje—with which to frame Filipino 
political behavior. 
 
The use of such terminology continues to encapsulate the 
Philippines within the Spanish empire as a whole—a project initiated, as 
we have seen, by LeRoy, Blair, and Robertson. Up to a certain extent, 
modern scholars see more similarities between the Philippines and Latin 
America rather than Southeast Asia. They consider phenomena such as 
caciquism, compadrazgo or “bossism” as uniquely Filipino owing to 
historical circumstances, with little or no comparisons in Southeast 
Asia.49 Although they try to escape from clichés such as caciquism, 
behind their political analyses we can discern the ghosts of “our Spanish 
inheritance.” 
 In short, we can conclude that while new terminologies have 
appeared since 1946 for the study of Philippine politics, a discursive 
transformation has really not taken place. The discourse of the “dark age” 
of Spanish rule first elaborated upon by James LeRoy, and further 
developed by Blair and Robertson, Bourne, Worcester, Williams, Mayo, 
Hayden and others, continues to flourish up to the present day. 
                                                 
49 This approach has had continuity in John Sidel’s Capital, Coercion and Crime: Bossism in the 




This thesis has challenged and pursued two main arguments, which 
interact with each other. The first argument is that American scholarship 
has played a crucial role in the portrayal of a “dark age” of Spanish rule 
in its vast empire. It is important to note that the medievalism conferred 
upon the Spanish system did not emerge in 1898. The Americans started 
to outline this image during the mid-nineteenth century, when the U.S. 
administration decided to annex Texas and California, territories which 
had belonged to Spain. The books published during those years presented 
a misleading Spanish history by which Spain was depicted as medieval, 
anachronistic, decrepit, and the like. In fact, in order to support the image 
of medievalism the Americans introduced their books with a picture of a 
medieval knight.  
The picture of a Spanish medieval knight was mobilized to justify 
the American occupation and conquest of the Philippines. At this point 
the other main argument of this thesis emerges: the American 
construction of Philippine history. As early as 1898 the American 
administration put into motion the machinery to write a history of the 
Philippines which differed from the reality but which has since been 
perpetuated, thanks to the homogeneity of the imperialist discourse. The 
imperialists were able to rely on the support of Christian reverends, 
universities, publishers, private collectors and the like in the face of a 
heterogeneous anti-imperialist group constituted by writers such as Mark 
Twain as well as Americans whose deep racial prejudice led them to 
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become anti-imperialist. They considered the Filipinos as an inferior 
race, not advanced enough to participate in the political life of the 
American people and therefore destined to remain an alien people. This 
heterogeneity of the anti-imperialist group and the suppression of 
important books which advocated for the independence of the Philippines 
facilitated the triumph of the imperialist discourse in the academe.  
In spite of antagonistic perspectives about the future of the 
Philippines and the Filipinos, imperialists and anti-imperialist attained a 
consensus when they described the Spanish colonial system. For 
instance, the reverend Josiah Strong, a recalcitrant imperialist full of 
racial prejudices stated in 1898: 
We have freed the Filipinos from the abuses of Spanish rule. We 
cannot have them to drift alone on a dark aimless sea. We must 
save these less fortunate people from barbarism. We must patiently 
and with kindness teach theses people to govern themselves and 
enjoy the blessing of Christian civilization.50  
 
This idea of a tyrannical Spanish rule was corroborated by anti-
imperialists such as Mark Twain who thought that liberating the Filipinos 
from “the government under which they had suffered for three hundred 
years was a good business for us to be in.”51 
Josiah Strong and Mark Twain outlined a picture of the “dark age” 
of Spanish rule. Strong was more convincing than Twain in his discourse 
since he was able to indoctrinate his parishioners into the necessity of 
holding the archipelago and to influence McKinley, Roosevelt and Root 
about adopting a paternalistic discourse. Strong instituted two false 
premises that justified the conquest of the Philippines. On the one hand, 
                                                 
50 Address of the Reverend Josiah Strong delivered before the United States Missionary Council in 
Boston, 1898. Letters/Speeches from Imperialism Simulation. 
51 Mark Twain Home, New York Tribune. [New York, October, 15, 1900]. 
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he depicted the Filipinos as backward people, primitive and pagan. This 
picture fitted into the colonial discourse as a whole, in the so-called white 
man’s burden. In fact, it was a common colonial pretext for the 
intervention by Great Britain, France and Holland in Southeast Asia. But, 
the case of the Philippines was not comparable since in 1898 the 
Filipinos became independent for a brief period and they continued to 
demand their independence. The Philippines was the most modern 
country in Southeast Asian with an important number of educated 
natives, familiar with liberal ideas, European manners, and the like. In 
spite of the American construction by which the United States needed to 
make heroic efforts to free the oppressed and teach “millions of ignorant 
people with a diversity of languages,” Spanish was the language of the 60 
per cent of the population. Actually Spanish was the official language 
and as Galicano Apacible stated in 1898, the Spaniards had never denied 
citizenship to the Filipinos.  
The Philippines had become the most important colony for the 
Spaniards and this importance was reflected in the books and 
newspapers. In fact, the Spanish administration from 1868 to the collapse 
of the empire implemented many reforms in order to restructure an old 
administration in the archipelago. Perhaps the most relevant reforms 
were institutional at the municipal and judicial levels. However, from 
Josiah Strong onwards this “modernism” of the late colonial Philippines 
was depicted as its opposite: “backwardness.” 
 The other false premise of Strong, inextricably related to the 
apparent barbarism of the Filipinos, is the idea of the Manifest Destiny of 
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the United States. Strong and his Missionary Council did not support a 
grab for empire, but they supported a paternal relationship of their 
government with the Philippines. God had outfitted the Americans with 
the task to teach millions of ignorant, debased human beings how to live. 
“It is a divine mission.”52 Strong was shaping the later report of the 
Schurman Commission and was debunking the promise of independence 
made to Aguinaldo.  
 As has been explained in this thesis, Aguinaldo received a promise 
of independence and there are sources which de facto corroborate this 
promise. But perhaps the most explicit source is a letter written by 
Aguinaldo to President McKinley. Aguinaldo realized the Americans had 
used him to expel the Spaniards from the Philippines and he stated 
categorically “Mr. President, you know we will not willingly surrender 
our freedom. If you do not withdraw your army, there will be a war.”53 
The Schurman Commission came to the Philippines seemingly to pacify 
the archipelago, but failed to do so. However, it set four important 
precedents. Schurman wrote the most exhaustive history of Spanish rule, 
shaping the contours of the “dark age” by concluding that the Spanish 
system failed to accomplish even the primary ends of good government. 
Moreover, Schurman constructed a discourse that emphasized the “black 
legend”of the Filipino Republic, demonstrating the incapacity of the 
Filipinos to govern themselves by examining a great number of 
witnesses. These witnesses were deliberately co-opted and Schurman 
concluded that most of the Filipinos did not want independence. Needless 
                                                 
52 Address of the Reverend Josiah Strong delivered before the U.S. Missionary Council in Boston, 
1898. 
53 Letter from Emilio Aguinaldo to President McKinley. Letters/Speeches for Imperialism Simulation. 
 464 
to say the witnesses were favorable to the American occupation, 
becoming, thus, the vox populi of the Philippines.  Schurman laid the 
foundation for the further development of the discourses of “caciquism” 
besides supporting the idea of a perennial chaos, anarchy and incipient 
oligarchism in the islands. Finally, the Commission predicted that the 
Filipinos would become more Americans than themselves.  
 This optimistic view, as this thesis has argued, soon became a 
problem and even a burden for the Americans. A terrible war ensued, 
which demonstrated that the Filipinos were more prepared for their self-
government as the Americans had in fact foreseen. But the Americans, 
intending to stay, needed to reverse the arguments and what originally 
was a “war,” such as Aguinaldo stated to McKinley, become known as 
an “insurgency” for a hundred years. The reality of the Filipino-
American war was concealed in the American libraries under the entries 
of “insurgency” until 1998. Those so-called “collaborators” of the 
Americans became a burden when they started in 1904 to complain of the 
imperialistic government implemented by the United States. As for the 
Filipinos who would become more American than the people from the 
United States, they remained  a “problem” until the decade of the 1920s. 
David P. Barrows stated in the Eighth Annual Report of the Commission 
(1908) that “Spanish continues to be the most important language spoken 
in political, journalistic and commercial circles.”54 
 The Imperialists did not give up the fight, and so to construct their 
version of Filipino history they started to reverse the arguments so as not 
                                                 
54 David P. Barrows: Eight Annual Report, p. 94. 
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to concede more self-government to the recalcitrant Filipinos. They 
invented an exploitative system such as caciquism which sometimes was 
a Spanish inheritance and at other times inherent in the Filipino ethos. 
This argument would emerge during the periods of crisis when the 
Filipinos thought they had come of age to govern themselves or to 
achieve the ultimate goal of independence. 
 We can conclude that the Americans finally achieved their 
objectives and the Filipinos forgot their war, assumed that there was a 
repugnant system called caciquism, and became Americanized. Today 
few Filipinos know that their forebears such as Agoncillo, Apacible or 
Sixto Lopez brought anticolonial discourse to the debate about 
imperialism within the U.S. since they are rarely mentioned in histories 
of the anti-imperialist movement. Their role in the debate was important 
for a number of reasons. Most importantly, Filipino opposition to the 
U.S. rule gave the Anti-Imperialist League justification for its work. 
Lamentably, this political effervescence came to an end when Leonard 
Wood became the governor-general of the Philippines and implanted a 
policy of involution. At that point, the Filipinos had been Americanized. 
This thesis has not aimed to provide a definitive and deterministic 
history. On the contrary, it has been an invitation to revisit and to re-write 
the history of the period from 1898 to 1946. I have tried to present an 
alternative to the dominant history of so-called Spanish [mis]rule or the 
Spanish medieval yoke. At present we still do not know the true impact 
of Spanish reformism since we are not familiar enough with the 
important Spanish historiography on the Philippines that emerged during 
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the nineteenth century, and we have not made any survey of the rich 
archives with this aim in mind. Therefore it is not rare to find the image 
generated by the Americans a century ago still being reproduced today. It 
still seems natural to assume that “the religious orders, the army and an 
obsolete, despotic administration, in spite of an assimilist discourse of the 
Spanish administration, controlled until the end the influences of the 
colonial machinery.”55 This citation is an example of the Spanish 
Imperial School which has established chronological markers such as, for 
example, that Philippine history starts with the arrival of Legazpi and 
finishes in 1898. The Philippines is to this date still encapsulated in 
Departments of “Historia de América” (Latin American History), such as 
Blair and Robertson, in their Philippine Islands 1493-1898, conceived of 
the archipelago a hundred years ago. This thesis has sought to uncover 
the lineages of, and ultimately challenge, such stereotypical images. 
                                                 
55 Sánchez Gómez, Luis Ángel. Un Imperio en la Vitrina. El Colonialismo Español en el Pacífico y la 







aniquilar  had several acceptations in Spanish in the 
nineteenth century, one of them which has fallen 
into disuse is “to humiliate.” Aniquilar was 
translated by the Americans into “annihilate.” The 
Spanish term differs of the English one. A possible 
translation could be “to destroy” but never to kill in 
mass. 
 
cacicazgo This term was used by the Spaniards as early as the 
fifteenth century. The first edition of the RAE 
(1729) defined cacicazgo as dignity of the cacique 
or noble among the Indios; it is also taken by the 
territory or dominion the cacique has. In 1925, the 
term adopted a new acceptation related to the 
prevalent Spanish system: Autoridad or power of 
the cacique. At this point, cacicazgo becomes a 
synonymous of caciquismo. Blair and Robertson 
translated the term cacicazgo into caciquedom in 
order to infer the present evils the Americans 
confronted were inherited from Spanish times. 
 
cacique This term was used by the Spaniards in the fifteenth 
century. The RAE defined it in 1729 as chief of 
vassals, or superior in the Indian province or towns: 
and although in many places the Indios have other 
names according to their languages, the Spaniards 
call them caciques. It seems that the Spaniards took 
[the name] from the Isles of Barlovento which were 
the first they conquered. It is a Mexican voice 
which means señor. This first generalization gave 
way to infer that the term cacique was used in the 
Philippines as well. This term underwent a change 
in 1884 related to the Spanish democratic system. 
At that moment, the term such as emerged in the 
literature acquired a derogatory meaning 
figuratively:  any principal person in a town which 
exerted excessive influence in political and 
administrative matters. Far from these definitions, 
the caciques were an essential vehicle in the 
                                                 
1 I have used to define this term the Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana por la Real Academia 
Española. Decimatercia Edición, Año 1899. I have chosen this year as a marker since the Filipinos 
used these words such as the RAE defined at the turn of the nineteenth century. 
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democratic mechanism since they were able to 
attract the masses to the national life, exerting their 
votes. 
 
caciquismo excessive influence of the caciques in the towns. At 
the opening of the twentieth century the term 
degenerated to political system in which there is no 
more law than the will of the caciques. This 
definition is related to the criticisms of the 
regenerationists. This is the acceptation taken by 
LeRoy in 1905 and prevailing in the present 
literature. However caciquism is a political system, 
a form of socialization of the constitutional 
mechanism in the Spanish Restoration (1875-1923). 
It was the formal framework of liberalism.  In fact 
caciquism is a patronage system. 
 
compadrazgo This term appeared in the first edition of the 
dictionary of RAE. In 1729 it meant the resulting 
connection or kinship among the godfather and the 
parents of baptized children. In 1884, coinciding 
with the Restoration, the term acquired a derogatory 
meaning developing in Spanish into compadraje 
union and concert of several persons to praise and to 
assist each other. 
 
compadre means godfather. There is a second acceptation: In 
Andalucia and other places vulgar people call 
compadres to their friends, and it becomes a way of 
greeting when they meet each other. In 1884, 
compadre takes a new acceptation: protector, 
benefactor. This is the meaning the Americans co-
opted. Compadre such as has been used in the 
Philippines has become a synonymous of crony. 
 
caudillo In 1899, this word meant head/ leader and superior 
who leads and orders the army||. Head and director 
of a guild, community or body. 
 
clase directora was the classic terminology used in the nineteenth 
century and at the beginning of the twentieth 
century to define the political class or ruling class. 
 
dictator In 1899, meant supreme magistrate among the old 
Romans to whom appointed the consuls during 
dangerous times for the Republic in order to rule as 
sovereign.|| In some modern republics, supreme 




filibustero This term appeared for first time in the RAE in 1869 
defined as pirates who in the seventeenth century 
invaded the West Indian seas. In 1899 at the request 
of Retana, a filibustero was who works for the 
emancipation of “our” overseas provinces. 
 
ladrón who robs or steals something. 
 
ladronismo This term does not exist in the dictionary of RAE. I 
have found it used in some countries of Latin 
American as a synonymous of caciquism, 
compadraje or tyranny. 
 
latrofaccioso This word has not any entry in the dictionary of 
RAE. It is composed of two words –ladrón and 
faccioso which means armed rebel. During the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries latrofaccioso 
was used to designate the bandits in Spain. 
 
 peonage meant until 1822 group of peons or infantry 
soldiers. The term peona[g]e changed in 1822 to 
peona[j]e with the same meaning. The change of the 
consonant took place in order to distinguish the 
Spanish etymology from the new connotations the 
term was acquiring in Latin American. Peonage 
emerged in Mexico, after the collapse of the empire 
with a new meaning: a system by which the debtors 
are bound in servitude to their creditors until the 
debts are paid. Dean C. Worcester co-opted this 
term in order to infer the Americans inherited this 
coercive system from the Spaniards. 
 
reconcentración the reconcetration policy was implemented by 
Valeriano Weyler in Cuba. This term must not be 
confused with the concentration camps from the 
twentieth century since the idea of reconcentración 
was to move the civilians to central localizations in 
order to keep the Cuban civilians alive and 






I have divided the bibliography into several sections since I have 
used different books and materials from the United States, Spain and the 
Philippines. Therefore there are three sections devoted to the Spanish 
regime. The first one covers the turn of the eighteenth century. The second 
section is devoted to part of the bibliography which emerged in the 
nineteenth century. I have included in this section some Filipino authors 
since they published most of their books in Madrid. The last section 
covers the collapse of the Spanish empire to the Filipino independence 
1946. 
There is a section devoted to American occupation from 1898 to 
1946 and a Filipino section which covers the same years.  
I have mentioned some journals I have used for specific years such 
as 1905, related to Taft’s visit to the Philippines and the emergence of 
caciquism, and 1913 on the rise to pre-eminence of the slavery issue. 
 Finally, there is a section with a general bibliography from 1949 to 
2005. This general bibliography relies on some books which came out at 
the beginning of the twentieth century written by foreigners such as 
Foreman, Sawyer, and Ireland. 
 
I. SPANISH SOURCES BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
-Copia Literal de las Reales Zedulas despachadas desde el año de 1580 en 
adelante de D. Francisco Antonio de Figueroa, Escribano Mayor de la 
Superior Gobernación y Guerra de estas Yslas Philipinas. Año de 1751. 
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Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Institut Universitari d’Història Jaume Vicens 
Vives. 
-Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana, en que se explica el Verdadero 
Sentido de   las Voces, su Naturaleza y Calidad, con las Phrases o Modos 
de Hablar, los Proverbios o Refranes, y otras cosas convenientes al uso de 
la Lengua. Dedicado al Rey Nuestro Señor Don Phelipe V (Que Dios 
Guarde) a cuyas Reales Expensas se hace esta obra. Compuesto por la 
Real Academia Española. Tomo Segundo que contiene la letra C. En 
Madrid en la Imprenta de Francisco del Hierro. Impresor de la Real 
Academia Española. Año de 1729. 
-Manuscript: Observaciones sobre el Estado Político y Económico de las 
Yslas Filipinas, 1795?  
 
II. SPANISH SOURCES FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
-Abella y Casariego, Enrique. Filipinas. Madrid: [s.n.] Imprenta de 
Enrique Teodoro y Alonso, 1898. 
-Aguilar, J.N. Colonización de Filipinas. Estudios Prácticos acerca de la 
Colonización con Elementos Peninsulares, de Nuestras Posesiones 
Oceánicas. Madrid: Establecimiento tipográfico de Alfredo Alonso, 1893.  
-Alvárez y Tejero, Luis Prudencio. De las Islas Filipinas. Memoria. 
Valencia: [s.n.] Imprenta de Cabrerizo, 1842. 
-Artigas Cuerva, Manuel. El Municipio Filipino. Compilación de Cuanto 
se ha Prescrito sobre este Particular e Historia Municipal de Filipinas 
desde los Primeros Tiempos de la Dominación Española. Tomo I. Manila:  
Imprenta de D.J. Ataide y Compañía, 1894. 
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-Ayerbe, Marques de. Sitio y Conquista por los Ingleses en 1762. Madrid: 
[s.n.] Imprenta de Ramón Miede, 1897. 
-Azcárraga y Palmero, Manuel. La Libertad de Comercio en las Islas 
Filipinas. Madrid: [s.n.] Imprenta de José Noguera, 1871. 
-Balaguer, Victor. Islas Filipinas. Memoria. Madrid: [s.n] Angles 
Imprenta, 1895. 
-Balaguer, Victor Papers. Museo-Biblioteca Victor Balaguer.  MS/ 
Ultramar 3. 
-Barrantes, Vicente. La Instrucción Primaria en Filipinas. Madrid: 
Imprenta de la Iberia, 1869. 
-Barrantes, Vicente. Apuntes Interesantes sobre las Islas Filipinas, que 
pueden ser útiles para hacer las Reformas Convenientes y Productivas 
para el País y para la Nación. Escritas por un Español de larga 
Experiencia en aquel País y Amante del Progreso. Madrid: Imprenta del 
Pueblo, 1869. 
-Bernáldez Pizarro, Manuel. Dictamen sobre las Causas que se oponen a 
la Seguridad y Fomento de las Islas Filipinas [manuscript], 1827. 
-Blanco Herrero, Miguel. Política de España en Ultramar. Madrid: 
Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1888. 
-Blanco, Ramón. Memoria que al Senado dirige el General Blanco acerca 
de los Últimos Sucesos ocurridos en las Islas de Luzón. Madrid: 
Establecimiento Tip. El Liberal, 1897. 
-Cabezas de Herrera, J. Informe emitido por el Consejo de Ultramar sobre 
la conveniencia de establecer en Filipinas Bancos Hipotecarios. Madrid: 
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Tipografía de Manuel Ginés Hernández. Imprenta del Diario de Manila, 
1889.  
-Cañamaque, Francisco. Las Islas Filipinas. Madrid:  [s.n.] Librería 
Fernando Fe, 1880.  
-Caro y Mora, Juan. La Situación del País. Colección de Artículos 
publicados por La Voz Española, acerca de la Insurrección Tagala, sus 
causas y principales cuestiones que afectan a Filipinas. 2ª Edición. Manila: 
Imprenta de Amigos del País, 1897.  
-Castillo y Jiménez, José M. El Katipunan o el Filibusterismo en 
Filipinas. Crónica Ilustrada con documentos autógrafos y fotogravados, 
Madrid, 1897.  
-Colección de El Faro Administrativo. El Municipio Filipino. 
Compilación de cuanto se ha prescrito sobre este particular e Historia 
Municipal de Filipinas desde los Primeros Tiempos de la Dominación 
Española. Tomo I. Manila: Imprenta de D.J. Ataide y Compañía, 1894.  
-Combés, Francisco. Historia de Mindanao y Joló. Madrid: Wenceslao E. 
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